Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 74-405 and former § 19-8-2, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

In matters of adoption, superior courts have very broad discretion which will not be controlled by appellate courts except in cases of plain abuse. Johnson v. Taylor, 153 Ga. App. 15, 264 S.E.2d 512 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Proceeding instituted under this chapter is purely statutory and does not fall within classification of any cases of which Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Criswell v. Jones, 187 Ga. 55, 199 S.E. 804 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405); Herrin v. Graham, 209 Ga. 281, 71 S.E.2d 550 (1952); Hendrix v. Hunter, 214 Ga. 722, 107 S.E.2d 195 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405);(decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Natural parent is not a party defendant to adoption proceedings. Thus, the requirement that the petition for adoption be filed in the county where the adopting parents reside, as provided for in former Code 1933, § 74-405, was not in conflict with the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which requires that venue in civil cases be in the county where the defendants reside. Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d 23, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872, 102 S. Ct. 342, 70 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Natural parents' residence immaterial.

- Venue is proper when the adoption petition has been filed in the county in which the adopting parents reside, regardless of where the natural parents reside. Spires v. Bittick, 171 Ga. App. 914, 321 S.E.2d 407 (1984) (decided under former § 19-8-2, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 1).

Residence or domicile of child in this state is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to adoption if adoption proceeding is brought in county of adopting parents' residence. Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 275 S.E.2d 769 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Jurisdiction of adoption during deprivation proceeding in juvenile court.

- Superior court has exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters and had jurisdiction to entertain adoption petition notwithstanding pendency of deprivation proceedings in the juvenile court involving the same child. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234 (1992).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the court had jurisdiction over adoption and termination of parental rights proceeding as statutory law granted the trial court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and other proceedings that were not granted exclusively to the juvenile courts; since the juvenile courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, those types of matters were to be heard by the juvenile courts, but the trial court had the authority to hear adoption and other matters, such as the adoptive parents' adoption petition filed to adopt the biological parents' minor child. Snyder v. Carter, 276 Ga. App. 426, 623 S.E.2d 241 (2005).

Jurisdiction properly exercised.

- Trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction in a petition for adoption because the Georgia Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., did not govern adoption proceedings. Barr v. Gregor, 316 Ga. App. 269, 728 S.E.2d 868 (2012).

Actions not brought in connection with adoption proceeding.

- Proceeding for termination of parental rights brought for the purpose of awarding custody to the Department of Family and Children Services so that children could be placed for adoption some time in the future was not brought in connection with a petition for adoption; therefore, jurisdiction was proper in the juvenile court. In re C.D.C., 230 Ga. App. 237, 495 S.E.2d 872 (1998).

Welfare and best interests of child in custody disputes.

- Court, having jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to fullest extent granted the court under adoption statute, and is confronted with one paramount question, which, in all controversies or proceedings for custody of children, is welfare and best interests of child. Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291, 73 S.E.2d 572 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 275 S.E.2d 769 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Termination of father's parental rights.

- Trial court had jurisdiction over an action to terminate a father's parental rights pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2, which granted exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and made venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside. Rokowski v. Gilbert, 275 Ga. App. 305, 620 S.E.2d 509 (2005).

Error to grant adoption petition.

- Because the evidence showed that the child's needs could be equally met in either the mother's or the grandparent's home, the trial court abused the court's discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-10(a), (b)(1), (2), and § 15-11- 94(b)(4) and granting the grandmother's and the step-grandfather's petition for adoption under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2. McCollum v. Jones, 274 Ga. App. 815, 619 S.E.2d 313 (2005).

Construction with other law.

- Trial court erred in denying an aunt and uncle's petition to adopt their nephew under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-8, and should have applied O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7 as: (1) the former was not intended to be a general rule regarding the adoption of foreign children; (2) the aunt and uncle satisfied the jurisdictional and venue requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2 by filing the adoption petition in the superior court of their county of residence; and (3) as the child's aunt and uncle, they were relatives eligible to adopt under § 19-8-7(a). In re Adoption of D.J.F.M., 284 Ga. App. 420, 643 S.E.2d 879 (2007).

Full faith and credit.

- Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant full faith and credit to a Georgia court's judgment of adoption making the petitioner a legal parent of the children that the petititoner and the respondent had raised together where neither the statute upon which it relied, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-5(a), nor the Georgia courts indicated that the statute was jurisdictional and, thus, there was nothing to rebut the presumption that the Georgia judgment was issued by a court with jurisdiction. V.L. v. E.L., U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1017, 194 L. Ed. 2d 92 (2016).

Cited in Weems v. Saul, 52 Ga. App. 470, 183 S.E. 661 (1936); Mulligan v. Wingard, 72 Ga. App. 539, 34 S.E.2d 305 (1945); Cons v. Wipert, 207 Ga. 621, 63 S.E.2d 370 (1951); Wheeler v. Howard, 212 Ga. 553, 93 S.E.2d 723 (1956); Carpenter v. Forshee, 103 Ga. App. 758, 120 S.E.2d 786 (1961); McCall v. VanPopering, 124 Ga. App. 149, 183 S.E.2d 411 (1971); Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977); Hill v. Kaminsky, 160 Ga. App. 630, 287 S.E.2d 639 (1981).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 74-405 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

When superior court may terminate parent-child relationship in adoption proceeding.

- Although both superior and juvenile courts have jurisdiction to terminate parent-child relationship, the superior court may do so only in conjunction with an adoption proceeding which has been filed in that court. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Juvenile court termination of parental rights.

- Only juvenile court can terminate parental rights without concomitant adoption proceeding in process. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, §§ 53, 56.

C.J.S.

- 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Persons, § 78.

ALR.

- Requirements as to residence or domicil of adoptee or adoptive parent for purposes of adoption, 33 A.L.R.3d 176.