No constitutional right to be in a gang.

- Appellant, a juvenile, was not entitled to the dismissal of two counts of street gang criminal activity based on the juvenile's contention that the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., was overbroad because the statute criminalized the constitutionally protected freedom of association; criminal gang activity was not a protected activity even when committed by a group exercising the group's constitutional right to free association. In re K.R.S., 284 Ga. 853, 672 S.E.2d 622 (2009).

Constitutionality.

- Trial court properly denied the appellants' motion to dismiss various counts charging the appellants with gang-related crimes under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., since properly construed O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) did not directly or indirectly infringe upon the First Amendment right to freedom of association as, to support a conviction, gang conduct or participation was required. Further, reading § 16-15-4(a) according to the natural and obvious import of the statute's language and in conjunction with the specific definitions in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3, the statute provided a sufficiently definite warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct and was not susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and did not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, thus, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 671 S.E.2d 497 (2009).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39. - There is no legal authority to support the proposition that the Georgia Street Gang and Terrorism Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39, two very differently worded statutory provisions, are equivalent; thus, defendant's argument that, as a matter of law, if the armed robbery of September 17, 1999, and the murder of December 28, 1999, are considered as part of the "pattern of criminal street gang activity" for purposes of violating the Street Gang Act, the actions must necessarily also be considered "offenses occurring in the same series of acts" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39(c) failed. Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 616 S.E.2d 448 (2005).

Co-conspirator statements properly admitted.

- Defendants' murder convictions were upheld on appeal because the trial court did not err by admitting or refusing to strike a fellow gang member's testimony since the statements were admissible as co-conspirator statements under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E) as the statements were found to have been made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy of being a part of a criminal street gang. Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385, 810 S.E.2d 515 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., because various gang members including the defendant's brother and their associate were on the dance floor flashing gang hand signs and dancing roughly, purposefully bumping into other club patrons, and an altercation ensued; the defendant's brother struck the victim in the back of the victim's head with a beer bottle; the defendant's associate and several others struck the victim and punched the victim in the head; when the victim walked toward the exit door, the defendant hit the victim across the face with a bottle; and the victim was taken by ambulance to a hospital. Dowdell v. State, 325 Ga. App. 593, 754 S.E.2d 383 (2014).

Evidence demonstrated that "MPRC 300" was a "criminal street gang," as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-15-3(2), based on the defendant's and other members' conspiracy to commit armed robbery, expert testimony that "MPRC" stood for "Money Power Respect Click" and the "300" related to the Smyrna ZIP codes where the group operated, and evidence of the group's "jumpoff" or "freak" meeting before the group embarked on the robbery. Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 781 S.E.2d 777 (2016).

Evidence showing the defendant and the co-defendants were associated with a criminal street gang and that the planned robbery was intended to further the gang's interests authorized the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq. Blackledge v. State, 299 Ga. 385, 788 S.E.2d 353 (2016).

Sufficient evidence, including expert testimony, supported the appellants' convictions because the evidence established that the appellants were associated with a criminal street gang and that the armed robbery and aggravated assault the appellants engaged in constituted criminal street gang activity and were intended to further the interests of the gang. Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 794 S.E.2d 67 (2016).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- Conviction for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., was reversed because there was no evidence beyond the bandanas and a notebook to link the juveniles to membership in a criminal street gang. To sustain a conviction, the state had to prove that the criminal gang activity or plans for its continuation was ongoing at the time of the commission of the indicted offenses; in other words, the commission of an enumerated offense by the juveniles was not itself sufficient to prove the existence of a criminal street gang. In the Interest of A. G., 317 Ga. App. 165, 730 S.E.2d 187 (2012).

Evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., because the state failed to adduce any evidence that the defendant was associated with a gang or that the aggravated assault was intended in any way to further the interests of a gang. No witnesses testified that the defendant was in a gang or that those accompanying the defendant were members of a gang, and no evidence was presented that the defendant or any of the defendant's accomplices displayed gang symbols or colors on the day of the incident or at any other time. Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013).

Charge did not omit nexus between violence and gang activity.

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and gang-related crimes, the trial court did not commit plain error with regard to the court's jury instructions because the trial court correctly stated the law by using the statutory language in the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a), in the court's charge to the jury, so the charge did not omit a nexus between the violence, and it was not possible for the jury to convict the defendant without finding that nexus. Skinner v. State, 318 Ga. App. 217, 733 S.E.2d 506 (2012).

Merger of counts erroneous.

- Trial court erred by merging the guilty verdicts for armed robbery, burglary, and two counts of gang activity as armed robbery and burglary did not merge into malice murder. Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 794 S.E.2d 67 (2016).