Formal and proper motion in the record must be shown.

- Continuance not granted in absence of proper motion. Boggus v. State, 34 Ga. 275 (1866); Ray v. State, 91 Ga. 87, 16 S.E. 311 (1892); Pressley v. State, 132 Ga. 64, 63 S.E. 784 (1909).

In order for a party successfully to complain of a ruling which the party contends to have been a denial of a continuance, the party must be able to show a formal and proper motion in the record as the basis of the asserted error, and this rule is technically construed. Horton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 407, 208 S.E.2d 186 (1974).

Motion is addressed to court's sound discretion.

- Motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460, 224 S.E.2d 8, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 3225, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1219 (1976); Bunge v. State, 149 Ga. App. 712, 256 S.E.2d 23 (1979).

Motions for a continuance predicated on the basis that counsel had insufficient time to prepare for trial address themselves to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Nave v. State, 171 Ga. App. 165, 318 S.E.2d 753 (1984).

It was not error to grant a continuance ex parte, particularly when the court held a full hearing on the motion the following morning. The grant or denial of a motion for continuance is within the sole discretion of the trial judge, and absent a showing that such discretion was abused, it will not be controlled. Campbell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 790, 354 S.E.2d 10 (1987).

Grant or denial of a continuance is within the court's discretion. Plemons v. State, 155 Ga. App. 447, 270 S.E.2d 836 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Barnes v. State, 157 Ga. App. 582, 277 S.E.2d 916 (1981).

Grant or denial of a continuance to a criminal defendant is in the sound discretion of the court, especially when the defendant is in jail. Gann v. State, 166 Ga. App. 172, 303 S.E.2d 510 (1983).

Circumstances are to be considered.

- Every application for a continuance should be heard and determined according to the application's circumstances. Roberts v. Moore, 27 Ga. 411 (1859); Frain v. State, 40 Ga. 529 (1869).

Sufficiency of time for preparation depends on facts and circumstances.

- Whether or not a reversal is to be adjudged because counsel was not allowed sufficient time to prepare the case for trial is to be determined by the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Carnes v. State, 115 Ga. App. 387, 154 S.E.2d 781, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928, 88 S. Ct. 287, 19 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1967).

Question of whether speedy trial denied depends on facts and circumstances.

- Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is not merely a matter of time, but depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Newman v. State, 121 Ga. App. 692, 175 S.E.2d 144 (1970).

Distinction in treatment of motions made at term in which indictment found and at subsequent terms.

- Motions for continuance, made at the term at which the indictment is found, while addressed to the discretion of the court, stand upon a different footing from such motions made at a subsequent term. In such cases, the discretion of the court should be liberally exercised in favor of a fair trial, no less than that the trial should be speedy, and every facility should be afforded a defendant for presenting a defense as fully as the defendant might be able to do, were the case tried at a subsequent term. Reasonable opportunity for the defendant to prepare a defense should not be sacrificed in the interest of speed. Waters v. State, 62 Ga. App. 720, 9 S.E.2d 716 (1940).

Motion not made nor testimony offered as to motion's necessity.

- When no motion for continuance is made, nor is testimony offered under oath as to the motion's necessity, a new trial will not be granted for the failure to grant a continuance. Beavers v. State, 132 Ga. App. 94, 207 S.E.2d 550 (1974).

Oath of sufficient cause needed for continuance.

- Request for continuance must be supported by a showing on oath of sufficient cause that the principles of justice require a continuance of the case. Taylor v. City of Griffin, 113 Ga. App. 589, 149 S.E.2d 177 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016, 87 S. Ct. 733, 17 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1967).

Good reason given for continuance.

- If a good reason is shown as to why the party is not prepared to go to trial, a continuance should be granted. Parker v. State, 81 Ga. 332, 6 S.E. 600 (1888).

If no reason given for granting continuance, denial will not be reversed.

- When it does not appear that any reason was stated to the trial court why the court should not then proceed with the trial of the case, the judgment of the trial court in denying a requested continuance will not be reversed. Taylor v. City of Griffin, 113 Ga. App. 589, 149 S.E.2d 177 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016, 87 S. Ct. 733, 17 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1967).

Amendments alone do not entitle opposite party to a continuance. Myrick v. State, 13 Ga. 190 (1853).

No continuance for something easily anticipated.

- Continuance should not be granted for something that might reasonably have been anticipated. King v. State, 21 Ga. 220 (1857).

Prejudicial acts or statements of presiding judge.

- That an act or statement of the presiding judge may be prejudicial to a defendant about to be placed on trial is not a legal ground of a motion for a continuance. Smith v. State, 7 Ga. App. 252, 66 S.E. 556 (1909).

Cited in Whitley v. State, 38 Ga. 50 (1868); Harvey v. State, 67 Ga. 639 (1881); Blackman v. State, 76 Ga. 288 (1886); Barrow v. State, 121 Ga. 187, 48 S.E. 950 (1904); Brooks v. State, 3 Ga. App. 458, 60 S.E. 211 (1908); Howell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 186, 62 S.E. 1000 (1908); Haines v. State, 8 Ga. App. 627, 70 S.E. 84 (1911); Trammell v. State, 183 Ga. 711, 189 S.E. 529 (1937); Holley v. State, 191 Ga. 804, 14 S.E.2d 103 (1941); Williams v. State, 192 Ga. 247, 15 S.E.2d 219 (1941); Woodward v. State, 197 Ga. 60, 28 S.E.2d 480 (1943); Akridge v. State, 85 Ga. App. 117, 68 S.E.2d 168 (1951); Waters v. State, 85 Ga. App. 79, 68 S.E.2d 233 (1951); Cartee v. State, 85 Ga. App. 532, 69 S.E.2d 827 (1952); Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 839, 114 S.E.2d 35 (1960); Blevins v. State, 113 Ga. App. 413, 148 S.E.2d 192 (1966); Butler v. State, 126 Ga. App. 22, 189 S.E.2d 870 (1972); State v. King, 137 Ga. App. 26, 222 S.E.2d 859 (1975); Gaines v. State, 142 Ga. App. 181, 235 S.E.2d 640 (1977); Lewis v. State, 239 Ga. 732, 238 S.E.2d 892 (1977); Garner v. State, 159 Ga. App. 244, 282 S.E.2d 909 (1981); Wiley v. State, 250 Ga. 343, 296 S.E.2d 714 (1982); Hampton v. State, 250 Ga. 805, 301 S.E.2d 274 (1983); Blair v. State, 166 Ga. App. 434, 304 S.E.2d 535 (1983); Mora v. State, 292 Ga. App. 860, 666 S.E.2d 412 (2008).

Facts to which the absent witness would have testified must appear.

- Judge is entitled to this information in order that the judge can decide whether the evidence of the absent witness is material and admissible and not blindly accept the statement of the defendant's counsel that the evidence of the witness was material and admissible. Mell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 302, 25 S.E.2d 142 (1943).

Defendant should state how defendant expects to procure attendance of absent witness.

- On the hearing of a motion for a continuance based upon the absence of a material witness for the defense, if the court is authorized to find that the witness was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, that the witness's absence was not temporary, and that the court was powerless to force the witness to attend, although the movant did state that the movant expected to have the witness present at the next term of the court, if possible, in these circumstances the motion should have gone further and stated the means whereby the movant expected to procure the witness's attendance, as that the witness had promised to attend, or that the movant had some other ground for the movant's expectation that the witness would attend. Wright v. State, 71 Ga. App. 346, 30 S.E.2d 839 (1944).

Testimony by another as to matters to which absent witness was to testify.

- There is no abuse of discretion in overruling a motion for continuance because of the absence of witnesses to prove the good character of the accused since it was shown that there was at least one other witness who was present at the trial by whom the defendant could establish character. Stevens v. State, 49 Ga. App. 248, 174 S.E. 718 (1934).

Denial of a continuance on account of absence of a witness is not reversible error if another witness testifies to the facts to which the absent witness was expected to testify. Johnson v. State, 72 Ga. App. 534, 34 S.E.2d 555 (1945).

If witness makes an unexpected statement which defendant knows is false, the party surprised should move for a continuance. Sanders v. State, 7 Ga. App. 603, 67 S.E. 696 (1910).

Defendant testifying that the defendant does not need absent witness' testimony.

- Court does not abuse the court's discretion in refusing a continuance to the defendant on the ground of the absence of a witness if the defendant testifies that the defendant does not need such testimony, and it does not appear where and when the witness can be located. Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939).

Illness of a relative, not a necessary party to the case, is not ground for continuance. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. 595, 180 S.E. 101 (1935).

Failure of district attorney's office to produce witness.

- When the district attorney's office assumes the onus of producing a witness and fails to do so, it in effect testifies to the court that the witness' appearance would hurt rather than help the defendant's case. Cox v. State, 147 Ga. App. 743, 250 S.E.2d 193 (1978).

Absence of witness for state.

- It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant a continuance to the state based on the absence of a police officer witness, who was not under subpoena but had been served with a notice since the officer was prevented from testifying because the officer was placed on administrative leave. Hicks v. State, 221 Ga. App. 735, 472 S.E.2d 474 (1996).

Trial court did not err in granting the state's motion for continuance under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-33(a) because, while a subpoena was issued for an absent witness, a former deputy, the sheriff's office failed to serve the subpoena, because the former deputy was subpoenaed to appear on the date in a separate case, however, the other case had settled and the former deputy was absent from court. Dowd v. State, 280 Ga. App. 563, 634 S.E.2d 509 (2006).

Continuance to secure attendance of medical examiner.

- No abuse of discretion resulted from the grant of a continuance to the state based on the absence of the medical examiner, who was a material witness, because the defendant failed to show a show a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-33. Moreover, in granting the prosecutor's motion for a continuance, the trial court noted that the court would do the same for a defendant in similar circumstances. Parker v. State, 282 Ga. 897, 655 S.E.2d 582 (2008).

Burden is on the state to show the absence of a witness was harmless. The mere statement of opposing counsel to this effect is insufficient. Cox v. State, 147 Ga. App. 743, 250 S.E.2d 193 (1978).

Delay in subpoenaing witness as grounds for denial of motion.

- If the defendant's motion for continuance is based upon the absence of a material witness for whom a subpoena was not issued by the defendant until the morning the trial was to begin and who had not been served therewith at the time the motion was made, there is no error in overruling the motion. Eady v. State, 129 Ga. App. 656, 200 S.E.2d 767 (1973).

Need for time to prepare case as grounds for continuance.

- It is not ground for reversal of a judgment denying a new trial in a criminal case that the judge refused to grant a continuance, when sole counsel for the defendant accused of murder had been engaged in the trial of the same case during the two preceding days, which trial had resulted in a mistrial, and had done a great amount of work, and did not feel that counsel could safely go to trial in a case of such gravity and importance. The motion for continuance not having met the requirements of any rule permitting continuances, it is necessarily a question presented to the discretion of the judge, and the trial court's discretion in granting or refusing continuances will not be disturbed, unless manifestly, flagrantly, and clearly abused. Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943).

Time to be allowed counsel to prepare for trial is in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's discretion will not be interfered with by the court unless abused. Kell v. State, 188 Ga. 670, 4 S.E.2d 596 (1939); Bunge v. State, 149 Ga. App. 712, 256 S.E.2d 23 (1979).

Lack of opportunity for defendant to confer with lawyers.

- When no unusual or intricate matters of fact or law appear, it is no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge to overrule a motion to continue based on lack of opportunity of the defendant to confer with the defendant's lawyers. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. 595, 180 S.E. 101 (1935).

Fault in nonrepresentation of defendant as affecting right to continuance.

- If the fault in nonrepresentation lies with the defendant, the defendant is not entitled to a continuance, but if there is uncertainty as to whether the fault of nonrepresentation lies with the defendant a continuance should be granted. In re Brookins, 153 Ga. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 560 (1980).

Withdrawal of counsel or lack of preparation of new counsel.

- Neither sudden withdrawal of retained counsel nor lack of preparation of new counsel is ipso facto a ground for continuance. Horton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 407, 208 S.E.2d 186 (1974).

Delay in obtaining counsel as grounds for denying motion.

- Court does not abuse the court's discretion in overruling a motion for continuance when the accused is under bond, and the case is specially set at a time satisfactory with counsel who represented the accused at the commitment hearing, the accused being advised of the date, having made no request of the court to appoint counsel for the accused, and having waited until the night preceding the date fixed for the trial to procure counsel, as it is the accused's own fault if the accused's counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare a defense. Townsend v. State, 78 Ga. App. 385, 50 S.E.2d 801 (1948).

Appointment of counsel shortly before trial as grounds for continuance.

- If an accused is forced to trial immediately after counsel appointed for defense, a continuance should be allowed. Jones v. State, 65 Ga. 506 (1880); McArver v. State, 114 Ga. 514, 40 S.E. 779 (1902).

When counsel is appointed to defend the accused on the charge of murder, slightly less than 24 hours before the case is called for trial, the court does not abuse the court's discretion in overruling a motion then made for a continuance on the ground that the defendant's counsel had not had sufficient time within which to prepare for trial. Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241 (1940), commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 55 (1940).

Appointment of defense counsel eight days prior to trial.

- Defendant was not prejudiced by the appointment of counsel eight days prior to trial and denial of continuances, when on the day set for trial defense counsel requested a continuance, stating that counsel had not had an opportunity to talk with all the witnesses, but the trial court denied this motion, stating that counsel would be given an opportunity to interview witnesses prior to their testimony, since no showing was made that any prospective witness not interviewed by the defense would have been beneficial to the defendant. Newberry v. State, 250 Ga. 819, 301 S.E.2d 282 (1983).

Misunderstanding by counsel.

- When there is a misunderstanding on the part of counsel, a continuance will not be allowed unless it is entirely honest and justifiable. Long v. State, 38 Ga. 491 (1868).

Short continuance upheld.

- Although public defender was unable to prepare for the case due to the public defender office's extremely heavy workload, because counsel had been assigned the case approximately eight months earlier and appellant had been arraigned more than three months earlier, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting counsel just under a week to complete the preparations. Roberts v. State, 208 Ga. App. 64, 430 S.E.2d 175 (1993).

Physical inability of accused to stand trial as grounds for continuance.

- When a motion for a continuance is made on the ground that the accused is physically unable to stand the strain of a trial, and the accused is present in court, the presiding judge may consider the condition of the accused as it appears to the judge, as well as the testimony adduced on the motion. In such a case the good sense, sound judgment, and humanity of the trial judge must be relied on as safeguards against injustice. Warren v. State, 53 Ga. App. 221, 185 S.E. 385 (1936).

Defendant as juror.

- That defendant is a juror for the week during which the defendant's case is called for trial is not ground for a continuance. Johnson v. State, 83 Ga. 553, 10 S.E. 207 (1889).

Same jurors appearing at both trials for jointly indicted defendants.

- When accused is jointly indicted with another, the fact that some of the jurors constituting the panel upon the former had at the same term served on the trial of the latter is no ground for a continuance. Humphries v. State, 100 Ga. 260, 28 S.E. 25 (1897).

Use of same witnesses and evidence.

- It is not grounds for a continuance that one of those accused is tried for the same offense as the other and the case involved the same evidence and the same witnesses. Sutton v. State, 18 Ga. App. 28, 88 S.E. 744 (1916); Sutton v. State, 18 Ga. App. 162, 88 S.E. 1005 (1916).

Length of postponement.

- Postponement to a later day in term is subject to the sound discretion of the judge. Lyles v. State, 130 Ga. 294, 60 S.E. 578 (1908).

Circumstances which would be sufficient to cause postponement of trial for 60 days must be extraordinary and unusual. Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 4 S.E.2d 418 (1939).

Popular excitement alone is not sufficient to postpone the trial of a case, except under extraordinary circumstances. Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 4 S.E.2d 418 (1939).

Public prejudice insufficient.

- In view of provisions for obtaining impartial jurors, public prejudice alone is not sufficient for a continuance. Fogarty v. State, 80 Ga. 450, 5 S.E. 782 (1888); Charlon v. State, 106 Ga. 400, 32 S.E. 347 (1899).

Continuance will not be granted simply on the assertion of the accused that the accused is unable to have a fair trial because of public excitement. Taylor v. State, 135 Ga. 622, 70 S.E. 237 (1911).

Newspaper publicity not in itself grounds for postponement.

- Fact that the newspapers of a community have dwelt upon a crime situation that was being investigated by the grand jury will not of itself cause a postponement of a case reached in its regular course. Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 4 S.E.2d 418 (1939).

Right to demand trial is in keeping with policy.

- In keeping with the policy of former Code 1933, § 27-2002 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-8-33), it is provided by former Code 1933, § 27-1901 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170) that an accused person may demand such trial. Harris v. State, 84 Ga. App. 1, 65 S.E.2d 267 (1951).

Mere statements of defendant to counsel and repeated to the court in a motion for continuance are, at most, in the nature of hearsay and have no probative value. The court is not required to consider on the motion for a continuance any conclusion drawn by counsel from such statements made by the defendant to counsel and argued to the court. Townsend v. State, 78 Ga. App. 385, 50 S.E.2d 801 (1948).

Abuse of discretion generally.

- Discretion of the trial court in refusing to grant a continuance will not be interfered with unless such discretion is abused. Dorsey v. State, 236 Ga. 591, 225 S.E.2d 418 (1976); Marshall v. State, 143 Ga. App. 731, 240 S.E.2d 176 (1977).

Motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852, 230 S.E.2d 287 (1976), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 106 S. Ct. 1991, 90 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1986).

Broad discretion given to the presiding judge in granting or refusing to continue trials is not to be disturbed unless manifestly abused. Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241 (1940), commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 55 (1940) Carnes v. State, 115 Ga. App. 387, 154 S.E.2d 781, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928, 88 S. Ct. 287, 19 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1967).

Grant of motions for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and an appellate court will not interfere unless it is clearly shown that the trial judge abused the judge's discretion. Terry v. State, 160 Ga. App. 433, 287 S.E.2d 360 (1981).

Counsel's opinion that defendant incapable of continuing.

- If the defendant's counsel offered only counsel's opinion that the defendant was incapable of continuing with the trial, there was an insufficient showing of a necessity for a continuance. Nash v. State, 179 Ga. App. 702, 347 S.E.2d 651 (1986).

Jury bias.

- After a defendant contended that the defendant failed to conduct a proper voir dire because the defendant was afraid of irritating prospective jurors because of aggressive questioning the panel received during voir dire prior to the defendant's brother's trial for the same offense, there was no error to deny a motion for continuance without showing actual evidence of jury bias or prejudice. Kelley v. State, 168 Ga. App. 911, 311 S.E.2d 180 (1983).

No material injury to accused.

- Discretion not abused if no material injury results to accused. Hardy v. State, 117 Ga. 40, 43 S.E. 434 (1903); Teal v. State, 119 Ga. 102, 45 S.E. 964 (1903).

Failure to prepare demurrer and plea.

- Discretion is not abused by refusal to continue to later hour in day in order to allow counsel to prepare demurrer and plea when there is no reason why such plea was not prepared. Oglesby v. State, 121 Ga. 602, 49 S.E. 706 (1905).

If harm not demonstrated, enumerations of error are meritless.

- Refusal of continuance is not cause for a new trial if the defendant is not injured by the ruling. Cox v. State, 147 Ga. App. 743, 250 S.E.2d 193 (1978).

If the defendant has failed to demonstrate any such harm by either the court's failure to grant a continuance or the court's issuance of the order and the court's rescinding thereof, the defendant's enumerations of error are without merit. Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S. Ct. 1346, 63 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 285 S.E.2d 3 (1981); Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993), overruled on other grounds, McClellan v. State, 274 Ga. 819, 561 S.E.2d 82 (2002).

Supreme Court will prevent the precipitation of a case if a continuance was necessary. Maddox v. State, 32 Ga. 581, 79 Am. Dec. 307 (1861).

Only when record shows identifiable prejudice is reversal authorized on appeal.

- It is only when the record reveals to the appellate courts facts or circumstances showing as a matter of law identifiable prejudice to the accused, such as when the events have moved so swiftly that constitutional guaranties are overridden, that the reviewing courts are authorized to reverse the trial court's refusal to grant an extension. Carnes v. State, 115 Ga. App. 387, 154 S.E.2d 781, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928, 88 S. Ct. 287, 19 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1967).

Review of denial of motion based on inadequate preparation time or inability to use witness.

- Court of Appeals will not interfere with the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a continuance on a motion based generally on two grounds: inadequate time for counsel to prepare for trial; and the inability to use a witness present at the scene of the crime who was accused of participating. Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 188 S.E.2d 828 (1972).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 286, 287.

C.J.S.

- 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 876 et seq.

ALR.

- Hostile sentiment or prejudice as ground for continuance of criminal trial, 39 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Right of accused to continuance because of absence of witness who is fugitive from justice, 42 A.L.R.2d 1229.

Amendment of indictment or information with respect to name or capacity of person alleged to have been victim of crime as ground for continuance, 85 A.L.R.2d 1204.

Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance, 73 A.L.R.3d 725.

Illness or incapacity of judge, prosecuting officer, or prosecution witness as justifying delay in bringing accused speedily to trial - state cases, 78 A.L.R.3d 297.

Application of speedy trial statute to dismissal or other termination of prior indictment or information and bringing of new indictment or information, 39 A.L.R.4th 899.