O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 (2019)

Time for commencement of action

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this article is extinguished unless action is brought: (1) Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Code Section 18-2-74, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant; (2) Under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 18-2-74 or subsection (a) of Code Section 18-2-75, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or (3) Under subsection (b) of Code Section 18-2-75, within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

History

Code 1981, § 18-2-79, enacted by Ga. L.

2002, p. 141, § 3; Ga. L. 2015, p. 996, § 4A-1/SB 65.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former § 18-2-22 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Limitations on actions. - U.S. Bankruptcy Court determined appropriate limitations periods for claims for alleged fraudulent conveyances of real property (seven years) and personal property (four years) by analogy to adverse possession and conversion, respectively, in the absence of an express limitations period in former O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22. Broadfoot v. Hunerwadel, 282 B.R. 54, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 299 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22). Trial court improperly granted summary judgment to judgment debtors on a judgment creditor’s claim under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-28 upon finding that the limitations period under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 barred the claim as there was no legal basis to conclude that the limitation period in § 18-2-79 was applicable to the creditor’s claim. Morris v. Nexus Real Estate Mortg. & Inv. Co., 296 Ga. App. 477, 675 S.E.2d 511, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 234 (2009). Chapter 7 trustee was not barred by the statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 or under 11 U.S.C. § 546 from pursuing a cause of action under 11 U.S.C.

§ 544 because the debtor filed the debtor’s petition before the state statute of limitations expired, but was barred from pursuing avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 548 of any transfer occurring prior to two years before the petition was filed. Watts v. Peachtree Tech. Partners, LLC (In re Palisades at West Paces Imaging Ctr., LLC), No. 09-87600-WLH, No. 11-5183, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3576 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2011). As an administrator’s fraudulent conveyance claims were time barred under O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-74(a)(1) and 18-2-79(1), a limited liability company’s (LLC) failure to respond to the administrator’s requests for admissions was of no consequence and the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the LLC was improper. Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 726 S.E.2d 730, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 348 (2012). Administrator’s fraudulent conveyance claims against group one were time barred under O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-74(a)(1) and 18-2-79(1), even though the claim was not time barred under the limitations period in effect when the claim accrued, as application of § 18-2-79, a procedural law in effect at the time the suit was filed, did not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X; the adminis-

trator also failed to avail the administrator of the one-year statute of limitation effective upon discovery of the alleged fraud. Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 726 S.E.2d 730, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 348 (2012). Even though the four-year statute of limitations under the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., had not expired, a Chapter 7 trustee’s avoidance action, which was brought pursuant to a Bankruptcy Code provision allowing the trustee to step into the shoes of an unsecured creditor, was barred by the two-year limitations period in the Bankruptcy Code. Nor was the statute tolled by a Bankruptcy Code provision dealing with extensions of time as the trustee’s fraudulent transfer action was brought standing in the shoes of a creditor, not the debtor. Boudreaux v. Hall Oil Co. (In re Pope Logging, Inc.), No. 11-30153, No. 15-03004, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3136 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2015). In a transfer avoidance action under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), the complaint alleged sufficient facts to raise questions of fact regarding whether the statute of limitations barred the trustee’s claim as it was plausible that the debtors concealed the transfers and the creditor did not learn of the transfers until years later. Lubin v. Markowitz (In re Markowitz), No. 1468061-BEM, No. 16-5221-BEM, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 767 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2017). Trustee’s avoidance claim for transfer of certain real property pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-2-74(a)(1) was time barred because from the day the deed was recorded, any subsequent purchaser or judgment creditor was on notice of the transfer and any applicable statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 started running as of that date. Gordon v. Webster (In re Webster), 629 B.R. 654, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2021). Action to set aside fraudulent transfer timely filed. - Fraudulent transfer occurred on the date the deed was recorded, even though the deed was signed nearly 18 months earlier, and the creditor timely filed the creditor’s com-

plaint and action to set aside the fraudulent transfer approximately six months before the four-year statute of limitation would have run. Kent v. A.O. White, Jr., Consulting Eng’r, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 563, 631 S.E.2d 782, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 639 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1710, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 790 (Ga. Oct. 2, 2006). Fraudulent transfer claim was time-barred. - Former director’s putative transferee met the transferee’s burden for summary judgment purposes of asserting that a fraudulent transfer claim was time-barred, but the creditor failed to point to specific evidence that gave rise to a triable issue with respect to whether the limitation period did not bar the claim. Am. Nat’l Holding Corp. v. EMM Credit, LLC, 323 Ga. App. 655, 748 S.E.2d 683 (2013). Fraudulent transfer claims alleging actual fraud survived summary judgment because fact issues existed as to when the fraudulent nature of the transfers was discovered, but some constructive fraud claims were untimely because no discovery rule applied. Am. Pegasus SPC v. Clear Skies Holding Co., LLC, No. 1:13CV-03035-ELR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189547 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2015). Claim not subject to dismissal based on unrecorded deeds. - Judgment creditor’s fraudulent transfer action was not shown to be barred by limitations because, even assuming that the reference to the year 2003 in unwitnessed and unrecorded deeds from the judgment debtor proved that the deeds were executed in 2003, those deeds could not prove the passing of title, and questions concerning the judgment creditor’s diligence in discovering the alleged fraud were generally questions for a trier of fact. RES-GA YPL, LLC v. Rowland, 340 Ga. App. 713, 798 S.E.2d 315, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 130 (2017). Improper dismissal for failure to state a claim. - Trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because it was too soon in the case to conclude, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs could not present evidence satisfying the statutory elements of O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et. seq., seeking to void the transfer of assets. Lyle

v. Fulcrum Loan Holdings, 354 Ga. App. 742, 841 S.E.2d 182, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 190 (2020), cert. denied, No. S20C1327,

2020 Ga. LEXIS 789 (Ga. Oct. 19, 2020), cert. denied, No. S20C1103, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. Oct. 19, 2020).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, § 152 et seq.

C.J.S. 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 123 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 25 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 2003–2025 · leading case: Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 807 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 2017).
Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 807 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 14× “First, they said, the UFTA claim is time barred under former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), which provides in pertinent part: A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer.”
Merrill Ranch Props., LLC v. Austell Et Al., 784 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 7× “Although Defendants acknowledge, at least implicitly and assuming the Loan was effectively assigned, that Plaintiff has standing as a creditor under the UFTA to pursue this claim, they argue that summary judgment was also properly granted as to this fraudulent transfer claim…”
Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp. Et Al., 802 S.E.2d 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “S17A0765, docketed December 14, 2016 (transfer order noted that a primary issue on appeal is whether the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 preempts two Georgia statutes, OCGA §§ 18-2-79 and 44-12-24). 9 Despite Fox’s assertions to the…”
Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 2× “In addition, the Georgia UFTA plainly states that it applies to transfers that were made with actual intent to defraud up to four years before a claim arose, see OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), as well as the more common situation where the claim arose first and the defendant then…”
United States v. Henco Holding Corp., 985 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2021). “See Ga. Code Ann. § 18-2-79 . To the extent that the Caceres Defendants argue that the government cannot proceed against them because UFTA repealed Georgia’s former fraudulent transfer statutes, this argument is without merit.”
Gordon v. Harrison (In re Alpha Prot. Servs., Inc.), 531 B.R. 889 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2015). · cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 In support of avoiding the payments to J.”
Hill v. Duscio, 292 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “( [34] at 11-13); see also O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 ("A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer .”
Kent v. A. O. White, Jr., Consulting Eng'r, Inc., 631 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 18-2-79 (2). 4. Kent further argues that the superior court’s February 22, 2002 order on damages was void and unenforceable.”
Res-ga Ypl, LLC v. Rowland Et Al., 798 S.E.2d 315 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 18-2-79 (1),(2). The Rowland Appellees assert, as they did in the trial court, that the four-year limitation period began to run in 2003, when the Defective Deeds were allegedly executed, and that the one year “discovery” period for intentional fraud began to run, at…”
Huggins v. Powell, 726 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “Contending that she had a vested right to application of a seven-year statute of limitation in effect prior to the enactment of OCGA § 18-2-79, effective July 1, 2002, which provides a four-year statute of limitation (for actions involving the fraudulent conveyance of real…”
Lanier v. Anthony, 583 S.E.2d 893 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “Under that Act, a cause of action for certain fraudulent transfers is extinguished unless brought within four years after the transfer or within one year after the transfer “could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.”
Finn v. All. Bank, 838 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). “110 (West 2012); Ga.Code Ann. § 18-2-79 (2010); Haw. Rev. Stat.”
— 18-2-79(1) — 3 cases
Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 807 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 2017). “First, they said, the UFTA claim is time barred under former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), which provides in pertinent part: A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.