CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 8, 1999 | 270 Ga. 811
...Miller also moved to dismiss the question of the construction of the trust "equalization" provisions, arguing that the issue was not ripe for decision; Walker did not oppose dismissal of the issue. The superior court granted Walker's motion for summary judgment, citing OCGA §
19-8-19, [2] the present law providing for the effect of a decree of adoption, finding that the Doe children ceased to be N.J.'s descendants upon their adoptions and were no longer members of the class of beneficiaries of the trust....
...t vested at the trust's inception in 1988 before their adoptions occurred; that the children retained their interests after their adoptions *25 because their interests were absolutely and indefeasibly fixed and determined; and that to interpret OCGA §
19-8-19 to divest such vested interests would result in an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. I and X of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. However, the arguments are unavailing. The express provisions of OCGA §
19-8-19 make plain that the legislature intended that following adoption there be a complete substitution of families for the adopted individual....
...f contact; in a case such as this one, in which it has been determined that the children's new identities and whereabouts must not be disclosed, this contact could have serious consequences for the welfare of the adopted children. [4] Moreover, OCGA §
19-8-19 on its face is not vulnerable to the charge that it works a deprivation of property rights for it conveys upon the adopted individual full rights and privileges as a biological child of the petitioner....
...d to take, in the absence of an express contrary *26 intent. See Thomas at 693(1),
279 S.E.2d 440. Former OCGA §
19-8-14, in effect at the times of execution of the trust and the settlor's death in 1988, contained provisions similar to present OCGA §
19-8-19, severing all former familial relationships of the adopted child....
...y benefit Nancy Jean and her living children. Not only does the majority misconstrue the settlor's intent, but it also wrongly applies the state's adoption statute to divest the adopted grandchildren of rights that vested before their adoption. OCGA §
19-8-19 provides that an adoption decree makes the adopted individual a stranger to his former relatives, "for all purposes, including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed bef...
...reasonably thinks are necessary in order to locate and make contact with N.J., including the employment of professional tracers, and a decision on its part that it has been unable to locate N.J. is to be final and conclusive on all parties. [2] OCGA §
19-8-19 provides: (a) A decree of adoption, whether issued by a court of this state or by a court of any other jurisdiction, shall have the following effect as to matters within the jurisdiction of or before a court in this state: (1) Except with...
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 20, 2022 | 315 Ga. 304
...ut
providing notice to Alford or the trial court.4
In October 2019, Barnhill moved to dismiss Alford’s petition for
grandparent visitation, arguing that Katheryn’s adoption severed
all legal ties between Alford and the Child under OCGA §
19-8-195
and that Alford had “no standing” to prosecute her action for
grandparent visitation under OCGA §
19-7-3 (b) (2).6 Barnhill also
moved to dismiss Alford’s petition on the theory that the petition
was prematurely filed in violat...
...——————————
4 On November 5, 2019, Katheryn moved to be added as a party-
defendant to the grandparent visitation action due to her adoption of the Child.
The motion was granted on November 19, 2019.
5 Pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-19, “a decree of adoption shall terminate all
legal relationships between the adopted individual and his or her relatives,
including his or her parent, so that the adopted individual thereafter shall be
a stranger to his or her former rela...
...(“[a]ny family member shall
have the right to intervene in and seek to obtain visitation rights . .
. whenever there has been an adoption in which the adopted child
has been adopted by . . . a stepparent, notwithstanding the
provisions of Code Section
19-8-19”), but Alford did not do so. And,
thus, as soon as the adoption was finalized, Katheryn became the
legal mother of the Child and Alford became a legal stranger to the
Child as a matter of law. See OCGA §
19-8-19 (a) (1) (“[A] decree of
adoption shall terminate all legal relationships between the adopted
individual and his or her relatives ....
...rights in order to address this apparent scrivener’s error.
30
BETHEL, Justice, concurring specially.
While I am dubious that the ultimate holding of Fielder is
correct when it is considered alongside OCGA §
19-8-19 (a) (1), the
Barnhills did not challenge the portion of the trial court’s decision
finding standing as recognized in that case....
...ld without
providing notice to Alford or the court where Alford’s petition for
visitation was pending. See OCGA §
19-7-3 (b) (2). The adoption
decree resulted in the termination of the legal relationship between
Alford and the Child. See OCGA §
19-8-19.
Despite the legal, personal, and practical consequences flowing
from the adoption proceeding, the Barnhills failed to inform Alford
and the trial court of the filing, pendency, and finalization of the
adoption....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 12, 2004 | 278 Ga. 206, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2339
...g the grandparents of that minor. [3] Conner argues that the Wallses are no longer the grandparents of his daughter, and therefore can no longer seek custody of her under OCGA §
19-7-1(b.1). He relies upon OCGA §
19-8-21(b), which states that OCGA §
19-8-19 applies to *175 an adult adoption....
...nstruction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after the adoption is decreed, which do not expressly include the individual by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship.... OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1)....
...ne under OCGA §
19-7-1(b.1) in the divorce custody matter. However, this argument ignores the fact that the intervention, and a court order granting temporary custody, have already occurred. And because of that fact, even if it is assumed that OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) operates so as to affect relationships other than those of the adoptee, the specific statutory language of the Code section would exclude this situation from the operation of that statute. Under OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1), an adoption does not affect those "documents" and "instruments" which "expressly include the individual by name." Here, the individual at issue, the child, [5] is specifically named in the petition for intervention under OCGA §
19-7-1(b.1), and in the court's interlocutory custody order. [6] Thus, Conner's argument must fail; OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) cannot be read to extinguish the legal status that the Wallses held in this case....
...Walls (Grandparents) in John Conner's divorce action, and in setting aside the award to them of temporary custody of his child. I do not, however, agree with the rationale used by the majority to arrive at that result. Resolution of this case is controlled by OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that a decree of adoption terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his relatives, including his parent, so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his fo...
...l v. Holcomb,
193 Ga.App. 474,
388 S.E.2d 65 (1989) (adoption of grandchild terminates grandparent's visitation rights). The trial court agreed with his interpretation of the scope of the statute. The majority reverses, concluding that, [u]nder OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1), an adoption does not affect those "documents" and "instruments" which "expressly include the individual by name." Here, the individual at issue, the child, is specifically named in the petition for intervention under OCGA §
19-7-1(b.1), and in the court's interlocutory custody order. Thus, ... OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) cannot be read to extinguish the legal status that the [Grandparents] held in this case. Majority opinion, pp. 174-175. The fallacy that I perceive in the majority's analysis is that, under its express wording, OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) applies only to those "documents" and "instruments" which have been "executed." To "execute," when used in connection with such terms, means "[t]o make (a legal document) valid by signing; to bring (a legal document) into its final, legally enforceable form...." Black's Law Dictionary, p....
...Pleadings and orders are filed, not executed. To "file" means "[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record...." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 642 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, I believe that OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) uses "documents" in the limited sense of "deeds, agreements, title papers, letters, receipts, and other written instruments used to prove a fact [,]" whereas "instruments" refers only to those "written legal document[s] that define[...
...ess itself. Thus, I disagree with today's opinion, to the extent that it constitutes authority for construing "documents" and "instruments" as inclusive of pleadings and orders. Had the General Assembly intended such an expansive application of OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1), it would have used those judicial terms and would not have limited "documents" and "instruments" to those which were "executed." In my opinion, the proper focus in the interpretation of OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) should not be on "documents" and "instruments," but on whether the termination of Grandparents' relationship with Conner's child is one of the "purposes" the statute contemplates that the decree of adoption can serve....
...Adoption is a right which did not exist at common law, and is statutory in origin. Johnson v. Eidson,
235 Ga. 820, 821,
221 S.E.2d 813 (1976). A statute should be read in accordance with the natural and obvious import of its language. State v. Johnson,
269 Ga. 370, 371(1),
499 S.E.2d 56 (1998). As previously noted, OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) provides that an adoption decree "terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his relatives, including his parent, so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes...." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, by its express language, OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) evinces a legislative intent to limit its applicability to severance of the familial relationships of the adoptee only....
...iological connection with the grandchild. However, that is a distinction without a difference. At the time his adult adoption proceeding was initiated, both Conner and his child had the equivalent of a biological relationship with Grandparents. OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(2)....
...[G]rand[parents] and, as pointed out above, no judgment has operated on him, with the statutorily required consent of his parents, to sever that tie in favor of an adoptive family. Worley v. Worley, supra at 864. Therefore, I submit that the proper construction and application of OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1) results in the termination of Conner's legal relationship with Grandparents, but the termination of Grandparents' legal relationship with the child is beyond the scope of the Code section....
...f a minor child's parent whose parental rights have been terminated." However, OCGA §
19-7-3(a) states that this definition of "grandparent" applies as the term is "used in this Code section." Because of our analysis based upon the language of OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1), we need not determine whether the definition found in OCGA §
19-7-3(a) applies to OCGA §
19-7-1(b.1). [5] OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1)'s language concerning the inclusion of "the individual by name" apparently refers to the adopted individual....
...[6] Because the statute does not operate as to those documents which identify a person by name, the statute's statement that it affects those documents executed prior to the adoption does not apply in this instance. [7] Given our resolution of this case, we need not determine whether OCGA §
19-8-19(a)(1)'s statement that all legal relationships between an adopted person are terminated so that he is "thereafter a stranger to his former relatives" will operate, as a general matter, to terminate those relationships that are calculated t...
