O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-60 (2019)

‘‘Mentally incompetent to be executed’’ defined

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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As used in this article, the term ‘‘mentally incompetent to be executed’’ means that because of a mental condition the person is presently unable to know why he or she is being punished and understand the nature of the punishment.

History

Code 1981, § 17-10-60, enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1003, § 2.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For note, ‘‘Uncertain Waters: Tennard v. Dretke Provides

Swells of Protection for the Mentally Deficient But May Cause Rising Tides of Frivolous Claims,’’ see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1483 (2005).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cited in Alford v. State, 137 Ga. 458, 73 S.E. 375 (1912); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 122, 52 S.E.2d 433 (1949); Brown v.

State, 261 Ga. 66, 401 S.E.2d 492 (1991); Hall v. Brannan, 284 Ga. 716, 670 S.E.2d 87 (2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 63 et seq., 83 et seq. Am. Jur. Trials. - Capital Cases Involving Mental Retardation, 53 Am. Jur. Trials 1. C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 511 et seq. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 2328 et seq. ALR. - Insanity supervening after conviction and sentence of death, 49 A.L.R. 804.

Right of appeal in proceeding for restoration to competency, 122 A.L.R. 541. Insanity of accused at time of commission of offense, not raised at trial, as ground for habeas corpus or coram nobis after conviction, 29 A.L.R.2d 703. Effect of death of appellant upon appeal from judgment of mental incompetence against him, 54 A.L.R.2d 1161. Propriety of carrying out death sentences against mentally ill individuals, 111 A.L.R.5th 491.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1985–2011 · leading case: Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335 (Ga. 2011).
Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 4× “After Ford , Georgia established a separate procedure to address claims that a prisoner is "mentally incompetent to be executed," OCGA § 17-10-60 et seq., which is the exclusive procedure for raising such a challenge after sentencing, see OCGA § 17-10-62, and creates a…”
Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 4× “Compare OCGA § 17-10-60 et seq. which deals only with a trial court's ultimate stay of scheduled execution based upon mental incompetency rather than the factfinder's initial determination as to mental retardation at the guilt-innocence phase.”
Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999). · cites it 4× “1999); Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-901(a)(v) (Michie 1999).”
Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 4× “In Burgess , this court correctly distinguished OCGA § 17-10-60 et seq., which provides a post-conviction procedure for obtaining a stay of execution based upon mental incompetency.”
State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60 (Wash. 1990). · cites it 2× “811(b) (1989); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-60 (Supp. 1989); Ill.”
Hall v. Brannan, 670 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 2× “…of their executions. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 409-410 (II) (B) (106 SC 2595, 91 LE2d 335) (1986). See also OCGA § 17-10-60 et seq.”
Brown v. State, 401 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 2× “399 (106 SC 2595, 91 LE2d 335) (1986) (prohibiting execu *74 tion of insane persons) and OCGA § 17-10-60 (prohibiting execution of mentally incompetent persons).”
Billiot v. Epps, 671 F. Supp. 2d 840 (S.D. Miss. 2009). “07(1) (Westlaw 2009); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-60 (Westlaw 2009); Ky.”
Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2000). “1998); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-60 (1997); Ky.Rev. Stat.”
Coe v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 922 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). “07 (“whether he or she understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him or her”); Ga.Code § 17-10-60 (“unable to know why he or she is being punished and understand the nature of the punishment”); Md.”
Ford ex rel. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985). “07 (1983); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-60 et seq. (1982); Ill.”
Heck Van Tran v. State of TN (Tenn. 1999). · cites it 2× “1999); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-60 (1997); Kan. Stat.”
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