O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3 (2019)

Use of communication facility in committing or facilitating commission of act which constitutes felony under chapter; penalty

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under this chapter. Each separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this Code section. For purposes of this Code section, the term “communication facility” means any and all public and private instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, computer or computer network, and all other means of communication.

(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) of this Code section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $30,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than four years, or both.

History

Code 1981, § 16-13-32.3, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2359, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 574, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For survey article on criminal law and

procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For note on the 1995 amendment of this Code section, see 12 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 130 (1995).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Same transaction established. - Defendant’s plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds was improperly denied as to the offense of use of a communication facility in committing a crime under the Fulton County indictment because the state agreed to nolle prose the Forsyth County indictment; and the county and city detectives’ testimony confirmed that the communications charged were one and the same. Laghaeifar v. State, 360 Ga. App. 843, 861 S.E.2d 808, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 403 (2021). Participation in later drug sale irrelevant to charge under statute. - When a defendant was charged with using a communication facility (telephone) to facilitate a sale of cocaine, it was immaterial to guilt under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3 that the defendant did not participate in the subsequent sale of cocaine that the defendant had initially facilitated; the telephone call in which the defendant participated clearly aided in the sale of the cocaine. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Hunt v. State, 196 Ga. App. 694, 396 S.E.2d 802, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1006 (1990). Use of a telephone by defendant to arrange with another to pick up packages of drugs and deliver them to defendant’s apartment was sufficient evidence that defendant used a communication device to obtain possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. Russell v. State, 243 Ga. App. 378, 532 S.E.2d 137, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 392 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1237, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 634 (Ga. Sept. 11, 2000).

Use of a pager. - Because the defendant delivered cocaine to an informant and used a pager to aid in the cocaine’s distribution, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of distributing cocaine and using a communication facility to facilitate a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act, specifically violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-21(11) and 16-13-32.3(a). Capers v. State, 273 Ga. App. 427, 615 S.E.2d 126, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 374 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1592, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 546 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005). Venue not established. - State failed to prove venue on a count for unlawful use of a communication facility; the indictment alleged that the defendant had used a cellular telephone in Long County, but the state had not set forth any evidence that the defendant used the telephone there. Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga. App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 248 (2007). With regard to a defendant’s trial on various drug charges, the defendant’s convictions on three counts of using a communication device to commit or facilitate the commission of a designated felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3, were reversed because the state failed to prove venue since the state submitted no proof that three related phone calls made on September 23, 24, and 25, 2003, were made in Newton County, Georgia, wherein prosecution was sought. Rogers v. State, 298 Ga. App. 895, 681 S.E.2d 693, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 815 (2009). Evidence insufficient for conviction. - Transcripts of monitored telephone conversations between the

defendant and other individuals named in the indictment were insufficient to support defendant’s convictions of using a communications facility to commit, cause, or facilitate a violation of the Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., since the state introduced no evidence tending to suggest that any overt act was ever carried out in furtherance of the drug transaction which had been discussed. Kelleher v. State, 185 Ga. App. 774, 365 S.E.2d 889, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 255 (1988). When there was no direct evidence the defendant made a telephone call to arrange the delivery of cocaine as charged in the indictment, the circumstantial evidence was held to be insufficient as a matter of law to exclude other reasonable inferences. Britt v. State, 202 Ga. App. 689, 415 S.E.2d 492, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 167 (1992). Evidence sufficient for conviction. - Because: (1) the defendant failed to sufficiently prove an entrapment defense, and hence, the need for disclosure of an informant’s identity; (2) no error resulted in refusing to strike a juror for cause; and (3) the trial court’s entrapment

instruction was legally correct and did not mislead the jury, the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and two counts of use of communication facilities in committing a felony drug offense, under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3, were affirmed on appeal. Griffiths v. State, 283 Ga. App. 176, 641 S.E.2d 169, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1516 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0652, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 333 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2007). Recorded conversations between an informant and a defendant proved the defendant’s violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3, the use of communication facility in committing a felony. There was circumstantial evidence that the defendant was the participant in the phone calls, and the phone calls set up drug buys between the informant and the defendant. Kimble v. State, 301 Ga. App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0570, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 464 (Ga. May 17, 2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0569, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 466 (Ga. May 17, 2010).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2021 · leading case: Rogers v. State, 681 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
Rogers v. State, 681 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 14× “Greg Rogers appeals from his convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, two counts of selling methamphetamine, and four counts of using a communication device to commit or facilitate the commission of a designated felony under OCGA § 16-13-32.3. 1…”
Sullivan v. State, 622 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 14× “Although under step 1 concurrent jurisdiction exists in Georgia for the prosecution of the defendant for the crimes of using the phone to arrange either the murder or the drug crime, see OCGA§ 16-13-32.3 (a); Division 2, infra, under step 2 of the statutory analysis the former…”
Hunt v. State, 396 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 12× “Appellant Hunt was indicted for violating OCGA § 16-13-32.3 by using a communication facility to facilitate a sale of cocaine.”
Kimble v. State, 687 S.E.2d 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “Following a trial of all of the co-defendants but Waters, a Chatham County jury convicted Kimble and Loury of trafficking in cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-31 (a)) and, further, convicted Loury of trafficking in marijuana (OCGA § 16-13-31 (c)), use of a communications facility in…”
Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “NOTES [1] More specifically, she was charged with one count of unlawfully attempting to purchase a controlled substance in violation of OCGA § 16-4-1, one count of unlawfully using a communications facility in violation of OCGA § 16-13-32.”
Kelleher v. State, 365 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 16-13-32.3. The contraband upon which the three joint drug convictions were based was seized from the Kellehers’ residence during the course of two searches conducted pursuant to separate search warrants.”
Reeves v. The State., 816 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “2d 693 ((2009) (explaining that venue for the purposes of OCGA § 16-13-32.3, using a telephone to facilitate the commission of a felony, is located in the county in which the call originated or the county to which the call was made based on federal case law related to the…”
Gordon v. Frost, 388 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Gordon’s arrest at the pharmacy for violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by fraudulently attempting to obtain a controlled substance via the telephone, OCGA § 16-13-32.3. During trial, the court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Benton on all causes of…”
Baptiste v. State, 379 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 16-13-32.3. He enumerates several alleged errors in his effort to have his convictions reversed.”
Brannon v. State, 530 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “7 OCGA § 16-13-32.3 (a). 8 See generally Hunt v.”
Rhodes v. State, 407 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 16-13-32.3. The amphetamine count was not submitted to the jury.”
Cassie v. State, 385 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “(OCGA § 16-13-32.3.) Parague and Randall were also charged with possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.