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(Code 1981, §42-9-39, enacted by Ga. L. 1983, p. 523, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 14; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 27/HB 1059.)
- Power and authority of the board to grant reprieves, pardons, paroles, and other relief, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II.
- Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 18, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 1995, upon ratification by the voters of this state at the 1994 November general election of that proposed amendment to Article IV, Section II, Paragraph II of the Constitution authorizing the General Assembly to provide for mandatory minimum sentences and sentences of life without possibility of parole in certain cases and providing restrictions on the authority of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant paroles." That amendment was ratified by the voters on November 8, 1994, so this Code section, as set out above, became effective on January 1, 1995.
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994.'"
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The General Assembly declares and finds:
"(1) That persons who are convicted of certain serious violent felonies shall serve minimum terms of imprisonment which shall not be suspended, probated, stayed, deferred, or otherwise withheld by the sentencing judge; and
"(2) That sentences ordered by courts in cases of certain serious violent felonies shall be served in their entirety and shall not be reduced by parole or by any earned time, early release, work release, or other such sentence-reducing measures administered by the Department of Corrections."
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed on or after the effective date of this Act; provided, however, that any conviction occurring prior to, on, or after the effective date of this Act shall be deemed a 'conviction' for the purposes of this Act and shall be counted in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed for any offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act."
Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.
Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "The General Assembly declares and finds: (1) That the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994,' approved April 20, 1994 (Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959), provided that persons convicted of one of seven serious violent felonies shall serve minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment which shall not otherwise be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court; (2) That in State v. Allmond , 225 Ga. App. 509 (1997), the Georgia Court of Appeals held, notwithstanding the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994,' that the provisions of the First Offender Act would still be available to the sentencing court, which would mean that a person who committed a serious violent felony could be sentenced to less than the minimum mandatory ten-year sentence; and (3) That, contrary to the decision in State v. Allmond , it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that persons who commit a serious violent felony specified in the 'Sentence Reform Act of 1994' shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall not be eligible for first offender treatment."
Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that: "The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment."
- For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 11 (2006). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 159 (1994).
- There is no legal authority to support the proposition that the Georgia Street Gang and Terrorism Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39, two very differently worded statutory provisions, are equivalent; thus, the defendant's argument that, as a matter of law, if the armed robbery of September 17, 1999, and the murder of December 28, 1999, are considered as part of the "pattern of criminal street gang activity" for purposes of violating the Street Gang Act, they must necessarily also be considered "offenses occurring in the same series of acts" within the meaning of § 42-9-39(c) failed. Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 616 S.E.2d 448 (2005).
- Since in pleading guilty to four counts of murder and one count of aggravated assault, the defendant admitted a number of acts that a jury could reasonably consider "aggravating circumstances" under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b), and in both Georgia and other jurisdictions, the defendant might well have been sentenced to death, a sentence denying the defendant consideration of parole for 30 years, under subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39 does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." McClendon v. State, 256 Ga. 480, 350 S.E.2d 235 (1986).
- Defendant's sentence for crimes the juvenile committed as a juvenile, which amounted to eight consecutive life sentences plus 60 years, was upheld on appeal because the United States Supreme Court had not expanded its mandate that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as the Amendment applies to juvenile offenders requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile's youth and youth's attendant characteristics before imposing a sentence other than life without parole. Veal v. State, 303 Ga. 18, 810 S.E.2d 127 (2018).
Cited in Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843 (1986); Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 340 S.E.2d 869 (1986); Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986); In re L.L.B., 256 Ga. 768, 353 S.E.2d 507 (1987).
- 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole, §§ 30, 76.
- 67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole, §§ 18, 23-25, 46-53.
- Construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and state constitutional provisions proscribing state bills of attainder, 63 A.L.R. 6th 1.
Total Results: 14
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-05-29
Snippet: eligibility. See OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c); OCGA § 42-9-39 (c). 59
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-03-07
Snippet: provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 42- 9-39, for a first conviction of a serious violent
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-04-19
Snippet: provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 42-9-39 [concerning the authority of the State Board of
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-02-05
Citation: 810 S.E.2d 127
Snippet: life sentences plus 60 years. 1. Citing OCGA § 42-9-39 (c)1 , appellant notes that the aggregate sentence
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-03-07
Citation: 707 S.E.2d 78, 288 Ga. 739, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 549, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 180
Snippet: otherwise provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 42-9-39, for a first conviction of a serious violent felony
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-04-09
Citation: 698 S.E.2d 301, 287 Ga. 338, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2748, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 317
Snippet: parole, see, e.g., OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1, 17-10-7, 42-9-39, 42-9-40, and because the Board of Pardons and
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-02-01
Citation: 689 S.E.2d 286, 286 Ga. 434, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 253, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 111
Snippet: parole, see, e.g., OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1, 17-10-7, 42-9-39, 42-9-40, and because the Board of Pardons and
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2005-06-30
Citation: 616 S.E.2d 448, 279 Ga. 518, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2013, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 450
Snippet: consecutive life sentences in conjunction with OCGA § 42-9-39(c),[6] and that had counsel done so, he would have
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1994-12-05
Citation: 264 Ga. 777, 450 S.E.2d 680, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3985, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 914
Snippet: him ineligible for parole for 25 years. OCGA § 42-9-39 (b). However, the only evidence in Burgess’s trial
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-03-12
Citation: 353 S.E.2d 504, 256 Ga. 776, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 649
Snippet: defendant is now 50 years old, and that under OCGA § 42-9-39 (c), the defendant will not be eligible for consideration
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1986-11-25
Citation: 350 S.E.2d 235, 256 Ga. 480, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 931
Snippet: all to be served consecutively. Under OCGA § 42-9-39 (c), the trial court indicated that McClendon would
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1986-03-18
Citation: 340 S.E.2d 891, 255 Ga. 616, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 616
Snippet: mitigating evidence the fact that, under OCGA § 42-9-39 (c), he would not be eligible for parole for 30
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1986-03-11
Citation: 340 S.E.2d 869, 255 Ga. 598
Snippet: years before becoming eligible for parole. OCGA § 42-9-39 (c). Because this issue may again arise, we will
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1986-03-07
Citation: 340 S.E.2d 891, 255 Ga. 565
Snippet: be eligible for parole for 25 years. See OCGA § 42-9-39 (b). Thus, since Cook was already 56 years old