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O.C.G.A.Title 19Chapter 7

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43 (2022)

Petition; by whom brought; effect of agreement on right to bring petition; stay pending birth of child; court order for blood tests; genetic tests

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2022 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest cited 1983–2022 32citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 32 opinions since 1983, 3 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (d) (3 cases).

(a) A petition to establish the paternity of a child may be brought by:

(1) The child;

(2) The mother of the child;

(3) Any relative in whose care the child has been placed;

(4) The Department of Human Services in the name of and for the benefit of a child for whom public assistance is received or in the name of and for the benefit of a child not the recipient of public services whose custodian has applied for services for the child; or

(5) One who is alleged to be the father.

(b) Regardless of its terms, an agreement, other than an agreement approved by the court in accordance with this article, between an alleged or presumed father and the mother or child does not bar a petition under this Code section.

(c) If a petition under this article is brought before the birth of the child, all proceedings shall be stayed until after the birth except service of process, discovery, and the taking of depositions.

(d) In any case in which the paternity of a child or children has not been established, the court, either on its own motion or on the motion of any party, may order the mother, the alleged father, and the child or children to submit to genetic tests as specified in Code Section 19-7-45. Such motion, if made by a party, shall be supported by a sworn statement alleging paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasonable possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties or denying paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasonable possibility of the nonexistence of sexual contact between the parties. Appropriate orders shall be issued by the court. The court shall grant a party’s motion unless it finds a good excuse for noncooperation.

(e) In any case for the collection of child support involving the Department of Human Services in which the paternity of a child or children has not been established or in which the individual receiving services alleges that paternity rests in a person other than the previously established father, the Department of Human Services shall order genetic testing of the mother, the alleged father, and the child or children as specified in Code Section 19-7-45. No genetic testing shall be undertaken by the Department of Human Services if the child was adopted either by the applicant for services or other alleged parent or if the child was conceived by means of artificial insemination. The need for genetic testing shall be supported by a sworn statement alleging paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasonable possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties. The parties shall be given notice and an opportunity to contest the order before the Department of Human Services prior to the testing or the imposition of any noncooperation sanction.

(f) In any case in which the court or the Department of Human Services orders genetic testing and one or both of the parties to the action is receiving child support services pursuant to Code Section 19-11-6, the Department of Human Services shall pay the costs of such tests subject to recoupment from the alleged father if paternity is established. If the genetic test excludes the possibility of the alleged father being the biological father, then the applicant for services who named the alleged father shall be liable to the Department of Human Services for reimbursement of the paternity testing fee. Upon completion of the first test, but prior to the entry of any order, a second genetic test shall be ordered if the person making the request tenders payment in full of the cost of the initial test as well as the cost of the second test at the time of the request. Any party who, after notice sent by mail to his or her last known address, fails to cooperate with paternity testing or fails to make any child available for paternity testing may be sanctioned by the Department of Human Services. Such sanctions may include but shall not be limited to loss of the opportunity for paternity testing, loss of state benefits, denial of services, and administrative case closure. The Department of Human Services may bring a petition for contempt in the event of such noncooperation in violation of any court order.

History

Code 1933, § 74-304, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1374, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 279, § 3; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1613, § 17; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1247, § 4; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 2-2/HB 228; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1433, § 1/HB 568; Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 6/SB 64.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 18/SB 64, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall not be construed to affect a voluntary acknowledgment of legitimation that was valid under the former provisions of Code Section 19-7-21.1, nor any of the rights or responsibilities

flowing therefrom, if it was executed on or before June 30, 2016.” Law reviews. For article, “Georgia Inheritance Rights of Children Born Out of Wedlock,” see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 28 (1986). For note, “Surrogate Mother Agreements in Georgia: Conflict and Accord with Statutory and Case Law,” see 4 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 153 (1988). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 121 (1997). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 103 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - Statutory scheme for paternity actions set forth in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43 et seq. is not unconstitutional, notwithstanding the contention that the statutes create an improper gender-based classification that permits a male to be adjudged to be the father of a child and ordered to make corresponding child support payments without according him the same parental rights which automatically enure to the mother of that same child since: (1) the paternity statutes recognize the intrinsic differences in the circumstances of fathers and mothers of illegitimate children and eliminated the gender-based discrimination of the common law, which placed a duty of support on the mother, but not on the father; and (2) a father can achieve the same benefits as the mother by acknowledging a child as his own and filing a counterclaim for legitimation. Palmer v. Bertrand, 273 Ga. 475, 541 S.E.2d 360, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 62, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951, 122 S. Ct. 346, 151 L. Ed. 2d 262, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9490 (2001). Marriage to mother and recognition of child post birth. - Defendant became the legal father of the child by operation of law when the defendant married the mother after the child was born and recognized the child as the defendant’s own. Poe v. Cantrell, 361 Ga. App.

607, 863 S.E.2d 405, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 525 (2021). Not applicable to probate court proceedings involving descent and distribution. - In a proceeding for year’s support by the purported widow of a decedent on behalf of herself and her child, the widow incorrectly relied on O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43 to support her claim that the administrator of the decedent’s estate did not have standing to bring a petition to establish the paternity of the widow’s child as that statute was not applicable to probate court proceedings involving estate descent and distribution issues. Crowther v. Estate of Crowther, 258 Ga. App. 498, 574 S.E.2d 607, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1494 (2002). Putative father waived venue rights by choosing the county of the residence of the mother and the child and deciding to forego filing his action in the county of his own residence. Holcomb v. Ellis, 259 Ga. 625, 385 S.E.2d 670, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 508 (1989). Delay in pursuing paternity. - After the lapse of thirteen years, public policy forbids the court from becoming involved in a paternity suit when the plaintiff had an opportunity in 1983 to establish paternity even though the plaintiff alleges that the delay was partially a result of his reliance on counsel’s correspondence.

Grice v. Detwiler, 227 Ga. App. 280, 488 S.E.2d 755, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 905 (1997). Delay in filing legitimation petition. - Appellate court rejected a father’s contention that the juvenile court erred in holding that a delay in instituting legitimation proceedings justified a finding that the father abandoned his opportunity interest as the father’s reason for the delay, specifically, waiting to obtain the results of genetic testing, was not a condition precedent to filing a legitimation petition; moreover, even with the delay, the father could have filed his legitimation petition and then sought court-ordered genetic testing. In the Interest of J.L.E., 281 Ga. App. 805, 637 S.E.2d 446, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1253 (2006). Genetic testing not required. - Father failed to establish that the trial court was required to complete genetic testing prior to ruling on the issue of paternity. Ross v. Small, 355 Ga. App. 483, 844 S.E.2d 535, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 336 (2020). Order requiring a parent to submit to genetic testing erroneous and not supported. - In an action wherein a juvenile court approved the state’s plan for nonreunification of two twin children, the juvenile court erred by ordering a parent to submit to genetic testing and by holding that the parent lacked standing in any future related proceedings until that parent submitted to such testing as the parent had married the children’s other parent and recognized the children as the parent’s own. Further, the Department of

Family and Children Services failed to fully comply with O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43(d) by not supporting the motion with a sworn statement either alleging or denying the parent’s paternity. In the Interest of T.W., 288 Ga. App. 386, 654 S.E.2d 218, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1210 (2007). Trial court’s order requiring that an alleged father and a mother submit to paternity blood testing was erroneous because the doctrine of res judicata clearly proscribed the trial court’s reconsideration of the issue of paternity; an unappealed and unmodified final order establishing paternity and child support, which was predicated on the parties’ settlement agreement and paternity acknowledgment expressly consented to by the father, adjudged that he was the father of the mother’s child, and while the father moved to set aside the final order, the trial court found that he had failed to meet his burden of disestablishing paternity under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-54 and denied the motion. Venable v. Parker, 307 Ga. App. 880, 706 S.E.2d 211, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (2011). Agreement waiving support following artificial insemination. - Because the trial court by the court’s judgment of dismissal enforced a contract under which a mother relinquished her right to hold a sperm donor responsible for any resulting child as a valid contract, there was no violation of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43(b) for lack of a court order approving the contract. Brown v. Gadson, 288 Ga. App. 323, 654 S.E.2d 179, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1197 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0456, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 236 (Ga. Feb. 25, 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Illegitimate Children, §§ 36, 38, 39. C.J.S. 14 C.J.S., Children Out-of-Wedlock, § 89 et seq. ALR. Admissibility or compellability of blood

test to establish testee’s nonpaternity for purpose of challenging testee’s parental rights, 87 A.L.R.4th 572. Right of illegitimate child to maintain action to determine paternity, 86 A.L.R.5th 637.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 19-7-43 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENWorthington v. Worthington, 301 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. 1983).
cites § 19-7-43 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“” OCGA § 19-7-43 (b) (Code Ann. § 74-304). If § 19-7-24 (Code Ann.”
Later courts cite it for
“children . . . are not property, and absent a clear legislative declaration otherwise their support rights may not be bartered away by their parents. cits.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENLaBrec v. Davis, 534 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 19-7-43 8×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“No evidence suggests otherwise. LaBrec not only made a full commitment to the parental duties and responsibilities for rearing Denver, but also undertook legal action to legitimate Denver as his son.”
3
GREENBarnhill v. Alford, 882 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. 2022).
cites § 19-7-43 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“————————————————————— 1 Pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-43 (a) (5), “[a] petition to establish the paternity of a child may be brought by .”
4
GREENBrown v. Gadson, 654 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 19-7-43 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“678, 678-679 ( 250 SE2d 14 ) (1978)), and (ii) failed to approve the agreement of the parties under OCGA § 19-7-43 (b) (providing, among other things, that a petition to establish the paternity of a child may be barred upon a court-approved agreement between the “alleged or…”
5
GREENHolcomb v. Ellis, 385 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 19-7-43 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“She asserted that the complaint should be brought as a paternity action under OCGA § 19-7-43, that the Glynn County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such a paternity action, and that the venue was inappropriate in Glynn County.”
6
GREENGrice v. Detwiler, 488 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 19-7-43 4×subsections: (a)(5) 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“He later amended the petition to include requests to establish paternity, see OCGA § 19-7-43 (a) (5), and for the court to order blood tests to resolve any doubt as to paternity, see OCGA § 19-7-45.”
Later courts cite it for
“the disestablishment of legitimacy and paternity.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENGhrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“For instance, while the legislature enacted a statute allowing a father to petition to legitimate a child, it enacted no statute specifically providing for the de-legitimation of a child.”
The case’s holding
Parties to stipulations and agreements entered into during judicial proceedings are estopped from taking positions inconsistent with those agreements (collateral estoppel applies to statements of paternity in settlement agreements).
Later courts cite it for
“we have held time and time again that the court must consider the best interest and welfare of the child before granting a legitimation petition, and that it is not bound by the desires and contentions of the biological parents” · 1 citing court
8
GREENIn the Interest of J. L. E., 637 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“See OCGA §§ 19-7-43 (d); 19-7-45. And, a DFCS caseworker testified at the legitimation hearing that she advised appellant about the legitimation process shortly after J.”
Later courts cite it for
“because appellant failed to legitimate the child, he lacked standing to challenge the termination of his parental rights” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENDep't of Human Resources v. Mitchell, 501 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 19-7-43 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“The authority for DHR to bring a paternity action in the name of and for the benefit of a child is given in OCGA § 19-7-43 (a) (4). OCGA §§ 19-7-43 (d) and 19-7-45 mandate that the court order genetic tests to determine paternity unless “good cause” is shown why the genetic…”
Later courts cite it for
“the right of a child to support belongs to the child and cannot be waived by a parent” · 1 citing court
10
GREENNeill v. Brannon, 738 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“805, 806-807 ( 637 SE2d 446 ) (2006) (obtaining the results of genetic testing is not a condition precedent to filing a legitimation petition under OCGA § 19-7-22); see OCGA §§ 19-7-43 (d); 19-7-45. Consequently, we conclude that the undisputed evidence establishes that Brannon…”
The case’s holding
Where the evidence shows an unwed biological father abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his child, the court may deny his legitimation petition on that basis alone.
Later courts cite it for
“if the evidence supports a finding that the unwed father has abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his biological child, then the court is authorized to end its inquiry and to deny the legitimation petition on that basis.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENDep't of Human Resources v. Fleeman, 439 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1994).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“” Rather, we find that the judicial proceeding referred to in this section is one for the specific purpose of determining paternity, see OCGA § 19-7-43, or one in which the issue of paternity was clearly raised and litigated by the parties, and determined by the finder of fact.”
The case’s holding
Collateral estoppel does not bar a state agency from pursuing child support claims on behalf of a child who was not a party to a prior divorce proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“collateral estoppel precludes readjudication of an issue previously adjudicated between the parties or their privies in another action” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENRodriguez v. Nunez, 555 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“” Nunez prayed for a declaration pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-49 (a) that Rivas was Hilda’s father and an order “requiring genetic testing of the decedent and Plaintiff pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-7-43, 19-7-45, and 19-7-46.” Rivas, who was in Georgia on a work visa when he died, is…”
Later courts cite it for
“there is no magic in the title given to the complaint; under our rules of pleading, it is substance and not mere nomenclature that controls.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENVenable v. Parker, 706 S.E.2d 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 19-7-43 4×subsections: (d) 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“On appeal, Venable argues that the trial court lacked authority to order the genetic testing, given the court’s denial of Parker’s motion to set aside the Paternity Acknowledgment and Final Order.”
14
GREENBrown v. Dep't of Human Resources, 418 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“Regardless how denominated, appellant’s complaint clearly constituted a petition to establish the paternity of a child, which appellant as the alleged father was entitled to institute.”
Later courts cite it for
“appeals arising out of paternity petitions are domestic relations cases which require compliance with the discretionary appeal procedure of ocga 5-6-35.” · 9 citing courts
15
GREENHenry v. Beacham, 686 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“14 Finally, we find unpersuasive Henry’s argument that the trust corpus is too large; Henry has not pointed to any specific calculation error made by the trial court in determining the amount of corpus, and in light of the facts presented to the trial court, we do not, without…”
16
GREENPalmer v. Bertrand, 541 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. 2001).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“Palmer moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statutory scheme for paternity actions set forth in OCGA § 19-7-43 et seq. is unconstitutional.”
17
GREENIn the Interest of T. W., 654 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“Furthermore, although DFCS moved the court to order Tatum to submit to genetic testing to establish paternity, there is no evidence in the record that DFCS supported its motion with a sworn statement either alleging or denying his paternity as required by OCGA § 19-7-43 (d).…”
Later courts cite it for
“public policy is not advanced by the disestablishment of legitimacy and paternity.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENCrowther v. Est. of Crowther, 574 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“Among other things, Crowther argues that under OCGA § 19-7-43 Powell does not have standing to bring a petition to establish paternity, and that it does not appear that the genetic test was conducted in accordance with requirements set forth in OCGA § 19-7-45.”
19
GREENBrewton v. Poss, 728 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“And subsection (g), applicable to suits for paternity under OCGA § 19-7-43 (a) (4), explicitly state that an alleged father may file a third-party action for legitimation as part of his response to the paternity suit.”
20
GREENDep't of Human Resources v. Carlton, 329 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 19-7-43 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 19-7-43
“OCGA § 19-7-43 (4) authorizes DHR to bring a petition to establish the paternity of a child for whom public assistance has been furnished or whose custodian has applied for assistance for the child.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320022022

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2007. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.24Ga.7La. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(a)(5)1 case
Grice v. Detwiler, 488 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).“He later amended the petition to include requests to establish paternity, see OCGA § 19-7-43 (a) (5), and for the court to order blood tests to resolve any doubt as to paternity, see OCGA § 19-7-45.”
(d)3 cases
Venable v. Parker, 706 S.E.2d 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).“On appeal, Venable argues that the trial court lacked authority to order the genetic testing, given the court’s denial of Parker’s motion to set aside the Paternity Acknowledgment and Final Order.”
In re Tw, 654 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
In re Jle, 637 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).

Show all 32 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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