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2018 Georgia Code 18-2-79 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 18 DEBTOR AND CREDITOR

Section 2. Debtor and Creditor Relations, 18-2-1 through 18-2-85.

ARTICLE 4 UNIFORM VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT

18-2-79. Time for commencement of action.

A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this article is extinguished unless action is brought:

  1. Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Code Section 18-2-74, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
  2. Under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 18-2-74 or subsection (a) of Code Section 18-2-75, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
  3. Under subsection (b) of Code Section 18-2-75, within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

(Code 1981, §18-2-79, enacted by Ga. L. 2002, p. 141, § 3; Ga. L. 2015, p. 996, § 4A-1/SB 65.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former § 18-2-22 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Limitations on actions.

- U.S. Bankruptcy Court determined appropriate limitations periods for claims for alleged fraudulent conveyances of real property (seven years) and personal property (four years) by analogy to adverse possession and conversion, respectively, in the absence of an express limitations period in former O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22. Broadfoot v. Hunerwadel (In re Dulock), 282 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22).

Trial court improperly granted summary judgment to judgment debtors on a judgment creditor's claim under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-28 upon finding that the limitations period under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 barred the claim as there was no legal basis to conclude that the limitation period in § 18-2-79 was applicable to the creditor's claim. Morris v. Nexus Real Estate Mortg. & Inv. Co., 296 Ga. App. 477, 675 S.E.2d 511 (2009).

Chapter 7 trustee was not barred by the statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 or under 11 U.S.C. § 546 from pursuing a cause of action under 11 U.S.C. § 544 because the debtor filed the debtor's petition before the state statute of limitations expired, but was barred from pursuing avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 548 of any transfer occurring prior to two years before the petition was filed. Watts v. Peachtree Tech. Partners, LLC (In re Palisades at West Paces Imaging Ctr., LLC), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2011).

As an administrator's fraudulent conveyance claims were time-barred under O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-74(a)(1) and18-2-79(1), a limited liability company's (LLC) failure to respond to the administrator's requests for admissions was of no consequence and the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the LLC was improper. Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 726 S.E.2d 730 (2012).

Administrator's fraudulent conveyance claims against group one were time-barred under O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2- 74(a)(1) and18-2-79(1), even though the claim was not time-barred under the limitations period in effect when the claim accrued, as application of § 18-2-79, a procedural law in effect at the time the suit was filed, did not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X; the administrator also failed to avail the administrator of the one-year statute of limitation effective upon discovery of the alleged fraud. Huggins v. Powell, 315 Ga. App. 599, 726 S.E.2d 730 (2012).

Even though the four-year statute of limitations under the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (now Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), O.C.G.A. § 18-2-70 et seq., had not expired, a Chapter 7 trustee's avoidance action, which was brought pursuant to a Bankruptcy Code provision allowing the trustee to step into the shoes of an unsecured creditor, was barred by the two-year limitations period in the Bankruptcy Code. Nor was the statute tolled by a Bankruptcy Code provision dealing with extensions of time as the trustee's fraudulent transfer action was brought standing in the shoes of a creditor, not the debtor. Boudreaux v. Hall Oil Co. (In re Pope Logging, Inc.), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2015).

In a transfer avoidance action under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), the complaint alleged sufficient facts to raise questions of fact regarding whether the statute of limitations barred the trustee's claim as it was plausible that the debtors concealed the transfers and the creditor did not learn of the transfers until years later. Lubin v. Markowitz (In re Markowitz), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2017).

Action to set aside fraudulent transfer timely filed.

- Fraudulent transfer occurred on the date the deed was recorded, even though the deed was signed nearly 18 months earlier, and the creditor timely filed the creditor's complaint and action to set aside the fraudulent transfer approximately six months before the four-year statute of limitation would have run. Kent v. A.O. White, Jr., Consulting Eng'r, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 563, 631 S.E.2d 782 (2006).

Fraudulent transfer claim was time-barred.

- Former director's putative transferee met the transferee's burden for summary judgment purposes of asserting that a fraudulent transfer claim was time-barred, but the creditor failed to point to specific evidence that gave rise to a triable issue with respect to whether the limitation period did not bar the claim. Am. Nat'l Holding Corp. v. EMM Credit, LLC, 323 Ga. App. 655, 748 S.E.2d 683 (2013).

Fraudulent transfer claims alleging actual fraud survived summary judgment because fact issues existed as to when the fraudulent nature of the transfers was discovered, but some constructive fraud claims were untimely because no discovery rule applied. Am. Pegasus SPC v. Clear Skies Holding Co., LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2015).

Claim not subject to dismissal based on unrecorded deeds.

- Judgment creditor's fraudulent transfer action was not shown to be barred by limitations because, even assuming that the reference to the year 2003 in unwitnessed and unrecorded deeds from the judgment debtor proved that the deeds were executed in 2003, those deeds could not prove the passing of title, and questions concerning the judgment creditor's diligence in discovering the alleged fraud were generally questions for a trier of fact. RES-GA YPL, LLC v. Rowland, 340 Ga. App. 713, 798 S.E.2d 315 (2017).

Cited in Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011); Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, § 152 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 123 et seq.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2011 | 288 Ga. 600, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 419

...sfy a claim by the defendant, a transferee, or both, see OCGA § 18-2-77(a)(3)(A). In addition, the Georgia UFTA plainly states that it applies to transfers that were made with actual intent to defraud up to four years before a claim arose, see OCGA § 18-2-79(1), as well as the more common situation where the claim arose first and the defendant then transferred assets to avoid a future judgment....
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Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 302 Ga. 375 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 30, 2017 | 807 S.E.2d 444

...d Lovell’s creditors. CSB sought to avoid the conveyance pursuant to former OCGA § 18-2-74 (a) W- Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land moved to dismiss this claim upon three grounds. First, they said, the UFTA claim is time barred under former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), which provides in pertinent part: A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer......
...Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), noting that CSB asserted its UFTA claims as the successor by assignment of the FDIC in its capacity as receiver of a failed bank. As for the timeliness of its UFTA claim, CSB argued that FIRREA preempts former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), and its assertion of the UFTA claim was timely under FIRREA....
...If it does apply, CSB added, it too is preempted by federal law. Finally, as for actual or constructive notice of the allegedly fraudulent transfer, CSB argued that such notice would not defeat its UFTA claim in any event. The trial court rested its dismissal of the claim upon the time bar of former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), and it did not consider the other grounds asserted by Lovell, his wife, andAnkony Land for dismissing the claim. The trial court reasoned that former OCGA § 18-2-79(1) is a statute of repose, not a statute of limitation, and FIRREA does not, it concluded, preempt statutes of repose....
...on “the later of... the date of the appointment of the [FDIC] as conservator or receiver [ or . . . the date on which the cause of action accrues.” 12 USC § 1821 (d) (14) (B). If the FDIC Extender Statute applies, and if it preempts former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), CSB timely asserted the UFTA claim in *379question, inasmuch as it asserted that claim within three years of the date that the FDIC was appointed as the receiver for Georgia Trust. But as we noted, it is not clear that the FDIC Extender Statute applies at all....
...dered the question of whether an extender statute like the one in FIRREA applies to both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose and find that it does.” RBS Securities, 833 F3d at 1130 (I) (a). Decided October 30, 2017. Even if former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1) is a statute of repose, the trial court was wrong to conclude that the FDIC Extender Statute could not possibly preempt a statute of repose. Whether the FDIC Extender Statute applies at all in this case, and whether it actually preempts former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), are matters that we leave for the trial court to resolve on remand....