Statutory construction of "notwithstanding" under former provisions of subsection (e) of this section.

- In a case in which a gun rights organization and a Georgia state representative sought declaratory and injunctive relief because they asserted that Georgia House Bill (HB) 89 permitted any person who possessed a valid Georgia firearms license to carry a firearm in the non-sterile areas of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, they argued unsuccessfully that the "notwithstanding" language of HB 89, codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127, which authorized Georgia firearms license (GFL) holders to carry firearms in public transportation notwithstanding O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-122 through16-12-127, which is the Transportation Passenger Safety Act (TPSA), would be superfluous unless it was intended to make clear that a GFL holder could carry a firearm in an airport. They misleadingly focused only on O.C.G.A. § 16-12-127, but the "notwithstanding" language in HB 89 referred to all of the TPSA, and O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(b), another section of the TPSA, prohibited boarding any bus or rail vehicle with a firearm; since public transportation included bus and rail vehicles such as those operated by Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the "notwithstanding" language was needed to make clear that GFL holders could carry firearms onto such vehicles notwithstanding the TPSA. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2008), aff'd, 318 Fed. Appx. 851 (11th Cir. 2009).

Application of federal law.

- In a case in which a gun rights organization and a Georgia state representative sought declaratory and injunctive relief because they asserted that Georgia House Bill (HB) 89 permitted any person who possessed a valid Georgia firearms license to carry a firearm in the non-sterile areas of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, they argued unsuccessfully that if HB 89, codified as O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 did not apply to airports, then the exception for carrying firearms into a place prohibited by federal law was superfluous. The federal law exception applied to all of the places listed in HB 89, including parks, historic sites, and recreational and wildlife management areas, as well as public transportation. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2008), aff'd, 318 Fed. Appx. 851 (11th Cir. 2009).

Right to exclude individuals carrying weapons.

- Plain and unambiguous language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) grants persons in legal control of private property through a lease the right to exclude individuals carrying weapons. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 345 Ga. App. 160, 812 S.E.2d 527 (2018).

Application to airports.

- In a case in which a gun rights organization and a Georgia state representative sought declaratory and injunctive relief because they asserted that Georgia House Bill (HB) 89 permitted any person who possessed a valid Georgia firearms license to carry a firearm in the non-sterile areas of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, giving the terms of the statute their ordinary signification, the public transportation provision of HB 89, as codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127, did not apply to airports. HB 89 did not mention airports, nor did the bill define public transportation, and the ordinary signification of public transportation did not include airports. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2008), aff'd, 318 Fed. Appx. 851 (11th Cir. 2009).

That the defendant allegedly committed a separate offense by entering the airport security screening checkpoint while knowingly possessing a weapon did not invalidate the first charged offense for having a weapon in a government building as O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 criminalized the carrying of a weapon by a nonlicense holder through the airport's doorway while O.C.G.A. § 16-11-130.2 prohibited the defendant from entering the restricted area of the airport with the weapon. Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 785 S.E.2d 414 (2016).

Application to places of worship.

- When plaintiffs, a gun advocacy group and one of the group's members, and a church and the pastor, sought a declaratory judgment that O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(b)(4), regulating possession of weapons in a place of worship, violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, because § 16-11-127(d)(2) only required leaving guns in vehicles or notifying security or management and following directions for securing guns under § 16-11-127(d)(2) and (3), it was not an unmistakable pressure to forego religious precepts or pressure religious conduct to trigger scrutiny under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the claim against defendants, the State of Georgia, the Governor, a county, and a county manager failed. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. Ga. 2012).

When plaintiffs, a gun advocacy group and one of the group's members, and a church and the pastor, sought a declaratory judgment that O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(b)(4), regulating possession of weapons in a place of worship, violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), held that the Second Amendment protected a right to possess and carry weapons for self defense but did not elaborate on what all the "sensitive" places were to which a regulation could prohibit carrying a weapon, and absent clearer guidance, the safer approach was to assume that possession at a place of worship was within the Second Amendment guarantee and apply intermediate scrutiny, and since prohibiting firearms in a place of worship bore a substantial relationship to the important goal of protecting religious freedom by protecting attendees from the fear or threat of intimidation or armed attack, § 16-11-127(b)(4) passed intermediate scrutiny and the claim against defendants, the State of Georgia, the Governor, a county, and a county manager failed. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011), aff'd, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. Ga. 2012).

That plaintiff gun owners "would like" to carry a gun to be able to act in "self-defense" was a personal preference, motivated by a secular purpose, and there was no First Amendment protection for personal preferences or secular beliefs, thus, a First Amendment Free Exercise claim challenging Georgia's "Carry Law," O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(b), which banned carrying guns in a place of worship, failed. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).

Holiday barbecue with many people constitutes public gathering within meaning of former Penal Code 1895, § 342 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127). Wynne v. State, 123 Ga. 566, 51 S.E. 636 (1905).

Parking area on grounds of public gathering.

- Offense of carrying a firearm at a public gathering may occur in a parking area on the grounds of and in close proximity to a public gathering. Hubbard v. State, 210 Ga. App. 141, 435 S.E.2d 709 (1993).

Acquiring deadly weapon after arrival at public gathering is not indictable under former Penal Code 1895, § 342 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127). Modesette v. State, 115 Ga. 582, 41 S.E. 992 (1902); Culberson v. State, 119 Ga. 805, 47 S.E. 175 (1904).

Leaving public gathering, obtaining deadly weapon and then returning.

- If a person carries a deadly weapon to a place near a public gathering so that it will be accessible, and while gathering is in progress goes to place of deposit and obtains actual possession of weapon and carries it to the gathering, that person is guilty of the offense. Wynne v. State, 123 Ga. 566, 51 S.E. 636 (1905); Farmer v. State, 112 Ga. App. 438, 145 S.E.2d 594 (1965).

Declaratory judgment action on carrying in garden.

- Trial court erred by dismissing the appellants' declaratory judgment action on the basis that it improperly called for the interpretation and application of a criminal statute because they were not seeking an advisory opinion but sought a determination of whether licensed individuals may carry a weapon on the grounds of the garden at issue in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c), which was a proper subject for declaratory relief. Georgiacarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 299 Ga. 26, 785 S.E.2d 874 (2016).

Application to garden that leased property from city.

- Grant of summary judgment to a garden was affirmed because the private organization, which leased property from a city, was lawfully permitted under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) to prohibit individuals from carrying guns onto the organization's property. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 345 Ga. App. 160, 812 S.E.2d 527 (2018).

Having a license to carry a pistol is no justification under former Penal Code 1910, § 348 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127). Sockwell v. State, 27 Ga. App. 576, 109 S.E. 531 (1921).

It need not be alleged that accused was not a member of class excepted by former Penal Code 1895, § 342 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127). Kitchens v. State, 116 Ga. 847, 43 S.E. 256 (1903).

Focus is not on "place" but on "gathering" of people.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 should apply when people are gathered or will be gathered for a particular function and not when a weapon is carried lawfully to a public place where people may gather. The focus is not on the "place" but on the "gathering" of people. State v. Burns, 200 Ga. App. 16, 406 S.E.2d 547 (1991).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence amply supported the jury's verdict of guilty under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 since the evidence showed that defendant possessed a loaded weapon, a .22 caliber derringer, on the grounds of an auto auction and that many people were present in the parking lot when the gun was removed from defendant's person. Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983).

Defendant was properly convicted of carrying a deadly weapon after the defendant pulled a gun on security personnel at a tavern after security took defendant's keys because of defendant's intoxicated condition, notwithstanding defendant's contention that defendant acted in self-defense. Richardson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 890, 505 S.E.2d 57 (1998).

Cited in Smith v. State, 122 Ga. App. 768, 178 S.E.2d 751 (1970); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Simmons v. State, 246 Ga. 390, 271 S.E.2d 468 (1980); Sizemore Sec. Int'l, Inc. v. Lee, 161 Ga. App. 332, 287 S.E.2d 782 (1982); Jenga v. State, 166 Ga. App. 26, 303 S.E.2d 170 (1983).

Carrying pistol or revolver at shopping mall.

- Person who has properly obtained a license to carry a pistol or revolver under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 may legally carry a pistol or revolver at a shopping mall without violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-37.

Application to carry handgun need not be recorded.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 26-2902 and 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-127 and16-11-129) did not require recording of any portion of an application to carry a handgun. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-33.

There is no restriction against carrying an unloaded shotgun in a vehicle through this state. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-30.

State Board of Education security guard on duty at public facilities.

- Under former Code 1933, § 26-2902 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127), it was a misdemeanor for an individual to carry a firearm to any public gathering; therefore, a security guard cannot be authorized by the State Board of Education to bear arms while performing security duties at public facilities. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-3.

Application to gathering for particular function, not public place.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 applies when people are gathered or will gather for a particular function, but does not apply simply because a weapon is otherwise lawfully carried to a public place where people may be present. 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U96-22.

Fingerprinting required.

- Any misdemeanor offenses arising under subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127 are offenses for which those charged are to be fingerprinted. 2010 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10-6.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Weapons and Firearms, § 30.

C.J.S.

- 94 C.J.S., Weapons, § 37 et seq.

ALR.

- Cane as a deadly weapon, 30 A.L.R. 815.

Tear gas gun as dangerous or deadly weapon within statute inhibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons, 92 A.L.R. 1098.

Scope and effect of exception, in statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to persons on own premises or at place of business, 57 A.L.R.3d 938.

Statutory presumption of possession of weapon by occupants of place or vehicle where it was found, 87 A.L.R.3d 949.

Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 100 A.L.R.3d 287.

Validity of state statute proscribing possession or carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507.

Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal responsibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 745.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861, 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

Construction and application of United States Supreme Court holdings in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) respecting Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, to state or local laws regulating firearms or other weapons, 64 A.L.R.6th 131.