O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 (2019)

Short title

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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This article shall be known and may be cited as the “Georgia Controlled Substances Act.”

History

Code 1933, § 79A-801, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 221, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986).

For survey article on criminal law and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (2003). For annual survey on evidence law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 101 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Evidence sufficient for conviction. - Because defendant was the driver of a vehicle in which cocaine was found, the jury could conclude that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine in the vehicle and actually possessed the cocaine that fell from defendant’s sock; consequently, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq. Cody v. State, 275 Ga. App. 140, 619 S.E.2d 811, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 907 (2005). Evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction for methamphetamine possession was sufficient because the presumption of possession and control attached since the state presented evidence that the defendant was the sole resident of the house present during the execution of the search warrant when the methamphetamine was found in a common area of the house; the presumption of possession was not the sole evidence connecting the defendant to the crime of possession because the arresting officer testified that the defendant exhibited clear signs of methamphetamine intoxication. Martin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s drug possession convictions because: (1) when the defendant was stopped, after attempting to avoid an early morning traffic safety checkpoint, the defendant fled from the defendant’s vehicle, leaving the defendant’s screaming child behind; (2) the defendant was pursued and apprehended by sheriff’s deputies; (3) the deputies found a dry bag of marijuana and a bag of cocaine that appeared to be sticky with saliva on the ground, which was wet from rain, along the trail upon which the defendant had just run; and (4) evidence was presented of the defendant fleeing from the police in three similar incidents. Dix v. State, 307

Ga. App. 684, 705 S.E.2d 903, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 44 (2011). Sentencing for attempt to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. - There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for criminal attempt to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33, because defendant participated in a reverse undercover sting operation for the sale of a large amount of marijuana, defendant was seen with the money, and defendant was clearly an active participant in the transaction; sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33 was appropriate and did not violate the rule of lenity with respect to the sentencing range for attempt under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-6(b), as the former statute was specifically enacted for purposes of providing sentencing to convictions under the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., rendering the latter sentencing statute inapplicable to the present prosecution. Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 608 S.E.2d 631, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 119 (2005). Control over substance. - Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s cocaine possession conviction, even though only one witness, a police officer, testified about cocaine under defendant’s body, while others did not see the contraband; the jury was authorized to conclude that defendant had control over and possessed the cocaine found underneath the defendant’s body. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. App. 677, 624 S.E.2d 272, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2005). Trial court did not manifestly abuse the court’s discretion when the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance found in the car in which a probationer was riding was cocaine and that the probationer had constructive pos-

session of the cocaine because the driver of the car denied that the cocaine was the driver’s and stated that the cocaine was thrown to the floorboard under the driver’s feet by the probationer. Thurmond v. State, 304 Ga. App. 587, 696 S.E.2d 516, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (2010). No charge on entrapment warranted. - Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury on the defense of entrapment because there was no evidence that the defendant was improperly induced to commit the crime of selling drugs through a confidential informant’s undue

persuasion, incitement, or deceit; the informant gave the defendant money in exchange for pills during two transactions and cocaine during another transaction, and the defendant told the informant that the defendant needed to keep $300 to buy more pills, and the defendant demonstrated the defendant’s knowledge about the drugs when the defendant identified one type of pill that the defendant was selling to the informant as “green apples”. Graham v. State, 305 Ga. App. 772, 700 S.E.2d 863, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 813 (2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES U.L.A. Uniform Controlled Substances Act (U.L.A.) § 604. ALR. Minimum quantity of drug required to support claim that defendant is guilty of criminal “possession” of drug under state law, 4 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of state “drug kingpin” statutes, 30 A.L.R.5th 121. Prosecution of mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled substance to child, 70 A.L.R.5th 461.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2008).
Clark v. State, 912 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. 2025). · cites it 4× “Pertinent Facts and Procedural History On May 18, 2017, Marvante Clark was indicted by a Henry County grand jury for burglary, theft by receiving stolen property, two counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-20, et seq., obstruction of an…”
Demetris Kennedy v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 2× “Here, the indicted offenses were alleged to have occurred in February 2019, but the statutes on which Kennedy 2 OCGA § 16-13-21 defines certain words and phrases as they are used in the “Georgia Controlled Substances Act,” see OCGA § 16-13-20, et seq., including the term…”
In the Matter of David Godley Rigdon, 837 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. 2020). · cites it 2× “4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d),1 by entering a guilty plea on eight counts of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. While the maximum penalty for a Rule 8.”
State of Georgia v. Damion White (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2×
Nathan Ross Johnson v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2×
Pennington v. State, 306 Ga. 854 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “2 OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. that the conduct prohibited by OCGA § 16-13-32.”
Kimbrough v. State, 799 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. Paragraph 16-13-43 (a) (6) makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o withhold information from a practitioner that such person has obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner.”
Kimbrough v. State (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “9 Count 1 says that the pattern of racketeering activity is “more particularly described” in subsequent counts of the indictment, and indeed, 19 other counts charge various defendants with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by withholding information from a medical practitioner.”
Evans v. the State, 766 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “The offense at issue is set out in OCGA § 16-13-30 (a), 3 which provides that, “[e]xcept as authorized by [the Georgia Controlled SubstancesAct, OCGA §§ 16-13-20 through 16-13-56 (“theAct”),] itis unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, or have under his or her control any…”
Mordica v. State, 736 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. OCGA § 16-13-49 (d) (2), (3).”
Conrad v. State, 730 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “19 Furthermore, the drugs underlying Conrad’s and Presnal’s charges, suppression motion, and convictions were discovered in places that the warrant authorized to be searched specifically for controlled substances.”
George Conrad v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2×
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