Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 16-9-121 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 16 CRIMES AND OFFENSES

Section 9. Forgery and Fraudulent Practices, 16-9-1 through 16-9-157.

ARTICLE 8 IDENTITY FRAUD

16-9-121. Elements of offense.

  1. A person commits the offense of identity fraud when he or she willfully and fraudulently:
    1. Without authorization or consent, uses or possesses with intent to fraudulently use identifying information concerning a person;
    2. Uses identifying information of an individual under 18 years old over whom he or she exercises custodial authority;
    3. Uses or possesses with intent to fraudulently use identifying information concerning a deceased individual;
    4. Creates, uses, or possesses with intent to fraudulently use any counterfeit or fictitious identifying information concerning a fictitious person with intent to use such counterfeit or fictitious identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of a crime or fraud on another person; or
    5. Without authorization or consent, creates, uses, or possesses with intent to fraudulently use any counterfeit or fictitious identifying information concerning a real person with intent to use such counterfeit or fictitious identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of a crime or fraud on another person.
  2. A person commits the offense of identity fraud by receipt of fraudulent identification information when he or she willingly accepts for identification purposes identifying information which he or she knows to be fraudulent, stolen, counterfeit, or fictitious. In any prosecution under this subsection it shall not be necessary to show a conviction of the principal thief, counterfeiter, or fraudulent user.
  3. The offenses created by this Code section shall not merge with any other offense.
  4. This Code section shall not apply to a person under the age of 21 who uses a fraudulent, counterfeit, or other false identification card for the purpose of obtaining entry into a business establishment or for purchasing items which he or she is not of legal age to purchase.

(Code 1981, §16-9-121, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 865, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 16; Ga. L. 2002, p. 551, § 2; Ga. L. 2007, p. 450, § 4/SB 236; Ga. L. 2010, p. 568, § 1/HB 1016.)

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2007, p. 450, § 1/SB 236, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Georgia Personal Identity Protection Act.'"

Ga. L. 2007, p. 450, § 7/SB 236, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall apply to all offenses occurring on or after May 24, 2007.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 complies with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; since the crime of identity fraud, as defined by O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-121 and16-9-125 when read in para materia, takes place in the county where the victim and his or her personal information are located, there is no constitutional bar to trying the defendant in that county. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).

Trial court erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to the identity fraud charges against him as O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125 did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI, since identity fraud was a continuing offense, which extended into the county where the victim resided or was located. State v. Mayze, 280 Ga. 5, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005).

O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121 expressly prohibited the improper access of another's account at a financial institution such that the defendant was placed on notice that the use of a victim's social security number to obtain a job and thus access the victim's Internal Revenue Service account was illegal; thus, § 16-9-121 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant. Hernandez v. State, 281 Ga. 559, 639 S.E.2d 473 (2007).

Failure to prove venue.

- Defendant's conviction of identity fraud, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121, was reversed because the state failed to establish the victim's place of residence or the site where a credit card was stolen, and thus venue was not properly established as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125. Middlebrooks v. State, 277 Ga. App. 551, 627 S.E.2d 154 (2006).

Altering Facebook page sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant used the personal information of the missing child, which the defendant obtained from the child's mother, to alter the child's Facebook page by posting "wanted posters" and to lock the child out of the account by changing the password was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for identity fraud. Libri v. State, 346 Ga. App. 420, 816 S.E.2d 417 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant, on two different dates, approached cashiers at the same store, gave the cashiers a credit card that was falsified in that the credit card had the account numbers from another person's account superimposed over the credit card's original numbers, that the cashiers punched in the card's numbers manually when the cashiers could not get the card to scan properly, and that the defendant was able to obtain store merchandise because the sales were then approved was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for financial identity fraud. Epps v. State, 262 Ga. App. 113, 584 S.E.2d 701 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of identity fraud because for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121, the United States Treasury, the nation's foremost banking institution, fell within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120(5)(F); thus, when the defendant used a victim's social security number to obtain a job, the defendant accessed the victim's Internal Revenue Account, and thereby the United States Treasury, which was an illegal action under § 16-9-121. Hernandez v. State, 281 Ga. 559, 639 S.E.2d 473 (2007).

Defendant's identity fraud conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) a jury charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120(2) was not supported by the evidence; (2) an additional charge on the dictionary definition of fraud as a false representation of a matter of fact did not result in any prejudice; (3) the indictment was sufficient and plainly tracked the language of the identity fraud statute, laid out the elements of the offense, and allowed the defendant to prepare a defense; (4) the trial court's imposition of the maximum 10-year sentence was not unlawful; and (5) nothing in the record supported the defendant's claim that the state engaged in illegal plea bargaining tactics. Lee v. State, 283 Ga. App. 826, 642 S.E.2d 876 (2007).

Defendant's identity fraud conviction was upheld on appeal because the state presented sufficient evidence that the defendant attempted to open a bank account using the identity of another person, recording that person's social security number in doing so, with the intent to obtain that person's resources in one way or another. Vicks v. State, 289 Ga. App. 495, 657 S.E.2d 876 (2008).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal with regard to the defendant's conviction for identity fraud as sufficient evidence supported the conviction based on the state establishing that the defendant used the victim's personal information and credit to purchase a car by having another person use the victim's personal information and represent themselves as the defendant's relative and serve as the defendant's co-signer for the vehicle. Powell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 442, 667 S.E.2d 213 (2008).

Evidence that a niece stole, forged, and cashed over 20 checks totaling $425,000 from the law firm where she worked with the assistance of her aunt and six other women was sufficient to find the niece and aunt guilty of 20 counts of identity fraud in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-125, venue was proper in the county where the law firm's office was located. McKenzie v. State, 300 Ga. App. 469, 685 S.E.2d 333 (2009).

Defendant was properly convicted of financial identity fraud in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120 because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find that the defendant, either directly or as a party to a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, committed financial identity fraud by accessing the resources of the victims through the use of identifying information without the authorization or permission of the victims, with the intent to unlawfully appropriate the victim's resources to the defendant's own use; the federal tax identification number of either victim was required as part of the credit card application to obtain temporary charge passes, which the defendant used to purchase thousands of dollars worth of merchandise in a short period of time. Zachery v. State, 312 Ga. App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Evidence that the defendant, as a police officer, had access to a nationwide database that included people's personal information such as social security numbers; that the taxpayer identification number that the defendant provided to the cellular telephone company belonged to a Pennsylvania woman, who had not given the defendant permission to use it; and that each of the defendant's businesses were registered with the state under federal identification numbers that did not match the disputed social security number was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for financial identity fraud. Gaskins v. State, 318 Ga. App. 8, 733 S.E.2d 338 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the codefendant's conviction on 12 counts of identity fraud, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121(a)(1), based on the codefendant's admission that the codefendant provided the identifying information of several current and former tenants of the apartment complex the codefendant worked at to a third party and, even though the codefendant did not know the identity of the other persons involved in the scheme nor the details of the operation, the codefendant was concerned in the commission of the crime and intentionally aided or abetted in the commission of the crime by providing the information. Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012).

Testimony from the victims that the account numbers used belonged to the victims and the victims did not give the defendant, or anyone else, permission to use or possess those numbers was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for identity fraud. Smith v. State, 322 Ga. App. 433, 745 S.E.2d 683 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crimes of financial transaction card theft and identity fraud because the defendant obtained a financial transaction card from a victim without the victim's consent as the state introduced evidence that the individual that the defendant gave transaction cards to used both transaction cards, and it introduced the receipts evidencing the use and attempted use of the cards; and the defendant, without authorization, possessed a victim's financial transaction card information with the intent to use the card fraudulently. Daniel v. State, 342 Ga. App. 448, 803 S.E.2d 603 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of identity fraud, financial-transaction-card fraud, and exploitation of an elder person and the defendant's convictions for those predicate acts was sufficient to convict the defendant of violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., because the defendant participated in a scheme, in which the defendant and the defendant's cohorts obtained elderly victims' credit card, banking, and other financial and personal information by telephoning the victims and informing the victims that the victims' power would be cut off if the victims did not immediately provide such information; and the defendant used the cards or the account numbers to make purchases and to obtain cash advances. Roberts v. State, 344 Ga. App. 324, 810 S.E.2d 169 (2018).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- Because the state's evidence failed to demonstrate that the defendant accessed the resources of another by using identifying information to procure a cell phone, and a service contract for the cell phone, and failed to establish that the defendant either knew that a store clerk: (1) could not issue a phone without accessing the resources of a specific individual; (2) would need to use the identifying information of that individual to access such resources; or (3) in fact used such identifying information to access the resources of another for the purpose of providing the defendant with a cell phone, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of financial identity fraud. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 822, 648 S.E.2d 133 (2007).

Evidence was not sufficient to support defendant's conviction for identity fraud, because the applicable version O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121(a)(1), did not make fraudulent use of the identifying information of a corporation punishable as identity fraud, but only protected an individual person's information. Martinez v. State, 325 Ga. App. 267, 750 S.E.2d 504 (2013).

Successive prosecution for the same conduct.

- Trial court correctly rejected the defendant's plea in bar and denied defendant's motion in autrefois convict because the defendant did not show that defendant's prosecution for two counts of financial identity fraud under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121 was barred as an impermissible successive prosecution for the same conduct in another county by defendant's earlier conviction in that county of 33 counts of financial identity fraud. Summers v. State, 263 Ga. App. 338, 587 S.E.2d 768 (2003).

Hearsay testimony was harmless error.

- With regard to the charge of first-degree forgery and charge of identity fraud involving checks taken from the company checkbook of defendant's employer, the deputy's improper hearsay testimony that a driver's license number written on the checks matched the defendant's driver's license number was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including all of the stolen checks having been made payable to the defendant by someone other than the employer, the defendant's endorsement appearing on all of the checks, and the defendant's image captured on a bank security camera cashing one check. Archer v. State, 291 Ga. App. 175, 661 S.E.2d 230 (2008).

Preemption.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-9-21 is not preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c. Hernandez v. State, 281 Ga. 559, 639 S.E.2d 473 (2007).

Sentence upheld.

- Defendant's complaint on appeal that a 10-year sentence was unlawful was specious as the charge in the indictment was not attempted identity fraud under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-122, but was for the completed offense of identity fraud under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121. Lee v. State, 283 Ga. App. 826, 642 S.E.2d 876 (2007).

Cited in Davis v. State, 319 Ga. App. 501, 736 S.E.2d 160 (2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity, construction, and application of state statutes relating to offense of identity theft, 125 A.L.R.5th 537.

Criminal liability for unauthorized use of credit card under state credit card statutes, 68 A.L.R.6th 527.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 1, 2013 | 745 S.E.2d 646

Benham, Justice. Upon being tried before a jury, appellant Todd Christopher McNair was charged and convicted of identity fraud (OCGA § *28316-9-121)1 for the theft and use of the victim’s credit card....
...That is, on remand, the Court of Appeals must determine whether there was any uncertainty or ambiguity involving the statutes at issue which would have required the trial court to apply the rule of lenity. Id. Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 16-9-121 provides: “(a) A person commits the offense of identity fraud when he or she willfully and fraudulently: (1) Without authorization or consent, uses or possesses with intent to fraudulently use identifying information concerning a person;.....
Copy

State v. Mayze, 622 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2005 | 280 Ga. 5, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 3521

...ulton County. Using information contained in the wallet, Willie Mayze allegedly accessed Mr. Lloyd's credit history in DeKalb County. Eventually, Mayze was arrested and charged in Clayton County with two counts of identity fraud in violation of OCGA § 16-9-121....
...A crime may be ongoing or continuing, in which case venue would be appropriate in any county wherein the offense occurred. See State v. Kell, 276 Ga. 423, 577 S.E.2d 551 (2003). Mayze contends that the continuing crime theory does not apply because identity fraud, as defined by OCGA § 16-9-121, can be committed only in a county wherein the defendant obtained or recorded identifying information of the victim or accessed or attempted to access the resources of the victim....
...Thus, exclusive reliance on the "verb test" when considering the constitutionality of a venue provision enacted by the General Assembly is inappropriate. "[O]ther relevant statutory language" must be considered in determining the scope of the prohibition imposed by OCGA § 16-9-121 and, consequently, the location of permissible venues for a prosecution under that statute. OCGA §§ 16-9-121 and 16-9-125 are in pari materia and must, therefore, be construed together. See generally State v. Griffin, 268 Ga. 540, 542, 491 S.E.2d 340 (1997). Looking beyond the verbs contained in OCGA § 16-9-121 and giving consideration to the additional language contained in OCGA § 16-9-125, the General Assembly has clearly defined the crime of identity fraud as a continuing offense which extends into the county where the victim resides or is located....
...hysically located, the nature of the offense of identity fraud is the protection of the personal information contained therein. Moreover, that information is deemed to be in the lawful possession of the victim, so that when a defendant violates OCGA § 16-9-121 by engaging in an unauthorized access to the records, he thereby engages in the fraudulent use of information located in the county where the victim resides or is found. Since the crime of identity fraud, as thus defined by OCGA §§ 16-9-121 and 16-9-125 when read in pari materia, takes place in the county where the victim and his or her personal information are located, there is no constitutional bar to trying the defendant in that county....
...underlying records themselves, are located. Thus, the dissent misrepresents our holding by asserting on page 16, 622 S.E.2d at 845, that we have "overlook[ed] the undisputed fact that no element of the offense of identity fraud as set forth in OCGA § 16-9-121 actually occurred in the county where the defendant was tried in this case." The truth is that, in resolving this appeal, we have not erroneously limited our consideration to OCGA § 16-9-121, but we have instead properly taken into account that statute and all other provisions which are in pari materia....
...ich element occurs in the county where the victim lives. The fact that the language denoting identity fraud as an offense involving the victim's possessory interest in his or her own personal information appears in OCGA § 16-9-125, rather than OCGA § 16-9-121, does not have any constitutional significance....
...Obtains or records identifying information of a person which would assist in accessing the resources of that person or any other person; or (2) Accesses or attempts to access the resources of a person through the use of identifying information. OCGA § 16-9-121....
...In addressing instances of identity fraud perpetrated by individuals located outside of this State, the General Assembly may wish to look to statutory provisions such as OCGA § 16-9-94(4) to address this situation. [4] The General Assembly might also choose to broaden the means by which identity fraud is committed in OCGA § 16-9-121 to include causing certain economic impact to the victim....
...some physical evidence that the crime occurred. See OCGA § 17-2-2(c). We cannot apply any different set of rules to this case. Second, the majority overlooks the undisputed fact that no element of the offense of identity fraud as set forth in OCGA § 16-9-121 actually occurred in the county where the defendant was tried in this case. As it is currently defined, impact upon the victim is not an element of the offense of identity fraud as set forth in OCGA § 16-9-121, fully considering any language therein....
...It is evident from the General Assembly's language in OCGA § 16-9-125 that it desired to place venue in the county of the victim's residence because that is the place where the major impact of the crime will occur. The General Assembly, however, failed to define the crime of identity fraud in OCGA § 16-9-121 in such a way that this impact, itself, is a part of the crime committed....
Copy

White v. State, 903 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 27, 2024 | 319 Ga. 367

...The State contended that White made material omissions about Tyrael’s medical condition in applying for that policy, and alleged in the indictment—and contended at trial—that obtaining this policy was an overt act in 4 Count 5 alleged that White and Schullerman committed the offense of identity fraud, OCGA § 16-9-121, for the “April[ ] 2014” activation, using Tyrael’s identifiers, of a Capital One Bank Mastercard ending in -6266....
...Count 16 alleged, in overt acts 35 and 36, that White and Schullerman presented the credit card ending in -6266 to make two purchases, but the card was declined. Count 7 alleged that White and Schullerman committed the offense of identity fraud, OCGA § 16-9-121, for the April 2015 activation, using Tyrael’s identifiers, of a Citibank card ending in - 8773....
...1) (C), by using the Citibank card ending in -8773 to purchase electronics at Best Buy. Count 16, overt acts 7 and 9, incorporated Counts 7 and 9, respectively. Count 8 alleged that White and Schullerman committed the offense of identity fraud, OCGA § 16-9-121, for the April 2015 activation, using Tyrael’s identifiers, of a Capital One Bank credit account ending in -2313....
Copy

Hernandez v. State, 639 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 8, 2007 | 281 Ga. 559, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 93

...*474 Jana Michele Whaley, Royston, for Appellant. Robert W. Lavender, Elberton, James Walter Webb, A.D.A., for Appellee. MELTON, Justice. Following his conviction for identity fraud, Nohe Gomes Hernandez appeals, contending, among other things, that the identity fraud statute, OCGA § 16-9-121, is unconstitutionally vague....
...processing plant, he nonetheless contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because there was no evidence to show that he used this identifying information to access any resource of Smith as set forth in his indictment. OCGA § 16-9-121 provides: A person commits the offense of identity fraud when without the authorization or permission of a person with the intent unlawfully to appropriate resources of or cause physical harm to that person, or of any other person, to his...
...Therefore, by using Smith's identifying information to obtain a job, Hernandez accessed Smith's account with the IRS and thereby the United States Treasury and caused harm to Smith by attempting to make him responsible for Hernandez's tax debt. This resulted in a clear violation of OCGA § 16-9-121, and the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to determine that Hernandez was guilty of identity fraud. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 2. Hernandez contends that OCGA § 16-9-121 is unconstitutionally vague, arguing that it fails to place a reasonable person on notice that improper use of another's social security number to obtain a job is covered under its prohibition....
...That is exactly what Hernandez did in this case, and the plain language of OCGA § 16-9-120 and 121 placed him on notice that his actions were illegal. The statute, therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Hernandez in this case. 3. Finally, Hernandez contends that OCGA § 16-9-121 is preempted by federal law, namely Section 1324c of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (8 USC Section 1324c) which subjects an illegal immigrant using falsified identification documents to a cease and desist order and civil monetary penalties....
...Here, there is neither direct, implied, or field preemption. Nothing in the federal law explicitly overrides state law, and the two laws do not conflict in their operation or enforcement. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that OCGA § 16-9-121 is not preempted by federal law....