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2018 Georgia Code 16-11-129 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 11. Offenses Against Public Order and Safety, 16-11-1 through 16-11-224.

ARTICLE 4 DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES AND PRACTICES

16-11-129. Weapons carry license; gun safety information; temporary renewal permit; mandamus; verification of license.

  1. Application for weapons carry license or renewal license; term. The judge of the probate court of each county shall, on application under oath, on payment of a fee of $30.00, and on investigation of applicant pursuant to subsections (b) and (d) of this Code section, issue a weapons carry license or renewal license valid for a period of five years to any person whose domicile is in that county or who is on active duty with the United States armed forces and who is not a domiciliary of this state but who either resides in that county or on a military reservation located in whole or in part in that county at the time of such application. Such license or renewal license shall authorize that person to carry any weapon in any county of this state notwithstanding any change in that person's county of residence or state of domicile. Applicants shall submit the application for a weapons carry license or renewal license to the judge of the probate court on forms prescribed and furnished free of charge to persons wishing to apply for the license or renewal license. An application shall be considered to be for a renewal license if the applicant has a weapons carry license or renewal license with 90 or fewer days remaining before the expiration of such weapons carry license or renewal license or 30 or fewer days since the expiration of such weapons carry license or renewal license regardless of the county of issuance of the applicant's expired or expiring weapons carry license or renewal license. An applicant who is not a United States citizen shall provide sufficient personal identifying data, including without limitation his or her place of birth and United States issued alien or admission number, as the Georgia Bureau of Investigation may prescribe by rule or regulation. An applicant who is in nonimmigrant status shall provide proof of his or her qualifications for an exception to the federal firearm prohibition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 922(y). Forms shall be designed to elicit information from the applicant pertinent to his or her eligibility under this Code section, including citizenship, but shall not require data which is nonpertinent or irrelevant, such as serial numbers or other identification capable of being used as a de facto registration of firearms owned by the applicant. The Department of Public Safety shall furnish application forms and license forms required by this Code section. The forms shall be furnished to each judge of each probate court within this state at no cost.
    1. Upon receipt of an application for a weapons carry license or renewal license, the judge of the probate court may provide applicants printed information on gun safety that is produced by any person or organization that, in the discretion of the judge of the probate court, offers practical advice for gun safety. The source of such printed information shall be prominently displayed on such printed information.
    2. The Department of Natural Resources shall maintain on its principal, public website information, or a hyperlink to information, which provides resources for information on hunter education and classes and courses in this state that render instruction in gun safety. No person shall be required to take such classes or courses for purposes of this Code section where such information shall be provided solely for the convenience of the citizens of this state.
    3. Neither the judge of the probate court nor the Department of Natural Resources shall be liable to any person for personal injuries or damage to property arising from conformance to this subsection.
  2. Licensing exceptions.
    1. As used in this subsection, the term:
      1. "Armed forces" means active duty or a reserve component of the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, United States Coast Guard, United States Air Force, United States National Guard, Georgia Army National Guard, or Georgia Air National Guard.
      2. "Controlled substance" means any drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in the definition of controlled substances in paragraph (4) of Code Section 16-13-21.
      3. "Convicted" means an adjudication of guilt. Such term shall not include an order of discharge and exoneration pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42.
      4. "Dangerous drug" means any drug defined as such in Code Section 16-13-71.
    2. No weapons carry license shall be issued to:
      1. Any person younger than 21 years of age unless he or she:
        1. Is at least 18 years of age;
        2. Provides proof that he or she has completed basic training in the armed forces of the United States; and
        3. Provides proof that he or she is actively serving in the armed forces of the United States or has been honorably discharged from such service;
      2. Any person who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other state; by a court of the United States, including its territories, possessions, and dominions; or by a court of any foreign nation and has not been pardoned for such felony by the President of the United States, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or the person or agency empowered to grant pardons under the constitution or laws of such state or nation;
      3. Any person against whom proceedings are pending for any felony;
      4. Any person who is a fugitive from justice;
      5. Any person who is prohibited from possessing or shipping a firearm in interstate commerce pursuant to subsections (g) and (n) of 18 U.S.C. Section 922;
      6. Any person who has been convicted of an offense arising out of the unlawful manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance or other dangerous drug;
      7. Any person who has had his or her weapons carry license revoked pursuant to subsection (e) of this Code section within three years of the date of his or her application;
      8. Any person who has been convicted of any of the following:
        1. Carrying a weapon without a weapons carry license in violation of Code Section 16-11-126; or
        2. Carrying a weapon or long gun in an unauthorized location in violation of Code Section 16-11-127

        and has not been free of all restraint or supervision in connection therewith and free of any other conviction for at least five years immediately preceding the date of the application;

      9. Any person who has been convicted of any misdemeanor involving the use or possession of a controlled substance and has not been free of all restraint or supervision in connection therewith or free of:
        1. A second conviction of any misdemeanor involving the use or possession of a controlled substance; or
        2. Any conviction under subparagraphs (E) through (G) of this paragraph

        for at least five years immediately preceding the date of the application;

      10. Except as provided for in subsection (b.1) of this Code section, any person who has been hospitalized as an inpatient in any mental hospital or alcohol or drug treatment center within the five years immediately preceding the application. The judge of the probate court may require any applicant to sign a waiver authorizing any mental hospital or treatment center to inform the judge whether or not the applicant has been an inpatient in any such facility in the last five years and authorizing the superintendent of such facility to make to the judge a recommendation regarding whether the applicant is a threat to the safety of others and whether a license to carry a weapon should be issued. When such a waiver is required by the judge, the applicant shall pay a fee of $3.00 for reimbursement of the cost of making such a report by the mental health hospital, alcohol or drug treatment center, or the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, which the judge shall remit to the hospital, center, or department. The judge shall keep any such hospitalization or treatment information confidential. It shall be at the discretion of the judge, considering the circumstances surrounding the hospitalization and the recommendation of the superintendent of the hospital or treatment center where the individual was a patient, to issue the weapons carry license or renewal license;
      11. Except as provided for in subsection (b.1) of this Code section, any person who has been adjudicated mentally incompetent to stand trial; or
      12. Except as provided for in subsection (b.1) of this Code section, any person who has been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime pursuant to Part 2 of Article 6 of Chapter 7 of Title 17.

        (b.1)Petitions for relief from certain licensing exceptions.

        At the hearing provided for under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court shall receive and consider evidence in a closed proceeding concerning:

        Persons provided for under subparagraphs (b)(2)(J), (b)(2)(K), and (b)(2)(L) of this Code section may petition the court in which such adjudication, hospitalization, or treatment proceedings, if any, under Chapter 3 or 7 of Title 37 occurred for relief. A copy of such petition for relief shall be served as notice upon the opposing civil party or the prosecuting attorney for the state, as the case may be, or their successors, who appeared in the underlying case. Within 30 days of the receipt of such petition, such court shall hold a hearing on such petition for relief. Such prosecuting attorney for the state may represent the interests of the state at such hearing.

      13. The circumstances which caused the person to be subject to subparagraph (b)(2)(J), (b)(2)(K), or (b)(2)(L) of this Code section;
      14. The person's mental health and criminal history records, if any. The judge of such court may require any such person to sign a waiver authorizing the superintendent of any mental hospital or treatment center to make to the judge a recommendation regarding whether such person is a threat to the safety of others. When such a waiver is required by the judge, the applicant shall pay a fee of $3.00 for reimbursement of the cost of making such a report by the mental health hospital, alcohol or drug treatment center, or the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, which the judge shall remit to the hospital, center, or department;
      15. The person's reputation which shall be established through character witness statements, testimony, or other character evidence; and
      16. Changes in the person's condition or circumstances since such adjudication, hospitalization, or treatment proceedings under Chapter 3 or 7 of Title 37.

        The judge shall issue an order of his or her decision no later than 30 days after the hearing.

    3. The court shall grant the petition for relief if such court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person will not likely act in a manner dangerous to public safety in carrying a weapon and that granting the relief will not be contrary to the public interest. A record shall be kept of the hearing; provided, however, that such records shall remain confidential and be disclosed only to a court or to the parties in the event of an appeal. Any appeal of the court's ruling on the petition for relief shall be de novo review.
    4. If the court grants such person's petition for relief, the applicable subparagraph (b)(2)(J), (b)(2)(K), or (b)(2)(L) of this Code section shall not apply to such person in his or her application for a weapons carry license or renewal; provided, however, that such person shall comply with all other requirements for the issuance of a weapons carry license or renewal license. The clerk of such court shall report such order to the Georgia Crime Information Center immediately, but in no case later than ten business days after the date of such order.
    5. A person may petition for relief under this subsection not more than once every two years. In the case of a person who has been hospitalized as an inpatient, such person shall not petition for relief prior to being discharged from such treatment.
  3. Fingerprinting. Following completion of the application for a weapons carry license, the judge of the probate court shall require the applicant to proceed to an appropriate law enforcement agency in the county or to any vendor approved by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation for fingerprint submission services with the completed application so that such agency or vendor can capture the fingerprints of the applicant. The law enforcement agency shall be entitled to a fee of $5.00 from the applicant for its services in connection with fingerprinting and processing of an application. Fingerprinting shall not be required for applicants seeking temporary renewal licenses or renewal licenses.
  4. Investigation of applicant; issuance of weapons carry license; renewal.
      1. For weapons carry license applications, the judge of the probate court shall within five business days following the receipt of the application or request direct the law enforcement agency to request a fingerprint based criminal history records check from the Georgia Crime Information Center and Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of determining the suitability of the applicant and return an appropriate report to the judge of the probate court. Fingerprints shall be in such form and of such quality as prescribed by the Georgia Crime Information Center and under standards adopted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation may charge such fee as is necessary to cover the cost of the records search.
      2. For requests for license renewals, the presentation of a weapons carry license issued by any probate judge in this state shall be evidence to the judge of the probate court to whom a request for license renewal is made that the fingerprints of the weapons carry license holder are on file with the judge of the probate court who issued the weapons carry license, and the judge of the probate court to whom a request for license renewal is made shall, within five business days following the receipt of the request, direct the law enforcement agency to request a nonfingerprint based criminal history records check from the Georgia Crime Information Center and Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of determining the suitability of the applicant and return an appropriate report to the judge of the probate court to whom a request for license renewal is made.
    1. For both weapons carry license applications and requests for license renewals, the judge of the probate court shall within five business days following the receipt of the application or request also direct the law enforcement agency, in the same manner as provided for in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, to conduct a background check using the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Instant Criminal Background Check System and return an appropriate report to the probate judge.
    2. When a person who is not a United States citizen applies for a weapons carry license or renewal of a license under this Code section, the judge of the probate court shall direct the law enforcement agency to conduct a search of the records maintained by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and return an appropriate report to the probate judge. As a condition to the issuance of a license or the renewal of a license, an applicant who is in nonimmigrant status shall provide proof of his or her qualifications for an exception to the federal firearm prohibition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 922(y).
    3. The law enforcement agency shall report to the judge of the probate court within 20 days, by telephone and in writing, of any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license or renewal license under the terms of this Code section. When no derogatory information is found on the applicant bearing on his or her eligibility to obtain a license or renewal license, a report shall not be required. The law enforcement agency shall return the application directly to the judge of the probate court within such time period. Not later than ten days after the judge of the probate court receives the report from the law enforcement agency concerning the suitability of the applicant for a license, the judge of the probate court shall issue such applicant a license or renewal license to carry any weapon unless facts establishing ineligibility have been reported or unless the judge determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the requirements contained in this Code section. The judge of the probate court shall date stamp the report from the law enforcement agency to show the date on which the report was received by the judge of the probate court. The judge of the probate court shall not suspend the processing of the application or extend, delay, or avoid any time requirements provided for under this paragraph.
  5. Revocation, loss, or damage to license.
    1. If, at any time during the period for which the weapons carry license was issued, the judge of the probate court of the county in which the license was issued shall learn or have brought to his or her attention in any manner any reasonable ground to believe the licensee is not eligible to retain the license, the judge may, after notice and hearing, revoke the license of the person upon a finding that such person is not eligible for a weapons carry license pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section or an adjudication of falsification of application, mental incompetency, or chronic alcohol or narcotic usage. The judge of the probate court shall report such revocation to the Georgia Crime Information Center immediately but in no case later than ten days after such revocation. It shall be unlawful for any person to possess a license which has been revoked pursuant to this paragraph, and any person found in possession of any such revoked license, except in the performance of his or her official duties, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
    2. If a person is convicted of any crime or otherwise adjudicated in a matter which would make the maintenance of a weapons carry license by such person unlawful pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section, the judge of the superior court or state court hearing such case or presiding over such matter shall inquire whether such person is the holder of a weapons carry license. If such person is the holder of a weapons carry license, then the judge of the superior court or state court shall inquire of such person the county of the probate court which issued such weapons carry license, or if such person has ever had his or her weapons carry license renewed, then of the county of the probate court which most recently issued such person a renewal license. The judge of the superior court or state court shall notify the judge of the probate court of such county of the matter which makes the maintenance of a weapons carry license by such person to be unlawful pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section. The Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia and The Council of State Court Judges of Georgia shall provide by rule for the procedures which judges of the superior court and the judges of the state courts, respectively, are to follow for the purposes of this paragraph.
    3. Loss of any license issued in accordance with this Code section or damage to the license in any manner which shall render it illegible shall be reported to the judge of the probate court of the county in which it was issued within 48 hours of the time the loss or damage becomes known to the license holder. The judge of the probate court shall thereupon issue a replacement for and shall take custody of and destroy a damaged license; and in any case in which a license has been lost, he or she shall issue a cancellation order. The judge shall charge the fee specified in subsection (k) of Code Section 15-9-60 for such services.
    4. Any person, upon petition to the judge of the probate court, who has a weapons carry license or renewal license with more than 90 days remaining before the expiration of such weapons carry license or renewal license and who has had a legal name change, including, but not limited to, on account of marriage or divorce, or an address change shall be issued a replacement weapons carry license for the same time period of the weapons carry license or renewal license being replaced. Upon issuance and receipt of such replacement weapons carry license, the license holder shall surrender the weapons carry license being replaced to the judge of the probate court and such judge shall take custody of and destroy the weapons carry license being replaced. The judge of the probate court shall provide for the updating of any records as necessary to account for the license holder's change of name or address. The judge of the probate court shall charge the fee specified in paragraph (13) of subsection (k) of Code Section 15-9-60 for services provided under this paragraph.
  6. Weapons carry license specifications.
    1. Weapons carry licenses issued prior to January 1, 2012, shall be in the format specified by the former provisions of this paragraph as they existed on June 30, 2013.
    2. On and after January 1, 2012, newly issued or renewal weapons carry licenses shall incorporate overt and covert security features which shall be blended with the personal data printed on the license to form a significant barrier to imitation, replication, and duplication. There shall be a minimum of three different ultraviolet colors used to enhance the security of the license incorporating variable data, color shifting characteristics, and front edge only perimeter visibility. The weapons carry license shall have a color photograph viewable under ambient light on both the front and back of the license. The license shall incorporate custom optical variable devices featuring the great seal of the State of Georgia as well as matching demetalized optical variable devices viewable under ambient light from the front and back of the license incorporating microtext and unique alphanumeric serialization specific to the license holder. The license shall be of similar material, size, and thickness of a credit card and have a holographic laminate to secure and protect the license for the duration of the license period.
    3. Using the physical characteristics of the license set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection, The Council of Probate Court Judges of Georgia shall create specifications for the probate courts so that all weapons carry licenses in this state shall be uniform and so that probate courts can petition the Department of Administrative Services to purchase the equipment and supplies necessary for producing such licenses. The department shall follow the competitive bidding procedure set forth in Code Section 50-5-102.
  7. Alteration or counterfeiting of license; penalty. A person who deliberately alters or counterfeits a weapons carry license or who possesses an altered or counterfeit weapons carry license with the intent to misrepresent any information contained in such license shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than one nor more than five years.
  8. Licenses for former law enforcement officers.
    1. Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 16-11-130, any person who has served as a law enforcement officer for at least:
      1. Ten of the 12 years immediately preceding the retirement of such person as a law enforcement officer; or
      2. Ten years and left such employment as a result of a disability arising in the line of duty; and

        retired or left such employment in good standing with a state or federal certifying agency and receives benefits under the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund provided for under Chapter 17 of Title 47 or from a county, municipal, State of Georgia, state authority, federal, private sector, individual, or educational institution retirement system or program shall be entitled to be issued a weapons carry license as provided for in this Code section without the payment of any of the fees provided for in this Code section.

    2. Such person as provided for in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall comply with all the other provisions of this Code section relative to the issuance of such licenses, including, but not limited to the requirements under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section. Any person seeking to be issued a license pursuant to this subsection shall state his or her qualifications for eligibility under this subsection on his or her application under oath as provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section.
    3. As used in this subsection, the term "law enforcement officer" means any peace officer who is employed by the United States government or by the State of Georgia or any political subdivision thereof and who is required by the terms of his or her employment, whether by election or appointment, to give his or her full time to the preservation of public order or the protection of life and property or the prevention of crime. Such term shall include conservation rangers.
  9. Temporary renewal licenses.
    1. Any person who holds a weapons carry license under this Code section may, at the time he or she applies for a renewal of the license, also apply for a temporary renewal license if less than 90 days remain before expiration of the license he or she then holds or if the previous license has expired within the last 30 days.
    2. Unless the judge of the probate court knows or is made aware of any fact which would make the applicant ineligible for a five-year renewal license, the judge shall at the time of application issue a temporary renewal license to the applicant.
    3. Such a temporary renewal license shall be in the form of a paper receipt indicating the date on which the court received the renewal application and shall show the name, address, sex, age, and race of the applicant and that the temporary renewal license expires 90 days from the date of issue.
    4. During its period of validity the temporary renewal license, if carried on or about the holder's person together with the holder's previous license, shall be valid in the same manner and for the same purposes as a five-year license.
    5. A $1.00 fee shall be charged by the probate court for issuance of a temporary renewal license.
    6. A temporary renewal license may be revoked in the same manner as a five-year license.
  10. Applicant may seek relief. When an eligible applicant fails to receive a license, temporary renewal license, or renewal license within the time period required by this Code section and the application or request has been properly filed, the applicant may bring an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain a license, temporary renewal license, or renewal license. When an applicant is otherwise denied a license, temporary renewal license, or renewal license and contends that he or she is qualified to be issued a license, temporary renewal license, or renewal license, the applicant may bring an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain such license. Additionally, the applicant may request a hearing before the judge of the probate court relative to the applicant's fitness to be issued such license. Upon the issuance of a denial, the judge of the probate court shall inform the applicant of his or her rights pursuant to this subsection. If such applicant is the prevailing party, he or she shall be entitled to recover his or her costs in such action, including reasonable attorney's fees.
  11. Data base prohibition. A person or entity shall not create or maintain a multijurisdictional data base of information regarding persons issued weapons carry licenses.
  12. Verification of license. The judge of a probate court or his or her designee shall be authorized to verify the legitimacy and validity of a weapons carry license of a license holder pursuant to a subpoena or court order, for public safety purposes to law enforcement agencies pursuant to paragraph (40) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-18-72, and for licensing to a judge of a probate court or his or her designee pursuant to paragraph (40) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-18-72; provided, however, that the judge of a probate court or his or her designee shall not be authorized to provide any further information regarding license holders.

(a.1)Gun safety information.

(Ga. L. 1910, p. 134, §§ 2, 3; Code 1933, §§ 26-5104, 26-5105; Ga. L. 1960, p. 938, § 1; Code 1933, § 26-2904, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1430, § 4; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1607, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1981, p. 946, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1325, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1431, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 935, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 1388, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 305, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 481, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 138, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2012, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 16; Ga. L. 1994, p. 351, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 108, §§ 3-5; Ga. L. 1997, p. 514, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1011, § 2; Ga. L. 2006, p. 264, § 1/HB 1032; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1199, § 6/HB 89; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 3-2/HB 228; Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 1-7/SB 308; Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 16/HB 142; Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-7/HB 60; Ga. L. 2015, p. 805, § 6/HB 492; Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 16/HB 737; Ga. L. 2017, p. 509, § 1/SB 15; Ga. L. 2017, p. 555, § 6/HB 292; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 16/SB 365.)

The 2016 amendment, effective May 3, 2016, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection" for "subparagraph (d)(1)(B) of this subsection" in the middle of paragraph (d)(2).

The 2017 amendments. The first 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted the present provisions of subsection (h) for the former provisions, which read: "Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 16-11-130, any person who has served as a law enforcement officer for at least ten of the 12 years immediately preceding the retirement of such person as a law enforcement officer shall be entitled to be issued a weapons carry license as provided for in this Code section without the payment of any of the fees provided for in this Code section. Such person shall comply with all the other provisions of this Code section relative to the issuance of such licenses. As used in this subsection, the term 'law enforcement officer' means any peace officer who is employed by the United States government or by the State of Georgia or any political subdivision thereof and who is required by the terms of his or her employment, whether by election or appointment, to give his or her full time to the preservation of public order or the protection of life and property or the prevention of crime. Such term shall include conservation rangers." The second 2017 amendment, effective May 8, 2017, added subsection (a.1); in paragraph (d)(4), substituted "20 days" for "30 days" near the middle of the first sentence, and added the last sentence; in paragraph (e)(2), substituted "otherwise adjudicated in a matter" for "involved in any matter" near the beginning of the first sentence; and added paragraph (e)(4).

The 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised the designations in subsections (f) and (h).

Cross references.

- Bail recovery agents, § 17-6-56 et seq.

Exemption from section for private detectives and private security agents who hold firearms permits issued by Georgia Board of Private Detective and Security Agencies, § 43-38-10.

Inquiry regarding weapons carry license, Uniform Rules for the Superior Court of Georgia, Rule 48.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2008, p. 1199, § 1/HB 89, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Business Security and Employee Privacy Act.' "

Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 3-1/SB 308, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment of this Code section shall apply to all offenses committed on and after June 4, 2010, and shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before June 4, 2010, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecution.

Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-1/HB 60, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Carry Protection Act.'"

Ga. L. 2015, p. 805, § 6/HB 492, which amended this Code section, purported to amend subparagraph (b)(2)(A) but no changes were made, and also purported to amend paragraph (d)(1) but actually amended both paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2).

Ga. L. 2017, p. 555, § 1/HB 292, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly finds that:

"(1) The ownership of firearms is a clear and explicit right protected by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of this state;

"(2) Access to financial services provides for the functioning of a firearms industry and, thus, the constitutionally protected right of firearm ownership; and

"(3) The provisions of this Act are intended to implement the constitutional protections provided for under the law."

Law reviews.

- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 189 (1969). For article, "Crimes and Offenses," see 27 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 131 (2011). For annual survey on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 295 (2013). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 47 (2014). For annual survey on criminal law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 93 (2016). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 124 (1994). For review of 1996 offenses against public order and safety legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 123 (1996). For comment on Johnson v. Wright, 509 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975), see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 1207 (1976).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Legislative intent behind 1976 amendment (Ga. L. 1976, pp. 1430, 1433) was to require, after July 1, 1976, that any information as to identification of a weapon be treated as "nonpertinent and irrelevant." Holtzendorf v. State, 146 Ga. App. 823, 247 S.E.2d 599 (1978).

Intent of 1976 amendment to former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) was that section not require registration of firearms until former licenses expired. Holtzendorf v. State, 146 Ga. App. 823, 247 S.E.2d 599 (1978).

There is no conflict between former Code 1933, §§ 26-2902 and 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 and O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129). Byrdsong v. State, 245 Ga. 336, 265 S.E.2d 15 (1980).

Paragraph (b)(3) superseded.

- Clear impact of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) and (c) is to implicitly repeal O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)(3). Fain v. State, 259 Ga. 708, 386 S.E.2d 144 (1989).

Provision in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)(4) that probate court can require applicants to sign a waiver authorizing mental hospitals and drug and alcohol treatment centers to inform court whether applicant had been an inpatient within the past five years is allowed because the court needs these facts in order to make an informed decision to grant or deny applicant a license to carry a gun. Propst v. McCurry, 252 Ga. 56, 310 S.E.2d 914 (1984).

Statute not unconstitutional.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, which regulated the ability of citizens to carry a weapon in public, was justified by the goal to protect the safety of individuals who are in public places, which was a legitimate and compelling government interest. The statute was not unconstitutional as applied to an applicant who pled nolo contendre to violent felonies in Florida more than 20 years earlier, under either U.S. Const., amend. II or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. VIII. Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 751 S.E.2d 90 (2013).

Controlling law.

- Trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, seeking a judgment declaring that it was not a crime for a person with a weapons carry license to carry a firearm within a school safety zone, because the language of the house bill at issue, codified in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1, was controlling law and prohibited such conduct. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Code Revision Commission, 299 Ga. 896, 793 S.E.2d 35 (2016).

Organization lacked standing.

- Because an applicant's claim was moot since the applicant received a new weapons license and an organization lacked standing, it was incumbent upon the trial court to enter an order dismissing the organization's claims instead of granting the organization summary judgment. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. James, 298 Ga. 420, 782 S.E.2d 284 (2016).

Suit challenging carrying a weapon in a school safety zone properly dismissed.

- Trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's suit challenging the enforcement of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1), making it a crime to carry a firearm in a school safety zone, by the school that the plaintiff's child attended because the school had sovereign immunity against state law claims and the threat of arrest if the plaintiff brought a weapon in the school safety zone did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation to be remedied by the suit. Evans v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 337 Ga. App. 690, 788 S.E.2d 577 (2016).

Burden of proof.

- Defendant charged with carrying a concealed weapon has the burden of proving that defendant had a valid permit authorizing defendant to carry a handgun in a motor vehicle. London v. State, 235 Ga. App. 30, 508 S.E.2d 247 (1998).

First offender prohibited from obtaining permit.

- Provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b), prohibiting the granting of a pistol permit to a person convicted as a first offender for possession of a controlled substance, applied prospectively to an applicant who had been discharged as a first offender five years before enactment of the provision. Foss v. Probate Court of Chatham County, 232 Ga. App. 612, 502 S.E.2d 278 (1998).

License issued by probate court of county of former residence does not satisfy requirements. Asberry v. State, 142 Ga. App. 51, 234 S.E.2d 847 (1977).

Possession of license under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 did not dispense with municipal ordinance requirement that a certificate be obtained prior to the sale of a handgun. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cooper, 177 Ga. App. 540, 339 S.E.2d 755 (1986).

Nonpertinent or irrelevant information.

- When plaintiff gun permit applicant's complaint alleged that to apply for a Georgia Firearms License, the applicant had to supply the applicant's employment information in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 because the applicant's employment information was nonpertinent or irrelevant under § 16-11-129(a), dismissing that claim as moot after a temporary restraining order (TRO) required defendant agency official to process the application without the applicant's social security number, was error; the state law claim for prospective relief - enjoining the official from requiring employment information - was not moot. Camp v. Cason, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007)(Unpublished).

Evidence of bad character.

- Gun ownership, and carrying such a weapon, do not by themselves impute bad character. Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 512 S.E.2d 640 (1999).

Right to weapons carry license restored.

- When the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles restored "all" of the applicant's civil rights and removed "all" disabilities imposed on the applicant by Georgia law, it was apparent that the applicant regained any right to keep and bear arms that the applicant had lost as a result of a felony moonshining conviction, and the applicant was not subject to the disabilities to obtain a weapons carry license and possess firearms that otherwise would have applied to the applicant under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-129 and16-11-131(b). Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666, 740 S.E.2d 598 (2013).

After 18-year-old defendant admitted possession, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of carrying a pistol without a license since no license to carry a pistol can be issued to any person under 21 years of age. Waugh v. State, 218 Ga. App. 301, 460 S.E.2d 871 (1995).

Discretion of probate judge.

- Because a probate court may only issue a Georgia firearms license if no disqualifying or derogatory information is discovered as a result of background checks conducted by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the FBI, or the U.S. Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, the 60-day period for issuing a license under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(d)(4) is extended by the statute itself when necessary to accommodate any delays that reasonably may be attributed to the investigative process. Moore v. Cranford, 285 Ga. App. 666, 647 S.E.2d 295 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 706 (Ga. 2007).

Cited in Coleman v. State, 163 Ga. App. 173, 293 S.E.2d 395 (1982); Luke v. State, 178 Ga. App. 614, 344 S.E.2d 452 (1986); Moore v. Nelson, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2005); Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 26-5104 and 26-5105 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Public interest underlying section.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) concerns public interest, since its objective is to avoid unrestrained carrying of firearms outside of homes or places of business. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-10.

Permit to carry pistol issued by another state is not recognized in Georgia. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 143 (rendered under former Code 1933, §§ 26-5104, 26-5105).

There is no restriction against carrying an unloaded shotgun in a vehicle through this state. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-30.

Discretion of probate court judge in considering application for firearms permit.

- The judge of the probate court, in considering an application for a firearms permit under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, has no discretion to exercise, but must issue the permit unless provided with information indicating the disqualification of the applicant. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. U89-21.

Probate judge's authority under former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(a)) was permissive, not mandatory. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-112.

Discretionary meaning of word "may" in former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) was revitalized and strengthened when viewed along with former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)) which used word "shall" in regard to what a probate court judge must do when granting a license for a handgun; having both words "may" and "shall" used in that section, and in an almost side-by-side way, restores permissive or discretionary use of word "may." 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-10.

Probate judge has discretion regarding issuance of more than one permit to an individual.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) gives discretionary authority to probate court judge in county to determine whether or not to issue more than one license per person to carry a handgun in the county; further, a probate court judge has a duty to guard against having any one individual in the county becoming a threat to the community by issuing numerous permits to any one citizen. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-10.

Validity of license based on county residence.

- Person possesses a valid handgun license only when the handgun is issued in the person's county of present residence. When the holder of a handgun license changes the person's county of legal residence, the person must apply for a new license in the person's county of present residence, and the application should be processed as a first-time application pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(c)(2) (paragraph (c)(2) deleted in 2006). 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-49.

Word "resident" as used in former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) meant domicile. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-71.

Demonstration of domiciliary intent is necessary for issuance of license.

- General Assembly did not intend for probate judges to issue handgun licenses to every individual who passes through state for short period of time, but rather has extended this privilege to those individuals in this state who have demonstrated domiciliary intent and are known to be responsible citizens in their respective counties. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-26.

Considerations in determining residency.

- In making determination as to whether an individual is a resident, evidence of whether the individual pays Georgia income taxes and/or property taxes, which county the individual resides in, and what county the individual is registered to vote in should be considered. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-26.

"Resident" requirement precludes issuance of permit to persons merely working or doing business in county.

- As used in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, term "resident" means actual physical residence with intent to remain a resident. This precludes issuance of firearm permit to those persons who merely work or do business in county. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-26.

Military personnel generally not residents of county in which military installation is situated.

- One residing on military reservation does not qualify as resident of county in which military installation is situated, unless he or she has previously declared Georgia as his or her legal residence prior to moving onto reservation; military members residing off base would not be residents within meaning of former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) unless they intend to make Georgia their legal residence, and the county in which they were residing their place of domicile. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-71 (rendered prior to 1996 amendment).

Licensing foreign nationals.

- Probate judge may issue a firearm license to a qualified foreign national who is domiciled in the county over which the judge presides. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-15.

Former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) did not require recording of any portion of application to carry a handgun. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-33; 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47.

Only written memorial necessary to be kept in discharge of duties imposed by former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) was name of licensee and date of issuance of permit. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47.

Only name of permit holder and date of permit issuance are matters of public record. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47.

Although law enforcement agency check exceeds 60 days, license cannot issue prior to its return.

- In light of 60-day provision in former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129), the background check by a law enforcement agency is an essential condition precedent to issuing of license by probate judge to an applicant; the General Assembly never intended for a probate judge to issue a license until the judge had received a report from the respective law enforcement agency conducting the background check; therefore, a probate judge may not issue a pistol permit prior to return of law enforcement agency check should such check exceed 60 days as provided by law. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-45.

Entitlement to fee for processing applications.

- Law enforcement agency is entitled to a fee for processing applications for a license to carry a pistol or revolver when a background investigation is performed by accessing the records of the Georgia Crime Information Center. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-16.

Information obtained pursuant to criminal history check is confidential.

- Information obtained pursuant to criminal history background check, required by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, from taking of fingerprints and checking of these fingerprints with those presently on file with Georgia Crime Information Center is of a confidential nature and prohibited from public disclosure. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47.

Disclosure of confidential information would be unlawful.

- Disclosure of information obtained by local law enforcement agencies from Georgia Crime Information Center in conducting criminal history check would violate law and regulations governing dissemination of information contained in Georgia Crime Information Center's files, and would discourage voluntary compliance with the licensing provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47.

Effect of suspension of processing of nonfederal applicant fingerprint cards by FBI.

- Suspension of processing of nonfederal applicant fingerprint cards by FBI limits processing of applicants for permits to carry a firearm to criminal history information available from Georgia Crime Information Center and local law enforcement agencies, but does not change procedure for processing applications. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-97.

Carrying pistol or revolver at shopping mall.

- Person who has properly obtained a license to carry a pistol or revolver under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 may legally carry a pistol or revolver at a shopping mall without violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127, which prohibits the carriage of firearms to or while at a public gathering. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-37.

Private detectives and security guards may carry firearms while on duty or en route only when issued a permit from the Georgia Board of Private Detective and Security Agencies. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. 86-22.

Former Code 1933, § 26-2914 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131) was only an additional qualification to requirements presently provided for under former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(b)(3)). 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-32.

Discharge under First Offender Act prevents operation of disabilities.

- Applicant for license to carry a pistol or revolver under former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129) who has successfully completed, or who has been released prior to termination of the probationary period under the First Offender Act (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 8, T. 42), does not have to be free from all restraint or supervision for a specified period of years before applying for a pistol permit, since successful completion of period of probation has resulted in there being no adjudication of guilty and, therefore, no conviction. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-21.

Plea of nolo contendere to felony is not a statutory disqualification for a pistol license.

- Plea of nolo contendere to felony was not deemed plea of guilty to that felony, so as to prevent individual from qualifying for license to carry a pistol under former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129), however, probate judge might be able to deny a permit under such circumstances in view of the judge's discretion under subsection (a). 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-67.

Plea of nolo contendere to drug violation as disqualification.

- Person charged with a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., who has tendered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges, when such plea has been accepted by the trial court, has been convicted of that offense for the purposes of consideration of an application for a firearms permit, and is thus statutorily ineligible for the issuance of such a permit. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. U91-11.

Conviction arising out of the possession of marijuana precludes an applicant from obtaining a license to carry a pistol or revolver. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U97-29.

Relief by pardon applies to disabilities upon individuals within coverage of paragraph (b)(3).

- Relief by pardon applies to those disabilities placed upon persons who have been convicted of felony or forcible misdemeanor and who are seeking to secure a license to carry a pistol under former Code 1933, § 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129). Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-10.

Arrest while in drunken condition and carrying pistol in full view. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 50 (rendered under former Code 1933, §§ 26-5104, 26-5105).

Renewing license requires going through same procedures as for applying for license for first time. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-9 (rendered prior to 1983 amendment).

Fingerprinting not required.

- Offenses arising from a violation of subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 does not appear to be an offense for which fingerprinting is required. 2010 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10-6.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Weapons and Firearms, §§ 4, 8, 26, 34.

C.J.S.

- 94 C.J.S., Weapons, § 56.

ALR.

- Who is entitled to carry concealed weapons, 51 A.L.R.3d 504.

Judicial review of state or local administrative order approving, denying, or revoking permit or license to carry, possess, or own firearm, 91 A.L.R.6th 435.

Construction and application of state statutes and local ordinances regulating licenses or permits to carry concealed weapons, 12 A.L.R.7th 4.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129

Total Results: 16  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 4, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 90, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3330

HUNSTEIN, Justice. Probate Judge Andrew Bennett denied James Hertz’s application for a license to carry a weapon under OCGA § 16-11-129 based on Hertz’s 1994 nolo contendere plea to five felony charges in Florida....
...inal background check. After his application was denied, Hertz filed a complaint for mandamus, seeking to compel the probate judge to issue a weapons carry license on the grounds that he was a law-abiding citizen and met all the requirements of OCGA § 16-11-129....
...Because adjudication was withheld under Florida law, he argues that his nolo contendere plea in that state was the equivalent of first offender treatment under Georgia law, which he asserts would not disqualify him from obtaining a weapons carry license. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (3). To obtain the right to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, the petitioner must show either a clear legal right to the relief sought or a gross abuse of discretion. Dougherty County v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474 (1) (350 SE2d 457) (1986). OCGA § 16-11-129 sets out the requirements for obtaining a state license to carry a weapon, whether openly *63or concealed.1 Among the ten exceptions that disqualify a person from obtaining a license is a felony conviction. (2) No weapons carry license...
...(B) Any person who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other state ... and has not been pardoned for such felony by... the person or agency empowered to grant pardons under the constitution or laws of such state. . . . OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (B)....
...s listed in subparagraphs (F) and (I) of subsection (b) (2). Because Hertz has not shown that he had a clear legal right to the weapons carry license or that the probate judge committed a gross abuse of discretion in denying him a license under OCGA § 16-11-129, the superior court properly denied mandamus. 2....
...Given Hertz’s criminal history and the fact that the statute does not implicate Hertz’s right to possess a handgun in his own home, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test to apply in evaluating the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-11-129....
...ant, substantial, or important,” and “the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective [to] be reasonable, not perfect.” Marzzarella, 614 F3d at 98 (citations and punctuation omitted). These requirements are met here. OCGA § 16-11-129 regulates the ability of citizens to carry a weapon in public....
...a license only in public, not on one’s property or inside one’s home, and by limiting the disqualification to certain classes of people, including those who are younger than 21 years of age, mentally ill, or prior violators of the law. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2)....
...tural right of self-defence” but striking down provision banning citizens from carrying pistols openly as a violation of the constitutional right to bear arms under the Second Amendment). Therefore, we reject Hertz’s as-applied challenge to OCGA § 16-11-129 under the Second Amendment. 3....
...Peterson, Solicitor-General, amici curiae. The crime of carrying a concealed weapon was repealed in 2010. See Ga. L. 2010, p. 963, § 1-2 (revising OCGA § 16-11-126); 2010 Ga. Senate Journal, p. 4267, § 1-2 (final conference report showing deleted text). OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (3) specifically provides: If first offender treatment without adjudication of guilt for a conviction contained in subparagraph (F) or (I) of paragraph (2) of this subsection was entered and such sentence was successfully completed...
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Bell v. Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 14, 2021

...carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. 1 The General Assembly has identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain criminal convictions. OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2)....
...Unless otherwise indicated, however, the provisions of the statutes cited in this opinion are the same today as they were in February 2018. conviction, the General Assembly has provided a mechanism for a probate judge to obtain a criminal history report for an applicant. See OGCA § 16-11-129 (d). Once a probate judge has a sworn application and a criminal history report in hand, the probate judge’s discretion to deny a weapons carry license is limited. Under OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), a probate judge “shall issue” a license “unless” (1) “facts establishing ineligibility have been reported[,]” or (2) “the judge determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the [statutory] requirements[.]” We granted certiorari to determine whether a probate judge may deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant’s criminal history records report fails to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction....
...application for a weapons carry license, concluding that, if Bell’s 1986 arrest had resulted in a conviction and the conviction had involved domestic violence, Bell would be ineligible for a weapons carry license. The judge reasoned that OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) provides that “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued to ....
...at 814 (1), and we granted certiorari. 2. When a probate judge denies an application for a Georgia weapons carry license, the applicant has a statutory right to “bring an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain such license.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (j)....
...discretion.” Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 62 (1) (751 SE2d 90) (2013). Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Bell 5 failed to carry his burden to obtain mandamus relief, the plain language of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) leads us to conclude otherwise. When construing a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga....
...the English language would.” Id. at 172-173 (1) (a) (punctuation omitted). When, as here, statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,” our interpretive task begins and ends with the text itself. Id. at 173 (punctuation omitted). In OCGA § 16-11-129, the General Assembly set out a streamlined procedure for processing applications for weapons carry licenses. An applicant initiates the process by submitting an application under oath to a probate judge, having his or her photograph and fingerprints taken, and paying the required fees. 6 See OCGA § 16-11-129 (a), (c), (f) (2). After receiving the application, a probate judge must direct the “appropriate law enforcement agency in the county[,]” OCGA § 16-11-129 (c), to (d) (1) (a) ....
...United States citizen applies for a weapons carry license[,] . . . conduct a search of the records maintained by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and return an appropriate report to the probate judge. . . . OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (1) (A), (2), (3)....
...requirements contained in this Code section. . . . Id. (emphasis supplied). By its plain terms, paragraph (d) (4) sets out a mandatory requirement that a probate judge “shall” issue a license “unless” a listed exception applies.4 OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4); see Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga....
...The statute enumerates only two exceptions to this command, both of which require that the probate judge make an affirmative factual determination that the applicant 4 The phrase “shall issue . . . a license . . . unless” first appeared in the 2008 version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008). 5 “Although the word ‘shall’ is ‘generally construed as a mandatory directive,’ this Court has explained that it ‘need not always be construed in that fashion,’ if the context in which it is used indicates a permissive instruction.” Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853, 865 (5) (a) n.15 (815 SE2d 903) (2018) (citation omitted). Here, we discern no contextual basis for concluding that the word “shall,” as used in OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), does not function as a mandatory directive. 8 does not qualify for a weapons carry license. First, a probate judge may deny a license if “facts establishing ineligibility have been reported[.]” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied)....
...The statute recognizes no other exceptions to a probate judge’s duty to grant an application for a weapons carry license. Accordingly, “unless” one of the two exceptions applies, the probate judge must issue a weapons carry license. See id. 3. With this understanding of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) in mind, we turn to the heart of the question presented on certiorari: Does a probate judge have discretion to deny an application for a weapons carry license based solely on a determination that an applicant’s criminal his...
...he evidence” are clearly erroneous). 6 The probate judge does not argue that Bell’s 1986 arrest showed that he “[wa]s not of good moral character” or that he “failed to comply with any of the [statutory] requirements[,]” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), so we will not address the substance of those grounds in this opinion. 10 4. Here, Bell had a clear legal right to receive a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). In his sworn application, Bell stated that he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, which would have rendered him ineligible for a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E), and no evidence indicated that his statement was false....
...“facts establishing ineligibility” were not reported in Bell’s criminal 7 We note that a prior version of the statute provided that a probate judge “shall issue . . . a license . . . if the judge determines the applicant has met all the qualifications[.]” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2006) (emphasis supplied)....
...qualifications without the report). The General Assembly, however, has since flipped the burden of proof. Since 2008, the statute has provided that a probate judge must affirmatively determine that an applicant is not qualified before denying a license. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008) (providing that the probate judge “shall issue ....
...supplied)). A finding that the probate judge cannot determine whether the applicant is qualified is not equivalent to a finding that the applicant is not qualified. 12 history report or application. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
...violence — did not contradict his sworn statement. For the same reasons, the evidence before the probate judge did not support a “determin[ation]” that Bell “ha[d] not met all the qualifications” for a weapons carry license. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
...The judge’s argument that this provision calls on a probate judge to make a “quintessentially discretionary” determination about an applicant’s qualifications is incorrect. Because the statute enumerates the categories of persons who are disqualified from 8 See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) and 18 USC § 922 (g) (9). 13 receiving a weapons carry license, see OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2),9 a probate judge has no discretion to create new grounds for disqualification....
...forth in a legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly stated”). Further, because no evidence supported a finding that Bell “ha[d] not met all the qualifications” for a weapons carry license based on a disqualifying conviction, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), this case did not call upon the probate judge to exercise discretion in weighing conflicting evidence about his qualifications....
...ution of a controlled substance or other dangerous drug[,]” and “any person who has been hospitalized as an inpatient in any mental hospital or alcohol or drug treatment center within the five years immediately preceding the application.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (A), (B), (F), (J). 14 is authorized to resolve conflicts in the evidence.”). Moreover, the probate judge did not purport to weigh the evidence and conclude that Bell did not meet the qualifications but rather said she could not make such a determination. 5. The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 16-11-129 afforded the probate judge discretion to make a “judgment call” that Bell’s criminal history report was “incomplete” and therefore not “appropriate” because, in the court’s view, the structure of OCGA § 16-11-129 required a probate judge “to make a threshold determination as to whether the report returned by the law enforcement agency constituted an appropriate report.” Bell, 357 Ga....
... court concluded, a probate judge may deny an application if it determines that the report returned by the law enforcement agency is not “appropriate.” Id. at 814 (1). The Court of Appeals’ understanding of the statutory scheme was incorrect. As an initial matter, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) does not state that a probate judge may deny an application based on a threshold determination that an applicant’s criminal history report is “incomplete” or otherwise not “appropriate.” Instead, as discussed above,...
...e judge may deny an application only if the judge determines that (1) the facts reported establish the applicant’s ineligibility, or (2) the applicant is unqualified, not of good moral character, or has not met all statutory requirements. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
...suitable or compatible” or “fitting.”10 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 61 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “appropriate”); see also Deal, 10 The phrase “return an appropriate report” first appeared in the 2006 version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (1), (2) (2006). 17 294 Ga....
...eligibility for a weapons carry license[,]” and that the probate judge has a limited time to process an application after the judge “receives the report from the law enforcement agency concerning the suitability of the applicant for a license.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied)....
...such information would not change the report that the judge received. 19 carry license[,]” only the law enforcement agency could determine what information might be relevant to include in the report. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied).12 The statute further clarifies that the duty to determine what to include in the report rests solely with the law enforcement agency by providing that, “[w]hen no derogatory information is f...
...Although the report was overinclusive, the law enforcement agency satisfied its duty to report “any findings relating to [Bell] which may bear on [Bell’s] eligibility for a weapons carry license” by sending the probate judge a report that included all information produced from the criminal history record check. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). 20 determine what constitutes an “appropriate report,” the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the probate judge could make a discretionary choice to deny B...
...that such person is not eligible for a weapons carry license pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section or an adjudication of falsification of application, mental incompetency, or chronic alcohol or narcotic usage. . . . OCGA § 16-11-129 (e) (1). 21 people....
...issue a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Hargrove to issue Bell a weapons carry license. Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. 14 We note that, although Bell sought costs and attorney fees under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j), the trial court granted summary judgment to the probate judge on that issue, and Bell abandoned any challenge to the trial court’s ruling by failing to raise the issue before the Court of Appeals....
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Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Gardens, Inc, 306 Ga. 829 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 7, 2019

...to, or involving an individual, as opposed to the public or the 8 A “license holder” is “a person who holds a valid weapons carry license.” OCGA § 16-11-125.1 (3). Weapons carry licenses are issued pursuant to the standards and procedures set forth in OCGA § 16-11-129. 12 government.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1389 (10th ed....
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Henderson v. State, 532 S.E.2d 398 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2000 | 272 Ga. 621, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2512

...338, 341(7), 404 S.E.2d 788 (1991). 2. The trial court did not err in permitting Battle to testify that Henderson owned a .357 Magnum and a M-1 carbine and that Benjamin had a 9-millimeter handgun. Neither ownership nor possession of a firearm imputes bad character. OCGA §§ 16-11-129; XX-XX-XXX(c)....
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Johnson v. State, 839 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2020 | 308 Ga. 141

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Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 25, 2013 | 740 S.E.2d 598, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 743

...t, appeals from two orders of the trial court, the Superior Court of Clayton County. Case No. S12A1643 is Ferguson’s appeal of the trial court’s ruling that Manuel Perry is entitled to a Georgia weapons carry license (“WCL”) pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129, and Case No....
...S12X1644, Perry cross-appeals from the trial court’s ruling that his right to keep and bear arms under the Georgia and United States Constitutions was not violated by the denial of his WCL application. We vacate that ruling, because once the trial court determined, correctly, that Perry is entitled to a WCL under OCGA § 16-11-129, his claim thatthe denial of a WCL violates his right to keep and bear arms loses its premise, and the trial court should not have opined on that moot issue. 1....
...... removed” and “all civil and political rights lost as a result of [his] offense(s) be . . . restored.” Thirty years later, in February 2009, Perry applied for a WCL in the probate court of his county of residence, Clayton County. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (a). At that time, former OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (3) provided, in relevant part, that no WCL shall be issued to: Any person who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other state; by a court of the United States including its territories, possessions, and d...
...Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII of the 1983 Georgia Constitution.3 On April 5, 2012, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to Perry, declaring that he was eligible to receive a WCL because the legal disability imposed on him by OCGA § 16-11-129 had been removed by the Board’s 1979 order....
...sing only from his “sentence” and restored civil *671and political rights lost only due to his “offense,” without referring to his felony moonshining “conviction,” which is the source of Perry’s state firearms disabilities under OCGA §§ 16-11-129 and 16-11-131 (c)....
...(defining “disability” to include an “[incapacity . .. created by the law”). Thus, the Georgia statutes that prohibit convicted felons like Perry from possessing firearms and obtaining a WCL are disabilities imposed by state law. See OCGA §§ 16-11-129,16-11-131 (b)....
...regained any right to keep and bear arms that he had lost as a result of his felony conviction, and he is not subject to the disabilities to obtain a WCL and possess firearms that otherwise would have applied to him under OCGA §§ 16-11-131 (b) and 16-11-129....
...As a result, cases like Perry’s should be rare and relate only to orders issued by the Board decades ago. Decided March 25, 2013. Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Coleen D. Hosack, JackR. Hancock, for appellant. (d) For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Perry was entitled to a WCL under OCGA § 16-11-129 and the court’s mandamus order requiring Ferguson to issue a WCL to Perry. Case No....
...onformity with the law.” The premise of Perry’s argument is that the State’s denying a WCL to a convicted felon violates those constitutional rights. However, because the trial court ruled, correctly, that Perry is entitled to a WCL under OCGA § 16-11-129, that premise does not apply to him and his constitutional complaint is moot....
...We therefore vacate this portion of the trial court’s April 5, 2012, order. Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. S12A1643 and S12A1645. Judgment vacated in Case No. S12X1644. All the Justices concur. John R. Monroe, for appellee. The statute has since been amended and the same language is now found in OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (B). In the remainder of this opinion, we will refer to the relevant portion of the WCL statute simply as OCGA § 16-11-129. Subsection (d) provided another means by which a convicted felon could possess firearms without violating OCGA § 16-11-131 (b): A person who has been convicted of a felony, but who has been granted relief from the disabilities impos...
...whether Freeman remains good law. We recognize that several Attorney General opinions issued after the enactment of OCGA § 16-11-131 in 1980 have addressed specific questions regarding the interaction between Board orders, OCGA §§ 16-11-131 and 16-11-129....
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georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. James, 298 Ga. 420 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 1, 2016 | 782 S.E.2d 284

...Although Smith initially was refused a temporary renewal license, he was issued a weapons carry license on January 27, 2014, within 30 days of the filing of his application for a license, and before his previously issued license expired. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (i). Several weeks later, on February 18, 2014, Smith and appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc....
...licenses to other applicants, appellants acknowledged they were no longer entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. They asserted, nevertheless, that they were entitled to costs and attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” in the lawsuit. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). The trial court granted James’ summary judgment motion and denied appellants’ summary judgment motion....
...acknowledged a mandamus action was no longer necessary. They argue, however, they are entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees inasmuch as they were the “prevailing party” in the lawsuit. In this regard, appellants point out that, at the time they filed this lawsuit, OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) provided, in part: “When an eligible applicant fails to receive a license, temporary permit, or renewal license within the time period required by this Code section and the application or request has been properly filed, the app...
...at 746. Appellants’ argument notwithstanding, we note that Smith, the only named appellant in this case holding a weapons license, received a new weapons license from James within 30 days of filing his application – well within the time required by law. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
... Thus, as it pertains to appellant Smith, this case was moot from the outset. See City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653 (653 SE2d 43) (2007). As for appellant GCO, even assuming it was eligible for a weapons carry license, but see OCGA § 16-11-129 (a) and (c), it did not apply for a license and did not file this case as a class action on behalf of any individual who was “an eligible applicant.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (j)....
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Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 7, 2016 | 783 S.E.2d 900

...lia, he was carrying a weapon without a license in violation of OCGA § 16-11-126 (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, the carrying of a weapon outside one’s own property, motor vehicle, or place of business without a valid license) and OCGA § 16-11-129 (establishing requirements for the issuance of weapons carry licenses). Though he did not do so at the immunity hearing, nor at any time prior to trial or the entry of judgment, Amos argued in his motion for new trial that the...
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Lindsey v. State, 596 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 27, 2004 | 277 Ga. 772, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1531

...CGA § 16-11-126. Subsection (d) of that statute provides, in relevant part, that the crime of "carrying a concealed weapon," as previously defined, shall not forbid any person who is not among those enumerated as ineligible for a license under Code Section 16-11-129 from transporting a loaded firearm in any private passenger motor vehicle in an open manner and fully exposed to view or in the glove compartment, console, or similar compartment of the vehicle....
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Knox v. State of Georgia, 888 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 31, 2023 | 316 Ga. 426

...edings are conducted; (vi) Only apply to the carrying of handguns which a licensee is licensed to carry pursuant to subsection (e) of Code Section 16-11-126 and pursuant to Code Section 16-11-129; and (vii) Only apply to the carrying of handguns which are concealed. (B) Any weapons carry license holder who carries a handgun in a manner or in a building, property, room, or...
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GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Code Revision Comm'n, 299 Ga. 896 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 35

...l 22, 2014. See HB 826, Act 575, Ga. L. 2014, p. 432, § 1-1. Section 1-1 of that bill addressed weapons as they related to juveniles and schools and amended OCGA § 16-11-127.1 to permit a person licensed to carry a firearm3 in accordance with OCGA § 16-11-129 to do so within a school safety zone.4 See Ga....
...of a weapon, which was defined to include a firearm,6 within a school safety zone.5 See Ga. L. 2014, pp. 599, 605, § 1-6. This prohibition was subject to certain enumerated exceptions, *898including an exception allowing persons licensed under OCGA § 16-11-129 to carry or possess a firearm within a school safety zone but only “when such person carries or picks up a student within a school safety zone.” Id....
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Stephens v. State of Georgia, 321 Ga. 651 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 28, 2025

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Roberts v. Cuthpert, 317 Ga. 645 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 19, 2023

...further provides that “[i]f such applicant is the prevailing party, he or she shall be entitled to recover his or her costs in such action, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”2 We hold today that the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) and that the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution is not implicated by the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney fees, against a probate judge pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) because processing a weapons carry license does not involve the exercise of judicial 1 OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). 2 Id. 1 power....
...Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the superior court. 1. Pertinent facts and procedural history. In April 2019, Kevin Gary Roberts applied to Judge Clarence Cuthpert, Jr., probate judge for Rockdale County, for a weapons carry license pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129....
...However, Roberts testified at the hearing that he had never been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. After the hearing, Judge Cuthpert denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding that, “[b]ased upon [Roberts’s] history of violent offenses and failure to 4 OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) provides that the judge of the probate court shall issue such applicant a license . ....
...e Washington to provide Roberts with a weapons carry license. Judge Washington did not appeal the superior court’s grant of mandamus relief.7 Subsequently, Roberts filed a motion for costs, including reasonable attorney fees, under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j)....
...5 “against Judge Washington in his official capacity.”8 After briefing, the superior court denied Roberts’s motion for costs, concluding (1) the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity by enacting OCGA § 16-11-129 (j); (2) the doctrine of judicial immunity barred the costs-and-fees claim against the probate judges in their “individual and official capacity”; and (3) the recovery of costs and attorney fees was unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution....
...s-and-fees claim against the probate judge in his individual capacity is not before this Court, and we address the superior court’s sovereign-immunity ruling below.9 2. The General Assembly waived sovereign immunity when it enacted OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). “The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as enshrined in our Constitution, bars suits against the State and its employees in their official capacities unless a statute or the Constitution itself specifically waives that immunity.” State v....
...498, 502 (2) n.12 (883 SE2d 827) (2023). See also Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 746-747 (2) (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (holding state’s sovereign immunity extends to counties). Turning to the relevant statute, we have previously explained: “In OCGA § 16-11-129, the General Assembly set out a streamlined procedure for processing applications for weapons carry licenses....
...“Based on the records check results, the county law enforcement agency must then report to the probate judge ‘any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license.’” Id. (quoting OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4))....
...facts establishing ineligibility have been reported or unless the judge determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the requirements contained in this Code section. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
...Upon the issuance of a denial, the judge of the probate court shall inform the applicant of his or her rights pursuant to this subsection. If such applicant is the prevailing party, he or she shall be entitled to recover his or her costs in such action, including reasonable attorney’s fees. OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) (emphasis supplied). The Georgia Constitution provides that “[t]he sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.” Ga....
...in order to create a specific statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.” City of Union Point v. 10 Greene County, 303 Ga. 449, 453 (1) (812 SE2d 278) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) expressly authorizes a cause of action against a public official, i.e., the probate judge, based on the denial of an application for a weapons carry license. In order for OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) to have any meaning at all, it can only be interpreted as creating a waiver of sovereign immunity....
...301, 314 (4) (830 SE2d 179) (2019) (concluding that a statute which “expressly authorize[d] claimants to seek relief against a public official . . . amount[ed] to a specific waiver of sovereign immunity when public officials are sued in their official capacities”). Thus, OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) is an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity in the limited circumstances provided therein; that is, when an “applicant is the prevailing party” on an official-capacity claim, like here, the applicant “shall be entitled to recover his or her costs in such action, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (j)....
...The probate judge waived the defense of judicial immunity for the costs-and-fees claim asserted against him in his official capacity. Roberts contends the superior court erred by concluding that the doctrine of judicial immunity barred Roberts’s costs-and-fees claim under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) against the probate judge in his official capacity....
...rior court is reversed. See id. at 846-848 (1) (concluding the trial court erred in ruling sua sponte on the issue of quasi-judicial immunity). 4. The recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney fees, against a probate judge under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) does not violate the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution. Roberts also contends the superior court erred by concluding that the Separation of Powers Provision barred Roberts’s recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney fees, under OCGA § 16-11- 129 (j)....
... probate judges do not exercise judicial power when they grant or deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16- 11-129, and therefore, the Separation of Powers Provision is not implicated by the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney fees, under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). (a) Separation-of-Powers Principles The Georgia Constitution provides that “[t]he legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one sh...
...at 489 (2) (regulating professional bondspersons); OCGA § 10-2-41 (regulating certified public weighers); OCGA § 15-14-29 (regulating court reporters); OCGA § 40-15-5 (regulating instructors in a motorcycle operator safety training program). Indeed, OCGA § 16-11-129 appears to be the only statutory licensing scheme where the determination of “good moral character” is made solely by a judge....
...judicial function”); Northside Manor, 219 Ga. at 301 (concluding there was a violation of the Separation of Powers Provision because there was an “usurpation of exclusive judicial functions”). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) violates the Separation of Powers Provision and remand this case for a hearing on costs, including reasonable attorney fees, under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j).17 Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. LAGRUA, Justice, concurring. I write separately to note that OCGA § 16-11-129 has placed probate judges in a precarious situation because the statute requires that judges consider applicants’ criminal history reports, but the 17 We note that because the costs-and-fees claim is asserted against the probate judge in his official capacity, this claim is against the county....
...I am authorized to state that Justice McMillian and Justice Colvin join in this concurrence. 30 Decided September 19, 2023 — Reconsideration denied November 7, 2023. OCGA § 16-11-129 (j); constitutional question....

Bell v. Hargrove (Ga. 2021).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 14, 2021

..., when the weapons carry license application at issue in this case was submitted. Unless otherwise indicated, however, the provisions of the statutes cited in this opinion are the same today as they were in February 2018. criminal convictions. OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2). To assist probate judges in determining whether an applicant has a disqualifying conviction, the General Assembly has provided a mechanism for a probate judge to obtain a criminal history report for an applicant. See id. § 16-11-129 (d)....
...he qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the [statutory] requirements.” We granted certiorari to determine whether a probate judge may deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant’s criminal history records report fails to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction....
...application for a weapons carry license, concluding that, if Bell’s 1986 arrest had resulted in a conviction and the conviction had involved domestic violence, Bell would be ineligible for a weapons carry license. The judge reasoned that OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) 2 “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he intentionally and without legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded.” OCGA § 16-11-102....
...at 814 (1), and we granted certiorari. 2. When a probate judge denies an application for a Georgia weapons carry license, the applicant has a statutory right to “bring an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain such license.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (j)....
...5 discretion.” Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 62 (1) (751 SE2d 90) (2013). Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Bell failed to carry his burden to obtain mandamus relief, the plain language of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) leads us to conclude otherwise. When construing a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga....
...English language would.” Id. at 172-173 (1) (a) (punctuation omitted). When, as here, statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,” our interpretive task begins and ends with the text itself. Id. at 173 (punctuation omitted). In OCGA § 16-11-129, the General Assembly set out a streamlined procedure for processing applications for weapons carry licenses. An applicant initiates the process by submitting an 6 application under oath to a probate judge, having his or her photograph and fingerprints taken, and paying the required fees. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (a), (c), (f) (2). After receiving the application, a probate judge must direct the “appropriate law enforcement agency in the county,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (c), to (d) (1) (a) ....
...(3) [w]hen a person who is not a United States citizen applies for a weapons carry license[,] . . . conduct a search of the records maintained by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and return an appropriate report to the probate judge. Id. § 16-11-129 (d) (1) (A), (2), (3). Based on the records check results, the county law enforcement agency must then report to the probate judge “any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license.” Id. § 16-11-129 7 (d) (4)....
...requirements contained in this Code section. Id. (emphasis supplied). By its plain terms, subsection (d) (4) sets out a mandatory requirement that a probate judge “shall” issue a license “unless” a listed exception applies.4 OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4); see Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga....
...268, 269 (601 SE2d 99) (2004) (“‘Shall’ is generally construed as a word of command.”)5; see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1370 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “unless” as 4 The phrase “shall issue . . . a license . . . unless” first appeared in the 2008 version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008). 5 “Although the word ‘shall’ is ‘generally construed as a mandatory directive,’ this Court has explained that it ‘need not always be construed in that fashion,’ if the context in which it is used indicates a permissive instruction.” Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853, 865 n.15 (5) (815 SE2d 903) (2018). Here, we discern no contextual basis for concluding that the word “shall,” as used in OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), does not function as a mandatory directive. 8 “except on the condition that”)....
...The statute enumerates only two exceptions to this command, both of which require that the probate judge make an affirmative factual determination that the applicant does not qualify for a weapons carry license. First, a probate judge may deny a license if “facts establishing ineligibility have been reported.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied)....
...The statute recognizes no other exceptions to a probate judge’s duty to grant an application for a weapons carry license. Accordingly, “unless” one of the two exceptions applies, the probate judge must issue a weapons carry license. See id. 3. With this understanding of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) in mind, we turn to the heart of the question presented on certiorari: Does a probate judge have discretion to deny an application for a weapons carry license based solely on a determination that an...
...not support a factual finding in a special master’s report); see also 6 The probate judge does not argue that Bell’s 1986 arrest showed that he “[wa]s not of good moral character” or that he “failed to comply with any of the [statutory] requirements,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), so we will not address the substance of those grounds in this opinion. 10 Davis v. Davis, 262 Ga. 420, 421 (3) (419 SE2d 913) (1992) (noting that “speculative” findings “not supported by the evidence” are clearly erroneous). 4. Here, Bell had a clear legal right to receive a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). In his sworn application, Bell stated that he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, which would have rendered him ineligible for a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E), and no evidence indicated that his statement was false....
...could not have determined based on the evidentiary record, that an 7 We note that a prior version of the statute provided that a probate judge “shall issue . . . a license . . . if the judge determines the applicant has met all the qualifications.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2006) (emphasis supplied)....
...qualifications without the report). The General Assembly, however, has since flipped the burden of proof. Since 2008, the statute has provided that a probate judge must affirmatively determine that an applicant is not qualified before denying a license. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008) (providing that the probate judge “shall issue ....
... exception to her duty to issue a license applied. As the Court of Appeals correctly found, and as the judge concedes before this Court, “facts establishing ineligibility” were not reported in Bell’s criminal history report or application. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
...violence – did not contradict his sworn statement. For the same reasons, the evidence before the probate judge did not support a “determin[ation]” that Bell “ha[d] not met all the qualifications” for a weapons carry license. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). The judge’s argument that this provision calls on a probate judge to make a “quintessentially discretionary” determination 8 See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) and 18 USC § 922 (g) (9). 13 about an applicant’s qualifications is incorrect. Because the statute enumerates the categories of persons who are disqualified from receiving a weapons carry license, see id. § 16-11-129 (b) (2),9 a probate judge has no discretion to create new grounds for disqualification....
...forth in a legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly stated”). Further, because no evidence supported a finding that Bell “ha[d] not met all the qualifications” for a weapons carry license based on a disqualifying conviction, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), this case did not call upon the probate judge to exercise discretion in 9 The statute identifies several categories of persons to whom “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued,” including, for example, “[a]ny...
...ibution of a controlled substance or other dangerous drug,” and “any person who has been hospitalized as an inpatient in any mental hospital or alcohol or drug treatment center within the five years immediately preceding the application.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (A), (B), (F), (J). 14 weighing conflicting evidence about his qualifications....
...is authorized to resolve conflicts in the evidence.”). Moreover, the probate judge did not purport to weigh the evidence and conclude that Bell did not meet the qualifications but rather said she could not make such a determination. 5. The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 16-11-129 afforded the probate judge discretion to make a “judgment call” that Bell’s criminal history report was “incomplete” and therefore not “appropriate” because, in the court’s view, the structure of § 16-11- 129 require...
...Accordingly, the court concluded, a probate judge may deny an application if it determines that the report returned by the law enforcement agency is not “appropriate.” Id. at 814 (1). The Court of Appeals’ understanding of the statutory scheme was incorrect. As an initial matter, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) does not state that a probate judge may deny an application based on a threshold determination that an applicant’s criminal history report is “incomplete” or otherwise not “appropriate.” Instead, as discussed above,...
...e judge may deny an application only if the judge determines that (1) the facts reported establish the applicant’s ineligibility, or (2) the applicant is unqualified, not of good moral character, or has not met all statutory requirements. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)....
...any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license,” and that the probate judge has a limited time to process an application after the judge “receives 10 The phrase “return an appropriate report” first appeared in the 2006 version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (1), (2) (2006). 18 the report from the law enforcement agency concerning the suitability of the applicant for a license,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied)....
...law enforcement agency “report[s] . . . any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license,” only the law enforcement agency could determine what information might be relevant to include in the report. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied)....
...Although the report was overinclusive, the law enforcement agency satisfied its duty to report “any findings relating to [Bell] which may bear on [Bell’s] eligibility for a weapons carry license” by sending the probate judge a report that included all information produced from the criminal history record check. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). 20 information,” so only the law enforcement agency would be in a position to know whether a report is “required.” Id....
...affirming the trial court’s denial of mandamus relief. The Court of Appeals is directed to remand the case to the trial court with instructions to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Hargrove to issue Bell a weapons carry license. OCGA § 16-11-129 (e) (1). 14 We note that, although Bell sought costs and attorney’s fees under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j), the trial court granted summary judgment to the probate judge on that issue, and Bell abandoned any challenge to the trial court’s ruling by failing to raise the issue before the Court of Appeals....
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Fain v. State, 259 Ga. 708 (Ga. 1989).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 5, 1989 | 386 S.E.2d 144

...Fain was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. OCGA § 16-11-131. He was a convicted felon when he shot his wife, but he contends that we should nevertheless reverse his convic*709tion because he had a license to carry the firearm pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129. OCGA § 16-11-129 authorizes probate courts to issue licenses to carry pistols or revolvers....
...The statute provides that a probate court can issue a license to a convicted felon if the felony of which he was convicted was a nonforcible felony and if the felon has been “free of all restraint or supervision in connection therewith for at least five years.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (3)....
...under the constitutions or laws of the several states or of a foreign nation and, by the terms of the pardon, has expressly been authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm. We find that, although § 16-11-131 does not expressly refer to § 16-11-129 (b) (3), the clear impact of § 16-11-131 (b) and (c) is to implicitly repeal § 16-11-129 (b) (3)....
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Propst v. McCurry, 252 Ga. 56 (Ga. 1984).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 25, 1984 | 310 S.E.2d 914

...McCurry refused to sign the waiver, and the probate court denied his application. McCurry appealed, and the superior court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by Judge Propst. The issue here is whether the probate court was authorized to require the waiver. OCGA § 16-11-129 (Code Ann....