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2018 Georgia Code 16-12-32 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 16-12-32 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 16-12-32

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 12. Offenses Against Public Health and Morals, 16-12-1 through 16-12-191.

ARTICLE 2 GAMBLING AND RELATED OFFENSES

16-12-32. Civil forfeiture.

  1. As used in this Code section, the terms "proceeds," "property," and "United States" shall have the same meanings as set forth in Code Section 9-16-2, and "enterprise" means any person, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, association, or other legal entity created under the laws the United States or any foreign nation or a group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity and includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities.
  2. The following are declared to be contraband, and no person shall have a property right in them:
    1. Every gambling device except antique slot machines as provided for in subsection (b) of Code Section 16-12-24;
    2. Any property which is, directly or indirectly, used or intended for use in any manner to facilitate a violation of this article and any proceeds;
    3. Any property located in this state which was, directly or indirectly, used or intended for use in any manner to facilitate a violation of this article or of the laws of the United States relating to gambling and any proceeds;
    4. Any interest, security, claim, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise that a person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of this article or any of the laws of the United States relating to gambling and any proceeds; and
    5. Any property found in close proximity to any gambling device or other property subject to forfeiture under this Code section.
  3. Any property declared as contraband pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section shall be forfeited in accordance with the procedures set forth in Chapter 16 of Title 9.

(Code 1981, §16-12-32, enacted by Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 2-14/HB 233.)

Editor's notes.

- This Code section formerly pertained to seizure and disposition of property used in or derived from violation of this article. The former Code section was based on Ga. L. 1945, p. 351, § 2; Code 1933, §§ 26-2709, 26-2710, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Code 1981, §§ 16-12-31,16-12-32; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2325, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 13; Ga. L. 1990, p. 587, § 1, and was repealed by Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 2-14/HB 233, effective July 1, 2015.

Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 4-1/HB 233, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to seizures of property for forfeiture that occur on or after that date. Any such seizure that occurs before July 1, 2015, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such seizure."

Law reviews.

- For article, "Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate," see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 241 (1994). For article on the 2015 enactment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32(b) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to gambling club patrons whose funds were seized when police raided a club. Izzo v. State, 257 Ga. 109, 356 S.E.2d 204 (1987).

Cash admittedly from gambling.

- An individual's uncorroborated admission to a police officer that cash the individual voluntarily took from the individual's pocket the individual had earned gambling was sufficient to support forfeiture. Hall v. State, 226 Ga. App. 486, 486 S.E.2d 710 (1997).

Failure to prove that seizure was reported within time period allowed by statute.

- Trial court erred in ordering a forfeiture because the state did not prove that the seizure of money used in commercial gambling was reported to the district attorney within the time period allowed by O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32(d); as the state failed to present evidence of the notice date, there was no evidence that the state complied with O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32(d). Ridley v. State, 253 Ga. App. 896, 560 S.E.2d 769 (2002).

Prior conviction not required.

- Showing that the owner or user of the property sought to be condemned was convicted of a crime is not required. Defendant should not be faced with the Hobson's choice of leaving the petition unanswered, thereby conceding the condemnation by default, or answering and having the defendant's first offender record used against the defendant. Jones v. State, 212 Ga. App. 682, 442 S.E.2d 880 (1994).

Van used to transport fighting dogs may be condemned.

- Van used to transport two fighting dogs to the scene of dogfights and which was thus used to facilitate a dogfight in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-37 may be condemned as provided in O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32. Macon Auto Cleaners v. State, 175 Ga. App. 13, 332 S.E.2d 324 (1985).

Gas station employees paying out cash and lottery tickets.

- Judgment approving forfeiture was affirmed because by giving players cash and lottery tickets as rewards for winning games on the amusement machines, the gas station employees effectively converted the machines into gambling devices under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32(b)(4), which clearly violated the gambling laws of Georgia prohibiting cash payouts for winning games on machines when the winnings are determined by chance even if the games involve an element of skill. Patel v. State of Ga., 341 Ga. App. 419, 801 S.E.2d 551 (2017).

Determining if penalty is proportionate to offense.

- In determining whether forfeiture of property was constitutionally permissible, the court failed to address whether the harshness of the penalty was proportional to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture; therefore, remand was required for determination of that issue. Mayes v. State, 230 Ga. App. 172, 495 S.E.2d 640 (1998).

Cited in McFarland v. State, 134 Ga. App. 470, 214 S.E.2d 721 (1975); State v. Walls, 202 Ga. App. 899, 415 S.E.2d 921 (1992); Wilson v. State, 206 Ga. App. 599, 426 S.E.2d 192 (1992); Griffin v. State, 211 Ga. App. 750, 440 S.E.2d 483 (1994).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 26-6507 and 26-6508 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Manufacturing gambling devices.

- If gambling devices are contraband when transported, it follows logically that they may not be manufactured; thus, companies manufacturing gambling devices may not be established in the State of Georgia. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 319 (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-6507).

It is illegal to transport gambling devices within this state in intrastate commerce; however, this state does not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the transportation of gambling devices in interstate commerce. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 113 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 26-6507, 26-6508).

Office of the district attorney is not a "law enforcement agency" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32(h)(1). 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-22.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 955, 961, 983 et seq. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Gambling, § 134 et seq. 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures, § 312 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 38 C.J.S., Gaming, § 110 et seq.

ALR.

- Right to jury trial in case of seizure of property alleged to be illegally used, 17 A.L.R. 568; 50 A.L.R. 97.

Lawfulness of seizure of property used in violation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-12-32

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Swails v. State of Ga., 431 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 14, 1993 | 263 Ga. 276, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 2204

...nderlying nature of forfeitures before 1798 and the proceedings under OCGA § 16-13-49. This conclusion is consistent with legislative treatment of other forfeiture proceedings in Georgia pursuant to which trial by jury was and is required. See OCGA § 16-12-32 (f) (gambling devices) in which proceedings in the superior court "shall proceed as other civil cases in said court"; former Ga....
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Izzo v. State, 356 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 27, 1987 | 257 Ga. 109

...Davis, Kenneth R. Croy, for appellants. Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, James F. Martin, Nancy I. Jordan, Debra H. Bernes, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. BELL, Justice. This appeal involves an attack on the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-12-32 (b). The trial court held the statute constitutional, and we affirm. OCGA § 16-12-32 (b) provides, in relevant part, that "all property used in, intended for use in, used to facilitate, or derived from or realized through a violation of this article or which is located within any gambling place . . . is declared to be contraband and may be seized and forfeited as provided in this Code section." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-12-32 (a) defines "property" as being "any personal property of any type, tangible or intangible, including but not limited to vehicles, conveyances, aircraft, watercraft, funds, other things of value or choses in action ....
...Some of the money was in one-hundred-dollar stacks of one dollar bills wrapped in bank bands. The police seized, inter alia, money from the table tops and from the pockets, purses, and briefcases of the people in the club. The state sought the forfeiture of all the money seized during the raid under the provisions of OCGA § 16-12-32. The appellants defended by challenging the constitutionality of that statute. The trial court held the statute constitutional, and ruled that, because § 16-12-32 (b) authorizes the forfeiture of all property "located within any gambling place," the money seized *110 from the pockets, purses, wallets, and briefcases of the appellants was subject to forfeiture. 1. The appellants challenge OCGA § 16-12-32 (b) as being void for vagueness, both on its face and as applied to them....
...nd encourages arbitrary enforcement by placing too much discretion in the police to determine what is a "gambling place." They make a similar argument with respect to that part of the definition of "property" specifying "other things of value," OCGA § 16-12-32 (a)....
...ct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." Hoffman Estates, supra, 455 U. S. at 495. Accord Gouge v. City of Snellville, 249 Ga. 91 (3) (287 SE2d 539) (1982). We conclude that OCGA § 16-12-32 (b) is not vague in light of the circumstances in question in this case — the seizure of "funds" within a "gambling place." This is so because the provisions of the statute relied on by the state to seize the appellants' money are not vague....
...First, the definition of "gambling place" in § 16-12-20 (3) is sufficiently clear to warn persons of ordinary intelligence of what places to avoid, and is sufficiently clear to discourage or preclude arbitrary enforcement decisions concerning what places constitute "gambling places." Moreover, the term "funds," OCGA § 16-12-32 (a), clearly informs persons of ordinary intelligence that the term "property" used in § 16-12-32 (b) encompasses money. The term "funds" is also definite enough to inform police of what to seize in a "gambling place." The appellants' conduct clearly, then, fell within provisions of § 16-12-32 (b) which are not unconstitutionally vague. We therefore need not decide the merits of the appellants' argument that the *111 phrase, "other things of value," § 16-12-32 (a), is too vague to warn of the type of property which is subject to seizure if it is located within a "gambling place." For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court's decision upholding the constitutionality of § 16-12-32....
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Monte Carlo Parties, Ltd. v. Webb, 322 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 6, 1984 | 253 Ga. 508

...ted the court to enjoin Solicitor Webb from fulfilling his threat to prosecute, at least until the declaratory action was settled. Monte Carlo also requested that the court find Georgia's gambling laws, OCGA §§ 16-12-20 (2), 16-12-24, 16-12-30 and 16-12-32, unconstitutional....
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Ultra Telecom, Inc. v. State, 701 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 4, 2010 | 288 Ga. 65, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3194

...In connection with this prohibition, the Legislature has specifically defined the manner in which "a coin operated game or device designed and manufactured for bona fide amusement purposes" may be used without the machine being subject to condemnation by the State as an illegal gambling device. OCGA §§ 16-12-35; 16-12-32....
...Because the machines in question allow players to redeem accumulated points for a value in excess of $5 for a single play, they are not "bona fide coin operated amusement games or devices," but rather, illegal gambling devices that are subject to condemnation by the State. Id. See also OCGA § 16-12-32....