Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 17-13-25 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 13. Criminal Extradition, 17-13-1 through 17-13-49.

ARTICLE 2 UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT

17-13-25. Extradition of persons not present in demanding state at time of commission of crime.

The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided in Code Section 17-13-23 with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand and the provisions of this article not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom.

(Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 6.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Section not preempted by federal law.

- If the defendant was charged with taking actions in Georgia which resulted in the commission of a crime in Florida, the defendant contended that since the defendant never "fled" Florida, and federal law only authorizes extradition to states from which the fugitive has fled, the defendant was not subject to extradition in this case and that O.C.G.A. § 17-13-25, which authorizes extradition in cases such as this, should be preempted by federal law; the Supreme Court found no basis for a finding of preemption in the defendant's argument and thus found that the section could form the basis for the defendant's extradition. Haupt v. Mitchell, 256 Ga. 844, 353 S.E.2d 345 (1987).

Absence from demanding state when crime committed is not a defense.

- That accused was not present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged commission of the offense no longer presents a valid defense. Aikens v. Turner, 241 Ga. 401, 245 S.E.2d 660 (1978).

Absence from demanding state not a defense when the offense is nonsupport.

- Fact that the accused was not present in the other state at the time of the alleged commission of the offense of nonsupport is not a valid defense to an extradition proceeding brought under this section for the offense of nonsupport does not require the presence of the accused in the demanding state at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Johnstone v. Deyton, 233 Ga. 146, 210 S.E.2d 692 (1974).

Demanding state's requisition showing the crime was committed in this state.

- In a habeas corpus proceeding where the requisition of the Governor of the demanding state conclusively shows that the crime charged was committed in this state and not in the demanding state, the person so accused cannot be extradited as a fugitive from justice under 18 U.S.C. § 3182. Watson v. Grimes, 218 Ga. 631, 129 S.E.2d 795 (1963).

Governor's warrant is prima facie evidence of requirements for issuance.

- Warrant of the Governor in an extradition is prima facie evidence of the existence of every fact of a crime necessary for the warrant's issuance. Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 565, 176 S.E.2d 75 (1970).

One seeking habeas corpus must overcome prima facie case of Governor's warrant.

- Person held upon a Governor's warrant in an extradition proceeding and who is seeking to be released on a habeas corpus writ must introduce evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie case on the issue for which the person is being prosecuted in the demanding state. Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 565, 176 S.E.2d 75 (1970).

Erroneous issuance of warrant grounds for relief.

- In a habeas corpus proceeding, if it is shown that the Governor issued an extradition warrant pursuant to the mandatory terms of the Constitution and O.C.G.A. § 17-13-23, i.e., with the understanding that the petitioner had committed a crime in the demanding state and had fled therefrom, relief should have been granted based on a stipulation that the petitioner had not committed a crime while in the demanding state. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995).

Cited in Jackson v. Pittard, 211 Ga. 427, 86 S.E.2d 295 (1955); Mitchum v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 226, 179 S.E.2d 919 (1971); Nevil v. Tyson, 230 Ga. 438, 197 S.E.2d 340 (1973); Rutledge v. Tolbert, 240 Ga. 116, 239 S.E.2d 520 (1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition, §§ 28, 29.

C.J.S.

- 35 C.J.S. (Rev), Extradition and Detainers, §§ 11, 12.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.L.A.) § 6.

ALR.

- One charged with desertion or failure to support wife or child as fugitive from justice, subject to extradition, 32 A.L.R. 1167; 54 A.L.R. 281.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-13-25

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 20, 1995 | 453 S.E.2d 698

...ssued in response to the request is entitled to habeas corpus relief upon establishing that he is not a fugitive from justice. Jackson v. Pittard, supra. See also Rutledge v. Tolbert, 240 Ga. 116 (239 SE2d 520) (1977). 2. Section 6 of the UCEA (OCGA § 17-13-25) [5] was designed to cover cases not clearly reached by the constitutionally-based extradition laws; that is, where the accused could not technically be called a fugitive because he had committed a crime against the laws of a demanding state by doing acts outside of that state....
...led from justice and is found in this state. OCGA § 17-13-23 states: No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing, alleging, except in cases arising under Code Section 17-13-25, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found . . . [which] substantially charge[s] the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of the state; and the copy of the indictment . . . must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. [5] OCGA § 17-13-25 states: The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided in Code Section § 17-13-23 with committing an act...
...charges supported by probable cause. Many of the Georgia opinions do not reflect the basis, constitutional or statutory, of the issuance of the governor's warrant. We can only conclude that the Georgia cases involve warrants issued pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25 and its predecessor, Ga....
Copy

St. Lawrence v. Bartley, 495 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 26, 1998 | 269 Ga. 94, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 335

...d ... as a viable issue." Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, n. 6., 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995). However, those cases are distinguishable from this case for the reasons set forth in Jenkins, namely, that they either involved warrants issued pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25 and its predecessor statute, whereby the surrender of the accused to the demanding state is authorized even though the accused was not within the demanding state at the time the crime was committed, or else involved situations wherein the...
...Bartley's petition for habeas corpus relief, but I am compelled to write separately so as to explain my reasons for doing so. As the majority notes, there is a fundamental distinction between an extradition premised upon OCGA § 17-13-23 and an extradition proceeding brought pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25....
...By its terms, OCGA *22 § 17-13-23 requires a showing "that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state...." No such showing is required when seeking extradition under OCGA § 17-13-25....
Copy

McLeod v. Barrett, 271 Ga. 569 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1999 | 522 S.E.2d 219, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3800

...e an affidavit before a magistrate attesting to the escape. OCGA § 17-13-23 sets forth the form of the demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state. The written demand must allege, except in cases arising under OCGA § 17-13-25, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled the state....
Copy

Haupt v. Mitchell, 256 Ga. 844 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 1987 | 353 S.E.2d 345

...he commission of a crime in Florida. He contends that since he never “fled” Florida, and federal law only authorizes extradition to states *845from which the fugitive has fled, he is not subject to extradition in this case. He contends that OCGA § 17-13-25, which authorizes extradition in cases such as this one, should be pre-empted by federal law. We find no basis for a finding of pre-emption in Haupt’s argument and thus find that OCGA § 17-13-25 may form the basis for Haupt’s extradition....