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2018 Georgia Code 17-13-23 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 13. Criminal Extradition, 17-13-1 through 17-13-49.

ARTICLE 2 UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT

17-13-23. Form of demand for extradition of person charged with crime in another state.

No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing, alleging, except in cases arising under Code Section 17-13-25, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found, or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon, or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of the state; and the copy of the indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction, or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.

(Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 3.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

How presence of accused in demanding state when crime committed ascertained.

- Whether or not the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime may be ascertained from the demand as well as from the accompanying documents. Mitchell v. Dodd, 238 Ga. 638, 235 S.E.2d 15 (1977).

All reasonable presumptions are indulged to sustain the sufficiency of the instrument charging the crime. Baker v. Smith, 233 Ga. 644, 212 S.E.2d 819 (1975).

Mere defects overlooked so long as charge constitutes a crime.

- So long as the charge made against one whose extradition is sought legally constitutes a crime, mere defects in the indictment as an instrument of criminal proceedings will be disregarded. Baker v. Smith, 233 Ga. 644, 212 S.E.2d 819 (1975).

Demand based solely on warrant for arrest is insufficient.

- Demand for extradition must be based not on a warrant for arrest but on an indictment, on information supported by affidavit, or on an affidavit made before a magistrate together with any warrant for arrest issued thereon. The thrust of this rule is not directed so much to the recitals in the extradition warrant as to the fact that an arrest warrant without more is not sufficient. Carver v. Stynchcombe, 243 Ga. 477, 254 S.E.2d 856 (1979).

Indictment for escape not required.

- There is no requirement that the fugitive be separately indicted for escape or that there be an affidavit before a magistrate attesting to the escape. McLeod v. Barrett, 271 Ga. 569, 522 S.E.2d 219 (1999).

If indictment accompanies requisition, this state will make no further determination as to probable cause.

- If a copy of an indictment accompanies the requisition, no further determination of the existence of probable cause to arrest will be made by this state for in the interest of comity and the expeditious administration of justice the state will rely on the official representation that probable cause to arrest has been constitutionally found in the demanding state. Batton v. Griffin, 241 Ga. 548, 246 S.E.2d 667 (1978).

Foreign state's indictment sufficient to describe circumstance of crime's committal.

- Indictment from another state substantially charging the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of the foreign state, as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-13-23, sufficiently describes the "circumstance of its committal" as required by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, O.C.G.A. § 17-13-20 et seq. Grubbs v. Stynchcombe, 251 Ga. 39, 302 S.E.2d 552 (1983).

Requirement that signature of prosecutor or prosecuting officer appear on indictment.

- It is not necessary that the requisition show that the prosecutor's name has been endorsed on the back of the indictment or that the indictment has been signed by the proper prosecuting officer, although these matters may be required by the statutes of the demanding state. Baker v. Smith, 233 Ga. 644, 212 S.E.2d 819 (1975).

Witnesses need not be listed on the information. Baker v. Smith, 233 Ga. 644, 212 S.E.2d 819 (1975).

Recitation in requisition that it is accompanied by affidavit.

- It is not necessary that the requisition or the governor's warrant recite that the requisition is accompanied by an affidavit made before a magistrate. Wollweber v. Martin, 226 Ga. 20, 172 S.E.2d 605 (1970).

No warrant need accompany affidavit, unless warrant was issued.

- Affidavit is a supporting document of the Governor's requisition. It does not need to be accompanied by a warrant unless in fact a warrant was issued. Gramlick v. Griffin, 230 Ga. 20, 195 S.E.2d 446 (1973).

Affidavit not rendered insufficient by reason of fact that warrant does not issue.

- If no warrant is in fact issued upon the affidavit which accompanies the requisition, then the affidavit is not rendered insufficient by reason of that fact. Gramlick v. Griffin, 230 Ga. 20, 195 S.E.2d 446 (1973).

Affidavit made and sworn to by the prosecuting attorney, which asserts that the prosecutor knows the contents of the information and believes the contents to be true, is sufficient. Baker v. Smith, 233 Ga. 644, 212 S.E.2d 819 (1975).

Necessity for certification of affidavit by judge or clerk of court.

- If the affidavit of complaint upon which extradition is sought shows that it was made before a magistrate, it is not necessary that a judge or clerk of court certify that such was the case. Wollweber v. Martin, 226 Ga. 20, 172 S.E.2d 605 (1970).

Sufficiency of information supported by affidavit which lacks notarial seal.

- Information supported by affidavits which are executed in the presence of a notary public and authenticated by the Governor of another state, although lacking a notarial seal, is sufficient to authorize the warrant of the Governor of Georgia. Baker v. Smith, 233 Ga. 644, 212 S.E.2d 819 (1975).

Affidavit sworn to before a named person designated as "notary public, county prosecutor or county judge" is a description sufficient to show that such person was a "magistrate" within the meaning of Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 3 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-13-23). Bryant v. Griffin, 220 Ga. 154, 137 S.E.2d 640 (1964).

Evidentiary facts need not be stated in the affidavit. Wollweber v. Martin, 226 Ga. 20, 172 S.E.2d 605 (1970).

Sufficiency of averment that relator was in demanding state when crime committed.

- When a requisition for extradition incorporates by reference an attached authenticated copy of an indictment of the demanding state, specifically charging the relator with having committed a crime in that state on a day certain, and if the requisition asserts that the relator fled from the demanding state, the requisition has sufficiently averred that the relator was in the demanding state at the time the crime was committed. Mitchell v. Dodd, 238 Ga. 638, 235 S.E.2d 15 (1977).

Sufficiency of papers supported by affidavit executed before notary public.

- Extradition papers, otherwise admittedly in order, are not insufficient if accompanied by an information and an affidavit in support thereof executed in the presence of a notary public rather than an affidavit executed before a magistrate. Nevil v. Tyson, 230 Ga. 438, 197 S.E.2d 340 (1973).

Habeas corpus petition to challenge warrant.

- Detainee who was arrested pursuant to a fugitive warrant could challenge through a petition for habeas corpus the factual basis of the allegation that the detainee was present in the demanding state at the time of the crime. St. Lawrence v. Bartley, 269 Ga. 94, 495 S.E.2d 18 (1998).

Not error to deny habeas corpus and remand for delivery to demanding state if section complied with.

- If no question is presented or raised as to the legality or the sufficiency of the documents originally transmitted by the Governor of the demanding state, and if those documents, together with the demand of the Governor of the demanding state for extradition, comply in all respects with the requirements of this section, it is not error for the trial court to deny the habeas corpus and to remand the petitioner to the custody of the sheriff for delivery over to the proper authorities of the demanding state. DeWitt v. O'Neal, 225 Ga. 645, 171 S.E.2d 144 (1969).

Erroneous issuance of warrant grounds for relief.

- In a habeas corpus proceeding, if it was shown that the Governor issued an extradition warrant pursuant to the mandatory terms of the Constitution and O.C.G.A. § 17-13-23, i.e., with the understanding that the petitioner had committed a crime in the demanding state and had fled therefrom, relief should have been granted based on a stipulation that the petitioner had not committed a crime while in the demanding state. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995).

Extradition of one at large on bail pending appeal of federal conviction.

- One at large on bail pending appeal of one's federal conviction can be extradited by a sister state for the purpose of serving sentences imposed by that state. Extradition under such circumstances does not violate constitutional due process rights of the party extradited. Crane v. State, 233 Ga. 264, 210 S.E.2d 800 (1974).

Defendant was not fugitive from justice.

- Because a detainee who was arrested pursuant to a fugitive warrant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the detainee was not present in the demanding state at the time of the crime, the habeas court did not err in finding that the detainee was not a fugitive from justice. St. Lawrence v. Bartley, 269 Ga. 94, 495 S.E.2d 18 (1998).

Cited in West v. Graham, 211 Ga. 662, 87 S.E.2d 849 (1955); Winslow v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 262, 104 S.E.2d 76 (1958); Clonts v. Stynchcombe, 229 Ga. 672, 194 S.E.2d 94 (1972); Watson v. Stynchcombe, 240 Ga. 169, 240 S.E.2d 56 (1977); Harris v. Massey, 241 Ga. 580, 247 S.E.2d 55 (1978); Frazier v. Rutledge, 243 Ga. 39, 252 S.E.2d 465 (1979); Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 256 S.E.2d 778 (1979); Brown v. State, 243 Ga. App. 430, 533 S.E.2d 453 (2000); Powell v. Brown, 281 Ga. 609, 641 S.E.2d 519 (2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition, § 68 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 35 C.J.S. (Rev), Extradition and Detainers, §§ 19, 20, 25 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.L.A.) § 3.

ALR.

- One who left demanding state by official permission as a fugitive from justice for purposes of extradition, 67 A.L.R. 1480.

Sufficiency of recitals in rendition warrant in extradition as regards copy of indictment or affidavit, 89 A.L.R. 595.

Sufficiency of statements in demanding papers in extradition proceedings as allegation or proof of presence of accused in demanding state at time of commission of alleged crime or that accused is a fugitive, 135 A.L.R. 973.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute authorizing extradition of one who commits an act within the state or a third state resulting in a crime in the demanding state, 151 A.L.R. 239.

Determination, in extradition proceedings, or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, whether a crime is charged, 40 A.L.R.2d 1151.

Necessity and sufficiency of identification of accused as the person charged, to warrant extradition, 93 A.L.R.2d 912.

Necessity that demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive in extradition proceedings, 90 A.L.R.3d 1085.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-13-23

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 20, 1995 | 453 S.E.2d 698

...Constitution [2] and statutory roots in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) passed by the Georgia General Assembly in 1951. OCGA § 17-13-20 et seq. [3] The federal constitutional provision and the implementing state statutes (Sections 2 and 3 of the uniform act (OCGA §§ 17-13-22 and 17-13-23)) [4] require the governor of the asylum state to have arrested and delivered to the governor of a requesting state a person charged with a crime in the requesting state who has fled from justice and been found in the asylum state....
...vernor's assertion that the Alabama governor's request was accompanied by documents charging petitioner with a crime committed in Alabama make it apparent that the warrant was issued pursuant to the mandatory terms of the U. S. Constitution and OCGA § 17-13-23....
...the duty of the Governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state. OCGA § 17-13-23 states: No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing, alleging, except in cases arising under Code Section 17-13-25, that the accused was present in...
...must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. [5] OCGA § 17-13-25 states: The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided in Code Section § 17-13-23 with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand and the provisions of this article not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such ca...
...[7] Petitioner's habeas corpus petition to the second governor's warrant was granted on this ground. That habeas court found "a significant factual distinction" between the Alabama governor's extradition request couched in the mandatory language of the constitutional provision and OCGA §§ 17-13-22 and 17-13-23, and the parties' stipulation wherein the State of Alabama said it did not contend that petitioner violated the laws of Alabama while in that state....
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St. Lawrence v. Bartley, 495 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 26, 1998 | 269 Ga. 94, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 335

...The State adduced only the extradition warrant. The habeas court granted Bartley's petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that Bartley was not in South Carolina at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes and thus could not have "fled from justice" from that State. See OCGA § 17-13-23....
...282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codified in Georgia as OCGA § 17-13-20 et seq.). See Marini v. Gibson, 267 Ga. 398(1), 478 S.E.2d 767 (1996). See also OCGA § 17-13-23....
...crime in one state, left its jurisdiction, and was found within the territory of another state when it was sought to subject her to the criminal process of the former state. Anderson v. Roth, 231 Ga. 369, 370, 202 S.E.2d 91 (1973). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-23, the demand for extradition recognized by the Governor alleged, inter alia, that Bartley was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that she thereafter fled from the state....
...titioner was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, thereafter left its jurisdiction, and was found in the territory of this State. See Anderson v. Roth, supra, 231 Ga. at 370, 202 S.E.2d 91. See also OCGA § 17-13-23....
...I concur in the majority's affirmance of the grant of Ms. Bartley's petition for habeas corpus relief, but I am compelled to write separately so as to explain my reasons for doing so. As the majority notes, there is a fundamental distinction between an extradition premised upon OCGA § 17-13-23 and an extradition proceeding brought pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25. By its terms, OCGA *22 § 17-13-23 requires a showing "that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state...." No such showing is required when seeking extradition under OCGA § 17-13-25. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 45(2), fn. 6, 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995). The extradition proceedings brought against Ms. Bartley were based upon OCGA § 17-13-23....
...an extradition proceeding and a criminal trial. The issue in an extradition proceeding is not the accused's guilt or innocence, but only whether the accused should be extradited in order for that determination to be made in the demanding state. OCGA § 17-13-23 requires, as a condition of Ms....
...Under the present law of this state, I agree that, unless and until South Carolina brings an extradition proceeding in which Ms. Bartley fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence her absence from that state at the relevant time, she cannot be extradited pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-23....
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Powell v. Brown, 641 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2007 | 281 Ga. 609, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 188

...is found in this state." OCGA § 17-13-22. "No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing . . . authenticated by the executive authority making the demand." OCGA § 17-13-23....
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O'bryant v. Brown, 558 S.E.2d 2 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 2001 | 274 Ga. 534, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3615

...extradition to the State of Colorado. [1] On appeal, O'Bryant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in finding that she was a fugitive from justice. We disagree with this contention, and therefore affirm. In an extradition case under OCGA § 17-13-23, the issue whether a person is a fugitive from justice is "an inquiry which necessarily entails addressing whether the petitioner was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, thereafter left its j...
...Accordingly, based on the State's extradition documents, the trial court did not err in finding that O'Bryant was a fugitive from justice. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] See OCGA § 17-13-23....
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McLeod v. Barrett, 271 Ga. 569 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1999 | 522 S.E.2d 219, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3800

...rson appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus in an extradition proceeding. He contends that Georgia is precluded from extraditing him to the State of Mississippi because of Mississippi’s failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 17-13-23 with regard to his alleged escape, and the State’s failure to properly answer the habeas corpus petition, and to demonstrate that he is the person named in the request for extradition....
...On March 11, 1998, the habeas court denied McLeod’s request for release, finding that the State of Georgia had made an irrebuttable prima facie case for the extradition of McLeod a/k/a Edward Patterson. But the court stayed McLeod’s extradition pending the outcome of any appeal. 1. McLeod contends that, under OCGA § 17-13-23, the extradition documents on their face are insufficient to authorize extradition because there is no probable cause finding by Mississippi regarding escape, that is, there is the absence of an indictment charging him with escape or an affidavit before a magistrate attesting to his alleged escape. But McLeod misreads the statutory prerequisites for his extradition. There is no requirement that the fugitive be separately indicted for escape or that there be an affidavit before a magistrate attesting to the escape. OCGA § 17-13-23 sets forth the form of the demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state....
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Grubbs v. Stynchcombe, 251 Ga. 39 (Ga. 1983).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 12, 1983 | 302 S.E.2d 552

...Both are taken from the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. This provision of the Tennessee Code is applicable “When the return to this state of a person charged with crime in this state is required...,” as is OCGA § 17-13-43 (a) (Code Ann. § 44-423). Conversely, OCGA § 17-13-23 (Code Ann....
......” These corresponding provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act should be construed together. We hold that an indictment from another state “substantially charging] the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of the [foreign] state,” OCGA § 17-13-23 (Code Ann....