O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 (2019)

Short title

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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This article shall be known and may be cited as the “Georgia Controlled Substances Act.”

History

Code 1933, § 79A-801, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 221, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986).

For survey article on criminal law and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (2003). For annual survey on evidence law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 101 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Evidence sufficient for conviction. - Because defendant was the driver of a vehicle in which cocaine was found, the jury could conclude that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine in the vehicle and actually possessed the cocaine that fell from defendant’s sock; consequently, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq. Cody v. State, 275 Ga. App. 140, 619 S.E.2d 811, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 907 (2005). Evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction for methamphetamine possession was sufficient because the presumption of possession and control attached since the state presented evidence that the defendant was the sole resident of the house present during the execution of the search warrant when the methamphetamine was found in a common area of the house; the presumption of possession was not the sole evidence connecting the defendant to the crime of possession because the arresting officer testified that the defendant exhibited clear signs of methamphetamine intoxication. Martin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s drug possession convictions because: (1) when the defendant was stopped, after attempting to avoid an early morning traffic safety checkpoint, the defendant fled from the defendant’s vehicle, leaving the defendant’s screaming child behind; (2) the defendant was pursued and apprehended by sheriff’s deputies; (3) the deputies found a dry bag of marijuana and a bag of cocaine that appeared to be sticky with saliva on the ground, which was wet from rain, along the trail upon which the defendant had just run; and (4) evidence was presented of the defendant fleeing from the police in three similar incidents. Dix v. State, 307

Ga. App. 684, 705 S.E.2d 903, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 44 (2011). Sentencing for attempt to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. - There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for criminal attempt to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33, because defendant participated in a reverse undercover sting operation for the sale of a large amount of marijuana, defendant was seen with the money, and defendant was clearly an active participant in the transaction; sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-33 was appropriate and did not violate the rule of lenity with respect to the sentencing range for attempt under O.C.G.A. § 16-4-6(b), as the former statute was specifically enacted for purposes of providing sentencing to convictions under the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., rendering the latter sentencing statute inapplicable to the present prosecution. Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 608 S.E.2d 631, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 119 (2005). Control over substance. - Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s cocaine possession conviction, even though only one witness, a police officer, testified about cocaine under defendant’s body, while others did not see the contraband; the jury was authorized to conclude that defendant had control over and possessed the cocaine found underneath the defendant’s body. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. App. 677, 624 S.E.2d 272, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2005). Trial court did not manifestly abuse the court’s discretion when the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance found in the car in which a probationer was riding was cocaine and that the probationer had constructive pos-

session of the cocaine because the driver of the car denied that the cocaine was the driver’s and stated that the cocaine was thrown to the floorboard under the driver’s feet by the probationer. Thurmond v. State, 304 Ga. App. 587, 696 S.E.2d 516, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (2010). No charge on entrapment warranted. - Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury on the defense of entrapment because there was no evidence that the defendant was improperly induced to commit the crime of selling drugs through a confidential informant’s undue

persuasion, incitement, or deceit; the informant gave the defendant money in exchange for pills during two transactions and cocaine during another transaction, and the defendant told the informant that the defendant needed to keep $300 to buy more pills, and the defendant demonstrated the defendant’s knowledge about the drugs when the defendant identified one type of pill that the defendant was selling to the informant as “green apples”. Graham v. State, 305 Ga. App. 772, 700 S.E.2d 863, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 813 (2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES U.L.A. Uniform Controlled Substances Act (U.L.A.) § 604. ALR. Minimum quantity of drug required to support claim that defendant is guilty of criminal “possession” of drug under state law, 4 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of state “drug kingpin” statutes, 30 A.L.R.5th 121. Prosecution of mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled substance to child, 70 A.L.R.5th 461.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2008).
Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 4× “The warrant authorized the executing officers to search "for evidence of the crime of Violation of Georgia Controlled Substance[s] Act." (Emphasis in original.”
Kimbrough v. State, 799 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. Paragraph 16-13-43 (a) (6) makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o withhold information from a practitioner that such person has obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from another practitioner.”
Bettis v. State of Georgia, 491 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4× “manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent to distribute any controlled substance,” including cocaine.”
Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 2× “2 OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. 3 Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga.”
Woods v. State, 608 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 2× “The former Code section is a sentencing provision ofthe Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA§ 16-13-20 et seq., which prescribes that one convicted of attempt or conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act is subject to “the maximum punishment for the offense,…”
Chambers v. State, 579 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “The crimes relating to the possession or sale of marijuana are very specifically set forth in the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. Under OCGA § 16-13-21 (16) marijuana is specifically defined as: all parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis, whether…”
Barnes v. State, 339 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. 1986). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. We granted certiorari in this case, Barnes v.”
Asberry v. State, 467 S.E.2d 225 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “) In response to Asberry’s claims that marijuana is not a controlled substance for purposes of OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (4), the State argues that the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA §§ 16-13-20 through 16-13-56, contains proscriptions against marijuana, and, thus, marijuana…”
State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Darla Michelle Luster was charged in a two count indictment with violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. Count One charged Luster with possessing cocaine between January 1, 1991 and March 3, 1991.”
Dawkins v. State, 547 A.2d 1041 (Md. 1988). “15 (1976); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-20 to 16-13-56; Haw.”
Burroughs v. State, 379 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “, appeals his bench conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine, OCGA § 16-13-30, in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq. Orders of nolle prosequi were entered on one count of trafficking in cocaine, OCGA § 16-13-31 (a), and two…”
Robinson v. State, 297 S.E.2d 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 2× “(now OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq.), and the term has not been bindingly defined in the drug context either by this court or by our Supreme Court.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.