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Call Now: 904-383-7448The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided in Code Section 17-13-23 with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand and the provisions of this article not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom.
(Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 6.)
- If the defendant was charged with taking actions in Georgia which resulted in the commission of a crime in Florida, the defendant contended that since the defendant never "fled" Florida, and federal law only authorizes extradition to states from which the fugitive has fled, the defendant was not subject to extradition in this case and that O.C.G.A. § 17-13-25, which authorizes extradition in cases such as this, should be preempted by federal law; the Supreme Court found no basis for a finding of preemption in the defendant's argument and thus found that the section could form the basis for the defendant's extradition. Haupt v. Mitchell, 256 Ga. 844, 353 S.E.2d 345 (1987).
- That accused was not present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged commission of the offense no longer presents a valid defense. Aikens v. Turner, 241 Ga. 401, 245 S.E.2d 660 (1978).
- Fact that the accused was not present in the other state at the time of the alleged commission of the offense of nonsupport is not a valid defense to an extradition proceeding brought under this section for the offense of nonsupport does not require the presence of the accused in the demanding state at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Johnstone v. Deyton, 233 Ga. 146, 210 S.E.2d 692 (1974).
- In a habeas corpus proceeding where the requisition of the Governor of the demanding state conclusively shows that the crime charged was committed in this state and not in the demanding state, the person so accused cannot be extradited as a fugitive from justice under 18 U.S.C. § 3182. Watson v. Grimes, 218 Ga. 631, 129 S.E.2d 795 (1963).
- Warrant of the Governor in an extradition is prima facie evidence of the existence of every fact of a crime necessary for the warrant's issuance. Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 565, 176 S.E.2d 75 (1970).
- Person held upon a Governor's warrant in an extradition proceeding and who is seeking to be released on a habeas corpus writ must introduce evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie case on the issue for which the person is being prosecuted in the demanding state. Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 565, 176 S.E.2d 75 (1970).
- In a habeas corpus proceeding, if it is shown that the Governor issued an extradition warrant pursuant to the mandatory terms of the Constitution and O.C.G.A. § 17-13-23, i.e., with the understanding that the petitioner had committed a crime in the demanding state and had fled therefrom, relief should have been granted based on a stipulation that the petitioner had not committed a crime while in the demanding state. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995).
Cited in Jackson v. Pittard, 211 Ga. 427, 86 S.E.2d 295 (1955); Mitchum v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 226, 179 S.E.2d 919 (1971); Nevil v. Tyson, 230 Ga. 438, 197 S.E.2d 340 (1973); Rutledge v. Tolbert, 240 Ga. 116, 239 S.E.2d 520 (1977).
- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition, §§ 28, 29.
- 35 C.J.S. (Rev), Extradition and Detainers, §§ 11, 12.
- Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.L.A.) § 6.
- One charged with desertion or failure to support wife or child as fugitive from justice, subject to extradition, 32 A.L.R. 1167; 54 A.L.R. 281.
Total Results: 4
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1999-10-18
Citation: 271 Ga. 569, 522 S.E.2d 219, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3800, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 782
Snippet: must allege, except in cases arising under OCGA § 17-13-25, that the accused was present in the demanding
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1998-01-26
Citation: 495 S.E.2d 18, 269 Ga. 94, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 335, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 42
Snippet: either involved warrants issued pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25 and its predecessor statute, whereby the surrender
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1995-02-20
Citation: 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698
Snippet: 520) (1977). 2. Section 6 of the UCEA (OCGA § 17-13-25)[5] was designed to cover cases not clearly reached
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-03-04
Citation: 256 Ga. 844, 353 S.E.2d 345, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 645
Snippet: extradition in this case. He contends that OCGA § 17-13-25, which authorizes extradition in cases such as