State court does not have jurisdiction.

- While O.C.G.A § 16-8-18 grants the trial judge discretion to impose misdemeanor punishment, this provision does not reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. Accordingly, a state court does not have jurisdiction. Bass v. State, 169 Ga. App. 520, 313 S.E.2d 776 (1984).

Nature of entry.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18 makes no distinction between an authorized entry and an unauthorized entry. Loggins v. State, 169 Ga. App. 511, 313 S.E.2d 769 (1984).

Conviction for criminal trespass was not inconsistent with acquittal under former Code 1933, § 26-1813.1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18). Favors v. State, 149 Ga. App. 563, 254 S.E.2d 886 (1979).

Theft by taking did not merge with entering an automobile because the defendant completed the latter offense at the time the defendant entered the truck with the intent of taking items stored inside the truck, and because different elements had to be demonstrated to find the defendant guilty of both offenses. Hawkins v. State, 219 Ga. App. 484, 465 S.E.2d 527 (1995).

Because: (1) the defendant was properly sentenced for felony theft by taking as the defendant admitted to the accusation which valued the items taken at greater than $100; and (2) the offenses of theft by taking and entering an automobile with intent to commit theft did not merge for purposes of sentencing as each offense required the proof of different facts, the sentence imposed by the trial court was upheld. Neslein v. State, 288 Ga. App. 234, 653 S.E.2d 825 (2007).

Burglary conviction and entering an automobile with intent to commit a theft conviction did not merge as the state was required to show unlawful entry into a warehouse to convict the defendant of burglary, but not to obtain a conviction for entry of an automobile with intent to commit a theft; the burglary offense was completed when the defendant entered the warehouse without authority and with the intent to commit the theft of the computers; the automobile offense occurred when the defendant entered the victim's car with the intent to take the computers. Morris v. State, 274 Ga. App. 41, 616 S.E.2d 829 (2005).

Intent to commit theft could be inferred by defendant's admitted action of attempting to break into an automobile trunk in which valuables might be stored. The fact that defendant may have failed in accomplishing the apparent purpose did not render a finding of guilty improper. Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149, 358 S.E.2d 298 (1987).

In a prosecution for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18, an instruction authorizing the jury to infer an intent to commit a theft where an individual breaks into an area of an automobile in which valuables might be stored was correct. Pound v. State, 230 Ga. App. 467, 496 S.E.2d 769 (1998).

Evidence of prior convictions.

- Fact that the defendant entered different types of vehicles on different prior occasions or that the defendant used different methods to obtain entry into the vehicles did not render evidence of prior convictions for the same offense inadmissible. Sessions v. State, 207 Ga. App. 609, 428 S.E.2d 652 (1993).

Aggravated felony for purposes of federal sentencing enhancement.

- District court did not err in determining that the defendant's prior offense of entering an automobile with intent to commit a theft or other felony, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18, was an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because: (1) O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18 and the charging document established that the defendant was convicted of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft; (2) the defendant's prior offense was an attempted theft offense, within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U), because, by entering the automobile, the defendant performed a substantial step toward a theft; and (3) the Georgia court formally imposed a sentence of one year. United States v. Berumen-Ceniceros, F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2007)(Unpublished).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Hall v. State, 172 Ga. App. 371, 323 S.E.2d 261 (1984); Benton v. State, 178 Ga. App. 239, 342 S.E.2d 722 (1986); Groble v. State, 192 Ga. App. 260, 384 S.E.2d 281 (1989); Woods v. State, 196 Ga. App. 395, 396 S.E.2d 74 (1990); Hodges v. State, 222 Ga. App. 381, 474 S.E.2d 218 (1996); Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 622, 492 S.E.2d 290 (1997).

Following evidence found sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of entering a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant's presence at a motor vehicle, the defendant's possession of an item as the defendant fled, the defendant's flight itself, a cut hand and a bloodied broken window, and the discovery of a valuable tool which was in the car. Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 400, 306 S.E.2d 695 (1983).

Defendant's written statement admitting that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime and during the other perpetrator's conversations about breaking into the car, that the defendant raised the hood of the get-away car and that the defendant fled on foot when the police arrived sufficed for conviction. Crumbley v. State, 207 Ga. App. 33, 427 S.E.2d 27 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to convict, since, although no one saw the actual entry into the ambulance, it was after hours at a government facility with a locked gate, an ambulance was missing a battery, the hood was up, and the gate had been breached; finally, the defendants were stopped near the lot with the same type battery in their possession. Truax v. State, 207 Ga. App. 506, 428 S.E.2d 611 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony, since the defendant was found lying on the defendant's side inside the vehicle, rummaging under the seats, with no plausible explanation for defendant's behavior and with a series of tools and spare motor parts, commonly used to break into and steal cars. Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 572, 430 S.E.2d 883 (1993).

Although the evidence adduced at trial did not exactly track the specific description of the motor vehicle contained in the indictment, since the defendant was twice spotted in the vicinity of the vehicle and the defendant's fingerprints were matched to those of a suspect tool, the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of entering a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft. Woods v. State, 208 Ga. App. 565, 431 S.E.2d 167 (1993).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for auto theft under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18 since: (1) a blue car was stolen near the time and place of the location where a red stolen car was recovered; (2) the defendant was arrested after being observed driving away from a restaurant in the blue car; and (3) documents bearing the defendant's alias were recovered in both the blue car and the red car. Horner v. State, 257 Ga. App. 12, 570 S.E.2d 94 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for entering an auto with the intent to commit a theft since: (1) the victims saw the defendant in the victim's car, attempting to steal a speaker; (2) a car window had been smashed, and the interior of the car had been damaged; (3) the victims confronted the defendant, detained the defendant, and called the police; and (4) after the defendant was arrested, palm prints from the car were matched to the defendant's prints. Gary v. State, 259 Ga. App. 136, 575 S.E.2d 903 (2003).

Although circumstantial, evidence which identified the defendant as the perpetrator carrying burglary tools and in possession of property identified as taken from vehicles in a transmission shop, along with evidence that the defendant waived any issue regarding the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction or grant a mistrial, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18. Davis v. State, 263 Ga. App. 230, 587 S.E.2d 398 (2003).

Defendant's boasting that the defendant stole the victim's cell phone, coupled with the victim's testimony that the phone was missing, provided ample circumstantial evidence to support the defendant's convictions of entering an auto with intent to commit a theft, and of theft. In the Interest of M.C.A., 263 Ga. App. 770, 589 S.E.2d 331 (2003).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for entering an automobile as the person that a firefighter saw in an alley was the person that the dispatcher saw breaking into the trucks, the firefighter saw the defendant in the alley, the defendant was barefoot, a pair of shoes was found near the tools taken from the trucks, and the defendant's attempts to flee were circumstantial evidence of guilt. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 213, 614 S.E.2d 834 (2005).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for burglary and entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft because there was evidence corroborating the defendant's confession regarding how the defendant gained entry into both a warehouse and a car. Morris v. State, 274 Ga. App. 41, 616 S.E.2d 829 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of entering an automobile or other motor vehicle with intent to commit theft or felony, as the defendant's recent, unexplained possession of tools stolen from a vehicle's cab supported an inference that the defendant committed the theft and, therefore, that the defendant had entered the vehicle with intent to commit a theft. Drake v. State, 274 Ga. App. 882, 619 S.E.2d 380 (2005).

Because sufficient evidence was presented that a juvenile was a party to the crime of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony, and the evidence was corroborated by a police officer who questioned the juvenile's cohort, an adjudication based on the juvenile's commission of the act was upheld on appeal; thus, the juvenile's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. In the Interest of B.D., 287 Ga. App. 185, 651 S.E.2d 129 (2007).

There was no merit to argument of juvenile defendant that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove the acts of entering an automobile and criminal attempt to commit theft from a vehicle since, during the early morning hours, the defendant was in the area where a car stereo was stolen and the attempted theft of tire rims occurred, the driver's license bearing the false name the defendant gave was found at the crime scene, the defendant returned to the car that the defendant was driving with a car stereo, and car stereo parts were found in the car the defendant was driving. In the Interest of C.M., 290 Ga. App. 788, 661 S.E.2d 598 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of entering a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft because the victim found the defendant going through a box of personal items in the victim's truck, and when the victim questioned the defendant, the defendant fled and barricaded up in a nearby gas station bathroom, which raised an inference of criminal intent. Woods v. State, 302 Ga. App. 891, 691 S.E.2d 913 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18 as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, given that the defendant drove the defendant's truck to a pharmacy, waited with the truck idling while the defendant's friend got out, smashed a car window, and stole a purse, then drove away with the friend and hid the friend at the defendant's apartment when the police came. Rinks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 37, 718 S.E.2d 359 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree burglary and entering an auto because the state presented evidence that the defendant entered a dwelling house without authority with the intent to commit a theft as a victim's wallet was stolen from within the home lived in by two of the defendant's victims, and the defendant entered four cars with the intent to commit a theft. Daniel v. State, 342 Ga. App. 448, 803 S.E.2d 603 (2017).

Evidence sufficient for criminal attempt to enter automobile.

- Evidence that defendants discussed theft of a car stereo, possessed tools to aid in the commission of such a crime, and that the defendants drove to a shopping center parking lot in search of a specific car to enter was sufficient to find the defendants guilty of criminal attempt to enter an automobile. Evans v. State, 216 Ga. App. 21, 453 S.E.2d 100 (1995).

Attempt to enter an automobile did not merge with loitering.

- Merging of sentences for attempt to enter an automobile in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-8-18, and loitering under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-36 was not warranted because loitering required proof of presence in a place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, and attempt to enter an automobile required performance of an act which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of entering an automobile, both elements not required by the other crime. Brown v. State, 312 Ga. App. 489, 718 S.E.2d 847 (2011).

Repeated pull of car's door handle sufficient.

- Defendant's act of repeatedly pulling at a vehicle's door handle in a sorority house parking lot at 2:00 A.M. amounted to more than a mere preparatory act, and was instead an act proximately leading to the consummation of the crime of entering an automobile, supporting the defendant's conviction for attempt to enter an automobile in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-8-18. Brown v. State, 312 Ga. App. 489, 718 S.E.2d 847 (2011).

Insufficient evidence for conviction.

- An officer improperly arrested a defendant for sitting in a car, the owner of which the defendant could not identify. As the officer had no report of a stolen vehicle, nor was there any evidence that the vehicle had been broken into, the officer had no probable cause to remove the defendant from the vehicle and arrest the defendant; therefore, evidence consequently discovered in the vehicle was illegally obtained and properly suppressed. State v. Fisher, 293 Ga. App. 228, 666 S.E.2d 594 (2008).

Insufficient evidence of some charges.

- Items stolen from the victims' vehicles found in the defendant's car, stopped as the vehicle left the area of the thefts, were sufficient to sustain convictions of entering an auto with the intent to commit theft, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18; however, as there was no similar testimony as to items stolen from different victims, insufficient evidence supported other convictions because the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, without any other direct evidence, was insufficient to convict the defendant of the crimes that a passenger admitted to committing. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 94, 635 S.E.2d 577 (2006).

Lesser included offenses.

- In a prosecution for theft by taking of an automobile, defendant's requested charge on the lesser included crime of entering an automobile was properly denied where there was no evidence that defendant entered the automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony therein. Travis v. State, 243 Ga. App. 77, 532 S.E.2d 430 (2000).

Since entering an automobile was a lesser-included offense of theft by taking as a matter of fact, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense where the facts supported both offenses. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. App. 775, 566 S.E.2d 477 (2002).

Because the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of entering a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft since: (1) the victim found the defendant going through a box of personal items in the victim's truck, and (2) when the victim questioned the defendant, the defendant fled and barricaded up in a nearby gas station bathroom, the defendant was not entitled to a lesser included offense charge of criminal trespass; the defendant did not tailor the instruction to the applicable portion of the statute, and, in any event, a criminal trespass charge was not warranted since the evidence showed that the defendant entered the truck with the intent to commit theft. Woods v. State, 302 Ga. App. 891, 691 S.E.2d 913 (2010).

Mistrial properly denied despite allegation that the defendant's character was put in evidence, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the fact that the defendant's counsel declined to offer a curative instruction regarding the witness's statement; moreover, given the nature of the character statement, such was non-responsive to the state's questioning and unintentional. Ivey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 232, 644 S.E.2d 169 (2007).

Parties to crime.

- Defendant was correctly convicted of being a party to the crime of entering an automobile with intent to commit a theft since the defendant drove the car used as transportation to and from the crime scene and a co-perpetrator concealed the fruits of the crime until after the co-perpetrator and the defendant left the scene. Oakes v. State, 233 Ga. App. 684, 505 S.E.2d 33 (1998).

Juvenile's sentence under O.C.G.A.

§ 15-11-63 vacated. - Although the state argued that a juvenile had been adjudicated on five separate petitions setting out five separate felonies, because the record revealed that the adjudication had occurred on only two prior occasions for acts which, if done by an adult, would have been felonies, the juvenile's sentence under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(B)(vii) was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. In the Interest of P.R., 282 Ga. App. 480, 638 S.E.2d 898 (2006).

Cited in Massey v. State, 141 Ga. App. 557, 234 S.E.2d 144 (1977); Brooks v. State, 151 Ga. App. 384, 259 S.E.2d 743 (1979); Ligon v. State, 152 Ga. App. 661, 263 S.E.2d 534 (1979); Mills v. State, 160 Ga. App. 49, 286 S.E.2d 55 (1981); Matthews v. State, 161 Ga. App. 1, 289 S.E.2d 278 (1982); Austin v. State, 162 Ga. App. 709, 293 S.E.2d 10 (1982); Sledge v. State, 245 Ga. App. 488, 537 S.E.2d 753 (2000); Sinclair v. State, 248 Ga. App. 132, 546 S.E.2d 7 (2001); Ruffin v. State, 252 Ga. App. 289, 556 S.E.2d 191 (2001).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 335 et seq.

ALR.

- Automobiles: elements of offense defined in "joyriding" statutes, 9 A.L.R.3d 633.

Robbery, attempted robbery, or assault to commit robbery, as affected by intent to collect or secure debt or claim, 88 A.L.R.3d 1309.

Liability for personal injury or property damage caused by unauthorized use of automobile which had been parked with keys removed from ignition, 70 A.L.R.4th 276.

Burglary, breaking, or entering of motor vehicle, 72 A.L.R.4th 710.

Validity, construction, and application of Anti-Car Theft Act (18 USCS § 2119), 140 A.L.R. Fed 249.

What constitutes "aggravated felony" for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) - Theft or burglary offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), 62 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 255.