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2018 Georgia Code 19-7-20 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 7. Parent and Child Relationship Generally, 19-7-1 through 19-7-54.

ARTICLE 2 LEGITIMACY

19-7-20. Circumstances of legitimacy; disproving legitimacy; legitimation by marriage of parents and recognition of child.

  1. All children born in wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter are legitimate.
  2. The legitimacy of a child born as described in subsection (a) of this Code section may be disputed. Where possibility of access exists, the strong presumption is in favor of legitimacy and the proof must be clear to establish the contrary. If pregnancy existed at the time of the marriage and a divorce is sought and obtained on that ground, the child, although born in wedlock, will not be legitimate.
  3. The marriage of the mother and reputed father of a child born out of wedlock and the recognition by the father of the child as his shall render the child legitimate; in such case the child shall immediately take the surname of his father.

(Orig. Code 1863, §§ 1736, 1737; Code 1868, § 1777; Code 1873, § 1786; Code 1882, § 1786; Civil Code 1895, § 2493; Civil Code 1910, § 3012; Code 1933, § 74-101; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1720, § 4.)

Cross references.

- Inheritance rights of child born out of wedlock, § 53-2-3.

Law reviews.

- For article, "Georgia Inheritance Rights of Children Born Out of Wedlock," see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 28 (1986). For article, "Who is Georgia's Mother? Gestational Surrogacy: A Formulation for Georgia's Legislature," see 38 Ga. L. Rev. 395 (2003). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2004). For note proposing Blood Grouping Test Act to expand admissible guidance in paternity proceedings, see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 266 (1950). For note discussing scientific basis of blood classification and use of blood tests as evidence, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 306 (1964). For note discussing legitimation of illegitimate children by subsequent marriage of parents, see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 383 (1970). For note discussing the admissibility of husband and wife's testimony concerning nonaccess in determining the legitimacy of a child, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 448 (1970). For a note on the role of a judicial determination of paternity in the inheritance rights of illegitimate children in Georgia, see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 171 (1981). For comment on Wallace v. Wallace, 221 Ga. 510, 145 S.E.2d 546 (1965), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 219 (1966). For case comment, "In re Baby Girl Eason: Balancing Three Competing Interests in Third Party Adoptions," see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1217 (1988).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Primary purpose of the legitimation and paternity statutes is to provide for the establishment rather than the disestablishment of legitimacy and paternity. Ghrist v. Fricks, 219 Ga. App. 415, 465 S.E.2d 501 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012).

Law favors legitimation.

- Law favors marriage, and likewise the legitimizing of children, when it can be done with safety to society. Harrison v. Odum, 148 Ga. 489, 96 S.E. 1038 (1918).

Presumption of legitimacy arises only when child is born in wedlock. Mincey v. Mincey, 233 Ga. 512, 212 S.E.2d 345 (1975).

When child may avail itself of presumption.

- Absent evidence that mother was ever married, child cannot avail itself of benefit of presumption. Mincey v. Mincey, 233 Ga. 512, 212 S.E.2d 345 (1975).

Statute presumed child born within wedlock to be legitimate. Mims v. State, 43 Ga. App. 100, 157 S.E. 901 (1931); Ellis v. Woods, 214 Ga. 105, 103 S.E.2d 297 (1958); Boone v. Boone, 225 Ga. 610, 170 S.E.2d 414 (1969); B-B v. Califano, 476 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Ga. 1979), aff 'd sub. nom. B.B. ex rel. A.L.B. v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1981).

Child born in wedlock is presumed to be child of husband. Mims v. State, 43 Ga. App. 100, 157 S.E. 901 (1931); Ellis v. Woods, 214 Ga. 105, 103 S.E.2d 297 (1958); Boone v. Boone, 225 Ga. 610, 170 S.E.2d 414 (1969).

Presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law, and to overcome such presumption proof should be clear to establish contrary where possibility of access between husband and wife exists. Stephens v. State, 80 Ga. App. 823, 57 S.E.2d 493 (1950).

Presumption is rebuttable.

- Presumption that child born in wedlock is legitimate is rebuttable. McDonald v. Hester, 115 Ga. App. 740, 155 S.E.2d 720 (1967); B-B v. Califano, 476 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd sub nom. B-B v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1981); Parks v. State, 155 Ga. App. 44, 270 S.E.2d 271 (1980); Families First v. Gooden, 211 Ga. App. 272, 439 S.E.2d 34 (1993).

When presumption may be rebutted.

- In civil action, or on criminal prosecution, by evidence of nonaccess, or other testimony, presumption of legitimacy of offspring may be rebutted. Thornton v. State, 129 Ga. App. 574, 200 S.E.2d 298 (1973).

Presumption not rebutted.

- Mother failed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy raised by a child's birth during the marriage pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-20 and19-8-1(6) since the mother and husband knew that another man was the biological father of the child, the husband was listed with the mother's consent on the child's birth certificate as the child's father and had always provided financial and emotional support for the child, and when, if the husband had attempted to rebut the presumption of legitimacy the husband would have still been required to make child support payments. Baker v. Baker, 276 Ga. 778, 582 S.E.2d 102 (2003).

In IVF, paternity proved under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20. - O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21, which created an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy for children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter who were conceived by artificial insemination, did not apply to a child conceived by in-vitro fertilization (IVF). The mother could attempt to prove paternity by some other means, such as under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20. Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 806 S.E.2d 493 (2017).

No absolute right to validate child.

- Because the juvenile court failed to determine if one parent abandoned their opportunity interest to develop a relationship with the subject child, and failed to conduct a test of that parent's fitness or make a determination based upon the best interests of the child, the court's speculative conclusions were not equivalent to an examination of the benefit that might flow to the child if legitimated. Thus, the court, in essence, interpreted the parent's right to legitimate the child as absolute, without qualification, which was erroneous, requiring reversal. In the Interest of M.K., 288 Ga. App. 71, 653 S.E.2d 354 (2007).

Standard of proof needed to overcome presumption.

- Presumption of legitimacy of children born in wedlock can be overcome by clear and convincing proof, the common-law doctrine not being of force in Georgia. Harris v. Shelton, 151 Ga. 615, 107 S.E. 842 (1921).

Whether presumption has been rebutted is for jury determination.

- It is duty of jury to weigh evidence against presumption and to decide, as in exercise of the jury's judgment, the truth as it may appear. Parks v. State, 155 Ga. App. 44, 270 S.E.2d 271 (1980).

Effect of rebuttal of presumption.

- When there was uncontradicted testimony of the child's mother that she had lived apart from and not even seen her former husband for more than two years preceding conception of the child, the presumption of legitimacy did not apply, and the trial court's refusal of the putative father's request to give a charge on this principle was not error. Rainwater v. State, 210 Ga. App. 594, 436 S.E.2d 772 (1993).

Legitimated child may inherit from father's estate. Morris v. Dilbeck, 71 Ga. App. 470, 31 S.E.2d 93 (1944).

"Children," as a general rule, means legitimate children. Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S.E. 153 (1895).

Husband of woman at time of conception or birth is party at interest when another man claims fatherhood of the child in a legitimation proceeding; therefore, due process requires that the "legal father" must be served, but that service may be perfected in the same manner as provided for in adoption proceedings. In re White, 254 Ga. 678, 333 S.E.2d 588 (1985).

Initial burden of proving legitimacy.

- Evidence of the presumption of legitimacy arising from the birth of a child requires the production of contrary evidence from the husband, but it does not relieve the wife of her burden of proof to establish legitimacy in the first place. Miller v. Miller, 258 Ga. 168, 366 S.E.2d 682 (1988).

Virtual adoption.

- Trial court erred by granting a biological son's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of virtual adoption asserted by the purported adopted daughter because the court clearly erred by misinterpreting the requirement of partial performance of the agreement to adopt and erroneously concluded that an established virtual adoption can be undone by showing that the purported adopted daughter formed a relationship with their natural father after learning of his existence when a teenager. Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015).

Cited in Harrison v. Odum, 148 Ga. 489, 96 S.E. 1038 (1918); Wheeler v. Howard, 211 Ga. 596, 87 S.E.2d 377 (1955); Hobby v. Burke, 227 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1955); Miller v. Miller, 96 Ga. App. 469, 100 S.E.2d 594 (1957); Peters v. State, 98 Ga. App. 340, 106 S.E.2d 77 (1958); King v. King, 218 Ga. 534, 129 S.E.2d 147 (1962); Smith v. Smith, 224 Ga. 442, 162 S.E.2d 379 (1968); Clark v. Buttry, 121 Ga. App. 492, 174 S.E.2d 356 (1970); Dobyns v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 227 Ga. 253, 179 S.E. 915 (1971); In re J.B., 140 Ga. App. 668, 231 S.E.2d 821 (1976); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978); Aikens v. Turner, 241 Ga. 401, 245 S.E.2d 660 (1978); Ingram v. Pirkle, 150 Ga. App. 337, 258 S.E.2d 25 (1979); McMahan v. Koppers Co., 654 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1981); Glover v. Clark, 161 Ga. App. 552, 288 S.E.2d 887 (1982); In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982); Department of Human Resources v. Brinson, 171 Ga. App. 905, 321 S.E.2d 763 (1984); Jackson v. Jackson, 253 Ga. 576, 322 S.E.2d 725 (1984); Wilkins v. Department of Human Resources, 174 Ga. App. 105, 329 S.E.2d 266 (1985); Wilkins v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 190 Ga. App. 727, 380 S.E.2d 282 (1989); Jones v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1992); Hall v. Coleman, 242 Ga. App. 576, 530 S.E.2d 485 (2000).

Application

Mother may testify that "legal father" is not biological father of her child, and testify as to the identity of the biological father. In re White, 254 Ga. 678, 333 S.E.2d 588 (1985) (overruling Colson v. Huber, 74 Ga. App. 339, 39 S.E.2d 539 (1946), to the extent that it holds otherwise).

Mother of child born during wedlock is precluded by public policy from asserting the child's illegitimacy to show consideration for contract with man other than her husband, providing for payment of certain monthly sum for the child's support. Colson v. Huber, 74 Ga. App. 339, 39 S.E.2d 539 (1946), overruled on other grounds, In re White, 254 Ga. 678, 333 S.E.2d 588 (1985).

Witness cannot testify that husband denied paternity.

- Testimony that husband, in life, at time of delivery of testimony, said to witnesses that child born during marriage is not his is insufficient to overcome presumption that all children born in wedlock, whether begotten before or after marriage or within usual period of gestation thereafter, are legitimate, and presumptively the children of the husband; such declarations of the husband in life at time witnesses testified are not admissible evidence to show child is illegitimate or to bastardize the child. Richards v. State, 55 Ga. App. 184, 189 S.E. 682 (1937).

When plea of not guilty raises issue of legitimacy.

- Husband, by plea of not guilty in criminal case of abandonment of his minor child, or of bastardy, may put legitimacy of child in issue, and method of proving illegitimacy must be in accordance with rules of law. Richards v. State, 55 Ga. App. 184, 189 S.E. 682 (1937).

Issue of legitimacy is appropriate in divorce proceeding. McDonald v. Hester, 115 Ga. App. 740, 155 S.E.2d 720 (1967).

Marriage of parents and father's recognition of child legitimates child.

- Child born out of wedlock is made legitimate by subsequent valid marriage of child's parents, and recognition of child by father as his own. Morris v. Dilbeck, 71 Ga. App. 470, 31 S.E.2d 93 (1944).

Order requiring genetic testing erroneous following marriage and recognition of child.

- In an action wherein a juvenile court approved the state's plan for nonreunification of two twin children, the juvenile court erred by ordering a parent to submit to genetic testing and by holding that the parent lacked standing in any future related proceedings until that parent submitted to such testing as the parent had married the children's other parent and recognized the children as the parent's own. Further, the Department of Family and Children services failed to fully comply with O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43(d) by not supporting the motion with a sworn statement either alleging or denying the parent's paternity. In the Interest of T.W., 288 Ga. App. 386, 654 S.E.2d 218 (2007).

Illegitimate child may be legitimated by marriage of mother and reputed father and recognition of such child as his. Kersey v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. Ga. 1967).

Legitimation by marriage dates from birth.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 74-101 and 74-201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-20 and19-7-23) made child whose parents marry after the child's birth legitimate for all purposes from date of birth. Morris v. Dilbeck, 71 Ga. App. 470, 31 S.E.2d 93 (1944).

Legitimation of issue of bigamous marriage by cohabitation and recognition after death of first wife. See Smith v. Reed, 145 Ga. 724, 89 S.E. 815, 1917a L.R.A. 492 (1916).

Opportunity of access raises strong presumption in favor of legitimacy.

- When husband and wife have had opportunity of sexual intercourse, a very strong presumption arises that it must have taken place, and that child in question is the fruit; but it is only a very strong presumption, and no more. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence showing, inter alia, the habits of life and relative situations of the parties, their conduct and declarations connected with conduct, such as, for example, in birth certificates, or impossibility of access. Gibbons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 152 S.E.2d 815 (1966).

Husband not biological father.

- Former husband was improperly awarded the former wife's biological child, who was born before the parties' marriage; the husband's marriage to the wife after the child was born and acknowledgement of the child did not render the child legitimate under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20(c), as § 19-7-20(c), which applied to reputed fathers, was inapplicable as the parties always acknowledged that the husband was not the biological father of the child. Veal v. Veal, 281 Ga. 128, 636 S.E.2d 527 (2006).

When sexual intercourse is proved, nothing short of impossibility should impugn legitimacy of offspring. Simeonides v. Zervis, 120 Ga. App. 883, 172 S.E.2d 649 (1969), aff'd, 127 Ga. App. 506, 194 S.E.2d 324 (1972).

Once sexual intercourse between husband and wife is proved, nothing short of impossibility will rebut presumption of legitimacy of child born to wife. Herrin v. Herrin, 242 Ga. 256, 248 S.E.2d 651 (1978).

When sexual intercourse is presumed from propinquity of parties, slighter proof is required to rebut presumption. Simeonides v. Zervis, 120 Ga. App. 883, 172 S.E.2d 649 (1969), aff'd, 127 Ga. App. 506, 194 S.E.2d 324 (1972).

That four children previously were born of marriage shows only presumption of sexual intercourse between parties. Simeonides v. Zervis, 120 Ga. App. 883, 172 S.E.2d 649 (1968), aff'd, 127 Ga. App. 506, 194 S.E.2d 324 (1972).

Responsibility for illegitimate child placed upon parent who is present. This placing of full parental power in mother is consistent with public policy favoring marriage and family because father can choose to join the family. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978).

Intervention in legitimation proceeding.

- Trial court erred in granting a putative biological father's legitimation petition while a husband's timely, meritorious motion to intervene of right under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a) was pending because when the husband moved to intervene in the legitimation proceeding he was the child's legal father and had parental and custodial rights to the child, and the husband clearly had an interest in the legitimation proceeding; the husband's interest as the child's legal father would be impaired by a decision of the trial court that was unfavorable to him, and his interest was not adequately represented by the parties to the action since the child's mother consented to the legitimation action. Baker v. Lankford, 306 Ga. App. 327, 702 S.E.2d 666 (2010).

Denial of legitimation petition proper.

- Trial court properly denied the father's petition to legitimate a child since the father abandoned the father's interest when the father took no action during the wife's pregnancy or birth and did not seek to legitimate the child until more than five years after receiving the DNA results. Matthews v. Dukes, 314 Ga. App. 782, 726 S.E.2d 95 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Statute placed strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of child born in wedlock, and while this legitimacy may be disputed, it would take clear and positive evidence to rebut presumption in favor of child's legitimacy. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 418.

Mere indication that husband is not natural father of child is insufficient to rebut this presumption. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 418.

Issue born of common-law marriage would be legitimate. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 89.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Illegitimate Children, §§ 1 et seq., 14, 17, 68, 119.

C.J.S.

- 14 C.J.S., Children Out-of-Wedlock, §§ 1, 13, 16 et seq.

ALR.

- Attempt to bastardize child as affecting right to custody of the child, 4 A.L.R. 1119; 37 A.L.R. 531.

Presumption of legitimacy of child born to married woman as affected by lapse of more than normal period of gestation after access by husband, 7 A.L.R. 329.

Right of child legitimated by marriage of parents to take by inheritance from kindred of parents, 64 A.L.R. 1124.

What constitutes a "marriage" within meaning of a statute legitimating issue of all marriages null in law, 84 A.L.R. 499.

Degree of proof necessary to overcome presumption of legitimacy, 128 A.L.R. 713.

Status of child born to inmate of public institution, 159 A.L.R. 1229.

Legitimating effect of intermarriage of parents as affected by father's failure to acknowledge paternity, 175 A.L.R. 375.

Admissibility, on issue of child's legitimacy or parentage, of declarations of parents, relatives, or the child, deceased or unavailable, 31 A.L.R.2d 989.

Presumption of legitimacy, or of paternity, of child conceived or born before marriage, 57 A.L.R.2d 729.

Who qualifies as "child" within survivor benefit provisions of Federal Social Security Act, § 216(h)(2) [42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)], 60 A.L.R.2d 1070.

Determination of paternity, legitimacy, or legitimation in action for divorce, separation, or annulment, 65 A.L.R.2d 1381.

Race or color of child as admissible in evidence on issue of legitimacy or paternity, or as basis of rebuttal or exception to presumption of legitimacy, 32 A.L.R.3d 1303.

Presumption of legitimacy of child born after annulment, divorce, or separation, 46 A.L.R.3d 158.

Rule as regards competency of husband or wife to testify as to nonaccess, 49 A.L.R.3d 212.

Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.

Effect, in subsequent proceedings, of paternity findings or implications in divorce or annulment decree or in support of custody order made incidental thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846.

Legitimation by marriage to natural father of child born during mother's marriage to another, 80 A.L.R.3d 219.

Proof of husband's impotency or sterility as rebutting presumption of legitimacy, 84 A.L.R.3d 495.

Who may dispute presumption of legitimacy of child conceived or born during wedlock, 90 A.L.R.3d 1032.

Rights and remedies of parents inter se with respect to the names of their children, 40 A.L.R.5th 697.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20

Total Results: 12  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Baker v. Baker, 582 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 2, 2003 | 276 Ga. 778, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1683

...egally-adopted procedures that govern domestic matters. Because I believe this Court is stepping well beyond its bounds in this case, I must dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Hines join in this dissent. NOTES [1] OCGA § 19-7-20(a). [2] OCGA § 19-8-1(6). [3] Mitchell v. Ward, 231 Ga. 671, 672, 203 S.E.2d 484 (1974). [4] Miller v. Miller, 258 Ga. 168, 169, 366 S.E.2d 682 (1988). [5] OCGA § 19-7-20(b)....
...(b) The legitimacy of a child born as described in subsection (a) of this Code section may be disputed. Where possibility of access exists, the strong presumption is in favor of legitimacy and the proof must be clear to establish the contrary..... OCGA § 19-7-20.
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Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 2017 | 806 S.E.2d 493

...Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (93 SCt 2230, 37 LE2d 63) (1973), and our interpretation maintains the bounds of the plain language of the statute. Further, the irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy in OCGA § 19-7-21 is an exception to the general rule, found in OCGA § 19-7-20 (b), that legitimacy may be disputed, and an expansive reading of OCGA § 19-7-21 would allow the exception to swallow the rule.7 Appellee also contends that when the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 19-7-21 in 1964, that body could not h...
...ulted in the creation of a child). We do not find these decisions persuasive. Though Appellee may not establish legitimacy through OCGA § 19-7-21, we do not speak to whether Appellee may establish legal paternity through other means, such as OCGA § 19-7-20. It appears that the General Assembly has been familiar with advances in reproductive technologies since as early as the late 1980s....
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Pruitt v. Lindsey, 407 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 6, 1991 | 261 Ga. 540

...power and control is in the hands of the father. OCGA § 19-7-22. A child born out of wedlock, despite a judicial order and decree giving the child the rights of a legitimate child, is still a "child who is not legitimate" within the meaning of OCGA § 19-7-20....
...The term "bastard" has been replaced with "child born out of wedlock," and both parents have the joint and several duty to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of such children. OCGA § 19-7-24. A child born out of wedlock is "not legitimate," OCGA § 19-7-23(3), within the meaning of OCGA § 19-7-20, but he can be rendered legitimate if the "reputed" father subsequently marries the mother and "recognizes" the child as his own. OCGA § 19-7-20(c)....
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Wilkins v. Dep't of Human Resources, 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 27, 1985 | 255 Ga. 230

...onable to conclude that the General Assembly intended that phrase to include children born to a married woman, but begotten by a man other than her husband. (b) We note that it might be inferred from the presumption of legitimacy established by OCGA § 19-7-20 (a) for children "born in wedlock," that the phrase "born out of wedlock" must refer to children born to unwed mothers. However, we disagree. As already noted, statutes must be construed with the purpose and intent of the General Assembly in mind. OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) focuses on rights of putative fathers in termination proceedings, while OCGA § 19-7-20 deals with the longstanding evidentiary presumption that a child born to a married woman is legitimate. In view of the well-known policies behind OCGA § 19-7-20, we do not hesitate to conclude that the phrase "born in wedlock" is meant to refer to the status of the child, as born to a married woman, so as to raise a presumption that the husband of the married woman is the father of a child born to her, [2] and does not refer "`to the status of the parents of the child in relation to each other,'" Locklear, supra, 334 SE2d at 50. So construed, OCGA § 19-7-20 fits logically with our holding that a man can be considered the putative father of a child born to a married woman, but begotten by a man other than her husband, and leads to the following rule: a man can be considered the putative father of a child born out of wedlock when the child is born to a woman married to a man other than himself, but, under OCGA § 19-7-20 (a), the mother's husband is presumed to be the father of the child until rebutted by sufficient evidence....
...Applying the foregoing to the instant case, we hold that a man claiming to be the putative father of a child born to a married woman is entitled to appear and introduce proof of paternity under OCGA § 15-11-52 (b), bearing in mind that he must overcome the presumption of legitimacy created by OCGA § 19-7-20....
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Miller v. Miller, 366 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 14, 1988 | 258 Ga. 168

...[1] While a jury issue of paternity arose from the conflicting evidence, it was undisputed that the child was born during the parties' brief marriage. Consequently, Mrs. Miller was entitled to the benefit of the presumption of legitimacy set forth in OCGA § 19-7-20: (a) All children born in wedlock ....
...Consequently, the trial court's charge erred in casting upon the defendant the ultimate burden of proof. We therefore reverse. [6] *171 Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. Weltner, J., disqualified. NOTES [1] Later in his charge, the trial court judge recited the provisions of OCGA § 19-7-20, relating to the presumption, but did not otherwise instruct the jury as to its effect....
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Mathenia v. Brumbelow, 843 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 2020 | 308 Ga. 714

...Title 19, and now includes matters under “Chapters 6 through 9 of Title 19.” (Emphasis supplied.) In this regard, Article 2 of Chapter 7 of Title 19 deals specifically with “Legitimacy” and the procedures governing legitimation. See OCGA §§ 19-7-20 to 19-7-27....
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In Re White, 333 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 5, 1985 | 254 Ga. 678

...We have long held that when a child is born or conceived in wedlock there is a presumption of legitimacy. Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155 (1852). The legislature has *679 enacted a similar rule but has provided that the strong presumption of legitimacy may be disputed. To overcome the presumption, the proof must be "clear." OCGA § 19-7-20 (b)....
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Veal v. Veal, 281 Ga. 128 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 2006 | 636 S.E.2d 527, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3171

...The legitimation process is not meant to establish legal ties between a step-parent and child. As stated by the Court of Appeals in Clements v. Phillips, “only a [biological] father may bring [a legitimation] action.”4 Husband contends, however, that he legitimated H. under OCGA § 19-7-20 (c), which provides that “[t]he marriage of the mother and reputed father of a child born out of wedlock and the recognition by the father of the child as his shall render the child legitimate.”5 Contrary to husband’s contention, this Code section does not provide a means for a step-parent to legitimate a child....
...band’s visitation rights. OCGA § 19-7-25. OCGA § 19-7-22. 235 Ga. App. 588, 589 (510 SE2d 311) (1998); see also In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 160 (205 SE2d 522) (1974) (“the father alone has the right to legitimate a child”). OCGA § 19-7-20 (c). 276 Ga....
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Jackson v. Jackson, 322 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 27, 1984 | 253 Ga. 576

...trial court that the intervenor was in fact the child of the appellant, and as increasing the burden of proof of the appellant from a preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge, however, is substantially the same as OCGA § 19-7-20, which the appellant requested to be charged, and the case of Herrin v....
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Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 16, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 570

...Riley’s estate. On December 29, 2011, Shalanda filed a motion to intervene and request for heir determination in the probate court, asserting an interest in Mr. Riley’s estate both as a child born to the marriage of Mr. Riley and Mrs. Riley, see OCGA § 19-7-20 (a) (“All children born in wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter are legitimate.”), and, alternatively, based on Mr. Riley’s agreement to be her legal father....
...onel Riley” or “a severance of [Shalanda’s] relationship with her biological father,” Mr. Warren. The court noted that Shalanda’s entitlement to a share of Mr. Riley’s estate therefore would depend solely on her legal claim under OCGA § 19-7-20 (a)....
...2000) (“The doctrine of equitable adoption, despite its name, bears almost no relationship to a statutory legal adoption.”). 4 With regard to this interaction between legal and equitable relief, we note that Shalanda continues to seek legal relief under OCGA § 19-7-20 (a), even though, as the trial court noted, she 11 status arising from and created by a contract where one takes and agrees to legally adopt the child of another, but fails to do so.” 1 Mary F....
...The trial court noted that no prior Georgia case appears to involve an alleged virtual adoption by the child’s “legal” father. However, while Mr. Riley may have been Shalanda’s presumptive legal father because she was born while he was married to her mother, see OCGA § 19-7-20 (a), that presumption could be rebutted by clear proof that Shalanda was in fact Mr. Warren’s child, see § 19-7-20 (b) – and the record indicates that such proof may have existed....

Marquez v. Aguirre (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2025 | 770 S.E.2d 570

...power to designate who holds those rights, and an apparent gap in Georgia law regarding the ability of a stranger to a marriage to challenge the statutory presumption of legitimacy afforded to children born to wedded parents. See generally OCGA § 19-7-20 et seq....
...isplay every indication of a sincere and profound desire to bear the responsibility of fatherhood. 3 In Georgia, a child born to a married woman is presumed to be a legitimate child of the marriage. OCGA § 19-7-20(a). The presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted, however, in limited circumstances. See OCGA § 19-7-20(b) (“Where possibility of access exists, the strong presumption is in favor of legitimacy and the proof must be clear to establish the contrary.”)....
...3 While the legitimation petition process clearly articulates the best interest of the child standard for resolution of the ultimate question of granting the petition for legitimation, it provides no guidance on the question of what 8 OCGA § 19-7-20 et seq....
...And to make matters more confusing, the Code defines a “child born out of wedlock” to include, in relevant part, a “child who is the issue of adulterous intercourse of the wife during wedlock” or a “child who is not legitimate within the meaning of Code Section 19-7-20.” OCGA § 19-7-23....
...The definitional use of the disjunctive “or” notwithstanding, the statutory presumption of legitimacy means that a child can be both the issue of adulterous intercourse by a wife 10 and legitimate under OCGA § 19-7-20....
...Moreover, the historical common and statutory law was so robust in its protection of the presumption, 5 I am not entirely sure whether the definition of a “child born out of wedlock” would properly be understood as applying to a child presumed legitimate under OCGA § 19-7-20....
...to mean a conjunctive. Again, without offering a conclusive reading of the provision and acknowledging the disjunctive nature of the definition, it strikes me as odd and unlikely that the General Assembly would define the same child to be legitimate under OCGA § 19-7-20 but illegitimate under OCGA § 19-7- 23. 11 circumstance....

Sanders v. Riley, Adm'r (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 16, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 570

...Riley’s estate. On December 29, 2011, Shalanda filed a motion to intervene and request for heir determination in the probate court, asserting an interest in Mr. Riley’s estate both as a child born to the marriage of Mr. Riley and Mrs. Riley, see OCGA § 19-7-20 (a) (“All children born in wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter are legitimate.”), and, alternatively, based on Mr. Riley’s agreement to be her legal father....
...of [Shalanda’s] relationship with her biological father,” Mr. Warren. The court 8 noted that Shalanda’s entitlement to a share of Mr. Riley’s estate therefore would depend solely on her legal claim under OCGA § 19-7-20 (a)....
...2000) (“The doctrine of equitable adoption, despite its name, bears almost no relationship to a statutory legal adoption.”). 4 With regard to this interaction between legal and equitable relief, we note that Shalanda continues to seek legal relief under OCGA § 19-7-20 (a), even though, as the trial court noted, she appears to concede that it is at least highly unlikely that she is the biological child of Mr....
...The trial court noted that no prior Georgia case appears to involve an alleged virtual adoption by the child’s “legal” father. However, while Mr. Riley may have been Shalanda’s presumptive legal father because she was born while he was married to her mother, see OCGA § 19-7-20 (a), that presumption could be rebutted by clear proof that Shalanda was in fact Mr. Warren’s child, see OCGA § 19-7-20 (b) — and the record indicates that such proof may have existed....