Retroactive application of alimony modification statute unconstitutional.

- Although Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1 and Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 23 provided that the court could take cognizance of a petition seeking a change of alimony on the basis of a change in the income and financial condition of either spouse (rather than husband only), the retroactive application of the alimony modification statute is unconstitutional. Sovern v. Sovern, 156 Ga. App. 752, 275 S.E.2d 791 (1980).

Legislature's intent.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-23, General Assembly expressed the legislature's intention to make curative statute retrospective. Summerlin v. Summerlin, 247 Ga. 5, 274 S.E.2d 523 (1981).

Amendments cannot be applied so as to impair alimony agreements.

- Despite expressed legislative intent, amendments cannot be applied so as to impair alimony agreements entered into before the amendments, though incorporated into the court's final judgment and decree of divorce. Shure v. Shure, 245 Ga. 36, 262 S.E.2d 800 (1980).

No claim for modification of pre-1977 decree stated.

- When the sole ground asserted by the appellant for a modification of alimony was a change in the financial condition of his ex-wife, and the decree was entered in 1968, when the only basis for modification of alimony was a change in the income and financial status of the husband, the appellant's claim for modification failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Sovern v. Sovern, 156 Ga. App. 752, 275 S.E.2d 791 (1980).

Party in an alimony action in which a final judgment was entered prior to Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253, § 1, amending Ga. L. 1955, p. 630, § 1 (resulting in O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-18 and19-6-19) had a vested right in the judgment not being subject to modification because of a change in the income of the wife since the law in effect at the time of the judgment did not permit a modification on such change. McClain v. McClain, 241 Ga. 422, 246 S.E.2d 187 (1978).

Trial court did not improperly attempt to retain jurisdiction.

- Trial court did not improperly attempt to retain jurisdiction over post-divorce proceedings by directing the parties to follow an established mechanism to resolve disputes concerning the children, to alternate annual expenses such as the cost of uniforms, or to give the trial court a status report when the youngest child reached the age of 18; the order established permanent awards, and nothing in the language of the status report provision provided that the trial court could issue a modification of custody, visitation, or child support without a petition being properly filed by one of the parties under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-19 and19-9-23. Facey v. Facey, 281 Ga. 367, 638 S.E.2d 273 (2006).

Cited in Oliver v. Oliver, 244 Ga. 20, 257 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Morris v. Morris, 244 Ga. 120, 259 S.E.2d 65 (1979); Bisno v. Biloon, 161 Ga. App. 351, 291 S.E.2d 66 (1982).

ALR.

- Divorce: court's authority to institute or increase spousal support award after discharge of prior property award in bankruptcy, 87 A.L.R.4th 353.