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O.C.G.A.Title 19Chapter 7

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (2022)

In whom parental power lies; how such power lost; recovery for homicide of child.

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2022 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest cited 1983–2026 237citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 237 opinions since 1983, 36 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (6 cases).

Until a child reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated, the child shall remain under the control of his or her parents, who are entitled to the child's services and the proceeds of the child's labor. In the event that a court has awarded custody of the child to one parent, only the parent who has custody of the child is entitled to the child's services and the proceeds of the child's labor. Parental power shall be lost by: Voluntary contract releasing the right to a third person; Consent to the adoption of the child by a third person; Failure to provide necessaries for the child or abandonment of the child; Consent to the child's receiving the proceeds of his own labor, which consent shall be revocable at any time; Consent to the marriage of the child, who thus assumes inconsistent responsibilities; Cruel treatment of the child; A superior court order terminating parental rights in an adoption proceeding in accordance with Chapter 8 of this title; or A superior court order terminating parental rights of the legal father or the biological father who is not the legal father of the child in a petition for legitimation, a petition to establish paternity, a divorce proceeding, or a custody proceeding pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 5, 8, or 9 of this title, provided that such termination is in the best interest of such child; and provided, further, that this paragraph shall not apply to such termination when a child has been adopted or is conceived by artificial insemination as set forth in Code Section 19-7-21 or when an embryo is adopted as set forth in Article 2 of Chapter 8 of this title. In every case of the homicide of a child, minor or sui juris, there shall be some party entitled to recover the full value of the life of the child, either as provided in this Code section or as provided in Chapter 4 of Title 51 . If the deceased child does not leave a spouse or child, the right of recovery shall be in the parent or parents, if any, given such a right by this paragraph as follows: If the parents are living together and not divorced, the right shall be in the parents jointly; If either parent is deceased, the right shall be in the surviving parent; or If both parents are living but are divorced, separated, or living apart, the right shall be in both parents. However, if the parents are divorced, separated, or living apart and one parent refuses to proceed or cannot be located to proceed to recover for the wrongful death of a child, the other parent shall have the right to contract for representation on behalf of both parents, thereby binding both parents, and the right to proceed on behalf of both parents to recover for the homicide of the child with any ultimate recovery to be shared by the parents as provided in this subsection. Unless a motion is filed as provided in paragraph (6) of this subsection, such a judgment shall be divided equally between the parents by the judgment; and the share of an absent parent shall be held for such time, on such terms, and with such direction for payment if the absent parent is not found as the judgment directs. Payment of a judgment awarded to the parent or parents having the cause of action under this subparagraph or the execution of a release by a parent or parents having a cause of action under this subparagraph shall constitute a full and complete discharge of the judgment debtor or releasee. If, after two years from the date of any recovery, the share of an absent parent has not been paid to the absent parent, the other parent can petition the court for the funds, and the recovery, under appropriate court order, shall be paid over to the parent who initiated the recovery. The intent of this subsection is to provide a right of recovery in every case of the homicide of a child who does not leave a spouse or child. If, in any case, there is no right of action in a parent or parents under the above rules, the right of recovery shall be determined by Code Section 51-4-5. In this subsection the terms "homicide" and "full value of the life" shall have the meaning given them in Chapter 4 of Title 51 . In actions for recovery, the fact that the child was born out of wedlock shall be no bar to recovery. For cases in which the parents of a deceased child are divorced, separated, or living apart, a motion may be filed by either parent prior to trial requesting the judge to apportion fairly any judgment amounts awarded in the case. Where such a motion is filed, a judgment shall not be automatically divided. A postjudgment hearing shall be conducted by the judge at which each parent shall have the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence regarding that parent's relationship with the deceased child. The judge shall fairly determine the percentage of the judgment to be awarded to each parent. In making such a determination, the judge shall consider each parent's relationship with the deceased child, including permanent custody, control, and support, as well as any other factors found to be pertinent. The judge's decision shall not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (b.1)Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the custody of a child between the parents or either parent and a third party limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent, parental power may be lost by the parent, parents, or any other person if the court hearing the issue of custody, in the exercise of its sound discretion and taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, determines that an award of custody to such third party is for the best interest of the child or children and will best promote their welfare and happiness. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the child or children for custody to be awarded to the parent or parents of such child or children, but this presumption may be overcome by a showing that an award of custody to such third party is in the best interest of the child or children. The sole issue for determination in any such case shall be what is in the best interest of the child or children.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 1744; Code 1868, § 1784; Code 1873, § 1793; Code 1882, § 1793; Civil Code 1895, § 2502; Civil Code 1910, § 3021; Code 1933, § 74-108; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 43; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1154, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 619, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1720, § 3; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 19; Ga. L. 1996, p. 412, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1509, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 141, § 4/HB 847; Ga. L. 2010, p. 878, § 19/HB 1387; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-22/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-47/SB 364.)

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENClark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
cites § 19-7-1 98×subsections: (b) 2×cited by 130 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The trial courts found in both cases that it would be in the best interest of each child to remain with his grandparents, but struck down the "best-interest-of-the-child" standard in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) as unconstitutional. We granted the grandparents' discretionary applications…”
The case’s holding
Third party custody may be awarded without a finding of parental unfitness if the third party proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer harm.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the parent is a fit person entitled to custody, (2) a fit parent acts in the best interest of his or her child, and (3) the child's best interest is to be in the custody of a parent.” · 7 citing courts
2
GREENCarringer v. Rodgers, 578 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 2003).
cites § 19-7-1 32×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The trial court reluctantly granted summary judgment to Tant noting that: "OCGA § 19-7-1 grants a right of recovery to the decedent's parent only when the decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child and that OCGA § 51-4-5 `vest(s) the right of recovery in the administrator of…”
The case’s holding
A parent has standing to bring a wrongful death action against a surviving spouse who murdered the decedent child to recover the full value of the child's life.
Later courts cite it for
“the cardinal rule in construing a legislative act, is to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the law, and then to give it that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose.” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENStills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000).
cites § 19-7-1 36×subsections: (b)(1) 10× (b) 2×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“Terry Stills argues that this case is controlled by the best interest of the child standard contained in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1). That code section provides: Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the…”
The case’s holding
A custody determination between non-parents is governed by the best interest of the child standard.
Later courts cite it for
“whether the incarcerated parent has made an effort to communicate with the child and, despite imprisonment, maintain a parental bond in a meaningful, supportive and parental manner.” · 8 citing courts
4
GREENStone v. Stone, 774 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 2015).
cites § 19-7-1 25×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“587, 587-588 ( 544 SE2d 99 ) (2001) (construing OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1)). Moreover, construing the Code as authorizing the State to require a fit and capable parent to share custody of his child with anyone except the child’s other parent would raise significant constitutional…”
The case’s holding
Joint legal custody arrangements under Georgia law are limited to both parents and do not include third parties when a parent is a suitable custodian.
Later courts cite it for
“has clearly indicated that joint custody arrangements do not include third parties when one or both parents are suitable custodians.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENRhone v. Bolden, 608 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 19-7-1 18×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“While ordinarily both parents share equally in the wrongful death judgment, OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(C), one parent may move to apportion the award, and the judge ruling on the motion considers each parent's relationship with the deceased child.”
The case’s holding
The nature of the remedy determines whether a contempt order is civil or criminal rather than the label assigned by the trial court.
Later courts cite it for
“once an act has been determined to constitute contempt of court, the action the court takes to deal with the contempt determines whether the contempt is deemed 'criminal' contempt or 'civil' contempt, a distinction historically made by both appellate courts in this state.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENHoldaway v. Holdaway, 789 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 19-7-1 22×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“Upon entry of the trial court’s written order, the father filed the present appeal, challenging the award of custody to the maternal grandmother.”
Later courts cite it for
“due deference must be given to the trial court, acknowledging that it has the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENStrickland v. Strickland, 783 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2016).
cites § 19-7-1 8×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“Custody disputes between a natural parent and close third-party relatives are governed by OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.l). 2 This statute provides that, in awarding custody, “[t]he sole issue for determination .”
The case’s holding
An appellate court must not set aside a trial court's factual findings in a bench trial unless those findings are clearly erroneous.
Later courts cite it for
“in the appellate review of a bench trial, a trial court's factual findings must not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENTaylor v. Taylor, 623 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 2005).
cites § 19-7-1 24×subsections: (b) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“During the divorce negotiations, husband agreed to voluntarily surrender his parental rights, pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-1, in exchange for wife's agreement to release husband from any child support obligations.”
Later courts cite it for
“the welfare of the child is the controlling factor in the court's determination of custody.' cits.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENRichardson v. Barber, 527 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 19-7-1 40×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The trial court has already heard evidence of the relationship between the grandmother and the child, and neither OCGA § 19-7-1 nor our opinion in Wymbs requires that the trial court give credit to Richardson for such relationship.”
10
GREENWalls v. Walls, 599 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 2004).
cites § 19-7-1 32×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The elder Wallses moved to intervene in the divorce action, as paternal grandparents under OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1), seeking temporary and permanent custody of the child.”
Later courts cite it for
“those third parties allowed to seek custody of a child are 'limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENIn the Interest of C. L., 644 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 19-7-1 18×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The court acknowledged that Lloyd was not one of the limited number of related third parties who may seek custody from a parent under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.l) (which lists grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent), but ruled…”
12
GREENBaskin v. Hale, 787 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 19-7-1 14×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“ParentalpoweroverachildmaybelostpursuanttoOCGA § 19-7-1 (b) (1) by “[vjoluntary contract releasing the right to a third person.”
13
GREENDias v. Boone, 912 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 2025).
cites § 19-7-1 16×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“A plurality of this Court upheld the state’s third-party custody statute, OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1), which explicitly contains a rebuttable presumption that it is in a child’s best interest for custody to be awarded to the child’s parent or parents, only after construing the statute…”
Later courts cite it for
“does not explicitly require trial courts to give deference to a parent's judgment as to the best interests of the child regarding visitation with a third party,” · 1 citing court
14
GREENBlackstone v. Blackstone, 639 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 19-7-1 20×subsections: (b) 2× (b)(6) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“We cannot extend the loss of parental power and resulting loss of wrongful death rights found in OCGA § 19-7-1 to also extinguish the right to inherit as an heir from the decedent's estate.”
Later courts cite it for
“a wrongful death action ... is separate and distinct from a survival action for pain and suffering” · 1 citing court
15
YELLOWOB-Gyn Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 19-7-1 8×cited by 98 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Overruled in part by Lee v. State Farm Mutual Insurance: 1 citing opinion says overruled.
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“OCGA §§ 19-7-1; 51-4-4; 51-4-1. The Court of Appeals found that the claim asserted by Mrs.”
The case’s holding
A claim for emotional distress requires an impact that results in a physical injury or a pecuniary loss resulting from a tort involving an injury to the person.
Later courts cite it for
“the impact which will support a claim for damages for emotional distress must result in a physical injury.” · 7 citing courts
16
GREENBelluso v. Tant, 574 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 19-7-1 14×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“He claims that under OCGA § 19-7-1, he has a legal right to recover for the death of his child.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is within the equitable powers of the superior court to permit the prosecution of the wrongful death action by a parent when the surviving spouse is the alleged wrongdoer” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENWebster v. Wilkins, 456 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 19-7-1 12×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“Webster then reasons that Wilkins' statement that she is not fit to have a child implies an assertion of objective fact which is capable of being proved false because her fitness as a parent could be determined by a court of law pursuant to criteria set forth in OCGA §§ 19-7-1…”
The case’s holding
A statement is not actionable defamation if it is a subjective opinion on a matter where reasonable people might differ and cannot be proven true or false.
Later courts cite it for
“the loss of income, of profits, and even of gratuitous entertainment and hospitality will be special damage if the plaintiff can show that it was caused by the defendant's words.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENJewell v. Mcginnis, 816 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 19-7-1 8×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“to her mother and grandparents and directed the trial court to make the factual findings required under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1). On remand, the trial court entered a new order that contained factual findings and again granted joint legal custody to the mother and grandparents.”
19
GREENAbraham v. Black., 816 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 19-7-1 18×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The Defendants filed a motion to vacate the court's order and transfer the case to the superior court, which was also denied.”
20
GREENAlvarez v. Sills, 365 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. 1988).
cites § 19-7-1 12×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-1
“The majority also ignores the fact that the trial judge found, and wrote in his order, that because of the agreement, the appellee has custody. This finding is supported by the agreement which provides that the appellee would have indefinite custody (1) if the appellant, after…”

Show all 237 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 13 cases in 2016. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.181Ga.3411th Cir.6N.D. Ga.4M.D. Ga.3S.D. Ga.3La. Ct. App.2D.D.C.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 11 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)4 cases
South Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Poe, 480 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr., 46 F.4th 1259 (11th Cir. 2022).
Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr., 69 F.4th 738 (11th Cir. 2023).
Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr., No. 20-14565 (11th Cir. May 23, 2023).
(b)6 cases
Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).“The trial courts found in both cases that it would be in the best interest of each child to remain with his grandparents, but struck down the "best-interest-of-the-child" standard in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) as unconstitutional. We granted the grandparents' discretionary applications…”
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000).“Terry Stills argues that this case is controlled by the best interest of the child standard contained in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1). That code section provides: Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the…”
Taylor v. Taylor, 623 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 2005).“During the divorce negotiations, husband agreed to voluntarily surrender his parental rights, pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-1, in exchange for wife's agreement to release husband from any child support obligations.”
Blackstone v. Blackstone, 639 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).“We cannot extend the loss of parental power and resulting loss of wrongful death rights found in OCGA § 19-7-1 to also extinguish the right to inherit as an heir from the decedent's estate.”
Venticinque v. Lair, 924 S.E.2d 312 (Ga. 2025).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(b)(1)1 case
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000).
(b)(3)1 case
In re Iw, 695 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
(b)(6)1 case
Blackstone v. Blackstone, 639 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).

Show all 237 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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