Section abrogates rule at common law.

- At common law, jurisdiction attached in the county where death occurred, but by this section jurisdiction attached in the county where the mortal blow was given. Roach v. State, 34 Ga. 78 (1864).

Section does not violate due process.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 is not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite so as to violate state and federal concepts of due process. Rather, the statute adequately provides a mechanism to carry into effect the mandate of the state's constitution that criminal trials be held in the county in which the crime was committed. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Constitutional requirement that case be tried where crime committed not violated.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 does not conflict with state constitutional requirement that all criminal cases be tried in the county where the crime was committed. Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42, 329 S.E.2d 252 (1985).

Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 does not violate Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI), providing that criminal trials be held in the county in which the crime was committed. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2, venue in all criminal cases must be laid in the county in which the crime was allegedly committed. Walker v. State, 258 Ga. App. 354, 574 S.E.2d 317 (2002).

Purpose of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 is to provide for establishment of venue in situations where there is either some doubt as to which county was the scene of the crime or where the crime in fact occurred in more than one county. Its purpose is the same as O.C.G.A. § 16-8-11. Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981).

Section provides proper jurisdiction where location of crime unclear.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 provides a mechanism by which the mandate of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) can be carried out when the place in which the crime is committed cannot be determined with certainty. Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981).

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1), it was unlawful for any person to possess marijuana, and since the marijuana was found in defendant's pocket when the defendant was arrested, and defendant was observed traveling in Newton County before the defendant's arrest in Rockdale County, the evidence was sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana since O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e) provided that if a crime was committed upon any vehicle traveling within the state and it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed, the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the crime could have been committed through which the vehicle has traveled. Johnson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 706, 683 S.E.2d 659 (2009).

Location of crime is clear.

- For purposes of the aggravated battery - family violence offense and other offenses occurring in the parties' home, venue was proper in Athens-Clarke County because one of the responding officers of the Athens-Clarke County Police Department directly testified that the house where the defendant and the victim lived was located in Athens-Clarke County. Jones v. State, 329 Ga. App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (2014).

Because the victim's body was discovered in Douglas County, Georgia, and the county in which the cause of death was inflicted could not be determined, venue for the murder charge against both of the defendants was proper in Douglas County. Perera v. State, 295 Ga. 880, 763 S.E.2d 687 (2014).

Effect on jurisdiction of change of venue.

- Upon a change of venue in a criminal case, the county from which the case is transferred loses all jurisdiction to try the accused upon the indictment transferred at the time of the change, or any other indictment charging the same offense. Johnston v. State, 118 Ga. 310, 45 S.E. 381 (1903).

Venue of crime is jurisdictional fact.

- Venue must be proved as part of the general case. Dempsey v. State, 52 Ga. App. 35, 182 S.E. 56 (1935); Wright v. State, 219 Ga. App. 119, 464 S.E.2d 216 (1995).

After a defendant was granted a directed verdict on the basis that the state failed to prove venue in a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence per se, retrial was not barred under U.S. Const. amend. V and O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8 because, while venue had to be laid in the county in which the crime was allegedly committed under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 and venue was a jurisdictional fact, failure to prove venue was a procedural error that implied nothing as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Hudson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 758, 675 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, No. S09C1163, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 413 (Ga. 2009); cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1076, 130 S. Ct. 799, 175 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2009).

Venue determination reserved for finder of fact.

- Trial court erred by making a per se determination of venue and granting the defendant's motion to transfer the case to a different county within the response to the defendant's motion to suppress because a determination of venue was reserved for the finder of fact at trial. State v. Hasson, 334 Ga. App. 1, 778 S.E.2d 15 (2015).

Criminal defendant cannot require bill of exceptions when venue change denied.

- Defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to a direct bill of exceptions (see O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49,5-6-50) to a judgment denying a motion for change of venue on the ground that the defendant cannot obtain a fair trial in the county where the case is then pending. Hubbard v. State, 208 Ga. 472, 67 S.E.2d 562 (1951).

Place of occurrence of homicide.

- Use of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h) to determine venue in a homicide case is not precluded by § 17-2-2(c). Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 229, 83 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1984).

Prosecution venue for enticing child for immoral purposes.

- Venue lies in the county where the child was first enticed. Cornelius v. State, 213 Ga. App. 766, 445 S.E.2d 800 (1994).

Venue in cases of kidnapping.

- Venue is proper in the county where the victim was seized. Harris v. State, 165 Ga. App. 249, 299 S.E.2d 924 (1983).

Kidnapping is not a continuing offense, and the crime is consummated when the victim is seized; thus, the prosecution in an attempt to prove kidnapping failed to prove venue in a state county when the evidence showed that the victim was seized in another state. Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42, 329 S.E.2d 252 (1985); Jordan v. State, 242 Ga. App. 408, 530 S.E.2d 42 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Shields v. State, 276 Ga. 669, 581 S.E.2d 536 (2003).

Because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that a kidnapping might have been committed in Douglas County, there was no ground for reversal. A police officer testified that a bar and all the buildings surrounding the bar, from which a victim was abducted, were in Douglas County, although the bar was situated near the county line with Cobb County; while the victim was driven to an ATM in Cobb County, there was no evidence of the route taken between the bar and that ATM. Epps v. State, 297 Ga. App. 66, 676 S.E.2d 791 (2009).

Because a defendant forced the victim to drive to an abandoned house and then drove the victim through other neighborhoods before forcing the victim out of the car and refusing to return the victim's personal belongings, the defendant's convictions for kidnapping and robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40(a) and16-8-40 did not merge; pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e), venue was proper in any county through which the vehicle traveled. Aldridge v. State, 310 Ga. App. 502, 713 S.E.2d 682 (2011).

Venue in RICO cases governed by RICO venue provision.

- Venue for charges under the Georgia Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., was proper against one of the three defendants in Cobb County pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 16-14-11, even though the defendant was acquitted of a conspiracy charge and the defendant personally committed no acts in Cobb County. Lowery v. State, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 625 (2018).

Venue in cases of Medicaid fraud.

- Venue was proper in the county where a false report is submitted and processed in an attempt to fraudulently obtain medical assistance. Culver v. State, 254 Ga. App. 297, 562 S.E.2d 201 (2002).

In a Medicaid fraud case committed by a fraudulent scheme or device under O.C.G.A. § 49-4-146.1(b)(1)(C) of the Georgia Medical Assistance Act, O.C.G.A. § 49-4-140 et seq., pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a), venue is proper in any county where an act was committed in furtherance of the fraudulent transaction. Because defendants committed acts in furtherance of the fraud in counties in which the defendants were tried and convicted, venue in those counties was proper and the appellate court improperly reversed the defendants' convictions. State v. Kell, 276 Ga. 423, 577 S.E.2d 551 (2003).

Venue in robbery case.

- When the victim was given a ride by appellant at the Fort Gordon bus station, the victim was robbed in Augusta, which is in Richmond County, and the victim was let out about one mile from the Augusta airport, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense might have been committed in Richmond County, and is sufficient to show venue in Richmond County. Harper v. State, 172 Ga. App. 69, 321 S.E.2d 805 (1984).

Court of appeals erred in reversing the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft by taking since there was no evidence that the included crime was committed in the county in which the defendant was being tried; although the state was unwilling to allow the defendant to waive venue or stipulate that what occurred was a theft by taking that happened entirely in Clayton County, the defendant was free to present evidence and argue to the jury that while the defendant was guilty of committing theft by taking in Clayton County, the defendant was not guilty of armed robbery in DeKalb County. But the defendant could not require the state to agree that the defendant committed theft by taking in Clayton County or require the trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense over which the court lacked venue. State v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 706, 691 S.E.2d 207 (2010).

Venue in a conspiracy case.

- Venue is properly laid in the county in which the substantive offense is committed, even though the defendant may never have entered that county. Osborn v. State, 161 Ga. App. 132, 291 S.E.2d 22 (1982).

County where vehicle first spotted is county of venue.

- County where a defendant was arrested was not the proper venue since an officer spotted the defendant driving in another county and followed the defendant across the county line to make the arrest; the county in which the defendant was first driving was the proper venue. Pippins v. State, 204 Ga. App. 318, 419 S.E.2d 28, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 419 S.E.2d 28 (1992).

With respect to the offenses relating to or arising out of the police chase, including the offense of fleeing and attempting to elude police officers, venue was proper in Athens-Clarke County because, although the defendant drove through other counties, the police chase began in Athens-Clarke County, and there was testimony that the defendant's vehicle traveled in Athens-Clarke County during the course of the police chase. Jones v. State, 329 Ga. App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (2014).

Venue for crime in vehicle anywhere vehicle traverses.

- When a crime is committed in a vehicle traveling within this state, it may be considered to have been committed in any county traversed. Polk v. State, 142 Ga. App. 785, 236 S.E.2d 926 (1977).

When the crime occurred in a car traveling across several counties and continued as the car headed "back into town," and the evidence showed that the crime might have been committed in the forum county, venue was appropriate in that county under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 (e) and (h). Hendrix v. State, 242 Ga. App. 678, 530 S.E.2d 804 (2000).

Venue was proper in the county where the defendant committed several moving violations, although an arrest was effectuated in a neighboring county due to the officer's hot pursuit; the officer had legal authority to initiate pursuit and arrest, and the arrest was not invalid merely because the officer was outside the officer's jurisdiction. Page v. State, 250 Ga. App. 795, 553 S.E.2d 176 (2001).

When the defendant committed the offense in the defendant's vehicle while taking the victim to a car repair shop, and all of the roads to the repair shop were in the county where the defendant's trial occurred, under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e), the trial court had jurisdiction to try the defendant as the defendant could have been tried in any county through which defendant's vehicle traveled. Gearin v. State, 255 Ga. App. 329, 565 S.E.2d 540 (2002).

Evidence of venue in fleeing and eluding case.

- In a fleeing and eluding case under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395, the evidence was sufficient to establish venue as required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a), based on evidence that the chase originated in the county and continued there, including an eyewitness's testimony, dash cam footage, and a map. Payne v. State, 338 Ga. App. 677, 791 S.E.2d 451 (2016).

Venue for receiving stolen goods in county received.

- Venue of a charge of receiving stolen goods, knowing the goods to be stolen, is the county where such goods are received. Dempsey v. State, 52 Ga. App. 35, 182 S.E. 56 (1935).

Venue for the crime of making a false statement.

- Venue was in the county where the defendant signed a form falsely attesting to the use being made of government property, not the location of the office to which the form was sent. Spray v. State, 223 Ga. App. 154, 476 S.E.2d 878 (1996).

Trial court committed reversible error as a result of convicting a defendant for making false statements to a state or local government agency or department in a case wherein the state failed to prove venue in the jurisdiction that the defendant was tried. The state was obligated to prove that the defendant's false statements to Federal Bureau of Investigation officers occurred in Fulton County wherein the defendant was tried; thus, the defendant's conviction required reversal. Tesler v. State, 295 Ga. App. 569, 672 S.E.2d 522 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0810, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 334 (Ga. 2009).

No venue when police trick defendant into county for venue.

- Police officers' activities in maneuvering appellant into a county for the sole purpose of obtaining venue constituted a subterfuge and impermissibly conferred apparent venue over the defendant in that county. McCarty v. State, 152 Ga. App. 726, 263 S.E.2d 700 (1979).

Venue when custody unlawfully retained.

- When a parent lawfully removes the child from the state, but unlawfully retains custody out of state, the legislature intended that the victim's domicile, i.e., the custodial parent, should be the venue of any criminal prosecution. State v. Evans, 212 Ga. App. 415, 442 S.E.2d 287 (1994).

Proving venue in cruelty to children case.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial because the state did not fail to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt as to the counts of cruelty to children in the second degree for fracturing the second victim's ribs and cruelty to children in the first degree for fracturing the first victim's ribs and a leg because the evidence showed that the defendant and the children's mother moved with their children to an apartment in Clayton County in April 2009 and that they were the children's sole caretakers; that the victims' injuries were discovered in July 2009; and a doctor testified that the bone fractures had to have occurred at least one to two weeks in the past and at most a few months in the past. Freeman v. State, 333 Ga. App. 6, 775 S.E.2d 258 (2015).

Venue in drug possession charge cases.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h) applies when a drug possession charge results from the detection of metabolites that can remain in a defendant's urine two to four days after the drug is ingested, and venue is appropriate in the county where the defendant is present immediately before being asked to provide the urine sample. Pruitt v. State, 264 Ga. App. 44, 589 S.E.2d 864 (2003).

Venue is a question to be decided by the jury and the jury's decision will not be set aside as long as there is any evidence to support the decision. Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 106, 416 S.E.2d 375 (1992).

Venue a jury question when no concrete evidence presented as to where rape committed.

- When there is evidence that the victim was with the defendant in numerous counties, but there is no concrete evidence as to in which county she was raped and assaulted, the issue is properly submitted to the jury as to venue. Moss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 42, 285 S.E.2d 776 (1981).

Jury instruction on venue in homicide cases.

- Jury instruction in a murder case under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c), that, if it could not be determined where the cause of death was inflicted, it "shall be considered" that it was inflicted in the county where the body was discovered, did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. As a result, the following cases are disapproved: Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769(2), 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003), Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 827(3), 693 S.E.2d 490 (2010), and Owens v. McLaughlin, 733 F.3d 320, 327 (11th Cir. 2013). Shelton v. Lee, 299 Ga. 350, 788 S.E.2d 369 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1066, 197 L. Ed. 2d 187 (U.S. 2017).

Venue in violation of state ethics law.

- When the defendants were indicted under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-9 for failing to file documents with the state ethics commission under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34, venue was in the county where the commission was exclusively located; the place fixed for performance of the required act fixed the situs of the alleged crime. McKinney v. State, 282 Ga. 230, 647 S.E.2d 44 (2007).

Venue not relevant to motion to suppress.

- Grant of the defendant's motion to suppress on the basis of venue was reversed because the state did not need to establish venue at the pretrial hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress as it was not relevant to the issues raised in the motion, which challenged the reasonable basis for the traffic stop or whether the resulting search of the defendant and the defendant's vehicle were supported by probable cause. State v. Wallace, 338 Ga. App. 611, 791 S.E.2d 187 (2016).

Jury is not obliged to accept opinion evidence.

- Jury may accept evidence from surveyors and reject opinion evidence of law enforcement officers relating to the location of a county line. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Special instructions.

- When the case against the defendant is based upon the defendant's activities as a party or conspirator to the crime charged in the indictment and these activities took place in a county other than the one in which the prosecution is brought, a special instruction on venue is necessary to clarify the nature of the criminal activity for which the defendant is on trial. Osborn v. State, 161 Ga. App. 132, 291 S.E.2d 22 (1982).

Failure to instruct on venue.

- Although the trial court did not instruct the jury on venue, and neither party requested an instruction on venue, its complete charge on reasonable doubt, and instruction that the crimes as alleged in the indictment had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, when coupled with an indictment which specified that the crimes were committed in Fulton County, was sufficient such that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on venue provided no basis for reversal. Watson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 95, 587 S.E.2d 243 (2003).

Because the trial court properly instructed the jury that venue was a jurisdictional fact that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to each crime charged in the indictment, no reversible error resulted from the charge. Clark v. State, 283 Ga. 234, 657 S.E.2d 872 (2008).

Jury instruction.

- Supreme Court of Georgia has urged trial courts to give a separate charge on venue to encourage prosecutors to prove venue and to alert juries to the juries' specific role in determining venue, and also has recommended language to use in instructing the jury on venue; although the Court has encouraged the giving of the instruction, the Supreme Court has declined to reverse a conviction and require a new trial based on the trial court's failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on venue. Lanham v. State, 291 Ga. 625, 732 S.E.2d 72 (2012).

Former jeopardy.

- If a defendant is tried in one county in a court having jurisdiction of the offense, but the crime occurred in another county, no jeopardy attaches. Schiefelbein v. State, 258 Ga. 623, 373 S.E.2d 354 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1156, 103 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1989).

Effect of judgment on determination of venue issue.

- Litigation of the issue of venue in a second prosecution of defendant for a rape that allegedly occurred on a boundary lake was subject to collateral estoppel as defendant had been acquitted in an earlier proceeding at which the state had the opportunity to present evidence on the issue. Ganong v. State, 223 Ga. App. 163, 477 S.E.2d 324 (1996).

Cited in Blackman v. State, 80 Ga. 785, 7 S.E. 626 (1888); Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 S.E. 814 (1890); Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 52 S.E. 1 (1905); Upton v. State, 229 Ga. 834, 195 S.E.2d 21 (1972); Maddox v. State, 145 Ga. App. 363, 243 S.E.2d 740 (1978); Taylor v. State, 154 Ga. App. 279, 267 S.E.2d 891 (1980); Dabney v. State, 154 Ga. App. 355, 268 S.E.2d 408 (1980); Bundren v. State, 155 Ga. App. 265, 270 S.E.2d 807 (1980); Anderson v. State, 249 Ga. 132, 287 S.E.2d 195 (1982); Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462, 291 S.E.2d 497 (1982); Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 302 S.E.2d 555 (1983); Miller v. State, 169 Ga. App. 668, 314 S.E.2d 684 (1984); Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984); Thomas v. State, 255 Ga. 38, 334 S.E.2d 675 (1985); Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 703, 331 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Sypho v. State, 175 Ga. App. 833, 334 S.E.2d 878 (1985); Amerson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 97, 338 S.E.2d 528 (1985); Worth v. State, 179 Ga. App. 207, 346 S.E.2d 82 (1986); Caviness v. State, 180 Ga. App. 792, 350 S.E.2d 813 (1986); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Sanders v. State, 182 Ga. App. 581, 356 S.E.2d 537 (1987); Taylor v. State, 183 Ga. App. 314, 358 S.E.2d 845 (1987); Henderson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 275, 381 S.E.2d 423 (1989); Head v. State, 191 Ga. App. 262, 381 S.E.2d 519 (1989); White v. State, 193 Ga. App. 428, 387 S.E.2d 921 (1989); Randall v. State, 195 Ga. App. 755, 395 S.E.2d 2 (1990); Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990); Melton v. State, 204 Ga. App. 103, 418 S.E.2d 428 (1992); Dennis v. State, 263 Ga. 257, 430 S.E.2d 742 (1993); McGarity v. State, 212 Ga. App. 17, 440 S.E.2d 695 (1994); Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 476 S.E.2d 18 (1996); Turner v. State, 273 Ga. 340, 541 S.E.2d 641 (2001); Hanson v. State, 275 Ga. 470, 569 S.E.2d 513 (2002); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007); Rogers v. State, 298 Ga. App. 895, 681 S.E.2d 693 (2009); Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 717 S.E.2d 179 (2011); Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012).

Court assumes county in evidence is county within state.

- If a county is named in the evidence, the state will indulge the presumption that it is a county of this state, and if the name mentioned in the evidence is the county of the trial, the court will assume that the county at trial is the county in the evidence. Gibson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 297, 183 S.E. 83 (1935).

Court would take judicial notice.

- Court would take notice that named municipality was site of county wherein defendant was prosecuted and wholly within such county, and if all the evidence strongly tends to show that the crime was committed in the county where the trial was had, and if there is no evidence warranting even a bare conjecture that it was committed elsewhere, then venue is satisfactorily established. Hubbard v. State, 208 Ga. 472, 67 S.E.2d 562 (1951).

Court could take judicial notice that a city was located wholly within the county in which the defendant was tried. Gilmer v. State, 234 Ga. App. 309, 506 S.E.2d 452 (1998).

Testimony that crime committed in certain county proves committed within state.

- On an indictment tried in Putnam County, testimony that the crime was committed in Putnam County is sufficient proof that the crime was committed in Putnam County, Georgia. Dennis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 538, 180 S.E. 909 (1935).

Defendant was arrested for obstruction of a police officer for refusing to obey an officer's order to move the defendant's vehicle which was stopped on a public road. The officer's testimony that the road was located in Dawson County was sufficient to prove venue in Dawson County beyond a reasonable doubt. West v. State, 296 Ga. App. 58, 673 S.E.2d 558 (2009).

Testimony that crime committed in certain county.

- With regard to the defendant's murder conviction, the state established venue by proof beyond a reasonable doubt via testimony of the chief investigator, who used aerial photographs obtained from the tax assessor's office in Bryan County, Georgia, and identified the location of the residences of the defendant, the defendant's parents, the victim, and the place where the victim's body was found. Lanham v. State, 291 Ga. 625, 732 S.E.2d 72 (2012).

Proof crime committed in municipality does not prove venue in state's county.

- Proof that an offense was committed in a designated municipality is not of itself sufficient to show venue in any particular county of this state. Gibson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 297, 183 S.E. 83 (1935).

Trial of defendant in the Atlanta Traffic Court, a city court which sits in the Fulton County portion of Atlanta, was improper, after the state proved that the alleged offense took place in the city of Atlanta but did not offer any proof that the offense occurred in Fulton County; the defendant is entitled to be tried in the county in which the offense was alleged to have occurred. Waller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 323, 498 S.E.2d 362 (1998).

Venue in multi-county crime spree.

- State failed to prove venue for armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle since the facts showed that the victim was forced at gunpoint into the victim's car in a parking lot in one county and then was ordered to drive into a second county (the place of trial) where the victim was taken from the car and shot; both offenses were complete in the first county, and neither O.C.G.A. § 16-8-11 nor O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 were applicable to confer venue in the second county. Bradley v. State, 272 Ga. 740, 533 S.E.2d 727 (2000).

Venue was proper in the county in which the victim's body was discovered because it could not be readily determined in which county the cause of death was inflicted. Shelton v. State, 279 Ga. 161, 611 S.E.2d 11 (2005).

In general, criminal actions are tried in the county where the crime was committed; the victim's testimony that the defendant committed sexual assault offenses in Colquitt County, even though the defendant also committed some of the offenses in other counties, was sufficient to establish venue. Henry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 139, 616 S.E.2d 883 (2005).

Officer's testimony that the officer turned on lights and sirens on a road in Walton County and the defendant, a juvenile, did not stop was sufficient for the juvenile court to have found venue proven beyond a reasonable doubt for the charge of attempting to elude a police officer, but there was not sufficient evidence as to venue on the remaining charges, as those charges occurred at various points along a span of at least six miles, during which the officers left the city limits. In the Interest of M. C., 345 Ga. App. 863, 815 S.E.2d 194 (2018).

Venue demonstrable by circumstantial evidence.

- Venue in a criminal case, like any other fact, may be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Shi v. State, 52 Ga. App. 358, 183 S.E. 331 (1936); Hancock v. State, 196 Ga. 351, 26 S.E.2d 760 (1943); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980); McCord v. State, 248 Ga. 765, 285 S.E.2d 724 (1982); Parrott v. State, 190 Ga. App. 784, 380 S.E.2d 343 (1989).

Circumstantial, as well as direct evidence, may be used to establish venue. Levitt v. State, 201 Ga. App. 63, 410 S.E.2d 170 (1991).

Evidence that the arresting officer worked for the county in which the offenses occurred and was on duty on the day the officer made the arrest was sufficient to support a finding that the offenses of which the defendant was accused occurred in the county in which the defendant was tried. Joiner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 61, 497 S.E.2d 642 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), overruling Perry v. State, 154 Ga. App. 559, 269 S.E.2d 63 (1980); Mega v. State, 220 Ga. App. 481, 469 S.E.2d 771 (1996); Calloway v. State, 227 Ga. App. 775, 490 S.E.2d 521 (1997).

Although the prosecution did not introduce direct evidence which showed that the location of a robbery and murder was in the county where the defendant was tried, it did introduce evidence which showed that the crime occurred near a lounge that was in the county, and the jury was able to find proper venue by considering that evidence and the facts that the police officer who investigated the crime worked for the county and that the deceased's body was taken to the county's coroner for autopsy. Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002).

Trial court properly found that venue existed in Jones County, Georgia as: (1) the last time the victim was seen alive, the victim was involved in an altercation with defendant at their Jones County home; and (2) if defendant did kill the victim during that altercation, the defendant killed the victim in a moment of passion, as the jury necessarily found, then the death of the victim at the victim's Jones County home was consistent with this finding. Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (2009).

In a murder prosecution where the victim's body was never found, the evidence established that the defendant and the victim had left a ball park where they worked within five minutes of each other, that the victim's car was found abandoned at a gas station adjacent to the park, that a person whose voice characteristics matched the defendant's said on the telephone that the defendant took the victim at "the station," and that the park and the gas station were in DeKalb County was sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder might have been committed in DeKalb County; thus, the proper trial venue under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h) was proved to be in that county. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006).

In a child molestation case, venue in McIntosh County was proper; the victim testified that the crime occurred in the home of the victim's aunt, where the victim currently lived, and the aunt testified that she currently lived in McIntosh County. Flanders v. State, 285 Ga. App. 805, 648 S.E.2d 97 (2007).

Sufficient evidence supported that venue was properly established in Bibb County, Georgia, with regard to the defendant's aggravated assault, kidnapping, and rape convictions because although the two women were not sure where the defendant had driven them, the testimony of the camper whom one victim had found upon escaping established venue in Bibb County and the second area where the other victim was raped was only three minutes from the first. Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 796 S.E.2d 757 (2017).

Evidence as to venue, though slight, may be sufficient.

- Evidence may be sufficient when there is no conflicting evidence. Baker v. State, 55 Ga. App. 159, 189 S.E. 364 (1937); Ellard v. State, 233 Ga. 640, 212 S.E.2d 816 (1975); Rutledge v. State, 152 Ga. App. 755, 264 S.E.2d 244 (1979); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Arthur v. State, 154 Ga. App. 735, 269 S.E.2d 887 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1088, 101 S. Ct. 880, 66 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1981); Adcock v. State, 194 Ga. App. 627, 391 S.E.2d 438, aff'd, 260 Ga. 302, 392 S.E.2d 886 (1990); Sawyer v. State, 217 Ga. App. 406, 457 S.E.2d 685 (1995). But see Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998).

Venue must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. However, when the evidence is not conflicting and when no challenge to venue is raised at trial, slight evidence is sufficient to prove venue. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 106, 416 S.E.2d 375 (1992).

With regard to the defendant's murder conviction, sufficient evidence was submitted to support the conclusion that the cause of the victim's death was a beating involving blows to the head and while no direct evidence was presented establishing where the beating was committed, sufficient indirect or circumstantial evidence was presented from which the jury could conclude the victim was beaten at the pull-off on a road in Harris County, Georgia, where the victim was found. Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga. 179, 744 S.E.2d 763 (2013).

When a criminal defendant pleads not guilty, he or she has challenged venue and the state will not be permitted to invoke the exception permitting the state to establish venue with mere slight evidence. Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000).

Venue proved where evidence indicates crime committed in trial county.

- When all of the evidence introduced on the trial of a criminal case strongly and decidedly tended to show that the offense was committed in the county where the trial was had, and there was no evidence warranting even a bare conjecture that the crime was committed elsewhere, the venue was sufficiently proved. Roberson v. State, 69 Ga. App. 541, 26 S.E.2d 142 (1943).

When the victim testified that the movant took a car from the victim at gunpoint in Chatham County, Georgia, a reasonable trier of fact was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the movant committed the crimes of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in Chatham County, making that county the appropriate venue for the movant's trial pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a); thus, the convictions and sentences were not void and the trial court properly dismissed, based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the movant's post-conviction motion to vacate the convictions and sentences. Green v. State, 259 Ga. App. 195, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2002).

Venue was proven by testimony that the DVD-player that the defendant was accused of shoplifting from a store would not have come up on a scanner if it had not come from the particular store. Walker v. State, 268 Ga. App. 669, 602 S.E.2d 351 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for underaged drinking of an alcoholic beverage was upheld on appeal since the police officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath in the county wherein the defendant was arrested, which was enough to establish venue, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h). Burchett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 271, 641 S.E.2d 262 (2007).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for child molestation, the victim's testimony that the victim lived in a particular city, which was located in Spalding County, and that the incident occurred at another apartment, which the evidence revealed through the testimony was also located in that particular city, there was sufficient evidence to prove venue in Spalding County beyond a reasonable doubt. Mahone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 790, 668 S.E.2d 303 (2008).

State did not fail to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt because the proof was that the crime was committed in the County of Clayton; that the trial court was sitting in the County of Clayton and the State of Georgia was a fact known to the trial court from the court's own records and the public law, and when therefore it was proven that the crime was committed in the County of Clayton it was proven that the crime was committed in the county in which the trial court entertained jurisdiction over the crime. Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 709 S.E.2d 780 (2011).

Since there was no clear evidence that the fatal injury was inflicted anywhere other than Harris County, where the victim was found, and where the victim died, the state sufficiently proved venue. Walton v. State, 293 Ga. 607, 748 S.E.2d 866 (2013).

Proving venue in child molestation cases.

- Statements by the victim of a child molestation that the defendant inserted a finger into the victim's private area and that the incident occurred in the bedroom of the victim's home, and a second statement that the incident occurred in the grandparent's house, where the child in fact lived, coupled with the fact that the grandparent's house was in the county where the defendant's trial was conducted, was sufficient to allow a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime occurred in the county where the trial was held. Chalifoux v. State, 262 Ga. App. 895, 587 S.E.2d 62 (2003).

State proved venue in Cobb County beyond a reasonable doubt, with direct and circumstantial evidence, which showed that the defendant committed aggravated sexual battery upon the child victim while traveling from the victim's home in Cobb County to a bus stop. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (2006).

In a case where the defendant was convicted of aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomy, there was sufficient evidence to establish venue under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e); the evidence that the defendant, the defendant's parents, and the victim, who were traveling, stopped in Houston County, that the defendant entered the camper where the victim was sleeping, and that the defendant soon thereafter performed sex acts on the victim was sufficient to establish that the crimes could have been committed in Houston County. Boileau v. State, 285 Ga. App. 221, 645 S.E.2d 577 (2007).

Even though the victim was unable to testify with precision as to which county the attack took place, such was not required in order to establish the proper venue as the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape and aggravated sexual battery might have been committed in Fulton County, this evidence was sufficient to establish Fulton County as the proper venue. Arnold v. State, 284 Ga. App. 598, 645 S.E.2d 68 (2007).

Although the defendant argued that the state failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a) generally, a criminal case had to be tried in the county in which the crime was committed. The state had the burden of proving venue, which the state could do using either direct or circumstantial evidence, and whether the evidence as to venue satisfied the reasonable-doubt standard was a question for the jury, and the state's decision will not be set aside if there is any evidence to support the decision; therefore, because in the defendant's case, the victim testified that the defendant molested the victim in their residence and that the residence was located in Grady County, Georgia, venue was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Bynum v. State, 300 Ga. App. 163, 684 S.E.2d 330 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0225, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 300 (Ga. 2010).

Body found in county, although shooting site unconfirmed.

- Even when the evidence as to where the fatal shot was fired was inconclusive, if the evidence that the body was found in a particular county in the state was not contradicted, the contention that venue was not proven was without merit. Aldridge v. State, 236 Ga. 773, 225 S.E.2d 421 (1976).

Even though circumstances pointed to another county as the place of death, when no actual evidence of the murder was ever found in that county, the place of death could not be readily determined; thus, venue was appropriate in the county where the body was found. Kidwell v. State, 264 Ga. 427, 444 S.E.2d 789 (1994); Cook v. State, 273 Ga. 828, 546 S.E.2d 487 (2001).

Police officer's testimony that the burning car in which the victim's body was found was located in Fulton County was sufficient to establish venue in that county. Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 740 S.E.2d 609 (2013).

Confession of crime location to witness.

- Statement by defendant to a witness, during the investigation of a case, that the defendant committed the offense at a certain geographically located spot, plus the sworn testimony of the witness during the trial that such spot is in the county of the court taking jurisdiction, is sufficient proof of venue, when there are no circumstances tending to prove that the venue was in fact in some other county. Austin v. State, 89 Ga. App. 866, 81 S.E.2d 508 (1954).

Lottery documents found at defendant's home in county with lottery.

- Contention that the state failed to show jurisdictional venue in lottery prosecution was without merit since the lottery documents were seized at the defendant's home on the date defendant was arrested, and the jury was authorized to find that the exhibited documents were current, even though no dates were shown, and that the documents were being used in the numbers games which the evidence showed was at that time in full operation in the county. Mills v. State, 71 Ga. App. 353, 30 S.E.2d 824 (1944).

Statement showing murder in decedent's home in trial county.

- When the uncontradicted evidence and the defendant's statement showed that the accused did the killing as alleged in the indictment for murder without justification or mitigation, and that the killing was at the home of the deceased who lived on a named person's place in Clay County, and the trial was in Clay County, the verdict of guilt of murder without recommendation was supported by the evidence, and the venue was shown to be in Clay County, the place of trial. Jones v. State, 197 Ga. 604, 30 S.E.2d 192 (1944).

Venue in a murder case was proper.

- Venue proper in Columbia County, where the victim was shot in Columbia County, but the victim's body was discovered in a car in a lake in Lincoln County, and the medical examiner listed drowning, secondary to a bullet wound to the head, as the cause of death. Tankersley v. State, 261 Ga. 318, 404 S.E.2d 564 (1991).

Jury could properly find that venue of a murder trial was proper under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c) as the victim's body was discovered in the county of the proceedings and the county in which the cause of death was inflicted could not be readily determined; the mere fact that some circumstances pointed to another county as the place of death did not mean that there was a fatal variance between the allegata and probata since there was no actual evidence of the place of the murder. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004).

Since the defendant conceded that the homicide was committed in a moving vehicle and the victim's body was found in Houston County, and there was no evidence that the fatal injury was inflicted anywhere other than Houston County, the state sufficiently proved venue as to the murder. Faulkner v. State, 295 Ga. 321, 758 S.E.2d 817 (2014).

In a murder case, although there may have been conflicting evidence regarding in which county the victim's injuries were inflicted, it was undisputed that the victim's body was found in Pike County, and the jury was therefore authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was proper in Pike County, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c). Crawford v. State, 297 Ga. 680, 777 S.E.2d 463 (2015).

Venue in the county was established beyond a reasonable doubt under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c) because both victims suffered gunshot wounds and died at an address located in the county. Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 1, 799 S.E.2d 196 (2017).

Evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly in Houston County because the state presented testimony at trial establishing that the crimes against the victim culminating in the victim's murder were committed in Houston County as the place where the victim was severely beaten was in Houston County, the place where the victim was strangled to death was in Houston County, and the place where the victim's body was discovered was in Houston County; thus, the failure to prove venue was not a meritorious basis for granting directed verdicts of acquittal. Pike v. State, 302 Ga. 795, 809 S.E.2d 756 (2018).

Evidence that victim gave funds to embezzler in trial county.

- When the evidence authorized the jury to infer that at the time the money was entrusted for a specific purpose in Fulton County, the defendant intended to convert the money to defendant's own use and not to apply the money to the benefit and use of the owner so entrusting it, then venue could be laid in Fulton County. Price v. State, 76 Ga. App. 283, 45 S.E.2d 462 (1947).

County border location evidence.

- Evidence was sufficient to trigger the provisions of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 since the evidence showed that the victim was standing on the doorstep of the victim's home in Wilkinson County within walking distance of Twiggs County when the defendant, walking through a nearby backyard, threw a pipe at the victim. Carswell v. State, 244 Ga. App. 516, 534 S.E.2d 568 (2000).

Prosecution for larceny after trust where conversion in other county.

- Venue in prosecution for larceny after trust may be laid in the county where the property was entrusted, although the physical conversion of it was in another county, where the facts authorized the jury to find that the intent to convert the money was formed in the county where the property was entrusted. Price v. State, 76 Ga. App. 283, 45 S.E.2d 462 (1947).

Confession and corroboration authorized venue.

- On the prosecution for cattle stealing in which the defendant made an admissible confession as to every essential element of the crime, and the evidence was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti aliunde the confession, and the confession as to venue as well as the other essential elements of the crime was corroborated by other evidence, a verdict of guilty was authorized. Kicklighter v. State, 76 Ga. App. 246, 45 S.E.2d 719 (1947).

Evidence sufficient to establish the venue of crime of cattle stealing. Kicklighter v. State, 76 Ga. App. 246, 45 S.E.2d 719 (1947).

Venue of offense of attempting to steal cattle was sufficiently proved.

- Davis v. State, 66 Ga. App. 877, 19 S.E.2d 543 (1942).

When venue is not contested at trial, slight proof is sufficient. Jackson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 718, 341 S.E.2d 274 (1986); Brown v. State, 205 Ga. App. 31, 421 S.E.2d 340 (1992).

When evidence as to venue is conflicting.

- State must prove venue as jurisdictional fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Venue needs clear proof beyond reasonable doubt.

- Although slight evidence of venue may be sufficient when the fact of venue is not contested, nevertheless, it is a jurisdictional fact and must be proved clearly and beyond reasonable doubt. Gibson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 297, 183 S.E. 83 (1935); Rowland v. State, 90 Ga. App. 742, 84 S.E.2d 209 (1954).

Venue of the crime must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 718, 341 S.E.2d 274 (1986).

Venue must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Levitt v. State, 201 Ga. App. 63, 410 S.E.2d 170 (1991).

Absent sufficient proof establishing venue, and proof that a crime took place within a city without also proving that the city was entirely within a county did not establish venue, the defendant's aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sodomy convictions were reversed. Melton v. State, 282 Ga. App. 685, 639 S.E.2d 411 (2006).

Jury instructions set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c) violated the habeas petitioner's due process rights since Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. V made venue an essential element of malice murder, and the instruction's mandate that jurors had to consider the cause of death to have occurred where the body was found improperly shifted the burden of proving otherwise onto the defendant. Owens v. McLaughlin, 733 F.3d 320 (11th Cir. 2013).

Evidence of venue, though slight, may be sufficient.

- Defendant's conviction for impersonating a law enforcement officer was affirmed as venue was established since the state presented evidence that the defendant lived and was arrested in Catoosa County, Georgia, which authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant might have held oneself out as a law enforcement officer via the online application in Catoosa County; therefore, proof of venue was sufficient. Chase v. State, 337 Ga. App. 449, 787 S.E.2d 802 (2016).

Uniform traffic citations are not evidence for venue purposes.

- Citation cannot provide the factual basis necessary to establish venue. Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997).

Proof insufficient if venue evidence equivocal.

- Venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence; but circumstances which render it possible that an alleged crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court are insufficient to establish the jurisdictional element of venue when, from the circumstances adduced, it is as reasonable and possible that the crime was committed beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Clark v. State, 55 Ga. App. 162, 189 S.E. 379 (1937).

When the indictment did not charge uttering a forged instrument, but only charged the defendant with making, signing, forging, and counterfeiting the instrument, and the evidence failed to establish with any degree of clearness where this act may have taken place, the venue of the crime was not supported by the evidence. Rowland v. State, 90 Ga. App. 742, 84 S.E.2d 209 (1954).

Only rank speculation supported venue in the defendant's trial for cruelty to children; therefore, the trial court erred in not granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on this charge. Nihart v. State, 227 Ga. App. 272, 488 S.E.2d 740 (1997).

Evidence insufficient to establish venue.

- Evidence at defendant's trial on a charge of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, was insufficient to establish venue for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e), since the crime arose while the defendant was driving after a former girlfriend and the girlfriend testified to living with her parents in Paulding County, near the line of Polk County, and further, that when she was minutes or less from home, she stopped on the side of the road; there was no evidence by her or anyone else that the site off the roadway where the crime occurred was in Douglas County and, accordingly, reversal of the conviction was required. Morris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 115, 587 S.E.2d 272 (2003).

Juvenile's numerous delinquency adjudications were reversed because the relevant county was never mentioned by any witness and it is not sufficient to prove that a crime occurred in a particular city without also proving that the city is entirely within the relevant county. In the Interest of J.B., 289 Ga. App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for rape and related crimes involving one out of six victims was reversed on appeal as the state failed to prove that the crimes against that victim occurred in Fulton County, Georgia, where the trial was held as the victim stated that the victim was using a pay phone on a certain street at a certain location at the time the victim was abducted, but the state never put forth any evidence establishing that the street at issue was in Fulton County. Further, there was no evidence offered by the state to establish the location of the school the victim had met the police at after the crime. Baker v. State, 295 Ga. App. 162, 671 S.E.2d 206 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0571, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 183 (Ga. 2009).

State's failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and the codefendant possessed a pipe with traces of methamphetamine on the pipe, which was discovered in a search of the defendant's impounded vehicle in the county, rendered the verdict contrary to law, without a sufficient evidentiary basis, because venue was an essential element of the crime, and there was no direct evidence of possession of the pipe in the county; because there was no evidence placing the pipe in the vehicle while the vehicle was in the county, and there was a possibility that the pipe was put in the vehicle after the shootings during one of several stops the defendant and the codefendant made while in Alabama, venue for possession of methamphetamine was not proven to be in the county. Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009).

State failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt because evidence that the defendant's drugs sales to an informant occurred somewhere in Vidalia, Georgia, was insufficient to establish that the crimes occurred in Toombs County since the habeas court properly took judicial notice that Vidalia was located in two different counties, Toombs and Montgomery, and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e) was inapplicable; because the informant would have known the general locations where the sales occurred and because the drug task force agents knew the exact route that the informant and the defendant traveled, the state could have readily determined whether the drug sales occurred in Toombs County and offered evidence to the jury on that essential point. Thompson v. Brown, 288 Ga. 855, 708 S.E.2d 270 (2011).

Defendant's claim that the state failed to prove venue lacked merit as an officer testified that the victim's body was found in Baldwin County and additional testimony proved that the defendant drove the victim to the location where the victim was found, shot the victim, and left the victim for dead. Hargrove v. State, 291 Ga. 879, 734 S.E.2d 34 (2012).

State failed to present evidence of venue necessary for a fleeing and eluding conviction, as the testimony merely identified streets, but did indicate the counties in which the chase or shooting took place. Grant v. State, 326 Ga. App. 121, 756 S.E.2d 255 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for theft by taking since the evidence showed that the defendant never used the funds borrowed for relocating the Florida plant, as promised, and the loan was secured with equipment that the defendant did not own; however, the prosecution failed to prove venue was proper in Dodge County, Georgia, since although the contracts were executed in Dodge County, there was no evidence that the defendant exercised any control over the $ 350,000 in Dodge County. Davis v. State, 326 Ga. App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (2014).

Defendant's conviction for making a false statement in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 was reversed on appeal because the state offered no proof that the jail where the alleged statement was made was in a particular county and since the defendant was also driven, the false statement may have been made in another county. Stockard v. State, 327 Ga. App. 184, 755 S.E.2d 548 (2014).

Since the state failed to present circumstantial evidence supporting a finding that the defendant and the victim entered Fulton County, the jury had no basis to apply O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h). State v. Robertson, 329 Ga. App. 182, 764 S.E.2d 427 (2014).

There was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign because the state failed to prove venue. Glispie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 177, 779 S.E.2d 767 (2015), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 300 Ga. 128 793 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. 2016).

Defendant's murder conviction was reversed because although the evidence established that the cause of death, the shooting of the victim, was inflicted on a boat ramp in or near Lock and Dam Park and venue was proper where the boat ramp was situated under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(c), there was no evidence as to the county in which the park was located. Twitty v. State, 298 Ga. 204, 779 S.E.2d 298 (2015).

Testimony of victim.

- Testimony from the victim that property was taken from the victim's premises located in a certain county is sufficient to establish venue in that county. Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981).

Venue for financial transaction card theft.

- Because both the restaurant where defendant had access to the card and the store where the card was used were located in the same county, there was sufficient evidence to establish venue for financial transaction card theft. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 239, 539 S.E.2d 914 (2000).

Defendant's convictions on 20 counts of financial transaction card fraud were not authorized since the evidence on each count created the inference that the financial transaction card was presented and goods were received in a county other than that in which defendant was prosecuted. Newsom v. State, 183 Ga. App. 339, 359 S.E.2d 11 (1987).

Evidence sufficient to establish venue.

- In a drug possession case, the state properly established venue in Cherokee County beyond a reasonable doubt because O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h) permitted venue to be established in the county where a defendant was immediately present before being asked to provide a urine sample, which in the instant case was in the defendant's Cherokee County apartment where police officers were executing a search warrant. West v. State, 288 Ga. App. 566, 654 S.E.2d 463 (2007).

With regard to defendant's convictions on two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree and one count of aggravated battery, the state proved venue in Cobb County, Georgia, based on the defendant being indicted in Cobb County for crimes committed sometime between July 1, 2002, and December 22, 2002; the evidence presented at trial established that the defendant lived with the victim's parent and the victim at an apartment located in Cobb County during that time; the manager of the apartment complex saw the victim at the apartment on a daily basis and knew that the victim lived in the apartment with defendant; defendant admitted to whipping the victim on a daily basis; and the manager saw the victim in the apartment with injuries. Glover v. State, 292 Ga. App. 22, 663 S.E.2d 772 (2008).

As there was evidence from the defendant's confession to police and testimony from bank employees, together with physical evidence, that the defendant wrote a check out from a victim's checkbook in the defendant's name and then cashed the check at the bank, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for forgery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-1(a); the element of venue was properly established by the evidence as well pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a). Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).

Jury's determination that venue was proper in Fulton County was supported by the record and, thus, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was not erroneous under circumstances in which the victim was abducted at a mall in Fulton County, the victim stated that the defendant originally got on a northbound interstate, but that the victim had no idea where the victim and the defendant went from there, the victim and the defendant drove around for about 20 minutes, the victim was wearing blacked-out sunglasses and could not see, and eventually the victim was taken from the vehicle into an unknown location and raped; the most definite testimony regarding the location of the crimes related to the mall, which was shown to be located in Fulton County, and the jury was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape might have occurred in Fulton County. Leftwich v. State, 299 Ga. App. 392, 682 S.E.2d 614 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2013, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 710 (Ga. 2009); cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1019, 130 S. Ct. 1913, 176 L. Ed. 2d 386 (2010).

Evidence that a police officer found the victim lying on a sidewalk in Fulton County was sufficient to establish venue in that county under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a). Branford v. State, 299 Ga. App. 890, 685 S.E.2d 731 (2009).

Venue with regard to convictions for possession of methamphetamine and of less than an ounce of marijuana was established as being in the county where the drugs were discovered during a search of the defendant's impounded vehicle because although the state presented no evidence that the methamphetamine residue and the marijuana found in the vehicle were in the possession of the defendant and the codefendant while they were in the county. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted to having hand-rolled a marijuana cigarette found in the vehicle the morning of the shooting; that testimony, coupled with the undisputed fact that the defendant, the codefendant, and the vehicle were at a service station in the county at a time following the point at which the defendant admitted having made the cigarette, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and the codefendant possessed the marijuana cigarette in the county. Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (2009).

Since a shooting victim was assaulted in a vehicle that was shown by an investigator's officer to have been traveling through Fulton County, the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was proper in Fulton County. Saxton v. State, 300 Ga. App. 535, 685 S.E.2d 780 (2009).

State met the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue of the crime charged was properly in Fulton County because, although the victim did not know the exact location of the shooting, the logical import of the victim's testimony was that the crime scene itself was in Fulton County; the victim testified to driving from one street to what the victim thought was another street where the defendant shot the victim, and the state established that the first street was in Fulton County. Sewell v. State, 302 Ga. App. 151, 690 S.E.2d 634, cert. denied, No. S10C0856, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 530 (Ga. 2010).

State's proof of venue was sufficient because the uncontradicted evidence at trial was that the victim was shot and buried on a hunting property in Echols County. Cantera v. State, 304 Ga. App. 289, 696 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

State established venue under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. §§ 16-9-125 and17-2-2(a) because a reasonable trier of fact was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims resided or were found in Forsyth County at the time the offense of financial identity fraud was committed as alleged in the indictment; the victim testified that the victim had been a resident of Forsyth County for twelve years and that the victim's company had been located there for seventeen years. Zachery v. State, 312 Ga. App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

In an aggravated battery and gang activity case in which the crimes occurred at a bus stop outside Six Flags Over Georgia amusement park, there was sufficient evidence to establish venue in Cobb County because one defendant testified that the fight was "on Cobb County's side of the bus..." and other witnesses indicated on an exhibit the location where the witnesses exited the park and testified that the witnesses were at the Cobb County Transit bus stop. Morey v. State, 312 Ga. App. 678, 719 S.E.2d 504 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0451, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 592 (Ga. 2012).

State met the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue of the crime charged was properly in Troup County, Georgia because the testimony of the victim's grandmother first established the exact location of the crime scene, and the victim testified that the events on the night in question took place in that county; the defendant offered no evidence to the contrary. Strozier v. State, 314 Ga. App. 432, 724 S.E.2d 446 (2012).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h), the state adequately proved venue was in DeKalb County as to a murder victim whose body was never found because the victim was last seen alive in that county, the defendant confessed that the defendant shot the victim in Atlanta, which was partly in DeKalb County, and the defendant and the victim had been together every day at the defendant's residence in that county. Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 401, 721 S.E.2d 864 (2012).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant with arranging to buy cattle and failing or refusing to pay the seller in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-58 on the ground that venue did not lie in Laurens County because there was some evidence that the place of payment was at the seller's location in Laurens County and that the defendant wrongfully failed or refused to pay the seller in Laurens County for the cattle; even if the defendant's fraudulent intent arose in Kansas sometime after the cattle were shipped, the crime was not consummated until the defendant failed or refused to pay. Babbitt v. State, 314 Ga. App. 115, 723 S.E.2d 10 (2012).

State met the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly in Cobb County, Georgia, based on the evidence which showed that the child victim lived with the defendants at the family's residence which was located in Cobb County, there was evidence that the male defendant tied the victim up, tied the victim to a bedroom door at the home and whipped the victim, and the victim also testified that the male defendant had hit the victim at the family's home on the day the victim ran to a neighbor's home. Moore v. State, 319 Ga. App. 766, 738 S.E.2d 348 (2013).

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes were committed in Walton County, including that numerous officers from the Walton County Sheriff's Office responded to the scene of the crimes, evidence was collected by the criminal investigation unit of that office and, thus, venue was proven. Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557, 788 S.E.2d 484 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 646, 196 L. Ed. 2d 542 (U.S. 2017).

Evidence as a whole was sufficient to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt because the state demonstrated that the defendant encountered the victim at the Washington Street barber shop in Newton County; after the victim was shot, the victim's vehicle came to rest at a Washington Street service station in Newton County; the cause of death was inflicted on Washington Street within a few hundred yards of the Washington Street service station; and the victim was shot on Washington Street only minutes after the victim left the Washington Street barbershop and only moments before the victim's vehicle crashed and came to rest at the service station. McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 794 S.E.2d 118 (2016).

Evidence supported a finding that the crimes occurred in Floyd County where the Sheriff's Department employees heard the defendant's and the co-defendant's false statements to them about the purported death of the defendant's son's father. Reeves v. State, 346 Ga. App. 414, 816 S.E.2d 401 (2018).

Testimony sufficient to support evidence regarding venue.

- When one of the officers testified that a round of shots was directed at the officers' vehicle at a location that the officer believed to be within Clayton County, this testimony of the officer was sufficient to support the jury's finding that venue was in Clayton County. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 106, 416 S.E.2d 375 (1992).

Testimony of police officers that the crimes charged in the indictment occurred in the county where defendant's trial was conducted was sufficient to authorize a finding of venue. Jones v. State, 220 Ga. App. 161, 469 S.E.2d 300 (1996).

State's misstatement about an address where the crimes arising from the defendant's attack on a taxi driver occurred, made during the state's opening statement, did not prevent the state from proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt; the state's opening statement was not evidence, a witness and a police officer stated the correct address, the officer also identified the county where the crimes occurred, and any conflict in the evidence about where the crimes occurred was resolved by the jury in favor of the state. Schofield v. State, 261 Ga. App. 70, 582 S.E.2d 11 (2003).

By applying the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e) and (h), the jury could conclude that venue was proper because there was evidence that the victim's presence in the car remained voluntary until it became clear that the defendant was not mistakenly driving toward Alabama and that the defendant would not accommodate the victim's wish that the victim not be taken there; the jury could determine that the crime of kidnapping was complete when the defendant refused to turn the car around or to stop and let the victim exit. Pruitt v. State, 279 Ga. 140, 611 S.E.2d 47, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 866, 126 S. Ct. 165, 163 L. Ed. 2d 152 (2005).

Venue of defendant's armed robbery, theft by taking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime trial was proper in Hall County as the victim gave the victim's address and a police officer testified that the officer was called to investigate a robbery at that address in Hall County, where the officer spoke with the victim. Olarte v. State, 273 Ga. App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (2005).

Jury was authorized to interpret the testimony of a victim's parent that the parent lived with the daughter in Heard County, Georgia and that the parent lived in a different trailer than the one in which the family lived when the defendant molested the victim at the parent's home to mean that the victim's family had been residing in Heard County when defendant molested the victim as evidence that the offenses were committed in Heard County. Moody v. State, 279 Ga. App. 457, 631 S.E.2d 473 (2006).

Venue was established in a child molestation case when the victim's aunt testified that the victim told her that the defendant molested the victim at the "big house," which was what the victim called the house where the victim's grandmother lived, and the evidence established that the "big house" was in Meriwether County. Brooks v. State, 286 Ga. App. 209, 648 S.E.2d 724 (2007).

Venue in Randolph County had been proven for second-degree criminal damage and for criminal trespass involving a couple's property. A neighbor testified that the couple's home was "probably five or six houses past" the defendant's house and stated "yes" when asked if all of those houses were located in Randolph County. Bass v. State, 288 Ga. App. 690, 655 S.E.2d 303 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. 2009).

In defendants' trial for fleeing a police officer, reckless driving, and speeding, in Newton County, because a state trooper testified that the trooper first encountered defendants in Newton County and described the route using a map of Newton County. The trooper testified that no part of the pursuit took place off the map. Even had the route of pursuit taken the parties across county lines out of Newton County, venue would still be properly founded in Newton County pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e) or (h), which allowed venue wherever a portion of the crime took place or wherever the evidence showed the crime took place. Brewster v. State, 300 Ga. App. 143, 684 S.E.2d 309 (2009).

Incest and child molestation.

- Because the victim lived in the county where the trial was held and the defendant would stay overnight, this evidence supported an inference that the defendant had access to the victim in that county and showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant might have had intercourse with the victim there; consequently, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h), the evidence was sufficient to support venue there. Drake v. State, 238 Ga. App. 584, 519 S.E.2d 692 (1999).

Child molestation in travelling car.

- Although the victim testified that the victim did not know where the car was when the defendant touched the victim, venue was proper in a county which was said to have been traversed by adults who were also present in the vehicle. Withman v. State, 210 Ga. App. 159, 435 S.E.2d 519 (1993).

Rape in traveling car.

- Rape victim's testimony that she and abductors traveled for a time while making many turns, combined with evidence as to the county in which she was abducted, was sufficient to prove that the rape could have occurred in that county. Dillard v. State, 223 Ga. App. 405, 477 S.E.2d 674 (1996).

Since the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant's coconspirator raped and sodomized the victim in a hijacked car while the defendant was driving the car between counties, venue was sufficiently established under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(b), (e), (h). Short v. State, 276 Ga. App. 340, 623 S.E.2d 195 (2005).

Sodomy in traveling car.

- Incident on which a sodomy charge was based occurred about one mile from the home in Gordon County where the defendant and the victim lived, when the defendant and the victim were driving home; thus, under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e), the crime was considered to have occurred in Gordon County, through which the car traveled, and the state proved venue. Prudhomme v. State, 285 Ga. App. 662, 647 S.E.2d 343 (2007).

Venue established by subsection (h).

- Because O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h) applies by the statute's terms to "any case," use of subsection (h) to determine venue in a homicide case is not precluded and where the evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder might have been committed in Laurens County it was sufficient to support the jury's finding that venue was appropriate in Laurens County. Nelson v. State, 262 Ga. 763, 426 S.E.2d 357 (1993). But see Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999).

For venue purposes, evidence that showed that a murder victim's blood was found in a motel room in Floyd County, along with the fact that the victim was last seen alive in Floyd County, was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h) to allow a jury to consider that the murder might have been committed in Floyd County beyond a reasonable doubt. Edmond v. State, 283 Ga. 507, 661 S.E.2d 520 (2008).

State does not have to prove where drug ingested.

- Because the presence of methamphetamine in defendant's urine constituted circumstantial evidence that defendant knowingly possessed the drug within three days prior to a urine test, and because the state did not have to prove where the drug was actually ingested, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction and venue under O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h). Harbin v. State, 297 Ga. App. 877, 678 S.E.2d 553 (2009).

Evidence of highway number insufficient proof of venue.

- In a DUI case under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), the state failed to prove that venue was proper in Fayette County: the evidence showed only that the defendant was stopped on Highway 138 by a Fayette County Sheriff's deputy, which was insufficient to prove venue; because DUI elements were established by the evidence, retrial was permitted. Smith v. State, 345 Ga. App. 43, 812 S.E.2d 117 (2018).

Stipulating to venue.

- Pretermitting whether the decisions not to move for a directed verdict for lack of venue and to stipulate to venue fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant could not prove that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Indeed, if defense counsel either moved for a directed verdict as to the lack of venue or decided against ultimately stipulating to venue, the trial transcript clearly showed that the state was prepared to reopen the evidence to recall a witness to prove venue. Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 744 S.E.2d 413 (2013).

Jury instruction was not improper.

- Although the better practice was to give a jury instruction on venue that indicated that a jury "may consider" whether a crime was committed in any county in which the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime might have been committed, a jury instruction that instead mirrored the language of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2 was not erroneous and did not improperly shift the burden of proof regarding venue to the defendant in a murder case. Edmond v. State, 283 Ga. 507, 661 S.E.2d 520 (2008).

Venue a question of fact for the jury.

- Venue was a question for the jury where the victim was abducted in the county in which the trial was held and where the defendant's testimony was sufficiently contradicted in other areas so as to place in the hands of the jury all issues concerning the weight and credibility of the defendant's statements as to the location of the conduct. Campbell v. State, 223 Ga. App. 484, 477 S.E.2d 905 (1996).

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's fleeing or attempting to elude crimes took place in the county where the defendant's trial took place such that the trial court in that county had venue and jurisdiction; weighing the evidence of venue was a jury, not an appeals court, function. Ward v. State, 270 Ga. App. 427, 606 S.E.2d 877 (2004).

Whether the state established venue was a question for a jury because the question of whether the defendant's efforts to abandon the illegal files was successful when the defendant placed the files in the trash before entering Clayton County could not be determined as a matter of law at the pretrial stage. State v. Al-Khayyal, 322 Ga. App. 718, 744 S.E.2d 885 (2013).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 497, 499 et seq. 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 197.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 224 et seq.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute fixing venue of offense committed while upon public conveyances, or at stations or depots upon the route thereof, 11 A.L.R. 1020.

Pendency in one county of charge of larceny as bar to subsequent charge in another county of offense which involves both felonious breaking and felonious taking of same property, 19 A.L.R. 636.

Absence from state at time of offense as affecting jurisdiction of offense, 42 A.L.R. 272.

Where offense of obtaining money by fraud is deemed to be committed when mail or telegraph is employed, 43 A.L.R. 545.

Right to be tried in county or district in which offense was committed, as susceptible of waiver, 137 A.L.R. 686.

Jurisdiction and venue of criminal charge for child desertion or nonsupport as affected by nonresidence of parent or child, 44 A.L.R.2d 886.

Venue in homicide cases where crime is committed partly in one county and partly in another, 73 A.L.R.3d 907.

Venue in rape cases where crime is committed partly in one place and partly in another, 100 A.L.R.3d 1174.

Venue in bribery cases where crime is committed partly in one county and partly in another, 11 A.L.R.4th 704.