O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
All children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter who have been conceived by means of artificial
insemination are irrebuttably presumed legitimate if both spouses have consented in writing to the use and administration of artificial insemination.
History
Code 1933, § 74-101.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 166, § 1.
Annotations
Cross references. Persons authorized to administer or perform artificial insemination, § 43-3442. Law reviews. For note discussing legitimacy of children born by means of artificial insemination, see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 383 (1970). For article, “Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems Presented by the Test Tube Baby,” see 28 Emory L.J. 1045 (1980). For comment, “Surrogate Mother Contracts: Analysis of a Remedial Quagmire,” see 37 Emory L.J. 721 (1988). For article, “The Orwellian Nightmare Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproduc-
tive Technologies,” see 25 Ga. L. Rev. 625 (1991). For article, “Who is Georgia’s Mother? Gestational Surrogacy: A Formulation for Georgia’s Legislature,” see 38 Ga. L. Rev. 395 (2003). For article, “10th Annual Legal Ethics and Professionalism Symposium: Drawing the Ethical Line: Controversial Cases, Zealous Advocacy, and the Public Good,” see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 413 (2010). For note, “It Takes a Village: Considering the Other Interests at Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children,” see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 873 (2010). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2018). For note, “Carrying Capacity: Should Georgia Enact Surrogacy Regulation?,” see 54 Ga. L. Rev. 333 (2019).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS “Artificial insemination” did not include IVF. - O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21, which created an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy for children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter who were conceived by
artificial insemination, did not apply to a child conceived by in-vitro fertilization (IVF). Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 806 S.E.2d 493, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 896 (2017).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Illegitimate Children, § 2. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 2.
ALR. Rights and obligations resulting from human artificial insemination, A.L.R.4th 295.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case:
Patton v. Vanterpool, 806 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. 2017).
Patton v. Vanterpool, 806 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 62× “OCGA § 19-7-21 creates an “irrebuttable presumption” of legitimacy with respect to “[a] 11 children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter who [were] conceived by means of artificial insemination.”
Brown v. Gadson, 654 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “, OCGA § 19-7-21 (children born within wedlock and within the period of gestation by artificial insemination presumed legitimate upon the written consent of both spouses).”
Noggle v. Arnold, 338 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 4× “445 ( 133 SE2d 885 ) (1963); birth of common law marriage; birth by way of artificial insemination (OCGA § 19-7-21); legitimation procedure (OCGA § 19-7-22).”
Patton v. Vanterpool (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 60× “OCGA § 19-7-21 creates an “irrebuttable presumption” of legitimacy with respect to “[a]ll children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter who [were] conceived by means of artificial insemination.”
Tiffany Bolton v. Jennifer Bolton (Ga. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 11× “The trial court then rejected Tiffany’s statutory interpretation argument, finding that because OCGA § 19-7-21 was passed in 1964, the Legislature could have only contemplated the term “spouse” to refer to a man and a woman, not married persons in same-sex couples.”
David Patton v. Joycelyn Vanterpool (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 4× “She later moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that under OCGA § 19-7-21,1 Patton is the legal father of her child, who was conceived through in vitro fertilization using donor egg and sperm.”
Joycelyn Vanterpool v. David Patton (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 3× “pinion, back in the trial court, Patton filed a motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, arguing that Vanterpool was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata from bringing her paternity claim because the issue of a child being born of the marriage had already…”
Wilson Et Al. v. Moore, 804 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “[h]as legitimated a child pursuant to [OCGA § 19-7-21. l].”OCGA § 19-7-21.1 (a) (2) (F) (2008).”
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