O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123 (2019)
Bus or rail vehicle hijacking; boarding with concealed weapon; company use of reasonable security measures
(a)(1) A person commits the offense of bus or rail vehicle hijacking when he or she: (A) Seizes or exercises control by force or violence or threat of force or violence of any bus or rail vehicle within the jurisdiction of this state; (B) By force or violence or by threat of force or violence seizes or exercises control of any transportation company or all or any part of the transportation facilities owned or operated by any such company; or (C) By force or violence or by threat of force or violence substantially obstructs, hinders, interferes with, or otherwise disrupts or disturbs the operation of any transportation company or all or any part of a transportation facility. (2) Any person convicted of the offense of bus or rail hijacking shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
OFFENSES/HEALTH & MORALS
punished by imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. (b) Any person who boards or attempts to board an aircraft, bus, or rail vehicle with any explosive, destructive device, or hoax device as such terms are defined in Code Section 16-7-80; weapon or long gun as such terms are defined in Code Section 16-11-125.1 if such person is not a lawful weapons carrier as defined in Code Section 16-11-125.1; hazardous substance as defined by Code Section 12-8-92; or other device designed or modified for the purpose of offense and defense concealed on or about his or her person or property which is or would be accessible to such person while on the aircraft, bus, or rail vehicle shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years. The prohibition of this subsection shall not apply to any law enforcement officer, peace officer retired from a state or federal law enforcement agency, person in the military service of the state or of the United States, or commercial security personnel employed by the transportation company who is in possession of weapons used within the course and scope of employment; nor shall the prohibition apply to persons transporting weapons contained in baggage which is not accessible to passengers if the presence of such weapons has been declared to the transportation company and such weapons have been secured in a manner prescribed by state or federal law or regulation for the purpose of transportation or shipment. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any privately owned aircraft, bus, or rail vehicle if the owner of such aircraft or vehicle has given his or her express permission to board the aircraft or vehicle with the item. (c) The company may employ reasonable security measures, including any method or device, to detect concealed weapons, explosives, or hazardous material in baggage or freight or upon the person of the passenger. Upon the discovery of any such item or material in the possession of a person, unless the item is a weapon in the possession of a person exempted under subsection (b) of this Code section from the prohibition of that subsection (b), the company shall obtain possession and retain custody of such item or materials until they are transferred to the custody of law enforcement officers.
History
Ga. L. 1978, p. 2238, § 3; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 16; Ga. L. 1988, p. 415, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 416, § 7; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1094, § 5; Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 2-8/SB 308; Ga. L. 2022, p. 74, § 12/SB 319. Amendments. The 2022 amendment, effective April 12, 2022, substituted “terms are defined in Code Section 16-7-80; weapon or long gun
as such terms are defined in Code Section 16-11-125.1 if such person is not a lawful weapons carrier as defined in Code Section 16-11-125.1” for “term is defined in Code Section 16-7-80; firearm for which such person does not have on his or her person a valid weapons carry license issued pursuant to Code Section 16-11-129 unless possessing such firearm is prohibited by federal law”, and deleted “or knife”
preceding “or other device” in the first sentence in subsection (b).
Annotations
Cross references. Time limitation on prosecutions, § 17-3-1 et seq. Transportation of passengers by carriers generally, § 46-9-130 et seq. Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2002, p. 1094, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transportation Security Act of 2002.’” Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 3-1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment of this Code section shall apply to all offenses committed on and after June 4, 2010, and shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before June 4, 2010, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecution. Ga. L. 2022, p. 74, § 1/SB 319, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Chairman John Meadows Act.’” Ga. L. 2022, p. 74, § 2/SB 319, not
codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The General Assembly finds and determines that: “(1) The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution recognizes the right of the people to keep and bear arms and that such right shall not be infringed; and “(2) The people of this state, to perpetuate the principles of free government, insure justice to all, preserve peace, promote the interest and happiness of the citizen and of the family, and transmit to posterity the enjoyment of liberty, provided that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed but that the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.” Law reviews. For article, “Crimes and Offenses,” see 27 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 131 (2011). For article, “SB 319: Chairman John Meadows Act,” see 39 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2022).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Application to airports. - In a case in which a gun rights organization and a Georgia state representative sought declaratory and injunctive relief because they asserted that Georgia House Bill (HB) 89 permitted any person who possessed a valid Georgia firearms license to carry a firearm in the non-sterile areas of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, they argued unsuccessfully that the “notwithstanding” language of HB 89, codified at former O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(e), which authorized Georgia firearms license (GFL) holders to carry firearms in public transportation notwithstanding O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-122 through 16-12-127, which is the Transportation Passenger Safety Act (TPSA), would be superfluous unless it was intended to make clear that a GFL holder could carry a firearm in an airport. They misleadingly focused only on O.C.G.A. § 16-12-127, but the “notwithstanding” language in HB 89 referred to all of the TPSA, and O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(b), another section of the
TPSA, prohibited boarding any bus or rail vehicle with a firearm; since public transportation included bus and rail vehicles such as those operated by Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the “notwithstanding” language was needed to make clear that GFL holders could carry firearms onto such vehicles notwithstanding the TPSA. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108088 (N.D. Ga. 2008), aff’d, 318 Fed. Appx. 851, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5295 (11th Cir. 2009). Evidence supported verdict of guilty but mentally ill on the defendant’s bus hijacking charge as the defendant’s mental illness did not prove legal insanity since the defendant told a psychologist that the defendant grabbed the steering wheel of a moving bus because the driver was in difficulty; a trier of fact could conclude that if the defendant was motivated by a delusion that others were planning to harm the defendant, the delusion did not justify forcibly exercising con-
OFFENSES/HEALTH & MORALS
trol over the bus as the defendant did not tell the psychologist that the defendant took over steering the bus because of the defendant’s fear of being harmed. Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 87, 611 S.E.2d 759, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 225 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of boarding a bus with a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(b) because neither the bus driver nor a police officer detected a gun on defendant while the defendant was on a bus, but during an altercation with the officer immediately after leaving the bus, the defendant was seen striking the officer with a gun. Smith v. State, 301 Ga. App. 670, 688 S.E.2d 636, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1272 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0799, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 460 (Ga. May 17, 2010). Evidence sufficient for bus hijacking. - Trial court did not err in
denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of bus hijacking, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(a)(1)(A), because the jury was authorized to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exercised control of the bus by force; the defendant brandished a handgun in the open door of the bus as the defendant ordered a passenger to get off, and the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away because the driver felt the driver’s life was in danger and the driver did not want to agitate the defendant. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 546 (2011).
RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 100 A.L.R.3d 287.
What constitutes “dangerous weapon” under statutes prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons in motor vehicle, 2 A.L.R.4th 1342.