O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (2019)

Sentencing of person subject to death penalty or life without parole upon plea of guilty; duties of judge

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Repealed by Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 7/SB 13, effective April 29, 2009.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - This Code section was based on Code 1981, § 17-10-32.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 6. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 8/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘Except as provided in this section, the provisions of this Act shall apply only to those offenses committed after the effective date of this Act. With express written consent of the state, an accused whose offense was committed prior to the effective date of this Act may elect in writing to be sentenced under the provisions of this Act, provided that: (1) jeopardy for the offense charged has not attached or (2) the accused has been sentenced to death but the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal and the state is not barred from seeking prosecution after the remand.’’ This Act became effective April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 9/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘Except as provided in Section 8 of this Act, the amendment or repeal of a Code section by this Act shall not affect

any sentence imposed by any court of this state prior to the effective date of this Act.’’ Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 10/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘A person may be sentenced to life without parole without the prosecutor seeking the death penalty under the laws of this state.’’ Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 17(3)/HB 142 codified these provisions at Code Section 17-10-16.1. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 11(a)/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the law as set forth in this Code section as it existed prior to April 29, 2009, shall apply to all offenses committed on and before April 29, 2009, and the amendment by this Act shall apply to all crimes committed on and after April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 11(b)/SB 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: ‘‘The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the

Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result

of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.’’

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1996–2021 · leading case: State v. Velazquez, 657 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. 2008).
State v. Velazquez, 657 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 51× “As Velazquez pled guilty, his situation is governed by OCGA § 17-10-32.1. That statute reads: (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section, any person who has been indicted for an offense for which the death penalty or life without parole may be imposed…”
Pierce v. State, 717 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 14× “Pierce argues that, in *896 sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the trial court violated former OCGA § 17-10-32.1 by failing to make a specific, express finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Pope v. State, 801 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 12× “Pope contends that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole is void under former OCGA § 17-10-32.1, 2 because the sentencing court failed to comply with it.”
Moore v. State, 749 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 12× “1 provided that a defendant who enters a plea after indictment for an offense for which the death penalty or life without parole may be imposed may be sentenced to life imprisonment, or if the State has filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the judge may sentence…”
Moss v. State, 856 S.E.2d 280 (Ga. 2021). · cites it 6× “But Georgia law no longer requires as a prerequisite for an LWOP sentence that the State file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and OCGA § 17-10-32.1 has since been repealed.”
State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 12× “[8] Pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-32.1, defendants who enter a guilty plea after indictment for an offense for which the death penalty or life without parole may be imposed, may be sentenced to life imprisonment, id.”
Hughes v. State, 504 S.E.2d 696 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 10× “The court added: “[T]he court’s acceptance of the defendant’s plea constitutes an implicit, if not explicit, finding that there was a factual basis for the entry of the plea and an aggravating circumstance sufficient to authorize the penalty of life without parole.”
Sanders v. State, 631 S.E.2d 344 (Ga. 2006). · cites it 4× “Sanders also points to OCGA § 17-10-32.1 4 as providing a statutory right to plead guilty.”
Cordova v. the State, 771 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 2015). · cites it 8× “On February 3, 2014, Cordova filed the present pro se “motion to vacate void sentence,” contending that his sentences are void “as a result of the trial court’s failure to make a contemporaneous specification, beyond a reasonable doubt, the statutory aggravating circumstance…”
Williams v. State, 727 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 4× “1) and removing the sentencing duties of a judge regarding a person who pled guilty to an offense for which the death penalty or life without parole could be imposed (OCGA § 17-10-32.1). 2 See Ga. L. 2009, p.”
Lewis v. State, 804 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “1, thereby removing requirements that a jury find an aggravating circumstance before imposing the sentence of life without parole (OCGA § 17-10-31.”
Deloney v. State, 805 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “See former OCGA § 17-10-32.1 (b) (“Unless the district attorney has given notice that the state intends to seek the death penalty pursuant to the Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts, the judge shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.”
— 17-10-32.1(b) — 1 case
State v. Velazquez, 657 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. 2008). “As Velazquez pled guilty, his situation is governed by OCGA § 17-10-32.1. That statute reads: (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section, any person who has been indicted for an offense for which the death penalty or life without parole may be imposed…”
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