Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3702, former Code 1873, § 3755, former Code 1882, § 3755, former Penal Code 1895, § 991, former Penal Code 1910, § 1017, former Code 1933, § 38-121, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Former statute inapplicable.

- Exception stated in the former statute did not apply when the state does not rely solely on the testimony of a single accomplice. Ross v. State, 245 Ga. 173, 263 S.E.2d 913 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Admissibility of other crimes evidence is not governed by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Failure to charge on accomplice testimony and corroboration was not error as the prosecution largely relied on other evidence, not accomplice testimony, to prove defendant's guilt. Dillard v. State, 272 Ga. App. 523, 612 S.E.2d 804 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony that the victim knew both robbers and recognized the robbers during the robbery and the next day, even without the accomplice's pretrial statement implicating the defendant, was direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant's participation in the crime and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 was inapplicable. Jordan v. State, 278 Ga. App. 126, 628 S.E.2d 221 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish venue.

- See Moreno v. State, 255 Ga. App. 88, 564 S.E.2d 505 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When a victim of an aggravated assault and battery testified that the incident, wherein her former boyfriend was following her closely in his car and then shot her, occurred in a particular county at a stated location, such was sufficient to establish venue for those crimes. Morris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 115, 587 S.E.2d 272 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of single witness to establish fact.

- Testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact, and an officer's testimony that the officer saw defendant's hands on a plastic bag containing cocaine was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find that defendant possessed the cocaine. Lester v. State, 226 Ga. App. 373, 487 S.E.2d 25 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to authorize a jury's verdict that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and that the defendant committed simple battery by intentionally kicking the victim on the ankle, causing a bruise. Ringo v. State, 236 Ga. App. 38, 510 S.E.2d 893 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Where the 14-year-old victim allegedly consented to having sex with defendant, the sexual molestation conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) was supported by sufficient evidence; under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1, consent by the victim was irrelevant due to the inability of the victim to legally consent to intercourse, and it was for the jury to determine, in accordance with the testimony of at least a single witness pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, whether defendant's conduct was immoral or indecent under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a). Slack v. State, 265 Ga. App. 306, 593 S.E.2d 664 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When an eye-witness identified defendant as the individual the witness saw leave the witness's storage shed with the witness's goods, the evidence sufficed to sustain a verdict of guilty on the charge of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. Gibson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 696, 603 S.E.2d 319 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's burglary conviction after an employee of the burglarized store testified that the employee encountered defendant between 3:30 and 4:30 a.m. in the store, while defendant was trying to pry open the lock on a jewelry counter with a knife, the employee identified defendant from a photographic lineup and at trial, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of one witness is sufficient to establish a fact. Standfill v. State, 267 Ga. App. 612, 600 S.E.2d 695 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's multiple convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury, were supported by sufficient evidence because defendant and another robbed a store while holding the two owners at gunpoint, defendant led police on a high-speed car chase, and the defendant broke into and robbed two homes, one of which had an occupant that defendant beat; only one store owner's testimony was needed to establish the facts to support the aggravated assault conviction. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for child molestation, aggravated child molestation, statutory rape. and incest, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-3,16-6-4,16-6-4(c), and16-6-22, because defendant's step-daughter gave detailed testimony as to the continuing sexual conduct that defendant inflicted on the step-daughter over a period of years as the testimony from just that witness was sufficient to support the convictions, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8; further, there was corroborative testimony from a friend of the step-daughter who witnessed at least one incident, and from an aunt who testified that the older step-daughter had sat in defendant's lap and that defendant rubbed her legs, which was properly admitted for purposes of corroboration, bent of mind, lustful disposition toward children, and motive. Lewis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 41, 619 S.E.2d 699 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's new trial motion under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-22 was properly denied as the fact that the state failed to turn over two videotaped statements from defendant's sons, arising from criminal charges due to a domestic dispute, was based on inadvertence rather than bad faith, there was unimpeached eyewitness testimony from other witnesses that was sufficient to support defendant's convictions pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, and there was no showing that defendant suffered the kind of prejudice that undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial; accordingly, defendant's Brady rights were not violated and there was no violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-6 and17-16-7. Ely v. State, 275 Ga. App. 708, 621 S.E.2d 811 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, and the defendant's convictions for rape was supported by sufficient evidence since the victim testified that defendant forced her into a train boxcar, threatened to kill her, and had vaginal and oral sex with her against her will and without her consent. Davis v. State, 278 Ga. App. 628, 629 S.E.2d 537 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

On appeal from convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim lacked merit as independent corroboration of the alleged victim's testimony was unnecessary, given that testimony from a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and this included a victim's uncorroborated identification of an assailant; moreover, even if corroboration were needed, the similar transaction provided sufficient evidence of the defendant's identity, which was one of the purposes for which it was introduced. Pringle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 230, 635 S.E.2d 843 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In a prosecution for felony theft by taking of a van, the trial court was entitled to conclude that the victim was an innocent purchaser for value, believing the seller to be the owner, the defendant's claim to the contrary notwithstanding; moreover, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish this fact. Coursey v. State, 281 Ga. App. 494, 636 S.E.2d 669 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when the evidence showed: (1) two separate aggravated assaults, one with a knife and one with a hammer; (2) two separate instances of simple battery; and (3) a hours-long detention of the victim by the defendant, the evidence amply supported the jury's conviction on the charges of false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and simple battery. Brigman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 481, 639 S.E.2d 359 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) for participating in a drive-by shooting were supported by sufficient evidence because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 and it was the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; based on the testimony of the witnesses to the shooting, a reasonable jury could have rejected the defendant's claims and determined that the defendant was a party to each of the crimes. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because sufficient evidence was presented via the testimony of the victim regarding the defendant's attack with a screwdriver, which was corroborated by the defendant's own admissions at trial, the defendant's simple battery conviction was upheld on appeal; moreover, the defendant's characterization of the incident as one involving mutual argument did not in and of itself justify the actions. Rainey v. State, 286 Ga. App. 682, 649 S.E.2d 871 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the state met the state's burden of proving that defendant took the property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon; the state offered the testimony of the bus counter clerk as to the facts of the robbery and as to the identification of defendant as the gunman. That testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Range v. State, 289 Ga. App. 727, 658 S.E.2d 245 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a voluntary manslaughter count predicated on the defendant's claim of self-defense, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), because the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) and to enable a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant's stabbing of the victim was not justified as an act of self-defense; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, a neighbor's eyewitness testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was the aggressor, continued to use force after any imminent danger posed by the victim had passed, or used excessive force. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence from a child molestation victim was sufficient to convict a defendant of five counts of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4. The trial court properly admitted evidence that the defendant had asked the victim's sister to sleep with the defendant on a couch, and properly denied evidence that the victim had made an accusation of sexual misconduct against the victim's grandfather. Mauldin v. State, 313 Ga. App. 228, 721 S.E.2d 182 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and first degree cruelty to children with regard to the defendant's girlfriend's niece based on the testimony of the victim and similar transaction evidence involving the defendant's older daughter. Royal v. State, 319 Ga. App. 466, 735 S.E.2d 793 (2012)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony even though it was based on the victim's identifications of the defendant's eyes. Jones v. State, 329 Ga. App. 478, 765 S.E.2d 657 (2014).

Identification of officer sufficient.

- Police detective's in-court identification of defendant as the drug seller was sufficient to sustain conviction. James v. State, 233 Ga. App. 516, 504 S.E.2d 533 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Undercover agent's in-court identification of defendant as the seller of crack cocaine was sufficient to authorize the jury's guilty verdict. Ivory v. State, 234 Ga. App. 858, 508 S.E.2d 421 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Although a videotape of the transaction provided helpful confirmation of an undercover officer's identification of the defendant as the seller of cocaine, the testimony of the officer, by itself, was sufficient to support the jury's determination of guilt. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 633, 627 S.E.2d 196 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. Barber v. State, 236 Ga. App. 294, 512 S.E.2d 48 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Moton v. State, 242 Ga. App. 397, 530 S.E.2d 31 (2000); Cecil v. State, 263 Ga. App. 48, 587 S.E.2d 197 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony sufficient.

- Victim's statement in a videotape made by police that the victim was 16-years-old at the time defendant gave the victim marijuana and alcohol was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor as the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, such as the fact that the victim was a minor at the time the acts giving rise to the charge occurred. Little v. State, 262 Ga. App. 377, 585 S.E.2d 677 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions against defendant for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 since the victim identified defendant from a pre-trial photograph and from an in-court identification, a codefendant and a witness testified against defendant, and the gun that was used to shoot the victim was found near the car with shell casings in the car; it was noted that the testimony of just the victim was sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Dunn v. State, 262 Ga. App. 643, 586 S.E.2d 352 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony, alone, was sufficient to establish the time frame for the charged offenses. Henry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 139, 616 S.E.2d 883 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault since after using defendant's mother's telephone number, defendant contacted the victim and arranged a meeting to buy shoes, the victim identified the car defendant was driving, which was registered to defendant's mother, the victim identified defendant from a pretrial police photo array and at trial, and where, at the meeting arranged by the victim was shot in the face and defendant then rummaged through the victim's car where the victim kept the shoes. Waddell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 772, 627 S.E.2d 840 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 731, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9304, 166 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In a case in which the victim was allegedly bound and beaten by the defendant and thrown into a camper, which the defendant towed to a motel, the victim's testimony was sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40 as the testimony of a single witness was all that was necessary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 7, 635 S.E.2d 278 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and the defendant's rape conviction was upheld on appeal, as the victim's testimony at trial that the defendant's sexual organ penetrated hers after telling the defendant to stop was sufficient in and of itself, and no evidence was presented that directly contradicted this statement. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 106, 635 S.E.2d 582 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Despite the defendant's contentions that insufficient evidence as to a child's presence in the room when the victim was accosted required reversal of a cruelty to children conviction, such conviction was upheld, supported by the victim's testimony notifying the defendant of the presence of the child before the defendant fired a shot next to the victim's head. Price v. State, 281 Ga. App. 844, 637 S.E.2d 468 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony alone was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to establish the elements of a charge against the defendant of child molestation, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), as the victim testified that while she was at the defendant's home visiting his daughter, he requested that she kiss him and have sexual intercourse with him, and that he showed her his erect penis; there was also testimony from a jail nurse who confirmed that the defendant had a tattoo on his penis as described by the victim, and there was an internet instant-message conversation between the defendant and the victim, during which he apologized to her for his actions. Hammontree v. State, 283 Ga. App. 736, 642 S.E.2d 412 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's family violence battery conviction was affirmed on appeal as testimony from the victim, standing alone, describing the defendant's attack, when coupled with testimony regarding two prior incidents, sufficiently supported the conviction. Simmons v. State, 285 Ga. App. 129, 645 S.E.2d 622 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Despite the defendant's claim that the victim's testimony was too uncertain to support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery, the conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) it was not for the appeals court to determine or question how the jury resolved any apparent conflicts or uncertainties in the evidence; (2) in general, the testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish a fact; and (3) corroboration was not required, and if corroboration were, the bite mark on the defendant's shoulder, which was testified to by the victim, provided sufficient corroboration. Boyt v. State, 286 Ga. App. 460, 649 S.E.2d 589 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support armed robbery conviction since the victim testified that defendant took the victim's cell phone while defendant pointed a gun at the victim and threatened to shoot the victim; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Burden v. State, 290 Ga. App. 734, 660 S.E.2d 481 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence existed to support a defendant's convictions for incest and child molestation with regard to actions the defendant took toward the defendant's own children based on the children's recorded police interviews that were played for the jury; the testimony from a licensed clinical social worker who was admitted as an expert in child sexual abuse and the abuse's effect on children; and the testimony of the pediatric nurse practitioner who examined the victims and stated that, although the victims' physical exams were normal, the results were consistent with their reports of sexual abuse. The victims' testimony, standing alone, would have been sufficient to support the convictions; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Hubert v. State, 297 Ga. App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence was presented to support a defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the victim, a taxi driver, identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators based, inter alia, on the victim's knowledge of the defendant from living in the same townhome complex; a single witness's testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Troutman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 provided that a victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient, the victim's testimony that defendant twice shot at the victim was sufficient to find defendant guilty of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) despite testimony to the contrary. Hartley v. State, 299 Ga. App. 534, 683 S.E.2d 109 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because although one of the victim's identification was the only evidence linking the defendant to the crimes, the determination of a witness' credibility, including the accuracy of eyewitness identification, was within the exclusive province of the jury, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. 545, 705 S.E.2d 159 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's convictions for kidnapping, hijacking a motor vehicle, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a weapon on school property were authorized because pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the victim's testimony alone established the essential elements of the offenses. Lester v. State, 309 Ga. App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial counsel's failure to cross-examine the codefendant about a plea deal was not patently unreasonable because trial counsel's decision not to question the codefendant due to the potential harm to the defendant was a tactical and strategic decision; even if trial counsel performed deficiently, the defendant could not show prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, and even in the absence of the defendant's testimony placing the defendant at the scene and acknowledging that the defendant hit the victim, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish the facts necessary to support the defendant's convictions. Bonner v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of bus hijacking, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-123(a)(1)(A), because the jury was authorized to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exercised control of the bus by force; the defendant brandished a handgun in the open door of the bus as the defendant ordered a passenger to get off, and the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away because the driver felt the driver's life was in danger and the driver did not want to agitate the defendant. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because the victim's testimony was legally sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to establish that the defendants assaulted the victim with intent to rob, the issue of which defendant actually held the weapon was immaterial; therefore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), the evidence was sufficient to find them both guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rob and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and16-11-106. Clark v. State, 311 Ga. App. 58, 714 S.E.2d 736 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence that a defendant became highly intoxicated while having visitation with his seven-year-old daughter, that he licked her vagina, kissed her with his tongue in her mouth, and made her rub her hand on his penis was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c). A jury could infer from the evidence that the defendant's intent was to arouse and satisfy his sexual desires pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6. Obeginski v. State, 313 Ga. App. 567, 722 S.E.2d 162 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0908, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1013 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the victim testified that the defendant held a knife when the defendant told the victim to take her clothes off and to open her legs so that the defendant could have vaginal intercourse with her against her will; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, that testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction. Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence from a victim that the defendant robbed the victim of cash, cell phones, and a GPS unit at knifepoint was sufficient pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8 to establish that the defendant committed armed robbery with a knife in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-11-106(b)(1), although the defendant testified that the victim gave the defendant these items for drugs. Sanders v. State, 324 Ga. App. 4, 749 S.E.2d 14 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of aggravated assault, one count of burglary, and several firearms charges because: (1) both victims testified that the defendant was their assailant; and (2) the victims' testimony alone was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses. Smith v. State, 325 Ga. App. 739, 754 S.E.2d 783 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape because the victim testified that the defendant forced the victim to have vaginal intercourse with the defendant against the victim's will; the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the conviction; and testing showed that DNA found on the swabs taken from the victim as part of the sexual assault kit matched the defendant's DNA profile. Miller v. State, 325 Ga. App. 764, 754 S.E.2d 804 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with the intent to rape, aggravated sexual battery, and burglary based on the testimony of the victim that at approximately 4:00 a.m. the victim was in bed asleep when a man got into the victim's bed and began choking the victim, that it was not consensual, and that the perpetrator indicated watching the victim for some time and inserted two fingers into the victim's vagina. Davis v. State, 326 Ga. App. 778, 757 S.E.2d 443 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, financial- transaction-card fraud, battery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during a crime because the victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator who sat with the victim in the backseat of the car and threatened to shoot the victim in the victim's side; the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; the defendant was overheard saying on the night in question that the defendant wanted to commit a robbery; and the defendant attempted to persuade an acquaintance to provide the defendant with a false alibi. Belcher v. State, 344 Ga. App. 729, 812 S.E.2d 51 (2018).

Testimony of rape victim sufficient.

- Evidence was more than sufficient to authorize a jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of rape because the victim's testimony that "it hurt" when the defendant pushed his penis in her vagina and that he threatened to put her family out of his house if she told her parents or if she refused sexual contact was more than sufficient evidence of force; the jury was authorized to consider that the victim failed to initially disclose the incidents because she was fearful of the defendant and that the defendant yelled at the victim when she moved during intercourse as additional evidence of his forcible acts, and the victim's testimony, together with her immediate and consistent outcry to her father, law enforcement, and an emergency room pediatrician, provided the jury with ample evidence of penetration. Matlock v. State, 302 Ga. App. 173, 690 S.E.2d 489 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony from nurse as to cause of rape victim's injuries.

- Nurse was properly allowed to testify as to a rape victim's statement to the nurse that her assailant had blindfolded her and pushed her into furniture because the victim's statement to the nurse was given to explain the nature and origin of some of her injuries. The nurse's evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the rape victim had been pushed into furniture as she was pushed and dragged through her home while blindfolded, supporting the defendant's assault convictions. Bryant v. State, 304 Ga. App. 456, 696 S.E.2d 439 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of single informant sufficient to sustain conviction.

- Because the informant's testimony was the only testimony in which defendant was identified as the person who sold the methamphetamine to the informant in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of one witness was sufficient to establish defendant's identity. Vasquez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 548, 621 S.E.2d 764 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of motorist sufficient.

- Motorist's identification of defendant as the driver of a pick-up truck that hit the motorist's vehicle and then drove away was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to establish defendant's identity for purposes of defendant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident and following too closely, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-49 and40-6-270(a)(1). Craig v. State, 276 Ga. App. 329, 623 S.E.2d 518 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Officer's testimony sufficient.

- Because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and there was no requirement that an actual exchange of money for drugs be witnessed by more than one person or be recorded on videotape, the defendant's sale of cocaine conviction was upheld on appeal, based on a law enforcement agent's actions of handing the defendant $40 in exchange for two pieces of a substance that tested positive for cocaine. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 217, 635 S.E.2d 830 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When a deputy testified that the defendant resisted the deputy's efforts to break up a prison fight, then turned on the deputy, punched the deputy, and swung at the deputy repeatedly, injuring the deputy, there was sufficient evidence of mutiny in a penal institution and felony obstruction of an officer; the trial court was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6 to infer from the circumstances that the defendant both knowingly and willfully obstructed the deputy by the use of violence and intended to cause the deputy serious bodily injury by striking the deputy with a fist, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 testimony of a single witness was sufficient. Butler v. State, 284 Ga. App. 802, 644 S.E.2d 898 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that the arresting officer had a clear and unobstructed view of the defendant not wearing a seat belt as required by O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(f), based solely on that officer's testimony, as the testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish a fact. Schramm v. State, 286 Ga. App. 156, 648 S.E.2d 392 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Given that two officers testified that the officers saw the defendant, in plain view, packaging 35 grams of cocaine and 94 grams of marijuana into smaller packages, and the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute were upheld on appeal. King v. State, 289 Ga. App. 461, 657 S.E.2d 570 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence that a defendant was seen riding a bicycle after midnight while carrying a tire iron and a black saw case and wearing a new leather tool belt around the defendant's waist, along with the defendant's own statement that the defendant had been working at the address later determined to have been broken into and a tool belt and saw taken, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, although the defendant fled from police and the stolen items were not recovered. Wilcox v. State, 310 Ga. App. 382, 713 S.E.2d 468 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of arresting officer sufficient to convict.

- Defendant was properly convicted of felony possession of marijuana as a deputy sheriff testified that the defendant admitted that the marijuana found in the trunk of a rental car belonged to the defendant. Even though the defendant denied saying this, or possessing the drugs, the credibility of witnesses was for the jury to determine, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish the facts. McKinney v. State, 293 Ga. App. 419, 667 S.E.2d 210 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for obstruction of a police officer and other related crimes, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions based on the single testimony of the officer involved. Because it was the function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh any conflict in the evidence, the testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact; therefore, the testimony of the police officer who was involved in the altercation with the defendant was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the defendant. Whatley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of police investigator sufficient.

- Police investigator's testimony that the defendant held a three-inch knife to the investigator's throat amply supported a conviction under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Lloyd v. State, 280 Ga. 187, 625 S.E.2d 771 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony that the defendant raped the victim at knifepoint, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 341, 634 S.E.2d 134 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Kimbrough v. State, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 48 (Ga. 2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the victim's testimony that the defendant pulled a knife out of the defendant's pocket with the defendant's right hand and lunged at the victim was sufficient in itself to support convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-126. Testimony that the defendant had arthritis in the right hand at most created a conflict in the evidence, as there was also testimony that the defendant, a carpenter, used both hands in the defendant's trade. Carder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 265, 661 S.E.2d 632 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim testified that as the victim walked in front of the defendant's car, the defendant hit the gas pedal, throwing the victim onto the hood; accelerated when the victim asked the defendant to stop; and slammed on the brakes, causing the victim to slide down the hood, and the victim's legs and foot to be broken as they went underneath the car. As the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish these facts under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery. Cash v. State, 293 Ga. App. 702, 667 S.E.2d 691 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim's residence, entered without permission, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give defendant money was sufficient in and of itself to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim's testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim's car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's uncorroborated testimony that the defendant entered the victim's home by removing the back door from the door's hinges, ordered the victim at gunpoint to get in the defendant's truck, and did not bring the victim back home for hours, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and kidnapping. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim's testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim's car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and false imprisonment with regard to allegations that the defendant forced a romantic friend's minor child to perform oral sex on the defendant several times over a three year period, based on the testimony of the victim (which alone was sufficient), the videotaped forensic interview of the victim, the testimony of the police investigator and the victim's mother concerning what the victim told them, as well as the testimony of the victim's siblings, who were eyewitnesses to one incident. Further, the testimony of the victim that the defendant locked the victim in the house and would not let the victim leave supported the conviction on the false imprisonment charge. Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Secret Service agent testimony.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on hearsay grounds to portions of a Secret Service agent's testimony about what the agent learned during the investigation since the agent did not repeat the testimony of an out-of-court declarant. Bearden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 721, 728 S.E.2d 874 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In child molestation case, the victim's testimony did not require corroboration because: (1) the defendant's 15-year-old granddaughter testified that the defendant molested her in his home and in his pickup truck between the time she was in kindergarten until about the time she was in the sixth grade; (2) a physician testified that she found physical evidence that was consistent with penetration and sexual abuse; (3) an older granddaughter testified that she was molested by defendant 25 years ago; and (4) evidence was presented that defendant molested his five-year-old great granddaughter. Delk v. State, 274 Ga. App. 261, 619 S.E.2d 310 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony alone sufficient to prove mental suffering. Fabe v. Floyd, 199 Ga. App. 322, 405 S.E.2d 265, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 265 (1991) (on motion for rehearing) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Former statute not controlling in federal court.

- Georgia law requires independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony; this Georgia rule is not controlling upon collateral review by a federal court. Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Juvenile proceedings.

- Requirement of independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony now set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 is applicable to a juvenile proceeding. In re J.H.M., 202 Ga. App. 79, 413 S.E.2d 515 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Basis for principle of requiring corroboration in a felony when the only witness is an accomplice is to safeguard against one person falsely maintaining that the person and the defendant were accomplices to commit the crime. Coleman v. State, 227 Ga. 769, 183 S.E.2d 379 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

At common law one could be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; in Georgia, in felony cases, when the only witness is an accomplice, the accomplice's testimony must be corroborated and at common law, the doctrine did not amount to a rule of evidence, but merely to a "counsel of caution" given by the judge to a jury. LaFray v. State, 48 Ga. App. 133, 172 S.E. 155 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

If witness not accomplice.

- Unless a witness sought to be impeached is an accomplice of the accused, the witness's testimony, without any corroboration, may authorize the conviction of the accused in a felony case. Preston v. State, 42 Ga. App. 280, 155 S.E. 774 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017).

Uncorroborated testimony of accomplice is not sufficient to authorize a felony conviction. Holton v. State, 61 Ga. App. 654, 7 S.E.2d 202 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742 (1948); Potts v. State, 86 Ga. App. 779, 72 S.E.2d 553 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Edenfield v. State, 95 Ga. App. 2, 96 S.E.2d 533 (1957); Harris v. State, 96 Ga. App. 395, 100 S.E.2d 120 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Famber v. State, 134 Ga. App. 112, 213 S.E.2d 525 (1975); Adams v. State, 140 Ga. App. 621, 231 S.E.2d 547 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Dudley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 560, 251 S.E.2d 815 (1978); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Defendant may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Rule applies only when accomplice is sole witness.

- Rule that a felony conviction is not to be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice applies only when the accomplice is the sole witness upon whose testimony the state relies. McDaniel v. State, 158 Ga. App. 320, 279 S.E.2d 762 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Defendant's conviction did not rely solely on accomplice testimony, contrary to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, because the accomplice's sister testified. White v. State, 315 Ga. App. 54, 726 S.E.2d 548 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Corroboration of accomplice not necessary to sustain a misdemeanor conviction. Parsons v. State, 43 Ga. 197 (1871) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3702); Grant v. State, 89 Ga. 393, 15 S.E. 488 (1892); Martin v. State, 17 Ga. App. 372, 86 S.E. 945 (1915) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Carson v. State, 37 Ga. App. 100, 138 S.E. 920 (1927); Dobbs v. State, 44 Ga. App. 749, 162 S.E. 845 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Johnson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 813, 197 S.E. 61 (1938); Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Bell v. State, 85 Ga. App. 242, 68 S.E.2d 925 (1952); Drummond v. State, 87 Ga. App. 105, 73 S.E.2d 43 (1952) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Bridges v. State, 106 Ga. App. 363, 126 S.E.2d 903 (1962); C.C.R. v. State, 145 Ga. App. 27, 243 S.E.2d 601 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Neal v. State, 152 Ga. App. 270, 262 S.E.2d 561 (1979); Dabney v. State, 154 Ga. App. 355, 268 S.E.2d 408 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121),for comment, see 16 Ga. B.J. 226 (1953);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Trial court did not err in denying the codefendant's motion for directed verdict as to the defendant's conviction for misdemeanor theft by shoplifting because no corroboration of accomplice testimony was necessary to support a misdemeanor conviction. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Even though the prosecution was initiated as one seeking felony punishment, the factfinder was empowered to determine that the value of the property taken was less than the felony value, and when that was the decision the factfinder reached, the case was not a "felony case" for purposes of the accomplice corroboration requirement and the testimony of a single witness accomplice did not have to be corroborated. Heatherly v. State, 301 Ga. 386, 801 S.E.2d 827 (2017).

When several crimes are charged, each offense must be corroborated if accomplices are involved. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Distinction between general and specific testimony.

- Distinction must be made between evidence which tends to prove the truth of the accomplice's general testimony and that which tends to prove the identity and participation of the accused. Gaudin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 252, 211 S.E.2d 189 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Boggus v. State, 136 Ga. App. 917, 222 S.E.2d 686 (1975); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 225 S.E.2d 281 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Adams v. State, 140 Ga. App. 621, 231 S.E.2d 547 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Corroboration as to material facts.

- If the accomplice is corroborated in material parts of the accomplice's testimony, then the accomplice may be believed by the jury as to other material parts as to which there is no corroboration. Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Partial corroboration.

- Simply because an accomplice's testimony is corroborated in most details, it does not follow that the accomplice's testimony alone as to the identity and participation of the accused is sufficient to justify conviction. Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Gaudin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 252, 211 S.E.2d 189 (1974); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 225 S.E.2d 281 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Hobbs v. State, 142 Ga. App. 782, 237 S.E.2d 16 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Two crimes in unified transaction.

- When armed robbery was an integral part of a murder transaction and was simultaneous with the murder, independent corroboration of the murder is adequate to corroborate an accomplice's testimony as to the entire unified transaction including the armed robbery. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Independent evidence of defendant's involvement.

- Evidence showed that a witness's testimony was sufficiently corroborated to prove the defendant's involvement in the attempted robbery and murder of the victim because independent evidence showed that the defendant knew that the victim had lots of money; that the shooter planned and participated in the robbery with the defendant; that the defendant sent a driver to pick the shooter up on the night that the victim was shot; that the defendant threatened one of the defendant's escorts with a gun after the murder when the defendant suspected that the escort had spoken to police; and that the defendant fled Atlanta when the defendant knew that police could have been looking for the defendant in connection with the victim's murder. Rutledge v. State, 298 Ga. 37, 779 S.E.2d 275 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Witness as party.

- Fact that the witness is a party and is a prisoner convicted of a crime does not afford any basis to disregard the witness's testimony. Balkcom v. Vickers, 220 Ga. 345, 138 S.E.2d 868 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 727 S.E.2d 112 (2012) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Testimony of victim.

- When the alleged victim of the attack was the only witness to positively identify the defendant as the perpetrator, but when the victim's testimony was in many material respects corroborated, the jury had the right to believe the victim's testimony. Finney v. State, 51 Ga. App. 545, 181 S.E. 144 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

While the victim had just pulled into the parking lot of the victim's employer when defendant pointed a gun at the victim and demanded the victim's wallet, the victim's positive identification of defendant as the robber was sufficient to establish defendant's guilt and to support defendant's armed robbery conviction. Parks v. State, 257 Ga. App. 25, 570 S.E.2d 350 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because the victim's statement of sexual abuse was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to convict defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated child molestation, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, the victim's testimony did not have to be corroborated by physical evidence. Gartrell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 726, 613 S.E.2d 226 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence that the defendant intentionally struck the victim with a stick and that either the defendant or one of the other parties to the assault intentionally struck the victim with their fists and a concrete block supported an aggravated assault conviction; further, although the victim was the only person who testified about having been hit with a concrete block, and was not sure which of the victim's attackers struck that blow, this testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was hit with a concrete block because it made no difference whether an accomplice, and not the defendant, assaulted the victim in the manner alleged in the indictment. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Even if a burglary victim had not testified that the checks were missing, an intent to steal could have been inferred since the evidence showed the defendant's unlawful entry into the building of another where valuable goods were kept, and the trial court did not err in charging the jury that it was allowed to "infer" an intent to steal in the context of burglary; while the defendant denied the burglary upon a defense of alibi, the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was without merit. Studiemeyer v. State, 278 Ga. App. 756, 629 S.E.2d 593 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony as to the non-consensual and forcible nature of the victim's sexual contact with the defendant, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1). Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

While the state failed to produce a weapon, fingerprints, or other physical evidence tying defendant to the crimes, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the jury was authorized to accept the cashier's identification testimony; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Clowers v. State, 299 Ga. App. 576, 683 S.E.2d 46 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

The testimony of an armed robbery victim and the victim's love interest, who were eyewitnesses to the defendant's crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault, and who separately identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery and assault, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of aggravated assault because the victim's testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and that a shot was subsequently fired wounding the victim was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant committed a violent injury to the victim. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 690 S.E.2d 220 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of child victim.

- Even though child victim's testimony was the only direct evidence proving the essential elements, the child's testimony was sufficient to authorize defendant's conviction. Cantrell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 629, 500 S.E.2d 386 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Georgia law does not require corroboration of a child molestation victim's testimony. Atkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 489, 533 S.E.2d 152 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In a child molestation prosecution, the victim's testimony that defendant touched the victim "down there" was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Kidd v. State, 257 Ga. App. 744, 572 S.E.2d 80 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim's testimony alone was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of child molestation (O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)) and aggravated child molestation (O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b)), pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. The testimony of the victim's cousin, two school friends, and the interviewing detective, was admissible as substantive evidence under the former Child Hearsay Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16. Vaughn v. State, 301 Ga. App. 391, 687 S.E.2d 651 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Victim need not be corroborated.

- There is no requirement that the testimony of the victim of an alleged assault be corroborated in order to legally convict the accused. Gay v. State, 143 Ga. App. 857, 240 S.E.2d 226 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Samuels v. State, 223 Ga. App. 275, 477 S.E.2d 414 (1996);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When the victim's testimony established each and every element of the four offenses, the victim's testimony, alone, was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 339, 416 S.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 416 S.E.2d 755 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of three victims of armed robbery was sufficient to support conviction, and the testimony did not require corroboration. Johnson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 194, 444 S.E.2d 334 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When a third person testifies that a witness for the prosecution was an accomplice of the third person, and that the defendant was not a party to the crime, the testimony of the witness for the prosecution may not be excluded on the principle of requiring corroboration in a felony since the only witness is an accomplice. Coleman v. State, 227 Ga. 769, 183 S.E.2d 379 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Subscribing witnesses.

- Bill of sale to personalty, though attested by two subscribing witnesses, is admissible in evidence upon due proof of the document's execution by only one of the witnesses, without calling or accounting for the other. Cooper v. O'Brien, 98 Ga. 773, 26 S.E. 470 (1896) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5156).

Transaction with deceased person.

- Generally, the testimony of one witness is sufficient to establish a fact, even though such witness may be testifying to a transaction or communications with a deceased person. Donald v. Groves, 160 Ga. 163, 126 S.E. 583 (1925) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5742).

Grounds for new trial.

- Motion to rule out testimony of a witness who is a coindictee on the ground that such testimony shows the witness to be an accomplice is not a legal ground of objection, but the argument can be considered in connection with the general grounds of a motion for a new trial which contend that there is insufficient corroboration to warrant a conviction. Patterson v. State, 109 Ga. App. 582, 137 S.E.2d 74 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Crime of illegally selling drugs was not one of those listed in the former statute which would require the testimony of a second witness to support a conviction. Crews v. State, 133 Ga. App. 764, 213 S.E.2d 34 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121.

Corroboration of facts in perjury prosecution.

- State complied with O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 in producing more than two fact witnesses to testify about the facts alleged to have been falsely sworn to, i.e., the underlying acts the defendants used as a basis to swear out arrest warrants, but the state was not required to produce opinion witnesses to testify that the defendants swore falsely and committed perjury. Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Witness testimony about inaccurate date-time stamp.

- Trial court did not err in admitting under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-48(b) still photographs taken from an ATM's videotapes in a defendant's theft by deception prosecution because while a bank investigator testified that the date-time stamp was inaccurate by approximately one hour, such an inaccuracy went to the weight to be given the evidence but not to the evidence's admissibility. Parks v. State, 294 Ga. App. 646, 669 S.E.2d 684 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony was sufficient to sustain adjudication of child deprivation.

- Juvenile court did not err in adjudicating a child deprived and granting temporary custody of the child to the Department of Family and Children Services because, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of the pediatrician, the detective, and the caseworker were sufficient to sustain the adjudication that the child was deprived. In the Interest of K.B., 302 Ga. App. 50, 690 S.E.2d 627 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Cited in Stephens v. State, 323 Ga. App. 699, 747 S.E.2d 711 (2013); Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557, 788 S.E.2d 484 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 646, 196 L. Ed. 2d 542 (U.S. 2017); Cooper v. State, 342 Ga. App. 351, 801 S.E.2d 589 (2017); Phillips v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 1, 2018).

Test for determining.

- Test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is: "could the witness himself have been indicted for the offense, either as principal or as accessory?" Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S.E. 630, 98 Am. St. R. 145 (1903); Montiford v. State, 144 Ga. 582, 87 S.E. 797 (1916); LaFray v. State, 48 Ga. App. 133, 172 S.E. 115 (1933); Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643 (1934); Head v. State, 59 Ga. App. 451, 1 S.E.2d 227 (1939); Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534, 1 S.E.2d 405 (1939); Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504 (1941); Stebbins v. State, 78 Ga. App. 534, 51 S.E.2d 592 (1949); Harris v. State, 96 Ga. App. 395, 100 S.E.2d 120 (1957); Fortner v. State, 96 Ga. App. 855, 101 S.E.2d 908 (1958); Aimar v. State, 116 Ga. App. 204, 156 S.E.2d 367 (1967); Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476 (1975); Herrin v. State, 138 Ga. App. 729, 227 S.E.2d 498 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 232 S.E.2d 233, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970, 97 S. Ct. 2932, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1977).

Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 provides, in part, that in felony cases when the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient. This rule has been applied to juvenile proceedings. In re A.Z., 301 Ga. App. 524, 687 S.E.2d 887 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0492, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 335 (Ga. 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accessory before the fact and principals in the first and second degrees are all accomplices. Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stebbins v. State, 78 Ga. App. 534, 51 S.E.2d 592 (1949);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Accessory after the fact was not an accomplice within the meaning of the former statute. Allen v. State, 74 Ga. 769 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 447, 30 S.E. 971 (1897); Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643 (1934) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Mills v. State, 193 Ga. 139, 17 S.E.2d 719 (1941); Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983); 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Givens v. State, 273 Ga. 818, 546 S.E.2d 509 (2001);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);aff'd,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Association in crime.

- An accomplice is one who is associated with others in the commission of a crime, all being principals. Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

An accomplice is defined as one who is associated with others in the commission of a crime, all being principals. Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Defendant's convictions were not based on insufficient evidence when a witness gave uncorroborated testimony because the witness was not the defendant's accomplice as: (1) the defendant only asked the witness how to make a fake brick of cocaine; and (2) nothing showed the witness advised, encouraged, or counseled the defendant to commit a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(4), or that the witness intended to participate in a crime. Williams v. State, 289 Ga. 672, 715 S.E.2d 76 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Aiding and abetting.

- An "accomplice" is one who is present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or who could be convicted of the crime as an accessory before the fact. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

An "accomplice" is one who is present at the commission of the crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or who could be convicted of such crime as an accessory before the fact. Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534, 1 S.E.2d 405 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Definition of an accomplice is one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Participation in the commission of the same criminal act and in the execution of a common criminal intent is necessary to render one criminal, in a legal sense, an accomplice of another. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504 (1941); Cooper v. State, 197 Ga. 611, 30 S.E.2d 177 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551 (1980); Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Voluntary participation in the commission of the same criminal act is necessary to make one an accomplice; a participation that is the result of the will of another is not such participation as will make such a participant guilty. Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Fortner v. State, 96 Ga. App. 855, 101 S.E.2d 908 (1958); Aimar v. State, 116 Ga. App. 204, 156 S.E.2d 367 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Motes v. State, 161 Ga. App. 173, 288 S.E.2d 256 (1982);overruled on other grounds,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of crime and is essential to render one an accomplice. It follows that when this element is absent, one is not an accomplice. Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Presence at scene of crime.

- Although a witness may have been present at or near the scene of the crime, and may have concealed the fact for a time, yet if the witness did not in any way aid, abet, procure, or participate in the crime, the witness is not an accomplice. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Accomplice corroboration jury instruction was not required because there was no evidence that three witnesses for the state were the defendant's accomplices in a gang robbery and murder; although there was evidence that the three were present near or at the time of the shooting, the accomplices were in a separate vehicle, and if the accomplices had committed the crimes, the defendant would have been completely innocent. Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 816 S.E.2d 663 (2018).

Witness guilty only of concealing evidence of a crime after the crime's commission was not an "accomplice" within the meaning of the former statute. Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 207 S.E.2d 494 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Joint indictment and plea of guilty.

- Neither the joinder of a witness in an indictment with the defendant, nor a plea of guilty entered by the witness, necessarily makes the witness an accomplice with the defendant so as to require corroboration of the witness's testimony on the latter's trial. Maddox v. State, 131 Ga. App. 86, 205 S.E.2d 31 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Parties jointly indicted.

- Former statute has no application to one who, while jointly indicted with the accused, is not shown by the evidence to have been the accused's accomplice or to have participated in the crime. Walker v. State, 118 Ga. 757, 45 S.E. 608 (1903) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Davis v. State, 122 Ga. 564, 50 S.E. 376 (1905);(decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991).

Evidence of conviction or plea of guilty is admissible to show the guilt of the accomplice and thereby show the status or relationship of the parties and thus lay the foundation for determining the character of testimony against the defendant and whether or not corroboration thereof is required. Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Concealment of crime constitutes complicity.

- Fact that witness concealed the crime for which defendant was on trial made the witness an accomplice within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Collins v. State, 251 Ga. 521, 307 S.E.2d 496 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accomplice is one who acts as result of free will and not of duress or coercion. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Action was not free will of an accomplice.

- Trial court did not err by allowing the uncorroborated testimony of a witness to be admitted against two defendants as, contrary to the defendants' contentions, the witness was not an accomplice since the evidence authorized the jury to have found that the witness was coerced into participating in the racketeering crimes for which the defendants were convicted. Overton v. State, 295 Ga. App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0654, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Indictment for same crime does not make witness an accomplice.

- Fact that witness was indicted for the same murder as the defendant does not, without more, make the witness an accomplice. Collins v. State, 251 Ga. 521, 307 S.E.2d 496 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Fact that witness was jointly indicted with defendant on trial does not of itself render such witness an accomplice. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Female under the age of consent cannot be convicted of incestuous adultery and thus cannot be an accomplice. Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Informer for law enforcement agency who was cooperating with law enforcement at the time the evidence against the defendant was being gathered was not an accomplice. Marshall v. State, 98 Ga. App. 429, 105 S.E.2d 748 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Principal thief is not an accomplice of the receiver of stolen goods. Birdsong v. State, 120 Ga. 850, 48 S.E. 329 (1904).

Thief and one who receives stolen property from the thief are not accomplices. Stover v. State, 158 Ga. App. 644, 281 S.E.2d 642 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

If a thief and a receiver of stolen goods have acted pursuant to a common criminal enterprise, they are accomplices. Selvidge v. State, 252 Ga. 243, 313 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823, 105 S. Ct. 99, 83 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Presenter of check was not accomplice.

- Uttering element was established by sufficient evidence that the defendant's friend presented the check to a bank for cashing at the defendant's behest; the trial court properly charged the jury on the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony even though the jury determined that the friend was not an accomplice. King v. State, 277 Ga. App. 190, 626 S.E.2d 161 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Buyer of whiskey is not an accomplice of the seller. Gamble v. State, 4 Ga. App. 845, 62 S.E. 544 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991).

Person is not an accomplice to murder when the person does not know who the intended victim is or when the attempt on the victim's life is to be made, and the person does not in any way participate in or encourage the murder. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Self incrimination.

- Joint principals to a crime as accomplices are competent witnesses against each other, and while the one sought to be used as a witness has the right to claim the protection afforded by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI, providing that no person shall be competent to give testimony tending in any manner to criminate oneself, yet this constitutional guaranty is a personal privilege belonging to the witness and cannot be claimed for the witness for the benefit of another party. Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Independent inference of defendant's guilt.

- To sustain a conviction upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating circumstances which in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that defendant is guilty. Childers v. State, 52 Ga. 106 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); McCrory v. State, 101 Ga. 779, 28 S.E. 92 (1897); Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161 (1900) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Braxley v. State, 17 Ga. App. 196, 86 S.E. 425 (1915); Allen v. State, 40 Ga. App. 657, 150 S.E. 863 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Jolly v. State, 41 Ga. App. 494, 153 S.E. 432 (1930); Bradshaw v. State, 44 Ga. App. 783, 163 S.E. 295 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Whitehead v. State, 46 Ga. App. 176, 167 S.E. 204 (1932); Sanders v. State, 46 Ga. App. 175, 167 S.E. 207 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Austin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 217, 169 S.E. 729 (1933); Thompson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105, 182 S.E. 414 (1935) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Perkins v. State, 59 Ga. App. 335, 200 S.E. 812 (1939); Worley v. State, 60 Ga. App. 557, 4 S.E.2d 417 (1939) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762 (1939); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Middleton v. State, 72 Ga. App. 817, 35 S.E.2d 317 (1945); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Stebbins v. State, 78 Ga. App. 534, 51 S.E.2d 592 (1949); Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325, 63 S.E.2d 682 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Ivey v. State, 91 Ga. App. 455, 85 S.E.2d 829 (1955); McPherson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 839, 101 S.E.2d 750 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 111 S.E.2d 70 (1959); Patterson v. State, 109 Ga. App. 582, 137 S.E.2d 74 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965); Sutton v. State, 223 Ga. 313, 154 S.E.2d 578 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Powell v. State, 123 Ga. App. 795, 182 S.E.2d 677 (1971); West v. State, 232 Ga. 861, 209 S.E.2d 195 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308; 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3224, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1219 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 225 S.E.2d 281 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Baker v. State, 238 Ga. 389, 233 S.E.2d 347; 431 U.S. 970, 97 S. Ct. 2931, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977); Hobbs v. State, 142 Ga. App. 782, 237 S.E.2d 16 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Felix v. State, 143 Ga. App. 376, 238 S.E.2d 734 (1977); J.B.L. v. State, 144 Ga. App. 223, 241 S.E.2d 40 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Eubanks v. State, 240 Ga. 544, 242 S.E.2d 41 (1978); Llewellyn v. State, 241 Ga. 192, 243 S.E.2d 853 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Reaves v. State, 146 Ga. App. 409, 246 S.E.2d 427 (1978); Mulligan v. State, 245 Ga. 266, 264 S.E.2d 204 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stanford v. State, 157 Ga. App. 633, 278 S.E.2d 175 (1981); Gilbert v. State, 159 Ga. App. 326, 283 S.E.2d 361 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Contrary to defendant's argument, the testimony of defendant's accomplice, corroborated by two witnesses, provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty; the jury did not have to find that the corroborating evidence was itself sufficient to support the verdict, or that that evidence matched the testimony of the accomplice in every detail, as slight evidence identifying defendant as a participant in the criminal act was sufficient corroboration. Mitchell v. State, 279 Ga. 158, 611 S.E.2d 15 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the defendant's conviction of burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, was supported by sufficient evidence, including a neighbor's eyewitness testimony that the neighbor saw the defendant taking property out of the victim's house during the time when the burglary happened, which was corroborated by the discovery of an item of stolen property at the place where the defendant was residing, evidence which was entitled to even greater weight was the discovery of a business card from the defendant's probation officer at the victim's home. Walker v. State, 279 Ga. App. 390, 631 S.E.2d 413 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony, and the corroboration must connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Allen v. State, 175 Ga. App. 128, 333 S.E.2d 11 (1985); Hanson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 246, 387 S.E.2d 441 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); In re P.A.W., 224 Ga. App. 329, 480 S.E.2d 347 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's felony murder conviction because the defendant's polygraph results, which the defendant stipulated to admitting at trial, corroborated the defendant's accomplice's inculpatory testimony. Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 620 S.E.2d 356 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice's testimony including the 911 caller, a surveillance video seen by the jury, and the testimony of an officer as to the timing of driving from the murder scene to the car wash. Mangram v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 2, 2018).

Corroboration by other accomplices.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder as the defendant used a knife to stab the victim in the neck; a jailhouse informant testified that the defendant had admitted that the defendant and a juvenile had beat the victim with a pan, strangled the victim with a belt, and stabbed the victim in the neck; and, even if the supreme court were to assume that the only evidence of the defendant's guilt was the testimony of accomplices, because more than one accomplice testified at trial, the testimony of one accomplice could be corroborated by the testimony of the others. Ramirez v. State, 294 Ga. 440, 754 S.E.2d 325 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury that corroboration was required of an accomplice's testimony because there was evidence to corroborate the testimony that the defendant was involved with the crimes because two other witnesses testified that the defendant contacted the witnesses before the burglary. Barney v. State, 333 Ga. App. 807, 777 S.E.2d 490 (2015).

Testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity and participation of the accused which tends to connect the accused with the crime or leads to the inference that the accused is guilty. Gaddis v. Kemp, 638 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence independent of accomplice's out-of-court statements constituted sufficient corroboration to support the verdict of guilty. Slaughter v. State, 257 Ga. 104, 355 S.E.2d 660 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Connection of defendant with crime.

- Corroborating circumstances must connect the defendant with the crime independently of the testimony of the accomplice, and this requirement is not met by merely corroborating the accomplice as to time, place, and circumstances of the transaction, if there is nothing to connect the defendant therewith. Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534, 1 S.E.2d 405 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940); Rozier v. State, 68 Ga. App. 797, 24 S.E.2d 137 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Croker v. State, 101 Ga. App. 742, 115 S.E.2d 413 (1960); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 164 S.E.2d 808 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26 (1974); Gaudin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 252, 211 S.E.2d 189 (1974), cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Defendant's conduct before, during, and after the fatal strangulation of the victim including: (1) volunteering to kill the victim after an accomplice claimed that the victim's brother was responsible for the death of the accomplice's cousin; (2) participating in the strangulation death of the victim; (3) concealing the victim's dead body; and (4) disposing of the victim in the woods provided ample evidence to support defendant's guilt as a party to a malice murder and other crimes. Mitchell v. State, 279 Ga. 158, 611 S.E.2d 15 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in entering judgments of conviction on defendant's three burglary convictions in two cases following jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of those offenses; the state introduced sufficient evidence apart from the testimony of defendant's accomplice to warrant convictions, primarily based on the three homeowners' identification of the property taken and the homeowners' testimony about the circumstances under which the relevant property went missing. Daniel v. State, 275 Ga. App. 70, 619 S.E.2d 770 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In an armed robbery prosecution, when an investigator who had viewed and heard a videotape of the crime, in which one of the perpetrators made a high-pitched yell, testified that, while at the jail, the officer heard defendant make a sound that was so much like the sound on the tape that, "it was unreal," this testimony authorized the jury to convict this defendant. Shannon v. State, 275 Ga. App. 550, 621 S.E.2d 540 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

On appeal from the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and first-degree criminal damage to property convictions, the court held that the testimony provided by two of the victims identifying the defendant as one of the perpetrators was sufficient to uphold the conviction as: (1) the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; and (2) under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), the credibility of a witness was a matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Reid v. State, 281 Ga. App. 640, 637 S.E.2d 62 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Passenger's testimony stating that the defendant passed marijuana to the passenger and told the passenger to discard the marijuana was sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to support a finding of guilt of possession of more than an ounce of marijuana under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30; the marijuana found near the defendant was packaged the same way as the marijuana found outside the car, and it could, therefore, be inferred that the marijuana found outside the car had previously been in the back seat beside the defendant. Curtis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 638 S.E.2d 773 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0427, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 203 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

While the testimony of an accomplice standing alone was insufficient to convict, when the evidence identifying two of the three defendants as participants to an armed robbery of a female victim was not limited to the uncorroborated testimony of the driver of the getaway car, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that both were guilty. Williamson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 779, 648 S.E.2d 118 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant's live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Despite a juvenile's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an adjudication entered by the juvenile court on a charge of attempted rape was proper because the charge was supported not only by the testimony of the victim, but also by the corroborating testimony offered by both the victim's neighbor, who witnessed the attack, and the victim's sister, who chased the juvenile away from the scene. In the Interest of J.L.H., 289 Ga. App. 30, 656 S.E.2d 160 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Despite waiving error regarding a show up identification because: (1) a victim's identification of the defendant as one of the perpetrators of a burglary, robbery, and battery was sufficient and non-suggestive; and (2) the corroborating testimony from the defendant's two accomplices was admissible to support the defendant's convictions, as both accomplices testified as to the defendant's involvement in the crimes, those convictions were upheld on appeal; thus a new trial was properly denied. Carr v. State, 289 Ga. App. 875, 658 S.E.2d 419 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

With regard to a defendant's convictions on one count of enticing a child for indecent purposes, ten counts of child molestation, one count of aggravated child molestation, and three counts of cruelty to children in the first degree, regarding actions the defendant took toward three children and what the children were forced to do to each other by gunpoint while the defendant was a babysitter for the children, the state proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt based on the testimony of the three victims and the victims' videotaped forensic interviews. It was within the province of the jury to disbelieve the defendant's testimony that the defendant did not commit the charged crimes. Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga. App. 145, 671 S.E.2d 180 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0624, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 215 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of armed robbery of a restaurant, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because sufficient evidence corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery; the driver corroborated that the driver picked the defendant up and dropped the defendant and the accomplice off at the defendant's residence near the restaurant about two-and-one-half hours before the robbery, the driver overheard the defendant speaking to the accomplice about committing a robbery, and two more witnesses confirmed that the two were together that evening. Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the first incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the first crime was used in the second crime and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant's mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of methylenedioxyamphetamine, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt because based on the evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant threw a plastic bag containing drugs out the passenger side window of the defendant's car when the state presented evidence that a deputy saw the defendant actually possessing the bag of illegal narcotics as the defendant held the bag in the car before the defendant threw the bag out the passenger's window; an officer's testimony that the officer saw the defendant's hand on a plastic bag containing cocaine is sufficient to authorize a rationale trier of fact to find that the defendant possessed the cocaine. McCombs v. State, 306 Ga. App. 64, 701 S.E.2d 496 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of malice murder and related offenses because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 since although a co-indictee could be considered an accomplice to murder and the other non-drug-related crimes on which the defendant was tried, there was no evidence of the co-indictee's intent to participate in any crime other than drug trafficking; assuming that the co-indictee was an accomplice, a witness's apparent firsthand knowledge about the crime connected the defendant to the crime and thereby corroborated a co-indictee's testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. Moore v. State, 288 Ga. 187, 702 S.E.2d 176 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), was supported by sufficient evidence under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 since the defendant and the codefendant had both made statements regarding the defendant's involvement in the criminal activity, and the police observed the defendant's actions; there was evidence that the defendant was an active participant and a party to the trafficking offense. Martinez v. State, 314 Ga. App. 551, 724 S.E.2d 851 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

With regard to the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, the testimony of the victim alone was sufficient to support the conviction based on the victim identifying the defendant as the assailant from a photo array, as well as the victim testifying that the defendant had a gun, that when the victim turned and ran, the victim heard a gunshot and then discovered that the victim was shot. Lomax v. State, 319 Ga. App. 693, 738 S.E.2d 152 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony implicating the defendant in the robbery because the testimony of the victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator and was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony. Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767 (2013).

With regard to the defendant's murder conviction, the defendant's contention on appeal that the accomplice testimony used to convict was not corroborated was found meritless because there was slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the defendant as a participant in the crime; specifically, authorities found the defendant's blood and palm print on the car used during the crime which evidence corroborated the accomplice's testimony that the defendant was injured on the broken glass of the window the men used to gain entry to the victim's house. Lewis v. State, 293 Ga. 110, 744 S.E.2d 21 (2013).

With regard to the defendant's robbery conviction, contrary to the defendant's contention that the testimony of an accomplice was uncorroborated and thus insufficient to support the conviction, there was no conflict in the testimony that the defendant was a participant; thus, the corroborating evidence was more than slight and was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the accomplice's testimony was corroborated. Carter v. State, 324 Ga. App. 118, 749 S.E.2d 404 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on the victim identifying the defendant as the person who hit the victim on the head, an accomplice's testimony, the victim's car keys were found in a bag that the defendant had been holding when stopped by an officer, and the defendant fled from the officers when the officers attempted to arrest. Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688 (2013).

There was ample corroboration of the accomplice's testimony, including evidence that the murder weapon was found in the defendant's home, a cap and t-shirt like the ones that the victim said the defendant discarded near the murder scene were found near there, and the defendant's DNA was found on a cap found in the vehicle where the victims were shot. Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015).

Since the accomplice's testimony was corroborated by phone records, physical evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses, including the defendant's own statements to police, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions. McDonald v. State, 296 Ga. 643, 770 S.E.2d 6 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction as a party to the crime of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a) for fleeing and eluding because the appellant testified and admitted shoplifting, admitted to having a prior record of shoplifting, had only recently been released from prison, and that getting caught on the day of the events would be a parole violation that would send the appellant back to prison. McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422, 768 S.E.2d 751 (2015).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on the testimony of the victim that the defendant repeatedly had sexual intercourse and engaged in other sexual acts with the victim, who was younger than 16, as well as the wife's testimony that the defendant admitted to having sex with the victim. Jones v. State, 333 Ga. App. 796, 777 S.E.2d 480 (2015).

The testimony of the victim's brother, identifying the defendant as the shooter, was sufficient to support the convictions because two other eyewitnesses to the shooting corroborated the brother's description of the car driven by the shooter, and another witness corroborated the brother's description of the shooter getting out of the distinctive car a few days after the shooting at the apartment complex where the defendant was soon after arrested. Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 783 S.E.2d 652 (2016).

Victim's testimony that she had sex, including oral sex, with the defendant, her stepfather, beginning when she was 12 years old was corroborated by, among other things, the defendant's admissions and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the statutory rape, child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and incest convictions. Jackson v. State, 339 Ga. App. 313, 793 S.E.2d 201 (2016).

While the co-murderer's statement to police did make up a significant portion of the testimony connecting the defendant to the murders, it was not the only evidence against the defendant as cell phone evidence indicated the defendant was near the victims' home near the time the crimes took place and direct testimony established that the defendant recruited at least one participant in the robbery scheme that resulted in the murders. Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of, inter alia, malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because, assuming that the first witness was an accomplice, there was evidence independent of the first witness's testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes as cell phone records showed the defendant's cell phone was near the towing company where the victim worked around the time of the shooting; a second witness heard gunshots and saw a blue truck with a man standing outside and a man hanging out of a window with the man's arms formed as if shooting; and a third witness reported to police that the defendant and the co-indictee admitted to the third witness that they had killed the victim. Parks v. State, 302 Ga. 345, 806 S.E.2d 529 (2017).

Accomplice to felony exception not applicable.

- Sufficient evidence supported defendant's O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 burglary conviction. The former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 "accomplice to a felony" exception did not apply and the defendant's codefendant's evidence was admissible (and subject to cross-examination) since a neighbor also testified that the neighbor saw the defendant enter the victim's home and remove items which were later recovered from the codefendant. Millirons v. State, 268 Ga. App. 644, 602 S.E.2d 346 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Knowledge and use of home security code.

- Accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated when the victim's body was found in a manner consistent with the accomplice's testimony, other witnesses corroborated various details of the accomplice's testimony, and defendant left town, as the accomplice testified defendant warned the accomplice to do likewise. Hinely v. State, 275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of burglary, assault, and battery included an accomplice's testimony (sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by accomplice's knowledge and use of the defendant's grandmother's security code) that defendant hired an accomplice to kill the grandmother. Hill v. State, 268 Ga. App. 642, 602 S.E.2d 348 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Identity of accomplice alone is insufficient corroboration.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice. One who is guilty of a crime in which one participated will always be able to relate the facts of the case and if the corroboration goes only to the truth of that history, without identifying the person accused, it is really no corroboration at all. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Corroboration required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 need not be sufficient to warrant guilty verdict or prove every material element of the crime; it need only tend to connect and identify the defendant with the crime charged. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Raines v. State, 186 Ga. App. 239, 366 S.E.2d 841 (1988); Hanson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 246, 387 S.E.2d 441 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accomplice's testimony was corroborated for bank robbery conviction since: (1) the security guard identified defendant as a perpetrator; (2) a baseball cap dropped by the gunman was scientifically linked to defendant; (3) defendant gave the accomplice a gun before the later robberies, and the gun the accomplice discarded after a later robbery was the weapon taken from the bank security guard at the bank robbery; and (4) a still photograph of the gunman made from the bank surveillance videotape was shown to the jury. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. App. 595, 571 S.E.2d 817 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accomplice's identification of participants in crime must be corroborated.

- When an accomplice's testimony is corroborated in material part, other uncorroborated testimony may be believed by the jury, with one important exception: testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice. Cofer v. State, 166 Ga. App. 436, 304 S.E.2d 537 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of a defendant's accomplice implicating the defendant in several robberies was sufficiently corroborated based on the defendant's admission, eyewitnesses confirming that two persons participated, and the defendant's use of the victims' bank cards after the robberies. Thus, the defendant's participation as an accessory was sufficiently corroborated by evidence other than from the accomplice. Epps v. State, 296 Ga. App. 92, 673 S.E.2d 608 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Slight evidence sufficient to prove identity.

- Corroborating evidence of testimony of an accomplice, albeit slight, tended to prove defendant's identity and participation in the crime and therefore was sufficient as a matter of law. Walker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 868, 197 S.E. 67 (1938) ??? (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121)sb McPherson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 839, 101 S.E.2d 750 (1958); Trull v. State, 221 Ga. 442, 145 S.E.2d 242 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973); Harris v. State, 165 Ga. App. 186, 299 S.E.2d 393 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Williams v. State, 198 Ga. App. 725, 402 S.E.2d 796 (1991); Brown v. State, 199 Ga. App. 18, 404 S.E.2d 154 (1991) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Tucker v. State, 205 Ga. App. 683, 423 S.E.2d 422 (1992); Young v. State, 213 Ga. App. 278, 444 S.E.2d 598 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Knott v. State, 225 Ga. App. 604, 484 S.E.2d 342 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Slight evidence of corroboration, which may be entirely circumstantial, that connects a defendant with the crime satisfies the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, and the sufficiency of the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony is peculiarly a matter for the jury; thus, the evidence presented at defendant's trial for multiple burglary counts was sufficient to support defendant's convictions since the testimony of defendant's nephew, who acted as an accomplice, was corroborated by the testimony of the victims describing the methods used to break into their homes and the items that were taken. Gibson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 473, 600 S.E.2d 417 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was at least slight evidence from sources extraneous to the defendant's accomplice as to the defendant's identity and participation in a robbery, and the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict on that count. Extraneous evidence connected the defendant to at least one robbery in which the defendant employed the same modus operandi as the accomplice employed. Grimes v. State, 291 Ga. App. 585, 662 S.E.2d 346 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit burglary, and sexual battery because there was at lease slight evidence from sources extraneous to a co-conspirator as to the defendant's identity and participation in a home invasion and robbery; the co-conspirator testified that the co-conspirator attended a meeting to plan the robbery and that the meeting occurred at the apartment where the defendant resided, and extraneous evidence connected the defendant to at least two home invasions that employed the same modus operandi. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of other witnesses sufficient.

- Finding of delinquency by virtue of the minor's having committed acts which if done by an adult would have constituted motor vehicle theft and burglary was not based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; rather, many of the details were also corroborated by the testimony of two investigators, a relative of the minor, the owner of one of the stolen vehicles and the minor personally. In re J.B., 223 Ga. App. 429, 477 S.E.2d 874 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When a former detective testified without objection that a witness to a robbery gave a statement positively identifying the defendant as the gunman in an armed robbery, this testimony corroborated testimony of a co-participant, and whether it was sufficient for a conviction was for the jury to determine. Kenney v. State, 236 Ga. App. 359, 511 S.E.2d 923 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping as the testimony of at least one witness that was presented against defendant as to each offense was sufficient to establish as a fact that defendant committed the offenses. Singleton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 184, 577 S.E.2d 6 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless conduct, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-5-60(b), respectively; defendant and the codefendants were involved in a physical altercation with two restaurant patrons, and a codefendant's testimony that defendant retrieved a gun and shot the victim was sufficiently repeated by the testimony of other witnesses, who also connected defendant with the shooting pursuant to the corroboration requirement in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Baker v. State, 273 Ga. App. 297, 614 S.E.2d 904 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act because a passenger in the defendant's truck testified that defendant purchased crack cocaine from an individual in a high drug area, a rock of crack cocaine was found in defendant's truck, and a police officer corroborated that testimony pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 with the officer's own observations that the individual that defendant was talking to had money in a hand as the individual lowered the hand from defendant's truck window. Millsap v. State, 275 Ga. App. 732, 621 S.E.2d 837 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because testimony from a single witness was sufficient to establish a fact, testimony from both victims of an armed robbery that the defendant was the gunman during that robbery was sufficient direct evidence to establish that fact; moreover, the fact that the defendant offered another explanation for the defendant's presence at the scene, did not render the other evidence against the defendant insufficient or circumstantial. Bakyayita v. State, 278 Ga. App. 624, 629 S.E.2d 539 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because sufficient evidence was presented that a juvenile was a party to the crime of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony, and the evidence was corroborated by a police officer who questioned the juvenile's cohort, an adjudication based on the juvenile's commission of the act was upheld on appeal; thus, the juvenile's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. In the Interest of B.D., 287 Ga. App. 185, 651 S.E.2d 129 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In defendant's conviction for child molestation, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as sufficient evidence existed based on testimony of the child victim's parent, who testified as to discovery of defendant on top of the victim; further evidence in support of defendant's conviction included the child's videotaped police interviews describing what happened. Lopez v. State, 291 Ga. App. 210, 661 S.E.2d 618 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find a defendant guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt as it was within the jury's province to reject the defendant's defense denying the crime with regard to the victim as well as with regard to the witnesses who testified as to similar transactions with the defendant. The testimony of the victim was corroborated by an investigator and a forensic interviewer, who testified as to what the victim had told had occurred; the victim's statements were corroborated by the sheriff's investigator; and the jury was entitled to consider the victim's out-of-court statements as substantive evidence under the former Child Hearsay Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16. Lamb v. State, 293 Ga. App. 65, 666 S.E.2d 462 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession-of-a-firearm based on the testimony of three separate witnesses, including the victim, that the defendant threateningly pointed a gun at the victim's head. Further, regarding the need to show the victim's reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, the state presented evidence from the victim's mouth that the victim feared the gun and that the fear resulted in the victim urinating on the victim's person and in the victim lying to an officer at the front door to protect the victim's children. Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

The testimony of a victim and the victim's neighbor that the defendant was the person who held a gun to the victim's side and led the victim outside to search for money in the victim's truck, as well as a letter from the defendant to a codefendant implicating the defendant, was sufficient corroboration under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to create a jury question as to whether the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault. Decoteau v. State, 302 Ga. App. 451, 691 S.E.2d 328 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive, possession of an open container of alcoholic beverage, and disorderly conduct because the testimony of the driver accosted by the defendant and the arresting officer was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. Corbin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 768, 700 S.E.2d 868 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for forgery because although the only witness who testified to the defendant's participation in the forgery was her boyfriend's daughter, who testified that she and the defendant had together forged counterfeit currency, the trial court found that the daughter's testimony was corroborated by the fact that the counterfeit currency was found in a common area of the house where the defendant was the only resident; the judgment as to the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence was for the finder of fact to determine, and the trial court clearly found that the presumption of possession raised by the defendant's residence at the home was sufficiently corroborative. Martin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of two codefendants that a defendant was the third man in a burglary was sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 because the codefendants corroborated each other, and one codefendant's sibling testified that the sibling lent the three defendants the sibling's car and later noticed the defendant carrying a flat-screen television, which was taken in the burglary. Sims v. State, 306 Ga. App. 68, 701 S.E.2d 534 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient corroboration of an accomplice's testimony because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8; the testimony of the victim's fiancee and the accomplice's friend was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony directly identifying the defendant as the shooter, the physical description of the shooter that the fiance provided to the police fit the defendant, and the fiancee's description of the shooter's clothes was consistent with the accomplice's trial testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the incident. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803, 708 S.E.2d 331 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support a malice murder conviction, although no forensic or physical evidence was presented, because the jury determined that the eyewitnesses' testimony that the defendant fatally shot the victim during a drug transaction was credible. The testimony of a single witness was sufficient pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Handley v. State, 289 Ga. 786, 716 S.E.2d 176 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and while the only evidence of the shotgun at the scene of the assault of the victim came from a codefendant, other evidence from the victim and the police served to corroborate it. Emerson v. State, 315 Ga. App. 105, 726 S.E.2d 600 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions as the getaway driver's testimony about the heights of the defendant and the codefendant was consistent with the gas station clerk's comparison of their heights, and there was evidence that the defendant, who had no job, was spending significant amounts of money on cars and expensive clothing. Harrell v. State, 322 Ga. App. 115, 744 S.E.2d 105 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge on accomplice corroboration because the accomplice was not the only witness; thus, there was no error in failing to give the accomplice corroboration charge since the state relied on other evidence apart from the accomplice's testimony. Lane v. State, 324 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (2013).

In a case decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of an accomplice implicating the defendant was corroborated by evidence that the defendant believed the victim stole the defendant's cocaine, witnesses identified the defendant as being involved in dragging a man into a vehicle, and the victim's blood was found in the defendant's sister's basement. McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 750 S.E.2d 314 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of the victim's cousin was sufficient, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), to corroborate the accomplice's identification of the defendant as the shooter. Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 759 S.E.2d 846 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first defendant of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the fourth defendant's ex-girlfriend placed the first defendant at the scene of the shooting when the shooting occurred, which corroborated the testimony of the state's witness, who was a participant in the crimes, that the witness saw the first defendant at the scene shooting a gun and then fleeing with the other defendants. Grimes v. State, 296 Ga. 337, 766 S.E.2d 72 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41,16-5-21,16-5-41, and16-11-106, based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank, the defendant's clothing, a text message between the defendant and the defendant's accomplice, and the defendant's accomplice's testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015).

While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

Corroboration need not extend to every material detail.

- Testimony of one accomplice adequately corroborated that of another accomplice to the murder of appellant's former husband since although there were inconsistencies in that each attempted to place more culpability on the other in carrying out the scheme, they amply corroborated each other on the ultimate question of appellant's involvement in the scheme to have her former husband killed. Blalock v. State, 250 Ga. 441, 298 S.E.2d 477 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Need not warrant conviction.

- Corroborating evidence need not be in and of itself so strong as to support a verdict of guilty. Nance v. State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 S.E. 932 (1906) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Parham v. State, 3 Ga. App. 468, 60 S.E. 123 (1908); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762 (1939) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);aff'd,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Grave suspicion not sufficient.

- Corroborating evidence which merely casts a grave suspicion upon the defendant is not sufficient. McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346 (1881) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); Baker v. State, 14 Ga. App. 578, 81 S.E. 805 (1914); Thompson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105, 182 S.E. 414 (1935) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Worley v. State, 60 Ga. App. 557, 4 S.E.2d 417 (1939); Ivey v. State, 91 Ga. App. 455, 85 S.E.2d 829 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 224 S.E.2d 281 (1976); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime or leading to an inference that the accused is guilty and must do more than merely cast a grave suspicion of guilt on the accused. Powell v. State, 166 Ga. App. 393, 304 S.E.2d 515 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participator in the criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a verdict. Hargett v. State, 55 Ga. App. 192, 189 S.E. 675 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); King v. State, 77 Ga. App. 720, 49 S.E.2d 790 (1948); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); McPherson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 839, 101 S.E.2d 750 (1958); Wilkins v. State, 96 Ga. App. 841, 101 S.E.2d 912 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965); Lindsey v. State, 227 Ga. 48, 178 S.E.2d 848 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976); Jones v. State, 139 Ga. App. 643, 229 S.E.2d 121 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129 (1976); Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977); Felix v. State, 143 Ga. App. 376, 238 S.E.2d 734 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cummings v. State, 240 Ga. 104, 239 S.E.2d 529 (1977); Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376 (1978), cert. denied, Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 S.E.2d 341 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Neal v. State, 152 Ga. App. 270, 262 S.E.2d 561 (1979); Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 205, 264 S.E.2d 15 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874 (1980); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 741, 270 S.E.2d 5 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Black v. State, 155 Ga. App. 798, 272 S.E.2d 762 (1980); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Inman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 209, 355 S.E.2d 119 (1987); Thurston v. State, 186 Ga. App. 881, 368 S.E.2d 822 (1988) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Martin v. State, 209 Ga. App. 720, 434 S.E.2d 534 (1993); Dalton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 217, 513 S.E.2d 745 (1999) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Only slight evidence of participation in the offense from an extraneous source will provide the necessary corroboration under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, which may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence. Chergi v. State, 234 Ga. App. 548, 507 S.E.2d 795 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Confession of defendant was corroborated.

- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-40(a)(2) and16-8-41(a) were appropriate because the defendant's own confessions to participating in the crimes were corroborated by the testimony of the victims, among other evidence. Likewise, the defendant's codefendants' statements and testimony implicating the defendant in the crimes were corroborated by the defendant's confessions and the victims' testimony. Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga. App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Connection with crime more than suspicion of guilt.

- Corroborating evidence must, independently of the accomplice's testimony and of itself, connect the defendant on trial with the commission of the offense and tend to show defendant's guilt; a grave suspicion of the defendant's guilt is not sufficient. King v. State, 77 Ga. App. 720, 49 S.E.2d 790 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695, 69 S.E.2d 253 (1952); Wilkins v. State, 96 Ga. App. 841, 101 S.E.2d 912 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 111 S.E.2d 70 (1959); Seay v. State, 108 Ga. App. 724, 134 S.E.2d 422 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 164 S.E.2d 808 (1968); Caldwell v. State, 227 Ga. 703, 182 S.E.2d 789 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Felix v. State, 143 Ga. App. 376, 238 S.E.2d 734 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57 (1978); 440 U.S. 928, 99 S. Ct. 1265, 59 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979); Black v. State, 155 Ga. App. 798, 272 S.E.2d 762 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Need not warrant conviction but must do more than create suspicion.

- Corroborating evidence need not be so strong as to support a verdict of guilty, but it must be sufficient to connect the accused with the perpetration of the offense and lead to the inference of the accused's guilt, and more than sufficient to merely raise a suspicion against the accused. Sheppard v. State, 44 Ga. App. 481, 162 S.E. 413 (1931) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376 (1978); Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 S.E.2d 341 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Need not warrant conviction or be exhaustively corroborated.

- Corroboration need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a verdict or be corroborated in every material particular. Hargett v. State, 55 Ga. App. 192, 189 S.E. 675 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. 247, 42 S.E.2d 767 (1947); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mears v. State, 98 Ga. App. 576, 106 S.E.2d 854 (1958); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973); Atcheson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 152, 220 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Turner v. State, 235 Ga. 826, 221 S.E.2d 590 (1976); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976); Jones v. State, 139 Ga. App. 643, 229 S.E.2d 121 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony does not have to be sufficient in and of itself to support a verdict of guilty; circumstantial evidence tying the defendant to the crime and justifying an inference of guilt is satisfactory. Cofer v. State, 166 Ga. App. 436, 304 S.E.2d 537 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Slight evidence not warranting conviction and not supporting every material fact.

- Law does not require that the corroborating evidence shall in and of itself alone be sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty, or that the testimony of the accomplice shall be corroborated in every material particular. On the contrary, slight evidence that the crime was committed by both defendants, and identifying the defendants with the crime, will corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and warrant a conviction. Evans v. State, 78 Ga. 351 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Boswell v. State, 92 Ga. 581, 17 S.E. 805 (1893); Pritchett v. State, 92 Ga. 33, 18 S.E. 350 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Chapman v. State, 112 Ga. 56, 37 S.E. 102 (1900); Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S.E. 357 (1902) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Nance v. State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 S.E. 932 (1906); Davis v. State, 25 Ga. App. 532, 103 S.E. 819 (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); 25 Ga. App. 840 (1920); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359; 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Caldwell v. State, 227 Ga. 703, 182 S.E.2d 789 (1971); Mulligan v. State, 245 Ga. 266, 264 S.E.2d 204 (1980), cert. denied, Bennett v. State, 156 Ga. App. 617, 275 S.E.2d 701 (1980) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Powell v. State, 166 Ga. App. 393, 304 S.E.2d 515 (1983); Whitton v. State, 178 Ga. App. 862, 344 S.E.2d 703 (1986) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Howard v. State, 181 Ga. App. 187, 351 S.E.2d 550 (1986); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155, 351 S.E.2d 683 (1986), cert. denied, Slaughter v. State, 227 Ga. App. 739, 490 S.E.2d 399 (1997) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Direct or circumstantial evidence.

- Sufficient corroboration may consist of either direct or circumstantial evidence which connects the defendant with the crime, tends to show the defendant's participation therein, and would justify an inference of the guilt of the accused independently of the testimony of the accomplice. Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 S.E.2d 341 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Circumstantial evidence.

- Circumstantial evidence, when taken with the accomplice testimony, showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient corroboration. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Although corroboration may be by circumstantial evidence, the evidence must do more than merely cast a grave suspicion of guilt on the accused. Claybrooks v. State, 189 Ga. App. 431, 375 S.E.2d 880, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 375 S.E.2d 880 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Circumstantial evidence presented at trial sufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice.

- See Howard v. State, 187 Ga. App. 74, 369 S.E.2d 271 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 474 S.E.2d 708 (1996);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of other witnesses linking the defendant to the crime was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanchez v. State, 203 Ga. App. 61, 416 S.E.2d 139 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony in a prosecution for burglary of a store since the corroborating evidence included a burglary call to the police, a store security video which showed events testified to by the accomplice, and an incriminating statement made by the defendant. Williams v. State, 234 Ga. App. 191, 506 S.E.2d 237 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient corroborating evidence enabled the jury to conclude that the defendant was a party to the robbery based on testimony that the defendant and an accomplice met before and immediately following the robbery, defendant's own testimony of being in the drug business, cellular phone records indicating the defendant was in the vicinity of the robbery when the robbery occurred, eyewitness testimony, and evidence that the defendant sent the amount of money taken from the victim to another. Jackson v. State, 294 Ga. 34, 751 S.E.2d 63 (2013).

Corroboration by second accomplice.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the evidence sufficed to sustain the defendant's conviction where an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery's inception through the robbery's execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim's money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim's residence by supplying the defendant's car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Corroboration circumstantial and consistent with innocence.

- When corroboration of the alleged accomplice's testimony is entirely circumstantial and is of itself as consistent with innocence as with guilt, such evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict. Reed v. State, 127 Ga. App. 458, 194 S.E.2d 121 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Source of corroboration.

- Corroboration of an accomplice must come from a source or sources other than his or her own testimony, were it otherwise the rule as to corroboration would obviously be nugatory and worthless. Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161 (1900) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Butler v. State, 17 Ga. App. 522, 87 S.E. 712 (1916);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017).

There was adequate corroboration.

- See Cain v. State, 212 Ga. App. 531, 442 S.E.2d 279 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Bush v. State, 267 Ga. 877, 485 S.E.2d 466 (1997); Givens v. State, 227 Ga. App. 861, 490 S.E.2d 530 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); In re J.L., 229 Ga. App. 447, 494 S.E.2d 274 (1997); Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779, 505 S.E.2d 4 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1118, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Sparks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 11, 505 S.E.2d 555 (1998); Dalton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 217, 513 S.E.2d 745 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Purvis v. State, 239 Ga. App. 900, 522 S.E.2d 499 (1999); Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 523 S.E.2d 294 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Crumpton v. State, 244 Ga. App. 57, 534 S.E.2d 809 (2000); Blair v. State, 246 Ga. App. 533, 541 S.E.2d 120 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 731, 541 S.E.2d 701 (2000); Callaway v. State, 247 Ga. App. 310, 542 S.E.2d 596 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 543 S.E.2d 81 (2000); Eidson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 26, 543 S.E.2d 100 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001); Parker v. State, 249 Ga. App. 530, 549 S.E.2d 154 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient corroborating evidence existed to support accomplice's testimony that defendant kicked in the door of the victim's residence and committed other crimes inside that residence against the victim, as another person, other than defendant and the other two men who committed the crimes, gave a statement to police regarding defendant's presence at the scene of the crime and that statement was introduced at trial through the police officer who witnessed the statement. Moore v. State, 261 Ga. App. 752, 583 S.E.2d 588 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Although the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant was insufficient to convict defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, there was other evidence, including defendant's statements to police that defendant urged the codefendant to kill the victim, to show that defendant aided and abetted and counseled another to commit the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and (4). Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because of the corroborating testimony from the defendant's two accomplices, the accomplice testimony was admissible to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(3), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Scott v. State, 302 Ga. App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and aggravated assault because the independent corroborating evidence in the case was substantial; an accomplice's testimony implicating the defendants was corroborated by the aggravated assault victim, who positively identified one of the defendants, that defendant's own admission to a woman in the defendant's apartment, evidence that the second defendant had sustained shotgun wounds on the evening of the crimes, ballistics evidence tying that defendant to the crime scene, and the presence of that defendant's blood on the first defendant's clothing and in the getaway vehicle. Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of the defendant's two accomplices was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes (murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault) for which the defendant was convicted. Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by receiving because in addition to the accomplice's testimony, a deputy with the county sheriff's office observed the accomplice and a codefendant appear to shoplift at a store, after which they got into the defendant's car; the defendant did not stop when police were chasing the defendant but instead continued to drive evasively while the codefendant threw items out of the passenger window, and there were no receipts showing that the items had been purchased. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In an armed robbery prosecution, the testimony of the defendant's accomplice was corroborated as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, in that the accomplice's testimony regarding the defendant's planning of the crime was corroborated by telephone records, the store's security video tape, and the fact that money was deposited into the defendant's account only two days after the crime. Bell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 28, 722 S.E.2d 871 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence that the defendant was linked to the getaway vehicle, and that the defendant was present the next morning at a hotel with the vehicle, the co-indictee, the first defendant, the marijuana, and the cash was sufficient corroborating evidence to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the armed robbery of the four victims and the subsequent shootings that killed the first victim and injured the second victim. Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 751 S.E.2d 399 (2013).

Evidence sufficiently corroborated the victim's testimony that the defendant, along with the three co-defendants, kidnapped the victim for ransom because the proprietor of a business located in the same strip mall as the victim's clothing store saw the victim being forcibly taken away; on conversations monitored from one of the co-defendant's telephones, the victim was overheard pleading that the defendants not kill the victim; the victim was overheard asking the victim's family for money; after an investigatory stop, the defendant was found in the back seat, along with the victim and a hidden gun; and the victim stated that the victim's life had been threatened. Deleon-Alvarez v. State, 324 Ga. App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of five counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud because, although only the defendant's alleged accomplice testified that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to obtain possession of the controlled substances by fraud and deception, the state presented evidence of corroborating circumstances that proved the defendant's intent as the defendant went to the pharmacy on one occasion to pick up a medication that was clearly labeled as having been dispensed for the defendant, purportedly on the authority of a doctor who had never provided care for the defendant. Hopkins v. State, 328 Ga. App. 844, 761 S.E.2d 896 (2014).

Complaining witness's testimony that the defendant violated the 12-month stalking protective order by repeatedly shining a light on the witness when the witness took out the trash, shining the light into the witness's house, and yelling obscenities at the witness was sufficient to establish that the defendant violated the protective order where video evidence supplemented such testimony. Birdsong v. Barnett, 334 Ga. App. 120, 778 S.E.2d 372 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the first defendant of felony murder of two of the victims, the aggravated assault of another two victims, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to possess cocaine because the accomplice's testimony that the first defendant participated in the crimes was corroborated both by an assault victim's identification of the first defendant at trial as well as the rap lyrics the first defendant composed in jail which referenced the use of an AK-47 that resulted in the first defendant becoming a co-defendant of the shooter. Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 772 S.E.2d 630 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony, including evidence that all three participating were members of a gang and text messages regarding the removal of fingerprints, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In addition to accomplice testimony, evidence that the defendant was in possession of the murder weapon in the days preceding the crimes, placed calls from the vicinity of the crime scene in the early morning hours on the day of the crimes, and was with the victim the night before and the morning of the crimes was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer. McCain v. State, 300 Ga. 400, 794 S.E.2d 58 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of felony murder, violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and other offenses because the second defendant was a member of a local street gang; the accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated as there was a recorded cell phone call in which the second defendant stated that the second defendant was carrying weapons and seeking a criminal opportunity; the second defendant was tied to the first set of crimes in which the second defendant's victim was killed through ballistic evidence; and the second defendant's involvement in the second set of crimes was corroborated by the second defendant's own statements to a cousin. Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 805 S.E.2d 80 (2017)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of, inter alia, malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and attempted armed robbery as the state presented ample evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony because a witness testified that the defendant was present when the victim opened the victim's wallet to reveal a large amount of cash; the defendant agreed to do a controlled phone call with the accomplice, which was recorded by police and played for the jury; and, in that phone call, the defendant made incriminating statements regarding the location of the murder weapon, retrieving the weapon, and getting their story straight. Robinson v. State, 303 Ga. 321, 812 S.E.2d 232 (2018).

After the defendants were convicted of two counts of armed robbery and three counts of aggravated assault stemming from a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, in addition to the testimony of the getaway driver, who the state believed to be the defendants' accomplice, the testimony of the two store employees and DNA evidence presented by the state allowed the jury to infer that, during the robbery, the first defendant was wearing a black ski mask and a letterman-style jacket and carrying a revolver, while the second defendant was dressed in a Halloween mask and carrying a set of brass knuckles; thus, the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony presented by the defendants' accomplice. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

Adequate corroboration for RICO conviction.

- Testimony by defendant's cousin that the cousin saw defendant deliver packages to defendant's mother on several occasions corroborated defendant's mother's testimony that defendant supplied cocaine for sale by family members and was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. McGee v. State, 255 Ga. App. 708, 566 S.E.2d 431 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1058, 123 S. Ct. 633, 154 L. Ed. 2d 539 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for marijuana conviction.

- Sufficient corroboration existed to support a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute based on the testimony of an accomplice after the police saw that defendant was in a house that had marijuana in many rooms, the marijuana was divided into different colored baggies, implying different ownership, and defendant's flight from the scene showed defendant's consciousness of guilt. Ellison v. State, 265 Ga. App. 446, 594 S.E.2d 675 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In a trial for attempted trafficking in marijuana, a codefendant's statements were sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by the testimony of a case agent that a loaded pistol was found at the defendant's feet and that a bag containing the currency used in the drug transaction was found within arm's reach of the defendant. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for burglary conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for burglary after an accomplice's testimony that defendant was an active participant in the burglary was corroborated by: (1) a police officer's testimony that defendant was in a vehicle with two accomplices shortly after the burglary; (2) another officer's testimony that handguns were found in a pillowcase retrieved from the vehicle; and (3) the pawn shop owner's testimony that the guns found in the vehicle were the guns stolen from the owner's shop. Reynolds v. State, 267 Ga. App. 148, 598 S.E.2d 868 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of defendant's accomplice was sufficiently corroborated by defendant's possession of tools used in the crime, the fact that defendant was found near the scene of a bank burglary covered in grease that could have come from a bank machine, the fact that defendant was sweaty, as if defendant had been working, and the fact that pine straw similar to the pine straw in front of the burglarized bank was found in defendant's car. McNair v. State, 267 Ga. App. 872, 600 S.E.2d 830 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's burglary convictions were affirmed based on the defendant's accomplice's testimony that the defendant was present with the accomplice during two of the three burglaries, corroborated by the property owners' testimony that items were stolen during unauthorized entries into their respective residences, evidence that the stolen items were found in the defendant's bedroom shortly thereafter, and the defendant's inconsistent explanations for the defendant's possession of the stolen items. Mays v. State, 306 Ga. App. 507, 703 S.E.2d 21 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for aggravated assault conviction.

- Sufficient evidence supported aggravated assault conviction because both the victim and another witness testified that defendant stabbed the victim, and a nurse testified that the victim's injury was serious. Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 273, 612 S.E.2d 96 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) after the defendant's companions used metal knuckles, a metal pipe, and a gun to beat the victim; the defendant was a party to the offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as the victim, whose testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, testified that, during the incident, the defendant summoned the companions to help beat the victim, and the defendant and the companions repeatedly warned the victim not to testify in court in the defendant's criminal case. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for malice murder conviction.

- Sufficient non-accomplice evidence was presented to corroborate the testimony by accomplices of both defendants in trial on charges of malice murder and other related offenses, specifically, that: (1) the first defendant admitted to the victim's killing, via a note from that defendant to a non-accomplice witness, in order to prevent the victim from testifying; and (2) independent evidence was presented regarding the second defendant's participation in the crimes to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 584, 630 S.E.2d 370 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder because, when the victim turned the victim's back on the defendant, and started walking away, the defendant pulled out a gun, put it to the back of the victim's head, and fatally shot the victim; the first co-defendant saw the defendant running back to the car with a gun in the defendant's hand; the second co-defendant testified that the defendant shot the victim; the testimony of the victim's friend supported the testimony of the two co-defendants, though the friend was unable to unequivocally identify the defendant as the shooter; and, although some of the evidence was conveyed through the testimony of co-defendants, that evidence was properly corroborated. Fisher v. State, 299 Ga. 629, 791 S.E.2d 58 (2016).

Adequate corroboration for methamphetamine conviction.

- Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, and defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based upon the uncorroborated testimony of defendant's accomplice alone failed as the incriminating testimony by the accomplice was adequately corroborated by independent evidence, including defendant's possession of essential items for manufacturing methamphetamine; defendant's statement to a passenger in the back of the patrol car that a store likely had ratted about the matchbook purchases; and the large quantity of matchbooks found discarded along the route defendant had just traveled. Kohlmeier v. State, 289 Ga. App. 709, 658 S.E.2d 261 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because the accomplice testimony presented against a juvenile was sufficiently corroborated by two other witness, the juvenile's prior similar acts, and the juvenile's flight from the scene, the appeals court rejected the juvenile's sufficiency challenge. In the Interest of S.K., 289 Ga. App. 672, 658 S.E.2d 220 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for armed robbery and hijacking motor vehicle conviction.

- Trial court properly convicted defendant of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle because: (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant committed the crimes based on the testimony of the victim, who identified defendant as the individual who approached the victim's vehicle, pointed a gun, and demanded the vehicle; (2) two officers testified as to observing defendant driving the stolen vehicle the same night; and (3) the victim's cell phone was found on defendant's person when the defendant was arrested. Culver v. State, 290 Ga. App. 321, 659 S.E.2d 390 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for robbery, burglary, and related crimes conviction.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for robbery, burglary, and other related crimes, the testimony of a codefendant that implicated defendant was sufficiently corroborated by other testimony and evidence at trial. Burton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 822, 668 S.E.2d 306 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for armed robbery conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's armed robbery conviction since an accomplice, who was wearing a mask and holding a gun when the accomplice entered the victim's bedroom, testified that the defendant had given the accomplice the mask and the gun and that the accomplice had shouted downstairs to the defendant during the robbery; the testimony was corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by the victim's recognition of the defendant's voice from the shouted conversation during the robbery and by the defendant's resistance and flight when police arrived. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of armed robbery since the testimony of a 14-year-old accomplice was corroborated by testimony from a clerk in the store that was robbed by the defendant and others, and the state presented physical evidence - clothing worn by the robbers - that linked the defendant to the robbery. Sellers v. State, 294 Ga. App. 536, 669 S.E.2d 544 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In an armed robbery prosecution, as the victim identified the defendant as the driver of a car and the codefendant as the passenger who robbed the victim at gunpoint, and the pistol used in the robbery was found in the car's locked glove compartment, to which only the defendant had the key, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the codefendant in the robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 and sufficiently corroborated the codefendant's accomplice testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Bailey v. State, 295 Ga. App. 480, 672 S.E.2d 450 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

While no witness could specifically identify the dark clothes that were recovered by the police from the crawl space of the defendant's parent as having been worn by one of the robbers of a grocery store, these articles of clothing matched descriptions given to an officer that the two suspects wore dark attire with full sleeves. This evidence sufficiently corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery. Jupiter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 386, 707 S.E.2d 592 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict after the defendant was convicted of armed robbery because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 since there was evidence from which a jury could find sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony to support the defendant's conviction; the testimony of the victims corroborated the accomplice's testimony because the victims physical description of the perpetrator was consistent with the accomplice's testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the robbery. Harris v. State, 311 Ga. App. 336, 715 S.E.2d 757 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because, even if the driver was the defendant's accomplice, there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the driver's testimony that the defendant stated that the defendant robbed the victim as video surveillance images corroborated the driver's testimony that the driver drove the defendant to the scene to buy two pounds of marijuana; the discovery of a packet of marijuana on the victim's body corroborated the nature of the deal; and neither the two pounds of marijuana corroborated by another person's testimony nor the $2,400 confirmed by the defendant, was found in the car with the victim after the defendant shot and killed the victim and returned to the driver's car. Ngumezi v. State, 300 Ga. 764, 798 S.E.2d 229 (2017)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for weapons possession conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime as the testimony of the defendant's accomplice that the defendant raped the victim at gunpoint was corroborated by the victim's out-of-court and in-court identification of the defendant as the rapist, and the fact that the defendant's DNA was found on the victim's clothing. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for rape conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of rape as the testimony of the defendant's accomplice that the defendant raped the victim was corroborated by the victim's out-of-court and in-court identification of the defendant as the rapist and the fact that the defendant's DNA was found on the victim's clothing. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for sodomy conviction.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for new trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to prove aggravated sodomy since the only evidence of the victim performing oral sodomy upon the defendant came from the uncorroborated testimony of the victim's parent, who was an accomplice to the sexual abuse and because there was insufficient evidence of force. To the contrary, the victim's testimony as to the sexual abuse committed by the defendant sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the victim's parent, and the testimony of the victim that the defendant kept multiple guns around the outbuilding where the trio lived and that the defendant had repeatedly threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not engage in the sexual acts was sufficient to prove the element of force. Driggers v. State, 295 Ga. App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for cocaine conviction.

- While a defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to exclude the possibility that the cocaine belonged solely to the defendant's passenger, the testimony of the passenger that the passenger dropped the drugs out of the truck after the defendant threw the drugs in the passenger's lap was adequately corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by the facts that the defendant had more than $2,000 in the defendant's pocket and that the defendant was the owner and driver of the truck from which the drugs were thrown; the defendant was, thus, properly convicted of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) and possession of cocaine as a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. Wingfield v. State, 297 Ga. App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's accomplice's testimony that the defendant was knowingly in possession of cocaine found in their vehicle was corroborated by evidence of 575 grams of cocaine in the vehicle, that the defendant was extremely anxious when stopped by police, and the fact that there were 18 air fresheners hung throughout the vehicle, and was therefore sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, supporting the defendant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Richardson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 850, 700 S.E.2d 738 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for robbery conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant committed a robbery was not based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant's accomplice. A store employee corroborated the accomplice's testimony, and items similar to those taken during the robbery, as well as items taken during a later robbery, were recovered from the defendant's car, which was occupied by the defendant and the accomplice. Savage v. State, 298 Ga. App. 350, 679 S.E.2d 734 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accomplice cannot corroborate the accomplices own testimony by something the accomplice told another witness. The corroborating circumstances must be independent of the testimony of the accomplice. Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Corroboration required for each offense.

- Although slight evidence of corroboration connecting the defendant with the crime is sufficient, when the defendant is charged with the commission of several offenses, there must be corroborating evidence for each offense charged. Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874 (1980), cert. dismissed, 247 Ga. 8, 273 S.E.2d 409 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Testimony corroborated in murder trial.

- Testimony of the principal witness, an accomplice in the murder of which the accused was tried, was corroborated and the conviction was authorized by the evidence. George v. State, 167 Ga. 532, 146 S.E. 120 (1928) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017).

When appellant was convicted of burglary, armed robbery, and felony murder, and appellant admitted that the appellant went to the victim's house with an accomplice, but insisted that the accomplice killed the victim, and contends that the only evidence that the appellant committed the murder is the uncorroborated testimony of the appellant's accomplice, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, since appellant's own statement is sufficient evidence of the appellant's participation in the crime to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. Wisenbaker v. State, 259 Ga. 416, 383 S.E.2d 132 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Contrary to the defendant's claim, the defendant's convictions did not rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice as the timing and circumstances supported the identity of the defendant as the mastermind. The defendant had ample motive to kill the victim to prevent the victim from testifying against the defendant and the plain inference that the defendant was responsible for menacing phone calls was uncontradicted. Lindsey v. State, 295 Ga. 343, 760 S.E.2d 170 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the defendant and the accomplice planned to rob the victim; the accomplice heard two gunshots, and the defendant ran back to the car and pulled out some cash and a bank card with the victim's name on it; the victim later died; and the accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated as the defendant had financial problems and, thus, had a motive for robbery; and, in a recorded phone call, the defendant told the accomplice that the defendant had not used the bank card, which amounted to at least slight evidence that the defendant possessed the victim's property. Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 785 S.E.2d 869 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as a party because the witness testified that the witness was sleeping in the co-defendant's car when the witness awoke to the sound of gunshots, the co-defendant returned to the car and put down a revolver, and the witness jumped out of the car, saw the victim's body, and ran; and, if the witness was an accomplice, the witness's testimony was corroborated by other evidence as, inter alia, a jailhouse informant described a conversation in which the co-defendant complained that the witness was telling everything about a drug sale that went wrong, and the co-defendant admitted to shooting the victim. Anderson v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 787 S.E.2d 202 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence of tenancy and drug paraphernalia.

- Evidence that the defendant lived in an apartment and quantities of methamphetamine were located there, along with the implements of trafficking, a triple-beam scale, cutting materials, and baggies for packaging was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Lowe v. State, 208 Ga. App. 49, 430 S.E.2d 169 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony corroborated for drug possession.

- When defendant's flight itinerary was identical to drug courier's and defendant made voluntary statements that defendant would have cooperated with officials had the officials talked to defendant first instead of talking to "that girl first," the conviction was authorized by the evidence. Warren v. State, 207 Ga. App. 53, 427 S.E.2d 45 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient corroboration when the testimony of the detective regarding what the detective heard about setting up the deal, the detective's observation of the drug transaction, and the detective's later finding the marked bill was at least slight evidence from which the jury could conclude that evidence, independent of the accomplice's testimony, connected defendant to the crime and led to the inference that defendant was guilty. Black v. State, 242 Ga. App. 271, 529 S.E.2d 410 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine since defendant's two accomplices testified as to their purchase of cocaine and their being stopped by the police while enroute to a motel to smoke the cocaine and since the police found cocaine in the back seat of the car defendant was driving to the motel. Heard v. State, 257 Ga. App. 505, 571 S.E.2d 524 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony corroborated in sudden snatching robbery.

- Independent testimony of two separate victims sufficiently established evidence that defendant participated in accomplice's crimes, and thus was sufficient corroboration of accomplice's testimony. Daniel v. State, 207 Ga. App. 720, 429 S.E.2d 130 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of victim sufficient to corroborate accomplice's testimony.

- Jury charge that defendant may not have been convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the charged home invasion was unwarranted since, inter alia, the victims' testimony corroborated the accomplice's testimony regarding defendant's involvement. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 248, 596 S.E.2d 743 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice's testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of defendant sufficient to corroborate accomplice's testimony.

- In a prosecution for malice murder, even though defendant and defendant's accomplice each accused the other of being the actual perpetrator, defendant's own testimony - placing oneself at the scene and as a participant in disposing of some of the evidence, including the murder weapon - provided ample corroboration for the accomplice's testimony to support a conviction of defendant either as a party to the crime or as an actual perpetrator in the murder. Parkerson v. State, 265 Ga. 438, 457 S.E.2d 667 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's testimony sufficiently corroborated that of a codefendant to support the defendant's conviction of armed robbery since the defendant testified that the defendant was present during the planning of an armed robbery and that the defendant supplied the gun used during the robbery. Short v. State, 234 Ga. App. 633, 507 S.E.2d 514 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's statement concerning willing accompaniment of friends despite knowing those friends were involved in criminal activity and defendant's knowledge about items that were taken during such activity was sufficient evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony inculpating the defendant. Moore v. State, 245 Ga. App. 641, 537 S.E.2d 764 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

When defendant robbed the victims at gunpoint with two accomplices, the testimony of one accomplice that defendant was involved in the robbery was sufficient to corroborate testimony to the same effect from defendant's other accomplice and sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (2) and16-8-41(a). Gallimore v. State, 264 Ga. App. 629, 591 S.E.2d 485 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient corroboration of an accomplice's testimony as required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 based on the defendant's own testimony admitting that the defendant deliberately drove to the scene of the murder and shooting with others, knew that the men doing the shooting were armed, and moved to the crime scene rather than away from the scene. Laye v. State, 312 Ga. App. 862, 720 S.E.2d 233 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0534, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 280 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of state's witness sufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice.

- See Herndon v. State, 187 Ga. App. 77, 369 S.E.2d 264 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Recent possession of stolen property, not satisfactorily explained, is sufficient basis for the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. Inman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 209, 355 S.E.2d 119 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Guns and ski mask sufficient corroboration.

- Testimony of the codefendant, corroborated by circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery, since the codefendant testified that defendant actively participated in the robbery and guns and a ski mask identified as those used in the commission of the crime were found in the defendant's trailer. Eschena v. State, 203 Ga. App. 621, 417 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Identification by robbery victim.

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for armed robbery and to corroborate the accomplice's testimony, when one of the robbery victims identified the defendant as one of the robbers. Telfair v. State, 234 Ga. App. 444, 507 S.E.2d 195 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) because even though the defendant was found near a car similar to that involved in the robbery, with a shotgun similar to that used in the attack, and the defendant admitted being present at the scene of the robbery, the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Law v. State, 308 Ga. App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony corroborated in prosecution for armed robbery.

- An accomplice's specific, extensive testimony linking the defendant to an armed robbery was sufficiently corroborated by substantial evidence of the defendant's immediate, unexplained possession of stolen checks, forged identification cards, and the vehicle used during the robbery. Smith v. State, 234 Ga. App. 586, 506 S.E.2d 406 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In a prosecution for armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant's presence at a convenience store identified by defendant's accomplice, at the specific time identified by the accomplice, in the type of vehicle identified by the accomplice, with the array of loaded weaponry - including a 9mm weapon - identified by the accomplice, was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony regarding the defendant's participation as a party to the crime. House v. State, 237 Ga. App. 504, 515 S.E.2d 652 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant participated in an armed robbery because an accomplice's testimony, which implicated the defendant as a party to the crimes, was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony and evidence at trial when the testimony of a second accomplice regarding the circumstances surrounding the planned robbery, the defendant's participation in the planning of the robbery, and the party's actions before and after the robbery sufficiently corroborated the first accomplice's testimony; the first accomplice's testimony was further corroborated by the victims' descriptions of the events surrounding the robbery, and the police chief testified at trial that police found two sets of shoe prints at the scene of the robbery, but only one set where the second accomplice waited with the car, which also corroborated the accomplice's testimony about what happened after the robbery. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In a malice murder action, an accomplice's testimony that defendant was the shooter was corroborated by the evidence of defendant's animosity towards the victim, the fact that defendant had previously pulled a handgun on the victim, and the fact that defendant had celebrated the victim's murder. Moreover, defendant's confession to another that defendant shot the victim corroborated the accomplice's testimony. Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Violation of former statute not grounds for habeas corpus relief.

- Corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice is a statutory requirement, not a constitutional right. Since violation of a state law no longer constitutes a basis for habeas corpus relief, there is no constitutional nor habeas corpus ground for relief since the contention is the absence of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice. Gunter v. Hickman, 256 Ga. 315, 348 S.E.2d 644 (1986) (concurring opinions);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Corroborated by other testimony and physical evidence.

- Although there was one witness who implicated defendant in the commission of aggravated assault and recanted the witness's statements at trial, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant since the witness's statements to police implicating defendant in the fatal assault were corroborated by other testimony and the physical evidence. Kinney v. State, 271 Ga. 877, 525 S.E.2d 91 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

There was sufficient evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to convict defendant of firearms offenses and drug possession, after the codefendant testified that defendant owned five of the guns and the drugs that were found in the stopped vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, and the police officer who stopped defendant's vehicle corroborated the codefendant's testimony by stating that the officer found a gun under defendant's seat in the car. Spratling v. State, 255 Ga. App. 500, 565 S.E.2d 839 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accomplice's testimony corroborated.

- Although a conviction cannot be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, slight evidence of defendant's identity and participation from an extraneous source is all that is required to corroborate the accomplice's testimony, and thus, support the verdict. Leonard v. State, 241 Ga. App. 899, 528 S.E.2d 540 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony following a drug deal in which the victim took pills without paying for the pills because the shooter's testimony as an accomplice or party to the crime was not the only evidence identifying the defendant as a participant as the defendant's statement to police placed the defendant on the scene; the defendant's witnesses testified that the defendant engaged in the pursuit; the shooter testified that the defendant told the shooter to take a pistol from the front console and recover the pills, or else the defendant would kill the shooter; and the shooter fired multiple rounds, killing the victim. Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807, 796 S.E.2d 688 (2017).

Accomplice's testimony not sufficiently corroborated.

- Juvenile adjudications were reversed since the testimony of an accomplice witness was not sufficiently corroborated to support the guilty findings; the victim's prior report to a school concerning two of the three defendants did not connect defendants to the crime, and was insufficient corroboration. In the Interest of M.B., 267 Ga. App. 721, 601 S.E.2d 370 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Accomplice's testimony that the second defendant participated in the crimes of felony murder of two of the victims, the aggravated assault of another two victims, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to possess cocaine was not sufficiently corroborated to sustain the second defendant's convictions because the testimony of the shooter's girlfriend that the girlfriend saw the second defendant in a vehicle with the first defendant and the shooter on the evening after the murder did nothing to indicate that the second defendant actually participated in the crimes. Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 772 S.E.2d 630 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Lay opinion testimony of deputy admitted.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of distribution of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt; a deputy's lay opinion testimony was sufficient to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Strickland v. State, 302 Ga. App. 44, 690 S.E.2d 638 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Felony conviction based on testimony of accomplice.

- In order to sustain a felony conviction based upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts and circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime or lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty, and are more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. The necessary corroboration may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant's conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that defendant participated in the crime. Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512, 421 S.E.2d 523 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 501 S.E.2d 810 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's possession of the gun identified by the victim as used in the crime was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to the sequence of events and acts perpetrated by defendant and the accomplice with regard to the crimes of armed robbery, rape, and aggravated sodomy with the accomplice agreeing to testify against the defendant in return for a lighter sentence. Palmer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 751, 650 S.E.2d 255 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1770, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 678 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Uncorroborated testimony of accomplices is sufficient to authorize a felony conviction; thus, convictions of defendant for hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, and armed robbery that were based upon the testimony of defendant's two accomplices to the crimes were affirmed. Boles v. State, 257 Ga. App. 240, 570 S.E.2d 677 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Conduct on the part of the defendant may act to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Holton v. State, 61 Ga. App. 654, 7 S.E.2d 202 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26 (1974); Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 440 U.S. 928, 99 S. Ct. 1265, 59 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1979);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Defendant's attempts to conceal defendant's participation in an offense can corroborate defendant's accomplice's testimony regarding defendant's participation. Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 168, 263 S.E.2d 910 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798, 267 S.E.2d 237 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Evidence of conduct as corroboration may be circumstantial or direct.

- Conduct of a defendant before, during the time of, and after the commission of a crime can corroborate the testimony of an accomplice and can be shown by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stanford v. State, 157 Ga. App. 633, 278 S.E.2d 175 (1981);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Jury may consider the conduct of the defendant before, during, and after the commission of the crime to determine the defendant's intent and defendant's participation in the crime to determine whether defendant's conduct is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony to sustain the conviction. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

The necessary corroboration required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant's conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that defendant participated in the crime. Berry v. State, 248 Ga. 430, 283 S.E.2d 888 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

While a conviction based upon uncorroborated testimony of an alleged accomplice is insufficient, corroboration itself is peculiarly a matter for the jury, and may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence tending to show defendant's participation. Howell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 445, 295 S.E.2d 329 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Corroborating evidence connecting a defendant to a crime may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant's conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that the defendant participated in the crime; whether the corroborating evidence was sufficient in a given context was a matter for the jury, and even slight evidence of corroboration connecting an accused to a crime was legally sufficient. Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 582 S.E.2d 575 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize the defendant's conviction as a party to the crimes charged as it was established that the defendant and the accomplice entered the store together, the defendant watched the accomplice brandish a gun and reach toward the cash drawer, a witness observed the pair running out of the store in the same direction together, and it was a reasonable inference for the jury to conclude that the defendant lied to police about knowing the accomplice. Daniels v. State, 339 Ga. App. 837, 795 S.E.2d 94 (2016).

Modus operandi evidence in the case was sufficient to corroborate a witness's testimony identifying the appellant as a participant in two additional home invasion crimes because the perpetrators were all Spanish speaking and conducted themselves the same way as to all four home invasions that occurred and each happened over the course of only three weeks and were committed within the same county. Cisneros v. State, 299 Ga. 841, 792 S.E.2d 326 (2016).

Confession is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Lancaster v. State, 54 Ga. App. 243, 187 S.E. 617 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Wade v. State, 195 Ga. 870, 25 S.E.2d 712 (1943); Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Spencer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 822, 386 S.E.2d 705 (1989) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony of the codefendant that the murder defendant was the triggerman in the armed robbery was corroborated by the defendant's confession in which defendant admitted participation in the robbery. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant's own testimony regarding defendant's presence at the scene of the crime provided corroboration for defendant's brother's testimony linking the defendant with the crime. Mosier v. State, 223 Ga. App. 75, 476 S.E.2d 842 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Proof of corpus delicti as corroboration.

- Proof of the corpus delicti independently of the evidence of the accomplice is corroborative of the guilt of the accomplice, but does not at all corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to the guilt of another. Childers v. State, 52 Ga. 106 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346 (1881); Altman v. State, 5 Ga. App. 833, 63 S.E. 928 (1909) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); Smith v. State, 7 Ga. App. 781, 68 S.E. 335 (1910); Sanders v. State, 46 Ga. App. 175, 167 S.E. 207 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Statement describing burglary corroborated by officer's observations and guilty plea.

- Defendant's videotaped statement describing a burglary, which statement conflicted with defendant's subsequent testimony denying knowledge of or participation in the burglary, could be corroborated by: (1) the officer's independent observations of the items taken which corresponded with defendant's description; and (2) the district attorney's testimony as to defendant's plea of guilty to the burglary. Dixon v. State, 172 Ga. App. 803, 324 S.E.2d 780 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Recent unexplained possession of stolen property is sufficient basis for the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony and for a conviction of burglary. Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129 (1976); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Unexplained recent possession of goods taken in an armed robbery and burglary has some corroborative value. Brady v. State, 169 Ga. App. 316, 312 S.E.2d 632 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Pregnancy of the unmarried prosecutor, unless it be shown that such pregnancy resulted from the act of the defendant, does not constitute corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutor. Wilkins v. State, 96 Ga. App. 841, 101 S.E.2d 912 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

When testimony of defendant's wife-accomplice was corroborated by testimony of wife's sister who observed defendant beating the same victim on an earlier occasion, such evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for cruelty to children. Jackson v. State, 178 Ga. App. 378, 343 S.E.2d 122 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Polygraph test results are sufficient corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 205, 264 S.E.2d 15 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Defendant's prior inconsistent statements, which constituted substantive evidence, were sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony. Arnold v. State, 243 Ga. App. 118, 532 S.E.2d 458 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Evidence from extraneous source.

- First defendant and second defendant were incorrect in asserting that their convictions arising out of the robbery and murder of a drug dealer were supported by insufficient evidence as their convictions were not based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices; rather, those convictions also rested on extraneous source evidence identifying the defendants as participants in the crime, including the testimony and identification of the defendant's by a person present at the drug dealer's apartment when the crimes were committed as well as substantial forensic evidence linking the defendants to the crimes. Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 611 S.E.2d 3 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Testimony and cell phone records sufficient corroboration.

- Defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, and other crimes were not based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 as: 1) a victim testified that intruders took a wallet that police later found in the defendant's home; and 2) cell phone tower records established that the defendant and the accomplice were exchanging phone calls during the times when the crimes were committed and within the vicinity of the crime sites. Jackson v. State, 289 Ga. 798, 716 S.E.2d 188 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Slight physical evidence sufficient to corroborate.

- Evidence of a large bag of marijuana, digital scales, and plastic baggies in a bedroom belonging to defendant slightly corroborated defendant's brother's girlfriend's testimony that defendant possessed the marijuana and gave it to the girlfriend to sell, and a tax return and receipt belonging to defendant corroborated the girlfriend's contention that this room belonged to defendant. Slight corroboration was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Williams v. State, 299 Ga. App. 798, 683 S.E.2d 860 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Adequate corroboration for gang related beating.

- In addition to an accomplice's testimony linking the defendants to the beatings of the victims, there was evidence that one defendant was involved in a conversation about retribution, that the defendant was near the exit to an amusement park among the larger group shortly before the assault, and that the defendant rode home in a car with an admitted participant in the beating. Morey v. State, 312 Ga. App. 678, 719 S.E.2d 504 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0451, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 592 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

In general.

- To convict of perjury, there must be two witnesses, or one witness and proof by corroborating circumstances. McLaren v. State, 4 Ga. App. 643, 62 S.E. 138 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Davis v. State, 7 Ga. App. 680, 67 S.E. 839 (1910); Flemister v. State, 81 Ga. 768, 7 S.E. 642 (1888) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). Rodenberry v. State, 37 Ga. App. 359, 140 S.E. 386 (1927) See Potts v. State, 78 Ga. App. 799, 52 S.E.2d 575 (1949) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the juvenile committed perjury and, thus, was not sufficient to support the juvenile's adjudication as a delinquent since the state's perjury case against the juvenile rested solely on the testimony of a codefendant, and was not supported by the required two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances. In the Interest of C.H., 262 Ga. App. 630, 585 S.E.2d 921 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Sufficiency of corroboration.

- Nature and sufficiency of the corroboration necessary to prove the perjury must in each case be determined by the jury, but the equilibrium between the oath of the alleged perjurer and the oath of the contradicting witness should be destroyed by material and independent circumstances strongly corroborative of the positive testimony of the witness. Bell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63 S.E. 860 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for armed robbery since: (1) defendant affirmatively lied by denying that defendant knew one accomplice in defendant's initial statement to the police; (2) defendant was driving the getaway car when it was stopped by the police; and (3) defendant was in possession of the handgun used in the armed robbery and the money stolen in the armed robbery. The sufficiency of the corroboration of the accomplice's testimony that defendant participated in the planning of the robbery as required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 was a matter for the jury to determine. Clemons v. State, 265 Ga. App. 825, 595 S.E.2d 530 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

State satisfied the corroboration requirement as to the defendant's perjury conviction based on the defendant's denial that the defendant and the man who murdered the defendant's husband had a romantic relationship because the state produced testimony from a bartender at a night club who saw the defendant and the man at the club on the dance floor pressing their bodies together while the man cupped the defendant's buttocks and they engaged in passionate kissing; and the state produced corroborating circumstances in the form of romantic email messages between the man and the defendant and evidence that they shared hotel rooms on out-of-town business trips. Sneiderman v. State, 336 Ga. App. 153, 784 S.E.2d 18 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (2016).

Conspirator's testimony sufficient.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate a coconspirator's testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 and for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes for which the defendant was convicted; the state presented the testimony of numerous witnesses and other evidence that sufficiently corroborated the coconspirator's testimony about the defendant's participation in the crimes. Walker v. State, 310 Ga. App. 223, 713 S.E.2d 413 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Proof based on circumstantial evidence.

- Former statute did not apply to a case where the proof of perjury was necessarily based upon circumstantial evidence. Mallard v. State, 19 Ga. App. 99, 90 S.E. 1044 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017).

Charging part of former statute when inapplicable.

- Court did not err in giving in charge the former statute as to the number of witnesses necessary to convict of perjury and certain other offenses, although a part of the statute was not applicable to the case where the inapplicable part was explained. Pence v. State, 36 Ga. App. 270, 136 S.E. 820 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017).

Charge unnecessary when two witnesses testify.

- When two witnesses swear to the same state of facts, the fact that the witnesses are accomplices or are not accomplices, or that one is an accomplice and other not an accomplice, does not require a charge by the court, in the trial of a defendant alleged to be a party to a joint crime, that "where the only witness is an accomplice" the accomplice's testimony must be corroborated. Wilson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 570, 181 S.E. 134 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Farley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 580, 436 S.E.2d 770 (1993); Reeves v. State, 244 Ga. App. 15, 534 S.E.2d 179 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Failure to charge connection with crime.

- In charging upon the subject of corroboration of an accomplice, the court having instructed that the extent of corroborative testimony was a question for the jury, it was not error, in the absence of a proper request, to fail to charge further that the evidence in corroboration should connect the accused with the commission of the crime. Jones v. State, 200 Ga. 793, 38 S.E.2d 429 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737 (1976);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Charge on corroboration required.

- Because there was evidence to support a finding that the witness was an accomplice, the trial court erred, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, in refusing to give the defendant's requested instruction on the need for corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 756 S.E.2d 507 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court committed plain error by not providing a jury charge on the necessity of corroboration of the accomplice's testimony because by failing to give the required accomplice corroboration charge and instead charging the jury that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was generally sufficient to establish a fact, the trial court impermissibly empowered the jury to find the defendant guilty based solely on the accomplice's testimony; while there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support a verdict, that evidence was in no way overwhelming; the outcome of the trial court proceedings was likely affected by the error; and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125, 786 S.E.2d 672 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Defendant demonstrated prejudice resulting from trial counsel's failure to request an instruction regarding the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony as to the defendant's identity as the shooter, as the accomplice's identification of the defendant as the sole shooter was directly contradicted by the testimony of the bank manager, who identified the accomplice as the shooter, and other circumstantial evidence pointing to the accomplice. Burns v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 27, 2017).

When charge on corroboration not required.

- Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury that an accomplice's testimony alone, without corroboration, was insufficient to support a conviction because trial counsel did not request this charge and because the state did not rely wholly on the accomplice's testimony. Wooten v. State, 240 Ga. App. 725, 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Because the state relied on evidence other than the accomplice's testimony, the trial court was not required to submit the issue of the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence to the jury and was therefore not required to charge the jury on corroboration. Jenkins v. Byrd, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice had to be corroborated because, pretermitting whether the failure to instruct the jury on corroboration was error, the defendant could not successfully demonstrate that it was plain error as evidence from multiple witnesses, including the defendant's witnesses and the defendant personally, corroborated the shooter's testimony. Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807, 796 S.E.2d 688 (2017).

Charge not harmful.

- Charge in regard to the provision of the former statute, relating to corroboration of testimony of an accomplice in a felony case was not harmful to the defendants. Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Jury instruction proper.

- Trial court did not err in charging the jury as follows while deleting the bracketed word "generally": "The testimony of a witness is :generally] sufficient to establish a fact if the jury believes the witness." Thomas v. State, 249 Ga. App. 556, 548 S.E.2d 71 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a jury charge that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was generally sufficient to establish a fact because the trial court did not err in giving the charge. Bellamy v. State, 312 Ga. App. 899, 720 S.E.2d 323 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err by charging the jury that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was generally sufficient to establish a fact because the first sentence of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 was not a truism that the jury could only be instructed on when the case involved one of the exceptions. Bellamy v. State, 312 Ga. App. 899, 720 S.E.2d 323 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Jury charge regarding corroboration of an accomplice's testimony as given properly informed the jury of what corroboration was required; and the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt, partici- pation in a crime, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and that grave suspicion did not authorize a conviction; thus, there was no likelihood that the failure to instruct the jury using the complete language of the suggested pattern jury instructions affected the outcome of the trial, and there was no plain error. Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 805 S.E.2d 80 (2017).

Whether witness was an accomplice is a question for the jury. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646 (1937); Aimar v. State, 116 Ga. App. 204, 156 S.E.2d 367 (1967); Maddox v. State, 131 Ga. App. 86, 205 S.E.2d 31 (1974); Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476 (1975); Durham v. State, 243 Ga. 408, 254 S.E.2d 359 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 requires that accomplice testimony be corroborated in felony cases when the only witness is the accomplice, but only slight evidence from an extraneous source as to a defendant's identity and participation is needed to corroborate an accomplice's testimony, and, such evidence may be entirely circumstantial. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. App. 595, 571 S.E.2d 817 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Submitting question as to whether witness was accomplice.

- It is not error to submit to the jury the question of whether a witness for the state was or was not an accomplice even if the witness had confessed to being an accomplice and had been jointly indicted with the defendant on trial. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Jury determines whether participation voluntary.

- When a witness testifies that the witness was forced to accompany the defendants out of fear of one or both of the defendant's, it is for the jury to determine whether the witness is an accomplice. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Jones v. State, 268 Ga. 12, 483 S.E.2d 871 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Instruction to jury on status as accomplice is expression of opinion of guilt.

- To be accomplices of each other, both the defendant and the state's witness must have been involved in the criminal enterprise. One cannot be the "accomplice" of an innocent man. It therefore constitutes an expression of opinion by the court as to the guilt of the accused to instruct the jury that a witness who testified as to the defendant's guilt and admitted the witness's participation in the crime would be an accomplice of the accused. Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Failure to request accomplice corroboration instruction.

- Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel was deficient in failing to request an accomplice corroboration instruction regarding the testimony of the state's witness as the admission of the involvement of the state's witness with the defendant in the events before, during, and after the shooting, along with the initial lies of the state's witness to the police at the crime scene, could support a finding that the state's witness was an accomplice and not merely present for the crimes; and defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant as the lynchpin of the state's case against the defendant was the credibility of the state's witness. Fisher v. State, 299 Ga. 478, 788 S.E.2d 757 (2016).

Instruction on slight evidence.

- Judge should not charge the jury as matter of law that slight evidence is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice; but as a matter of fact slight evidence is sufficient, if it is satisfactory to the minds of the jury. Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Trial court's pattern charge that "slight evidence" connecting the defendant to the crime may have been sufficient to support the testimony of an accomplice stated the law accurately. Richardson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 429, 626 S.E.2d 518 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Trial court did not err when the court charged the jury on a dictionary definition of "corroborating evidence" in response to the jury's question asking for a definition of the term "slight corroboration" as the jury was properly instructed on the full scope of accomplice testimony; the definition of "corroborating evidence" given by the trial court was an accurate statement consistent with the law; the instruction on accomplice testimony was devoid of the term "slight corroboration" but rather used the terms "supporting evidence" and "slight evidence from another source." Grimes v. State, 296 Ga. 337, 766 S.E.2d 72 (2014).

Sufficiency of corroboration of accomplice's testimony is a question for the jury. Powers v. State, 44 Ga. 209 (1871) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3702); Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351 (1876); Bell v. State, 73 Ga. 572 (1884) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); Evans v. State, 78 Ga. 351 (1886); Sikes v. State, 105 Ga. 592, 31 S.E. 567 (1898) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Parham v. State, 3 Ga. App. 468, 60 S.E. 123 (1908); Gilbert v. State, 27 Ga. App. 604, 109 S.E. 697 (1921) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Sheppard v. State, 44 Ga. App. 481, 162 S.E. 413 (1931); Hargett v. State, 55 Ga. App. 192, 189 S.E. 675 (1937) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Garner v. State, 72 Ga. App. 819, 35 S.E.2d 317 (1945); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Sutton v. State, 223 Ga. 313, 154 S.E.2d 578 (1967); Lindsey v. State, 227 Ga. 48, 178 S.E.2d 848 (1970) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308 (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3224, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1219 (1976); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976); Jones v. State, 139 Ga. App. 643, 229 S.E.2d 121 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129 (1976); Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 741, 270 S.E.2d 5 (1980); Cody v. State, 195 Ga. App. 318, 393 S.E.2d 692 (1990) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Jury must infer guilt.

- Sufficiency of circumstances proved to corroborate the accomplice is entirely a matter for the jury, provided the circumstances proved, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty, and in some way connect the defendant with the guilty act. Potts v. State, 86 Ga. App. 779, 72 S.E.2d 553 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mears v. State, 98 Ga. App. 576, 106 S.E.2d 854 (1958);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121).

Slight evidence to support jury's determination.

- Extent of corroboration is a question to be determined by the jury; it may be strong, or it may be slight, but in each case it must be of such character as to satisfy the minds of the jury as to the connection of the accused with the criminal enterprise. Sheppard v. State, 44 Ga. App. 481, 162 S.E. 413 (1931) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Walker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 868, 197 S.E. 67 (1938); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940); Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. 247, 42 S.E.2d 767 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948); Croker v. State, 101 Ga. App. 742, 115 S.E.2d 413 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359; 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974); Townsend v. State, 141 Ga. App. 743, 234 S.E.2d 368 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977); Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 246 S.E.2d 642 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); 439 U.S. 991, 99 S. Ct. 593, 58 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1978); Haynes v. State, 149 Ga. App. 179, 253 S.E.2d 851 (1979), cert. denied, Butler v. State, 150 Ga. App. 751, 258 S.E.2d 691 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 421, 265 S.E.2d 341 (1980); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983); 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121);aff'd,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Jury to decide sufficiency of corroborating evidence.

- Sufficiency of corroboration evidence is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine. If the verdict is founded on slight evidence of corroboration connecting a defendant with the crime, the verdict is legally sufficient. Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512, 421 S.E.2d 523 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 501 S.E.2d 810 (1998); Pinkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 737, 534 S.E.2d 192 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8).

Failure to charge statute.

- When a person accused of perjury is on trial, the judge should instruct the jury that, before the jury would be authorized to convict the accused, the charge must be established by the testimony of two witnesses or by one witness and corroborating circumstances. However, the failure so to charge could not be harmful to the cause of the defendant, since the defendant introduced no evidence, and two or more witnesses for the plaintiff testified positively to each of the material allegations in the indictment. Oxford v. State, 40 Ga. App. 511, 150 S.E. 466 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017).

Failure to request instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

- Trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction regarding the requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated amounted to ineffective assistance as it was error and prejudiced the defendant as the accomplice's identification of the defendant as the sole shooter was directly contradicted by the testimony of the bank manager who affirmatively identified the accomplice as the shooter. Burns v. State, 342 Ga. App. 379, 803 S.E.2d 79 (2017).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1407.

ALR.

- Rule as to corroborative evidence in prosecutions for subornation of perjury, 56 A.L.R. 407.

Character and sufficiency of evidence required to corroborate testimony of plaintiff in divorce suit, 65 A.L.R. 169.

Testimony of defendant in favor of codefendant on setoff or counterclaim interposed by latter alone against decedent's estate, under statute disqualifying or requiring corroboration of adverse or interested party, 67 A.L.R. 1548.

Bribe giver as accomplice of bribe taker and vice versa within rule requiring corroboration of testimony of accomplice, 73 A.L.R. 389.

Corroboration of accomplice by evidence of defendant's actual or contemplated flight, or concealment of himself, 87 A.L.R. 767.

Corroboration by circumstantial evidence of testimony of single witness in prosecution for perjury, 111 A.L.R. 825.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the "two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances," rule included in charge to jury, 156 A.L.R. 499.

Question as to who are accomplices, within rule requiring corroboration of their testimony, as one of law or fact, 19 A.L.R.2d 1352.

Corroboration required under statute prohibiting judgment against representative of deceased person on uncorroborated testimony of his adversary, 21 A.L.R.2d 1013.

Thief as accomplice of one charged with receiving stolen property, or vice versa, within rule requiring corroboration or cautionary instruction, 53 A.L.R.2d 817.

Necessity and sufficiency of corroboration of plaintiff's testimony concerning ground for annulment of marriage, 71 A.L.R.2d 620.

Prosecutrix in incest case as accomplice or victim, 74 A.L.R.2d 705.

Conviction of perjury where one or more of elements is established solely by circumstantial evidence, 88 A.L.R.2d 852.

Corroboration of accomplice witness by objective evidence authenticated by same accomplice, 96 A.L.R.2d 1185.

Limiting number of noncharacter witnesses in civil case, 5 A.L.R.3d 169.

Limiting number of noncharacter witnesses in criminal case, 5 A.L.R.3d 238.

Woman upon whom abortion is committed or attempted as accomplice for purposes of rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony, 34 A.L.R.3d 858.

Receiver of stolen goods as accomplice of thief for purposes of corroboration, 74 A.L.R.3d 560.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense charged against accused, 19 A.L.R.4th 368.

Modern status of rule regarding necessity for corroboration of victim's testimony in prosecution for sexual offense, 31 A.L.R.4th 120.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the "two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances," rule included in charge to jury - state cases, 41 A.L.R.5th 1.