O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (2019)

In whom parental power lies; how such power lost; recovery for homicide of child.

✓ O.C.G.A.: 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Until a child reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated, the child shall remain under the control of his or her parents, who are entitled to the child's services and the proceeds of the child's labor. In the event that a court has awarded custody of the child to one parent, only the parent who has custody of the child is entitled to the child's services and the proceeds of the child's labor. Parental power shall be lost by: Voluntary contract releasing the right to a third person; Consent to the adoption of the child by a third person; Failure to provide necessaries for the child or abandonment of the child; Consent to the child's receiving the proceeds of his own labor, which consent shall be revocable at any time; Consent to the marriage of the child, who thus assumes inconsistent responsibilities; Cruel treatment of the child; A superior court order terminating parental rights in an adoption proceeding in accordance with Chapter 8 of this title; or A superior court order terminating parental rights of the legal father or the biological father who is not the legal father of the child in a petition for legitimation, a petition to establish paternity, a divorce proceeding, or a custody proceeding pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 5, 8, or 9 of this title, provided that such termination is in the best interest of such child; and provided, further, that this paragraph shall not apply to such termination when a child has been adopted or is conceived by artificial insemination as set forth in Code Section 19-7-21 or when an embryo is adopted as set forth in Article 2 of Chapter 8 of this title. In every case of the homicide of a child, minor or sui juris, there shall be some party entitled to recover the full value of the life of the child, either as provided in this Code section or as provided in Chapter 4 of Title 51 . If the deceased child does not leave a spouse or child, the right of recovery shall be in the parent or parents, if any, given such a right by this paragraph as follows: If the parents are living together and not divorced, the right shall be in the parents jointly; If either parent is deceased, the right shall be in the surviving parent; or If both parents are living but are divorced, separated, or living apart, the right shall be in both parents. However, if the parents are divorced, separated, or living apart and one parent refuses to proceed or cannot be located to proceed to recover for the wrongful death of a child, the other parent shall have the right to contract for representation on behalf of both parents, thereby binding both parents, and the right to proceed on behalf of both parents to recover for the homicide of the child with any ultimate recovery to be shared by the parents as provided in this subsection. Unless a motion is filed as provided in paragraph (6) of this subsection, such a judgment shall be divided equally between the parents by the judgment; and the share of an absent parent shall be held for such time, on such terms, and with such direction for payment if the absent parent is not found as the judgment directs. Payment of a judgment awarded to the parent or parents having the cause of action under this subparagraph or the execution of a release by a parent or parents having a cause of action under this subparagraph shall constitute a full and complete discharge of the judgment debtor or releasee. If, after two years from the date of any recovery, the share of an absent parent has not been paid to the absent parent, the other parent can petition the court for the funds, and the recovery, under appropriate court order, shall be paid over to the parent who initiated the recovery. The intent of this subsection is to provide a right of recovery in every case of the homicide of a child who does not leave a spouse or child. If, in any case, there is no right of action in a parent or parents under the above rules, the right of recovery shall be determined by Code Section 51-4-5. In this subsection the terms "homicide" and "full value of the life" shall have the meaning given them in Chapter 4 of Title 51 . In actions for recovery, the fact that the child was born out of wedlock shall be no bar to recovery. For cases in which the parents of a deceased child are divorced, separated, or living apart, a motion may be filed by either parent prior to trial requesting the judge to apportion fairly any judgment amounts awarded in the case. Where such a motion is filed, a judgment shall not be automatically divided. A postjudgment hearing shall be conducted by the judge at which each parent shall have the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence regarding that parent's relationship with the deceased child. The judge shall fairly determine the percentage of the judgment to be awarded to each parent. In making such a determination, the judge shall consider each parent's relationship with the deceased child, including permanent custody, control, and support, as well as any other factors found to be pertinent. The judge's decision shall not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (b.1)Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the custody of a child between the parents or either parent and a third party limited to grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent, parental power may be lost by the parent, parents, or any other person if the court hearing the issue of custody, in the exercise of its sound discretion and taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, determines that an award of custody to such third party is for the best interest of the child or children and will best promote their welfare and happiness. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the child or children for custody to be awarded to the parent or parents of such child or children, but this presumption may be overcome by a showing that an award of custody to such third party is in the best interest of the child or children. The sole issue for determination in any such case shall be what is in the best interest of the child or children.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 1744; Code 1868, § 1784; Code 1873, § 1793; Code 1882, § 1793; Civil Code 1895, § 2502; Civil Code 1910, § 3021; Code 1933, § 74-108; Ga. L. 1979, p. 466, § 43; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1154, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 619, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1720, § 3; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 19; Ga. L. 1996, p. 412, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1509, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 141, § 4/HB 847; Ga. L. 2010, p. 878, § 19/HB 1387; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-22/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-47/SB 364.)

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 237 cases (36 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001). · cites it 98× “The trial courts found in both cases that it would be in the best interest of each child to remain with his grandparents, but struck down the "best-interest-of-the-child" standard in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) as unconstitutional. We granted the grandparents' discretionary applications…”
Carringer v. Rodgers, 578 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 32× “The trial court reluctantly granted summary judgment to Tant noting that: "OCGA § 19-7-1 grants a right of recovery to the decedent's parent only when the decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child and that OCGA § 51-4-5 `vest(s) the right of recovery in the administrator of…”
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 36× “Terry Stills argues that this case is controlled by the best interest of the child standard contained in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1). That code section provides: Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the…”
Stone v. Stone, 774 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 2015). · cites it 25× “587, 587-588 ( 544 SE2d 99 ) (2001) (construing OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.1)). Moreover, construing the Code as authorizing the State to require a fit and capable parent to share custody of his child with anyone except the child’s other parent would raise significant constitutional…”
Rhone v. Bolden, 608 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 18× “While ordinarily both parents share equally in the wrongful death judgment, OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(C), one parent may move to apportion the award, and the judge ruling on the motion considers each parent's relationship with the deceased child.”
Holdaway v. Holdaway, 789 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 22× “Upon entry of the trial court’s written order, the father filed the present appeal, challenging the award of custody to the maternal grandmother.”
Strickland v. Strickland, 783 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 8× “Custody disputes between a natural parent and close third-party relatives are governed by OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.l). 2 This statute provides that, in awarding custody, “[t]he sole issue for determination .”
Taylor v. Taylor, 623 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 24× “During the divorce negotiations, husband agreed to voluntarily surrender his parental rights, pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-1, in exchange for wife's agreement to release husband from any child support obligations.”
Richardson v. Barber, 527 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 40× “The trial court has already heard evidence of the relationship between the grandmother and the child, and neither OCGA § 19-7-1 nor our opinion in Wymbs requires that the trial court give credit to Richardson for such relationship.”
Walls v. Walls, 599 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 32× “The elder Wallses moved to intervene in the divorce action, as paternal grandparents under OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1), seeking temporary and permanent custody of the child.”
In the Interest of C. L., 644 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 18× “The court acknowledged that Lloyd was not one of the limited number of related third parties who may seek custody from a parent under OCGA § 19-7-1 (b.l) (which lists grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent), but ruled…”
Baskin v. Hale, 787 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 14× “ParentalpoweroverachildmaybelostpursuanttoOCGA § 19-7-1 (b) (1) by “[vjoluntary contract releasing the right to a third person.”
19-7-1(6): 1 case
Richardson v. Barber, 527 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “The trial court has already heard evidence of the relationship between the grandmother and the child, and neither OCGA § 19-7-1 nor our opinion in Wymbs requires that the trial court give credit to Richardson for such relationship.”
19-7-1(a): 4 cases
South Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Poe, 480 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr., 46 F.4th 1259 (11th Cir. 2022).
Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr., 69 F.4th 738 (11th Cir. 2023).
19-7-1(b): 6 cases
Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001). “The trial courts found in both cases that it would be in the best interest of each child to remain with his grandparents, but struck down the "best-interest-of-the-child" standard in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1) as unconstitutional. We granted the grandparents' discretionary applications…”
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000). “Terry Stills argues that this case is controlled by the best interest of the child standard contained in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1). That code section provides: Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the…”
Taylor v. Taylor, 623 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 2005). “During the divorce negotiations, husband agreed to voluntarily surrender his parental rights, pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-1, in exchange for wife's agreement to release husband from any child support obligations.”
Blackstone v. Blackstone, 639 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
Venticinque v. Lair (Ga. 2025).
19-7-1(b)(1): 1 case
Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000). “Terry Stills argues that this case is controlled by the best interest of the child standard contained in OCGA § 19-7-1(b.1). That code section provides: Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section or any other law to the contrary, in any action involving the…”
19-7-1(b)(3): 1 case
In Re Iw, 695 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
19-7-1(b)(6): 1 case
Blackstone v. Blackstone, 639 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
19-7-1(c): 5 cases
Carringer v. Rodgers, 578 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 2003). “The trial court reluctantly granted summary judgment to Tant noting that: "OCGA § 19-7-1 grants a right of recovery to the decedent's parent only when the decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child and that OCGA § 51-4-5 `vest(s) the right of recovery in the administrator of…”
OB-Gyn Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989).
Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, 653 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Marcus Miller v. Sarita Wilcoxson (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
19-7-1(c)(1): 6 cases
Dammarell v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005).
South Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Poe, 480 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Baragona v. Kuwait Gulf Link Transp. Co., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
Roberts v. Aderhold, 615 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
Crockett v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
19-7-1(c)(2): 4 cases
Rhone v. Bolden, 608 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “While ordinarily both parents share equally in the wrongful death judgment, OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(C), one parent may move to apportion the award, and the judge ruling on the motion considers each parent's relationship with the deceased child.”
McDavid v. McDavid (Bankr. W.D. La. 2022).
19-7-1(c)(2)(B): 2 cases
Dammarell v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005).
Jahn v. Wilson Freight Lines, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
19-7-1(c)(2)(C): 4 cases
Rhone v. Bolden, 608 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “While ordinarily both parents share equally in the wrongful death judgment, OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(C), one parent may move to apportion the award, and the judge ruling on the motion considers each parent's relationship with the deceased child.”
Richardson v. Barber, 527 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “The trial court has already heard evidence of the relationship between the grandmother and the child, and neither OCGA § 19-7-1 nor our opinion in Wymbs requires that the trial court give credit to Richardson for such relationship.”
Marcus Miller v. Sarita Wilcoxson (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
McDavid v. McDavid (Bankr. W.D. La. 2022).
19-7-1(c)(3): 1 case
Carringer v. Rodgers, 578 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 2003). “The trial court reluctantly granted summary judgment to Tant noting that: "OCGA § 19-7-1 grants a right of recovery to the decedent's parent only when the decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child and that OCGA § 51-4-5 `vest(s) the right of recovery in the administrator of…”
19-7-1(c)(6): 3 cases
Richardson v. Barber, 527 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). “The trial court has already heard evidence of the relationship between the grandmother and the child, and neither OCGA § 19-7-1 nor our opinion in Wymbs requires that the trial court give credit to Richardson for such relationship.”
Rhone v. Bolden, 608 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “While ordinarily both parents share equally in the wrongful death judgment, OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(C), one parent may move to apportion the award, and the judge ruling on the motion considers each parent's relationship with the deceased child.”
Marcus Miller v. Sarita Wilcoxson (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.