Intent manifested by circumstances connected with perpetration of offense.

- Every crime consists in union or joint operation of act and intention. Sometimes intention can be proved, sometimes it can only be inferred or presumed; and general rule is that intention will be manifested by circumstances connected with perpetration of offense. Marzetta v. Steinman, 117 Ga. App. 471, 160 S.E.2d 590 (1968); Mallette v. State, 119 Ga. App. 24, 165 S.E.2d 870 (1969).

State proved that defendant, while intoxicated, purposely drove repeatedly over the road's center line and defendant's proffered defense that defendant "blacked out" was properly rejected. Crossley v. State, 261 Ga. App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (2003).

Defendant's ignorance of violating the law would not relieve defendant of criminal intent if defendant intended to do the act which the legislature prohibited. Wilson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 839, 197 S.E. 48 (1938).

Knowledge, like intent, is a question of fact which is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence. Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 183, 279 S.E.2d 483 (1981).

Whether requisite intent is manifested by circumstances is question for trier of fact, and, on review, appellate court will not disturb factual determination unless it is contrary to evidence and clearly erroneous. Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981); Burden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 778, 371 S.E.2d 410, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 778, 371 S.E.2d 410 (1988).

Intent with which act is done is a question of fact for determination by jury. Mallette v. State, 119 Ga. App. 24, 165 S.E.2d 870 (1969); M.J.W. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 350, 210 S.E.2d 842 (1974).

One is presumed to intend necessary and legitimate consequences of that which one knowingly does. M.J.W. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 350, 210 S.E.2d 842 (1974).

Presence, companionship and conduct before and after offense as relevant to intent.

- While mere presence at scene of commission of crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being party thereto, presence, companionship, and conduct before and after offense are circumstances from which one's participation in criminal intent may be inferred. Kimbro v. State, 152 Ga. App. 893, 264 S.E.2d 327 (1980); Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 305 S.E.2d 599 (1983); Norris v. State, 220 Ga. App. 87, 469 S.E.2d 214 (1996).

There was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to participate in the robbery of a delivery man where the evidence showed that defendant was privy to the robbery plan, participated in the robbery, and convened with the codefendants after the robbery. In the Interest of C.L.B., 267 Ga. App. 456, 600 S.E.2d 407 (2004).

Inferences and deductions which flow naturally from facts proved may be considered in determining intent. Fears v. State, 152 Ga. App. 817, 264 S.E.2d 284 (1979).

Motive.

- Motive is only one of several things that may be considered in finding intent. Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 236 S.E.2d 365 (1977).

Evidence of knowledge.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that a defendant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine concealed in the defendant's vehicle because the evidence established that the methamphetamine was located in an unmarked pill bottle within arm's reach on an open shelf behind the passenger's seat, in the console of the vehicle along with the defendant's personal possessions, and in the bedding area of the vehicle behind a panel having a missing screw, and there were no other passengers in the vehicle. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0176, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 179 (Ga. 2008).

Permissive presumption is created by combining former Code 1933,

§§ 26-604 and 26-605 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-5 and16-2-6) in charge. - Permissive presumption such as created by combining former Code 1933, §§ 26-604 and 26-605 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-5 and16-2-6) in charge allows, but does not require, trier of fact to infer elemental fact from proof by prosecutor of basic one and that places no burden of any kind on defendant. Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900 (1979).

Permissive presumptions are not inherently unconstitutional, but are to be tested by the rational connection test under which the court asks if ultimate fact to be presumed is more likely than not to flow from proved fact; and where former Code 1933, §§ 26-604 and 26-605 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-5 and16-2-6) are combined in charge to create such presumption, the presumption is rational as obviously it is more likely than not that a normal defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of defendant's acts. Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900 (1979).

Statute need not be charged, absent request, where essential elements of crime are charged.

- Trial court is not required to charge intention as defined by statute in absence of a timely written request if the court has charged essential elements of crime with which defendant is charged, including necessity of intent to commit crime. Whigham v. State, 131 Ga. App. 261, 205 S.E.2d 467 (1974); Carter v. State, 137 Ga. App. 824, 225 S.E.2d 73 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6).

It is not necessary that charge to jury be in exact language of Code. Parks v. State, 234 Ga. 579, 216 S.E.2d 804 (1975).

Failure to charge exact language of former Code 1933, §§ 26-604 and 26-605 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-5 and16-2-6) is not reversible error absent request therefor when subject of intent was fully charged. Smith v. State, 139 Ga. App. 660, 229 S.E.2d 74 (1976).

Detailed definition of intent not necessary.

- Upright and intelligent jurors would have no difficulty in understanding meaning of a simple word like "intent," and no detailed definition need be given. Powell v. State, 130 Ga. App. 588, 203 S.E.2d 893 (1974).

Charge that law presumes unlawful action is criminally intended until contrary shown is error, as it is contrary to the express language of the statute. Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 454, 191 S.E.2d 100 (1972).

Charging substance of section not burdenshifting.

- Trial court's charge to the jury stating the substance of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6 was not improper or burdenshifting in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979). Quick v. State, 198 Ga. App. 353, 401 S.E.2d 758 (1991).

Sufficiency of evidence.

- Jury's finding with respect to intent is not set aside because evidence supporting it is exceedingly weak. Mallette v. State, 119 Ga. App. 24, 165 S.E.2d 870 (1969).

Evidence supported a conviction for child molestation where: (1) the victim testified that the defendant touched the victim's genitals from the outside of the victim's clothing while the victim sat in front of the defendant on a four-wheeler; (2) another witness testified that the defendant touched the witness the same day; and (3), the jury did not believe the defendant's explanation that if the touching occurred, it was accidental. Collins v. State, 276 Ga. App. 358, 623 S.E.2d 192 (2005).

When a deputy testified that the defendant resisted the deputy's efforts to break up a prison fight, then turned on the deputy, punched the deputy, and swung at the deputy repeatedly, injuring the deputy, there was sufficient evidence of mutiny in a penal institution and felony obstruction of an officer; the trial court was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6 to infer from the circumstances that the defendant both knowingly and willfully obstructed the deputy by the use of violence and intended to cause the deputy serious bodily injury by striking the deputy with a fist, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), it could rely solely on the deputy's account of the events. Butler v. State, 284 Ga. App. 802, 644 S.E.2d 898 (2007).

Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was a party to the crime because there was ample evidence, based upon the defendant's actions and the defendant's presence, companionship, conduct, and demeanor before, during, and after the commission of the crime, to conclude that the defendant was more than "merely present" during the commission of the crimes; while in a car with the victim and companions, the front-seat passenger pulled out a gun and shot the victim, and during the incident, the defendant did not say or do anything to intervene. Cook v. State, 314 Ga. App. 289, 723 S.E.2d 709 (2012).

Cited in Rowland v. State, 124 Ga. App. 495, 184 S.E.2d 495 (1971); Shields v. State, 126 Ga. App. 544, 191 S.E.2d 448 (1972); Taylor v. State, 127 Ga. App. 692, 194 S.E.2d 627 (1972); Daniels v. State, 230 Ga. 126, 195 S.E.2d 900 (1973); Bloodworth v. State, 128 Ga. App. 657, 197 S.E.2d 423 (1973); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444, 197 S.E.2d 720 (1973); Pittman v. State, 230 Ga. 448, 197 S.E.2d 722 (1973); Bloodworth v. State, 129 Ga. App. 40, 198 S.E.2d 341 (1973); Murphy v. State, 129 Ga. App. 28, 198 S.E.2d 344 (1973); West v. State, 129 Ga. App. 271, 199 S.E.2d 354 (1973); Kramer v. State, 230 Ga. 855, 199 S.E.2d 805 (1973); James v. State, 232 Ga. 834, 209 S.E.2d 176 (1974); Bentley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 425, 205 S.E.2d 904 (1974); Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. 479, 211 S.E.2d 757 (1975); Franklin v. State, 136 Ga. App. 47, 220 S.E.2d 60 (1975); J.A.T. v. State, 136 Ga. App. 540, 221 S.E.2d 702 (1975); Littleton v. State, 139 Ga. App. 511, 229 S.E.2d 20 (1976); Ealey v. State, 139 Ga. App. 604, 229 S.E.2d 86 (1976); Dodson v. State, 237 Ga. 607, 229 S.E.2d 364 (1976); Bass v. State, 237 Ga. 710, 229 S.E.2d 448 (1976); Coleman v. State, 137 Ga. App. 689, 224 S.E.2d 878 (1976); Dodd v. State, 236 Ga. 572, 224 S.E.2d 408 (1976); Wiggins v. State, 139 Ga. App. 98, 227 S.E.2d 895 (1976); Robertson v. State, 140 Ga. App. 506, 231 S.E.2d 367 (1976); Harrison v. State, 140 Ga. App. 296, 231 S.E.2d 809 (1976); Jones v. State, 141 Ga. App. 17, 232 S.E.2d 365 (1977); Washington v. State, 142 Ga. App. 651, 236 S.E.2d 837 (1977); Baker v. State, 143 Ga. App. 302, 238 S.E.2d 241 (1977); Wells v. State, 144 Ga. App. 841, 242 S.E.2d 752 (1978); Jones v. State, 145 Ga. App. 356, 243 S.E.2d 747 (1978); Harris v. State, 145 Ga. App. 675, 244 S.E.2d 620 (1978); Dougherty v. State, 145 Ga. App. 718, 244 S.E.2d 638 (1978); Sheffield v. State, 241 Ga. 245, 244 S.E.2d 869 (1978); Spivey v. State, 241 Ga. 477, 246 S.E.2d 288 (1978); Hitchcock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 470, 246 S.E.2d 477 (1978); McCane v. State, 147 Ga. App. 730, 250 S.E.2d 181 (1978); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301, 259 S.E.2d 697 (1979); Jackson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 296, 260 S.E.2d 565 (1979); J.E.T. v. State, 151 Ga. App. 836, 261 S.E.2d 752 (1979); Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. App. 6, 262 S.E.2d 214 (1979); Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829, 264 S.E.2d 271 (1979); Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 263 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980); Green v. State, 155 Ga. App. 795, 272 S.E.2d 761 (1980); O'Bear v. State, 156 Ga. App. 100, 274 S.E.2d 54 (1980); Brewer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 468, 274 S.E.2d 817 (1980); Craft v. State, 158 Ga. App. 745, 282 S.E.2d 203 (1981); Simpson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 235, 283 S.E.2d 91 (1981); Ely v. State, 159 Ga. App. 693, 285 S.E.2d 66 (1981); Hardy v. State, 159 Ga. App. 854, 285 S.E.2d 547 (1981); Butler v. State, 161 Ga. App. 251, 288 S.E.2d 306 (1982); Billings v. State, 161 Ga. App. 500, 288 S.E.2d 622 (1982); Monteford v. State, 162 Ga. App. 491, 292 S.E.2d 93 (1982); McCormick v. State, 162 Ga. App. 267, 293 S.E.2d 35 (1982); Hall v. State, 162 Ga. App. 713, 293 S.E.2d 862 (1982); Gray v. State, 163 Ga. App. 720, 294 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Coker v. State, 163 Ga. App. 799, 295 S.E.2d 538 (1982); Talley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 150, 296 S.E.2d 173 (1982); Blalock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 257, 299 S.E.2d 919 (1983); Wilson v. Jones, 251 Ga. 23, 302 S.E.2d 546 (1983); McGahee v. State, 170 Ga. App. 227, 316 S.E.2d 832 (1984); Brown v. State, 173 Ga. App. 264, 326 S.E.2d 2 (1985); Smith v. State, 174 Ga. App. 744, 331 S.E.2d 91 (1985); Browning v. State, 174 Ga. App. 759, 331 S.E.2d 625 (1985); Lunz v. State, 174 Ga. App. 893, 332 S.E.2d 37 (1985); Colsson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 840, 341 S.E.2d 318 (1986); Daniel v. State, 179 Ga. App. 54, 345 S.E.2d 143 (1986); In re R.K.J., 179 Ga. App. 112, 345 S.E.2d 658 (1986); Worth v. State, 179 Ga. App. 207, 346 S.E.2d 82 (1986); Tucker v. State, 182 Ga. App. 625, 356 S.E.2d 559 (1987); Caldwell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 110, 357 S.E.2d 845 (1987); Carruth v. State, 183 Ga. App. 203, 358 S.E.2d 610 (1987); In re J.B., 183 Ga. App. 229, 358 S.E.2d 620 (1987); Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415, 373 S.E.2d 97 (1988); Fowler v. State, 188 Ga. App. 873, 374 S.E.2d 805 (1988); Villa v. State, 190 Ga. App. 530, 379 S.E.2d 417 (1989); Cline v. State, 199 Ga. App. 532, 405 S.E.2d 524 (1991); Loden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 683, 406 S.E.2d 103 (1991); Cole v. State, 200 Ga. App. 318, 408 S.E.2d 438 (1991); Griggs v. State, 208 Ga. App. 768, 432 S.E.2d 591 (1993); Andrew v. State, 216 Ga. App. 427, 454 S.E.2d 542 (1995); Massalene v. State, 224 Ga. App. 321, 480 S.E.2d 616 (1997); Wells v. State, 226 Ga. App. 172, 486 S.E.2d 390 (1997); Adams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 42, 520 S.E.2d 746 (1999); In the Interest of N.T.S., 242 Ga. App. 109, 528 S.E.2d 876 (2000); Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 858, 531 S.E.2d 409 (2000); In the Interest of G.J., 251 Ga. App. 299, 554 S.E.2d 269 (2001); Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 570 S.E.2d 428 (2002); Spickler v. State, 276 Ga. 164, 575 S.E.2d 482 (2003); Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (2004); Gant v. State, 291 Ga. App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (2008); Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (2008); Hickman v. State, 311 Ga. App. 544, 716 S.E.2d 597 (2011); Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga. App. 834, 717 S.E.2d 332 (2011); Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014); Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014).

Instruction that recent possession of stolen property may establish criminal intent.

- In prosecution for receiving stolen property, judge's instruction to jury "that recent possession of stolen property without satisfactory explanation is sufficient to establish criminal intent" was error, despite proper instruction on burden of proving criminal intent, and required reversal. Williams v. State, 159 Ga. App. 865, 285 S.E.2d 597 (1981).

Effect of testimony contradicting denial of intent.

- When defendant's posture is one of admitting presence and cooperation for one criminal purpose (stealing money from the cash register), but denying the intent of participating in an armed robbery, the matter thus essentially involves the credibility of the defendant; and if the defendant's explanation of the incident is contradicted by the testimony of the police officers, the hotel employee, and the victims, the jury is authorized to reject the explanation. Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 305 S.E.2d 599 (1983).

Flight as indication of sense of guilt.

- Act which constituted possession - flight from police with contraband - itself furnishes evidence of defendant's guilt and defendant's criminal intention to conceal incriminating evidence, just as evidence has been attempted to be concealed by such means as throwing it out of car windows. Haire v. State, 133 Ga. App. 12, 209 S.E.2d 681 (1974).

Flight upon seeing one whom accused has reason to believe may accuse him of specific crime may be shown as indication of sense of guilt. Jarmello v. State, 152 Ga. App. 741, 264 S.E.2d 34 (1979).

Defendant's attempts to interfere with the execution of search warrants, to flee, and to evade the police by hiding in a closet constituted evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt and intention to exercise control over contraband. Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 502 S.E.2d 323 (1998).

Intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires.

- In a prosecution for child molestation, where the evidence established that defendant exposed the defendant's genitals to a child under the age of 14, although defendant argued that the defendant had a different intention in exposing the defendant's genitals, it could be inferred from the act of exposure that the defendant did so with intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant's sexual desires. Hathcock v. State, 214 Ga. App. 188, 447 S.E.2d 104 (1994).

Intent, which is a mental attitude, is commonly detectable only inferentially, and the law accommodates this; the defendant's manual stimulation of the child victim's genitals allowed the jury to infer that the defendant acted with an improper intent, and the defendant's conviction for child molestation was affirmed. Holloway v. State, 268 Ga. App. 300, 601 S.E.2d 753 (2004).

Jury was presented with sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1) because the testimony of the defendant's former wife regarding what she observed on the night in question, i.e., that the defendant and the victim were asleep together with their underwear pulled down and that she saw what appeared to be fecal matter smeared on the victim's buttocks and the bed sheets, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the victim's and the defendant's otherwise inexplicable mutual exposure was for the purpose of satisfying the defendant's own sexual desires. DeLong v. State, 310 Ga. App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (2011).

Evidence that a defendant became highly intoxicated while having visitation with his seven-year-old daughter, that he licked her vagina, kissed her with his tongue in her mouth, and made her rub her hand on his penis was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c). A jury could infer from the evidence that the defendant's intent was to arouse and satisfy his sexual desires, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6. Obeginski v. State, 313 Ga. App. 567, 722 S.E.2d 162 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0908, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1013 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence authorized the jury to infer that the defendant touched the victim child's vagina over clothing and that the defendant intended to arouse the defendant's sexual desires or those of the victim as there was evidence that the defendant specifically called the victim to the defendant, sat the victim on the defendant's lap, placed a hand on the victim's vagina over the victim's clothes, and held a hand there for up to a minute. Latta v. State, 341 Ga. App. 696, 802 S.E.2d 264 (2017).

Prior act of driving under the influence is relevant to prove bent of mind or course of conduct. Tam v. State, 231 Ga. App. 15, 501 S.E.2d 51 (1998).

In a driving under the influence (DUI) per se case, the defendant's prior DUI conviction was improperly admitted to show intent as the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because the jury could infer intent from the defendant's act of driving after admittedly consuming alcohol without considering the prior DUI, and there was a danger of interjecting unfair prejudice at trial; however, admission of that evidence was harmless as the direct evidence of the defendant's guilt for the DUI-per se charge was overwhelming as the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, and the breath tests showed the defendant's blood alcohol content was substantially in excess of 0.08 grams. Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 802 S.E.2d 234 (2017).

Prior offenses of same sort, by themselves, fail to prove intent.

- If no modus operandi or other logical connection between prior offenses committed by defendant and case on trial is shown, mere fact that other offenses were of same sort as one for which defendant is on trial is not sufficient to prove intent. Kent v. State, 128 Ga. App. 132, 195 S.E.2d 770 (1973).

Driving car into police officer.

- Evidence that defendant drove a car through a roadblock toward a uniformed officer who was clearly visible was sufficient to find the requisite intent for aggravated assault. Thrasher v. State, 225 Ga. App. 717, 484 S.E.2d 755 (1997).

Evidence sufficient for shoplifting conviction.

- Evidence concerning defendant's conduct, evidencing intent to participate in theft, was sufficient for conviction of shoplifting. Carter v. State, 188 Ga. App. 464, 373 S.E.2d 277 (1988); Watson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 645, 448 S.E.2d 752 (1994).

Jury was authorized to find that the defendant acted with guilty knowledge and intent to commit credit card theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(a)(1) because the evidence established that the defendant obtained unauthorized possession of the victim's credit card and there was circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the defendant had knowledge that the defendant was accepting the credit card without authority and as part of an unlawful scheme; when the defendant was confronted by police officers, the defendant fled, and the defendant maintained unauthorized possession of a different credit card, along with additional items that could be used to engage in fraudulent credit transactions. Amaechi v. State, 306 Ga. App. 333, 702 S.E.2d 680 (2010).

Intent in aggravated sodomy case.

- Trial judge was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the criminal intent to commit the prohibited act of aggravated sodomy by placing the defendant's genitals in the victim's mouth with force and against the victim's will. Since there was no evidence that the trial court did not make the requisite finding regarding criminal intent, the appellate court found no error. Sims v. State, 267 Ga. App. 572, 600 S.E.2d 613 (2004).

Circumstances showing knowledge in possession of cocaine case.

- Evidence was sufficient to show that defendants knowingly possessed cocaine, as was required to support their convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) for trafficking in cocaine; their criminal intention was shown by the fact that when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense and a seat belt violation, their stories contradicted each other, their car smelled of air freshener, they could not explain who owned the car nor produce a vehicle registration for the vehicle that they were traveling in, and related circumstances from which a jury could infer that they knew about the large quantity of cocaine that was hidden in a secret compartment in their car, despite their claims that they did not know about the cocaine. Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 151, 619 S.E.2d 821 (2005).

Circumstances showing trafficking in cocaine.

- Defendant's intent to be a party to the crime of trafficking in cocaine was established by evidence that the defendant was aware that an alleged drug dealer kept cocaine in the house where the defendant was arrested, that the dealer doled cocaine out to the defendant and others so that they could sell the cocaine, that the defendant had sold cocaine for the dealer in the past and had stated the intent to do so on the day the defendant was arrested, that cocaine found in defendant's possession had the same packaging as cocaine found in the basement of the house, and that when the police arrived to execute a search warrant, the defendant attempted to destroy the cocaine the defendant had in the defendant's physical possession. Riley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 202, 663 S.E.2d 835 (2008).

Intention regarding drug trafficking.

- Evidence supported a jury's verdict that the defendants had access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over drugs found in a home the defendants did not rent or own, including evidence that defendants' belongings were in the home, that the defendants both had keys to the home, and that one of the defendant's vehicle had been parked outside the home through several days of surveillance. Lott v. State, 303 Ga. App. 775, 694 S.E.2d 698 (2010).

Evidence sufficient for possession of dangerous drugs conviction.

- Jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant intended to possess a dangerous drug in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-72, even if the defendant was subjectively unaware of the precise chemical compound in the bottle and its regulated nature because there was evidence supporting an inference that the defendant used a dangerous drug to sedate the defendant's sexual battery victim, and that conduct demonstrated the defendant's knowledge of the harmful effect of the compound; the term "dangerous drug" was defined to include alkyl nitrite, which was the compound the defendant possessed. Serna v. State, 308 Ga. App. 518, 707 S.E.2d 904 (2011).

Intent to assist in possession and sale of marijuana.

- There was sufficient evidence of knowledge and intent to assist with or participate in the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when a defendant drove the defendant's roommate to a location in another county and the roommate brought along a sealed, insulated bag, which the defendant placed in the back compartment of the car. Able v. State, 312 Ga. App. 252, 718 S.E.2d 96 (2011).

Sufficient evidence of malicious intent.

- While a person was not presumed to act with criminal intent, the jury was entitled to conclude that defendant acted with malicious intent in wounding the victim since defendant admitted to wanting to confront the victim, defendant began verbal and physical altercations with the victim, defendant's demeanor and conduct were very hostile and violent during the confrontation, and defendant swung defendant's own hand at the victim's head several times, resulting in multiple cuts to the victim's head which required 30 staples to close. Campbell v. State, 258 Ga. App. 863, 575 S.E.2d 748 (2002).

Existence of general criminal intent necessary to support convictions for aggravated assault could be inferred from the defendant's acts in leaving the scene of the altercation the defendant had with the defendant's sibling, returning with a gun, and firing into a truck cab where the person who had broken up the altercation and the defendant's spouse were sitting as they prepared to leave the scene. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (2004).

Sufficient evidence of participation in robbery.

- Defendant's aggravated assault and robbery convictions were upheld on appeal as evidence including the defendant's admission and flight from the scene authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant went to an apartment complex intending to participate in the robbery, and in fact participated in the robbery by acting as a lookout and an additional show of force; hence, the jury was authorized to infer criminal intent from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1717, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 80 (Ga. 2008).

Intent in aggravated assault case.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant argued that the evidence showed that the defendant did not intend to shoot the victim but acted in self-defense. This claim failed because under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6 whether the defendant committed the act with criminal intent was a question of fact for the jury. Gordon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 908, 670 S.E.2d 533 (2008).

Evidence of intent on charge of theft by conversion.

- Defendant's conviction of theft by conversion, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-4(a), was supported by sufficient evidence; evidence of defendant's failure to return a rented wood chipper, admitted lies regarding defendant's address and phone number, and defendant's flight after charges were filed was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6 for the jury to conclude that defendant fraudulently converted the chipper to defendant's own use. Terrell v. State, 275 Ga. App. 501, 621 S.E.2d 515 (2005).

Sufficient evidence of intent to rob.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the defendant's aggravated assault with intent to rob convictions because the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant fired a gun at the victims to further a robbery and the indictment did not charge the defendant with a specific intent to rob the victims but only with a general intent to rob; the defendant approached the victims, pointed a gun toward the head of one of the victims, and demanded money, and after robbing that victim, the defendant fled and fired several shots at the porch where the victims had been standing and at the victims once the victims began chasing the defendant. Johnson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 371, 696 S.E.2d 396 (2010).

Intent to make terroristic threats.

- Defendant was properly convicted of terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a) because the jury was presented with sufficient evidence by which to find that the defendant intended to terrorize officers by communicating a threat to blow up the defendant's home using propane; although there was testimony that the defendant suffered from a history of mental illness, the defendant did not plead the affirmative defense of insanity, and the issue of the defendant's criminal intent was a question of fact for the jury, which was presented with sufficient evidence to establish the requisite criminal intent. Layne v. State, 313 Ga. App. 608, 722 S.E.2d 351 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant intended to terrorize the victims based on the defendant yelling at an officer trying to restrain the defendant that the defendant was going to kill the officer and the officer's family. Harper v. State, 337 Ga. App. 57, 785 S.E.2d 691 (2016).

Sufficient intent to kidnap.

- Jury was authorized to find that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent from the fact that the defendant approached the victim who the defendant did not know and offered the victim money. Upon approaching the victim, the defendant grabbed the victim, lifted the victim up, and carried the victim away against the victim's will. Thomas v. State, 320 Ga. App. 101, 739 S.E.2d 417 (2013).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 281, 439 et seq. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, §§ 331, 333.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 41, 47 et seq.

ALR.

- Criminal responsibility of one who acts as decoy to detect commission of crime, 120 A.L.R. 1506.

Series of takings over a period of time as involving single or separate larcenies, 53 A.L.R.3d 398.

Homicide: burden of proof on defense that killing was accidental, 63 A.L.R.3d 936.

Remoteness in time of other similar offenses committed by accused as affecting admissibility of evidence thereof in prosecution for sex offense, 88 A.L.R.3d 8.

Robbery, attempted robbery, or assault to commit robbery, as affected by intent to collect or secure debt or claim, 88 A.L.R.3d 1309.