CopyCited 72 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 6, 1994 | 443 S.E.2d 839, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1892
...nalty is sought in their circuits, or the manner in which plea bargains are reached, would be insufficient to show that the Cobb County District Attorney acted in an unconstitutional manner in Rower’s case.
3. Contrary to Rower’s argument, OCGA §
17-10-16, authorizing a sentence of life without parole, is not unconstitutional for any of the reasons alleged....
CopyCited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 28, 2013 | 743 S.E.2d 12, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1344
...sibility of parole in all murder cases.
Appellant correctly notes that in 2011, the year after he killed the victim, the General Assembly expressly required the codification of § 10 of the 2009 Act in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated as OCGA §
17-10-16.1....
...2011, p.752, § 17 (3) (effective May 13, 2011) (“Title 17 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to criminal procedure is amended in: . . . Article 1 of Chapter 10, relating to procedure for sentencing and imposition of punishment, by codifying the text of Section 10 of [the 2009 Act] as Code Section
17-10-16.1.”)....
CopyCited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 8, 1999 | 270 Ga. 494, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 556
...96,
376 S.E.2d 851 (1989). It was designed for the benefit, not the detriment of a defendant, Romine v. State,
251 Ga. 208,
305 S.E.2d 93 (1983), and it does not interfere with the attorney-client relationship. 11. Jackson contends the death penalty statutes, OCGA §§
17-10-16,
17-10-30.1,
17-10-31.1,
17-10-32.1, are unconstitutional because they require the prosecutor to seek the death penalty in order to seek life without parole....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 21, 2014 | 754 S.E.2d 33, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 118
...y manslaughter was
unwarranted and properly denied. See Campbell v. State,
292 Ga. 766, 767 (2)
(740 SE2d 115) (2013).
10. Foster contends that the trial court erred by sentencing him to life
without parole pursuant to OCGA §§
16-5-1 and
17-10-16.1, maintaining that
the latter statute was applied to him in an ex post facto manner....
...With an
effective date of April 29, 2009, OCGA §
16-5-1 was amended to make life
without parole an available sentence in all murder cases. As such, life without
parole was an available sentencing option for Foster, who murdered Williams
on September 22, 2010. After the murder, the Legislature passed OCGA §
17-10-16.1, which provides that “[a] person may be sentenced to life without
parole without the prosecutor seeking the death penalty under the laws of this
7
state.” This codified a provision that had been adopted by the Legislature in
2009, but not codified. Ga. Laws 2009, p. 223, § 10. Contrary to Foster’s
characterization, OCGA §
17-10-16.1 did not originate the option of a sentence
of life without parole in a murder case, such that its application to Foster was ex
post facto....
CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2010 | 286 Ga. 650, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 754
...6-6-1 (b) and
17-10-6.1 and our holding that life without parole cannot be a punishment for rape. See State v. Velazquez, supra,
283 Ga. at 208-209,
657 S.E.2d 838. That holding is predicated upon the codified and uncodified language enacting OCGA §§
17-10-16 and
17-10-32.1, see Ga....
...Georgia, supra,
433 U.S. at 592(III),
97 S.Ct. 2861. See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at ___(II),
128 S.Ct. 2641 (grant of writ of certiorari referenced in Velazquez, supra at 208, fn. 2,
657 S.E.2d 838). Nothing in the enactment of OCGA §§
17-10-16 and
17-10-32.1 or our holding in Velazquez served to preclude the Legislature when it amended OCGA §§
16-6-1(b) and
17-10-6.1 in 2006 [4] from authorizing trial courts to impose a "de facto" life without parole sentence for a first conviction of rape....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 16, 2001 | 274 Ga. 246, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2230
...by the surviving victim, we find meritless Presnell's assertion that the trial court committed reversible error by approving its use. [3] Appended to Presnell's enumeration regarding the refused jury charges is his one-sentence contention that OCGA §
17-10-16, which provides that a jury may consider a sentence of life without parole upon agreement by the State, is unconstitutional....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 1996 | 266 Ga. 324, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 760
...ult, arson in the first degree and possession of an explosive device stemming from the July 1994 fire-bombing deaths of two young children and injury to their mother. Following the joint indictment, the State filed notices of intent pursuant to OCGA §
17-10-16 and OCGA §
17-10-30.1 to seek imprisonment for life without parole [1] but did not give notice of an intent to seek the death penalty....
...We granted interlocutory review and affirm the trial court's order that a sentence of life without parole is an alternative sentence to a sentence of death, dependent upon the State also seeking the death penalty. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motions, focusing solely on OCGA §
17-10-16(a) as authority for a sentence of life without parole independent of the State seeking the death penalty....
...[4] It is apparent from a review of these statutes that they represent a coherent statutory plan whereby death penalty provisions are and must be utilized in order to implement the life without parole sentencing option. In pertinent part the four new Code sections provide as follows: OCGA §
17-10-16(a) sets forth that a person convicted of an offense committed after May 1, 1993, for which the death penalty may be imposed "may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life without parole, or life imprisonment as provided in Article 2 of this chapter....
...Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting appellees' motions. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except CARLEY, J., who dissents. CARLEY, Justice, dissenting. It is clear that a sentence of life without parole is an alternative to a sentence of death, since OCGA §
17-10-16(a) unambiguously provides that one who is convicted of an offense for which "the death penalty may be imposed under the laws of this state may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life without parole, or life imprisonment as provided i...
...alty is a prerequisite to the imposition of a sentence of life without parole. The majority likewise correctly notes that the 1993 enactment also "created four new Code sections within Chapter 10 of Title 17." Those four new Code sections are OCGA §§
17-10-16,
17-10-30.1,
17-10-31.1 and
17-10-32.1....
...rovisions are and must be utilized in order to implement the life without parole sentencing option. Contrary to the majority, it is apparent from my review of these statutes that they do not represent such a statutory plan. As previously noted, OCGA §
17-10-16(a) provides that one who is convicted of an offense for which "the death penalty may be imposed under the laws of this state may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life without parole, or life imprisonment as provided in Article 2 of this chapter. " (Emphasis supplied.) Since Article 2 relates to the "Death Penalty Generally," the majority apparently construes OCGA §
17-10-16(a) as an expression of the legislative intent that a sentence of life without parole can be considered and imposed only when the State is seeking the death penalty....
...ich contains the statutory provisions relating to the death penalty, the General Assembly intended no more than that the sentence of life without parole be considered as an independent alternative sentence to the death penalty. Thus, insofar as OCGA §
17-10-16(a) authorizes the sentences of death, life without parole, or life "as provided in Article 2 of this chapter," it is the provisions of OCGA §§
17-10-30,
17-10-31 and
17-10-32 which relate to the sentence of death and the independent pro...
...NOTES [1] "[L]ife without parole" means that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his or her natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless such person is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he or she was sentenced. OCGA §
17-10-31.1(d)(1). See also OCGA §
17-10-16(b)....
...torney must file with the clerk of the superior court a written notice of an intention to seek the death penalty. [3] Ga.L.1993, p. 1654, §§ 1 and 2, amending OCGA §§
17-10-1 and
17-10-2. [4] Ga.L.1993, p. 1643, §§ 3, 4, 5 and 6 created OCGA §§
17-10-16,
17-10-30.1,
17-10-31.1 and
17-10-32.1....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2021 | 311 Ga. 123
...5 Moss also contends that a jury, and not a judge, must find him
irreparably corrupt for an LWOP sentence to be imposed. He correctly
20
(b) Moss also contends that he cannot be sentenced to LWOP
because OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) prohibits the imposition of an LWOP
sentence on a juvenile. We disagree.
OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
person who is convicted of an offense ....
...for which the
death penalty may be imposed under the laws of this state
may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life without
parole, or life imprisonment as provided in Article 2 of
this chapter.
Moss reasons that the portion of OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) that
permits an LWOP sentence when a person is “convicted of an offense
....
...tly held otherwise in Raines,
309 Ga.
at 268-273.
6 Moss analogizes to State v. Velazquez,
283 Ga. 206 (657 SE2d 838)
(2008), to argue that even when one statute (such as OCGA §
16-5-1 (e) (1)
here) provides LWOP as a sentencing option, OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) prevents
imposition of that sentence if either Georgia statutory law or United States
Supreme Court case law dictate that the death penalty cannot be imposed for
that offense....
...convicted of rape could not be sentenced to LWOP — which was enumerated
as an authorized sentence in the rape statute, see OCGA §
16-6-1 (b) — where
21
that the “notwithstanding any other provision of law” portion of
OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) references, and indeed grafts into the statute,
the United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence....
...820, 828 (809 SE2d 727) (2018) (in construing a
statute, “we must read the statutory text in its most natural and
reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would”) (citation and punctuation omitted). To that end, OCGA §
17-10-16 (a)’s reference to an offense “for which the death penalty
the State did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty....
...& W. P.
R. Co. v. Hemmings,
192 Ga. 724, 728 (16 SE2d 537) (1941)
(interpreting phrase “any law of the State” in a constitutional
provision to mean a “legislative enactment” and not a court
decision). Applied here, we conclude that OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) is
satisfied because OCGA §
16-5-1 (e) (1) enumerates death as a
potential sentence for murder.7 To hold otherwise would import into
7 OCGA §
16-5-1 (e) (1) provides: “A person convicted of the offense of
murder shall b...
...constitutional constraints imposed by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment — not by any Georgia
statute.”) (emphasis in original).
Perhaps in anticipation of this conclusion, Moss also argues
that if we do not adopt his interpretation of OCGA §
17-10-16 (a),
the statute will be rendered “mere surplusage” because its only
possible meaning is “that those who cannot constitutionally be
sentenced to death may also not be sentenced to life without parole.”
But that is not so....
... —including repealing other statutes pertaining to LWOP sentences
and adding OCGA §
16-5-1 (e) (1), which enumerates LWOP as a
potential sentence for persons convicted of murder — OCGA § 17-
10-16 (a) still retains meaning. Indeed, by its plain terms, OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) authorizes death, LWOP, and life in prison as sentences
for persons convicted of offenses for which the death penalty may be
imposed. And even to the extent OCGA §
16-5-1 (e) (1) controls
sentencing for the specific offense of murder, OCGA §
17-10-16 (a)
still serves as a general background rule that authorizes LWOP (as
well as death and life in prison) sentences for other offenses that
meet its requirements, whether those offenses currently exist in
Georgia law or may be enacted in the future....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 6, 2017 | 796 S.E.2d 694
...izing that “the situation in each case is governed by specific statutes.” Velazquez,
283 Ga. at 209 n. 3. See also Redden v. State,
294 Ga. App. 879, 881 (2) (670 SE2d 552) (2008) (“Ingram held that under the statutory scheme created by OCGA §§
17-10-16 (a),
17-10-30.1,
17-10-31.1, and
17-10-32.1, the legislature intended the sentence of life without parole to be considered and imposed only when the state is seeking the death penalty....
...The 2009 Act explicitly said in § 10 that “[a] person may be sentenced to life without parole without the prosecutor seeking the death penalty under the laws of this state.” In 2011, the General Assembly expressly required the codification of § 10 of the 2009Act in the Official Code of GeorgiaAnnotated as OCGA §
17-10-16.1....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 1997 | 268 Ga. 151, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 2351
...nded the case for resentencing. Brantley v. State,
262 Ga. 786,
427 S.E.2d 758 (1993). On remand, and with the express consent of the State, Brantley elected to be sentenced to life without parole for the murder of his former sister-in-law. See OCGA §
17-10-16 and Ga....
...No promises or threats were made to Brantley or to Allen. Allen was confident that Brantley understood the implications of the sentence and elected it knowingly and voluntarily. Prior to the sentencing, Allen advised Brantley that the constitutionality of OCGA §
17-10-16 had been upheld....
...hows that Brantley's decision did not turn on the attorneys' conjecture, rather Brantley knowingly opted for *172 life in prison without the possibility of parole in order to spare himself. 2. Brantley fails in the claim that the application of OCGA §
17-10-16 to his case is violative of the ex post facto prohibitions of the State and Federal Constitutions....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 25, 2008 | 283 Ga. 206, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 580
...the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. [Cit.]" Dudley v. State,
273 Ga. 466, 468,
542 S.E.2d 99 (2001). Prior to the 1999 enactment, the death penalty was statutorily authorized under OCGA §
16-6-1(b). Thus, in 1999, under OCGA §
17-10-16(a), [1] a rape prosecution was already within the ambit of Article 2 of Chapter 10 of Title 17 of the Official Code of Georgia, of which OCGA §
17-10-32.1 is a part....
...CARLEY, Justice, dissenting. In 1999, the General Assembly amended OCGA §
16-6-1(b) so as to authorize life imprisonment without parole as a sentencing option for the crime of rape. Ga. L. 1999, p. 666, § 1. Today, however, the majority holds that, by virtue of OCGA §
17-10-16(a), that sentence is governed by OCGA §§
17-10-30 et seq., including §
17-10-32.1, and, absent compliance with those statutes, is not available as punishment for the crime of rape, whether committed before or after the 1999 amendment....
...If the majority were correct, the legislature accomplished nothing by amending OCGA §
16-6-1(b) in 1999. More perplexing is the failure even to recognize the inconsistency, pointed out by the Court of Appeals, between the amendment and a construction of OCGA §
17-10-16(a) which limits the authority granted by that amendment. Velazquez v. State,
283 Ga.App. 863, 864,
643 S.E.2d 291 (2007). As correctly quoted in footnote 1 of the majority opinion, OCGA §
17-10-16(a) authorizes a sentence of life imprisonment without parole as provided in OCGA §§
17-10-30 et seq....
...for any crime for which the death penalty may be imposed, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The natural and ordinary meaning of the word "notwithstanding" is "without obstruction from" or "in spite of." [Cit.] Application of this definition to [OCGA §
17-10-16(a)] would mean that it was not intended as the exclusive method for [imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole]. The word "notwithstanding" does not indicate here any repugnancy among the [statutory] provisions. [Cit.] Williamson v. Schmid,
237 Ga. 630, 632,
229 S.E.2d 400 (1976). Thus, the natural meaning of OCGA §
17-10-16(a) is that "a person who is convicted of an offense ....
...for which such person is not sentenced to death"). See also Henry v. State,
279 Ga. 615, 618(6),
619 S.E.2d 609 (2005). In short, there is not any reason for this Court to assume that OCGA §
16-6-1(b) is meaningless and to extend the reach of OCGA §
17-10-16(a) beyond its plain language, such that the procedures of OCGA §§
17-10-30 et seq....
...apply to sentences for rape even though they do not apply to recidivist sentences pursuant to OCGA §
17-10-7(b). Accordingly, I dissent to the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice HUNSTEIN and Justice MELTON join in this dissent. NOTES [1] OCGA §
17-10-16(a) reads: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted of an offense committed after May 1, 1993, for which the death penalty may be imposed under the laws of this state may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for...
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 1998 | 269 Ga. 457
...inge on the authority of the Board to grant parole, but rendered Moore ineligible for parole. This Court granted Moore's application for discretionary review to consider the correctness of that ruling. 1. In Freeman, supra, this Court held that OCGA §
17-10-16, which provides for a sentence of life without parole, does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers....
...We believe that analogy is valid and adhere, therefore, to our holding in Freeman that the legislature's power to prescribe punishment for crime includes the power to make ineligibility for parole part of the punishment. We also reject Moore's contention in the alternative that Freeman is inapposite to his case. Just as OCGA §
17-10-16 provides that a person convicted of any offense for which a sentence of death could be imposed may be given a sentence under which that person is ineligible for parole, OCGA §
17-10-7(c) provides that persons who are convicted of a fourth felony are ineligible for parole....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 25, 2013 | 740 S.E.2d 598, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 743
...p and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.”
We note that the scope and vitality of Freeman’s holding are uncertain. Freeman involved a new statute, OCGA §
17-10-16, which took effect on May 1, 1993, and authorized a sentence of life without parole for persons convicted of an offense for which the death penalty may be imposed....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 2018
...entence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after discussing the matter with counsel "for some time prior to the hearing." The court also found that the sentence was not a void sentence, did not contravene public policy under OCGA §
17-10-16 and Brantley v....
...State ,
303 Ga. 567, 568 (n. 1),
814 S.E.2d 318 (2018).6 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole are now governed by OCGA §
17-10-16.
In this motion, Moore stated that he was incorporating his original motion and added a claim asserting that his due process rights were violated during the 2002 re-sentencing hearing in that the court did not specify which crime served...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 2018
...his guilty pleas and accept a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole after discussing the matter with counsel “for some time
prior to the hearing.” The court also found that the sentence was not a void
sentence, did not contravene public policy under OCGA §
17-10-16 and
Brantley v....
...State,
268 Ga. 151, 153 (486 SE2d 169) (1997), and that Moore was
not prejudiced by the sentence, as the State intended to seek the death penalty
1
Sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole are now governed by
OCGA §
17-10-16.
2
and Moore benefitted from the pleas by not having to face it.
Moore did not file a notice of appeal from the September 20, 2017 order;
rather, on October 3, 2017, he filed in the...
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2012 | 732 S.E.2d 752, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2918
...at 748-749.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, Christopher M. DeNeve, Assistant District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
OCGA §
17-10-16 (a) makes a life sentence without the possibility of parole an option in cases in which a person is “convicted of an offense committed after May 1, 1993, for which the death penalty may be imposed under the laws of this state.” The crimes of which Barnes was convicted occurred on February 13,1992. The act creating OCGA §
17-10-16 provided, however, that a defendant who committed an offense for which the death penalty may be imposed prior to May 1, 1993 may, with the express written consent of the State,
elect in writing to be sentenced under the provisions of thi...
