O.C.G.A. homeSearch Georgia
O.C.G.A.Title 19Chapter 8

O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2 (2022)

Jurisdiction and venue of adoption proceedings

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2022 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest cited 1984–2026 13citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 13 opinions since 1984, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) The superior courts of the several counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption.

(b) All petitions for adoption under this article shall be filed in the county in which any petitioner resides, except that:

(1) Upon good cause being shown, the court may, in its discretion, allow such petition to be filed in the court of the county: (A) Of the child’s domicile;

(B) In which is located any child-placing agency having legal custody of the child;

(C) Where the child was born if such petition is filed within one year of the child’s birth; or

(D) In which is located the office of the department having legal custody of the child;

(2) Any individual who is a resident of any United States army post or military reservation within this state may file such petition in any county adjacent to the United States army post or military reservation; and

(3) When a child has been placed for adoption with an individual who is a resident of another state in compliance with Chapter 4 of Title 39, relating to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children; with an individual who is a resident of another state to which the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not apply; or with an individual who is a resident of another country, such petition shall be filed in:

(A) The court of the county where the child was born, or resides, or was residing at the time of placement;

(B) The court of the county in which is located any child-placing agency having legal custody of the child; or

(C) Superior Court of Fulton County.

History

Code 1981, § 19-8-2, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 5; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 1-1/HB 159; Ga. L. 2021, p. 151, § 1/HB 154. The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, substituted “Children; with an individual who is a resident of another state to which the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not apply; or with an individual who is a resident of another country,” for “Children,” in paragraph (b)(3), and added “, or resides, or was residing at the time of placement” at the end of subparagraph (b)(3)(A).

Annotations

Law reviews. For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972). For article, “An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 275 (1973). For article surveying developments in Georgia domestic relations law from mid1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (1981).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 74-405 and former § 19-8-2, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section. In matters of adoption, superior courts have very broad discretion which will not be controlled by appellate courts except in cases of plain abuse. Johnson v. Taylor, 153 Ga. App. 15, 264 S.E.2d 512, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1654 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405). Proceeding instituted under this chapter is purely statutory and does

not fall within classification of any cases of which Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Criswell v. Jones, 187 Ga. 55, 199 S.E. 804, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 746 (1938), transferred, 60 Ga. App. 81, 3 S.E.2d 115, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 509 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405); Herrin v. Graham, 209 Ga. 281, 71 S.E.2d 550, 1952 Ga. LEXIS 461, transferred, 87 Ga. App. 291, 73 S.E.2d 572, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 670 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405); Hendrix v. Hunter, 214 Ga. 722, 107 S.E.2d 195, 1959 Ga. LEXIS 322, transferred, 99 Ga. App. 785, 110 S.E.2d 35, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 964 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

Natural parent is not a party defendant to adoption proceedings. Thus, the requirement that the petition for adoption be filed in the county where the adopting parents reside, as provided for in former Code 1933, § 74-405, was not in conflict with the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which requires that venue in civil cases be in the county where the defendants reside. Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d 23, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 618, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872, 102 S. Ct. 342, 70 L. Ed. 2d 177, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3756 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74405). Natural parents’ residence immaterial. - Venue is proper when the adoption petition has been filed in the county in which the adopting parents reside, regardless of where the natural parents reside. Spires v. Bittick, 171 Ga. App. 914, 321 S.E.2d 407, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3014 (1984) (decided under former § 198-2, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 1). Residence or domicile of child in this state is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to adoption if adoption proceeding is brought in county of adopting parents’ residence. Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 275 S.E.2d 769, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3175 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405). Jurisdiction of adoption during deprivation proceeding in juvenile court. - Superior court has exclusive jurisdiction in adoption matters and had jurisdiction to entertain adoption petition notwithstanding pendency of deprivation proceedings in the juvenile court involving the same child. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1137 (1992). Trial court did not err in concluding that the court had jurisdiction over adoption and termination of parental rights proceeding as statutory law granted the trial court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and other proceedings that were not granted exclusively to the juvenile courts; since the juvenile courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over deprivation proceedings, those types of matters

were to be heard by the juvenile courts, but the trial court had the authority to hear adoption and other matters, such as the adoptive parents’ adoption petition filed to adopt the biological parents’ minor child. Snyder v. Carter, 276 Ga. App. 426, 623 S.E.2d 241, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1271 (2005). Jurisdiction properly exercised. - Trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction in a petition for adoption because the Georgia Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 199-40 et seq., did not govern adoption proceedings. Barr v. Gregor, 316 Ga. App. 269, 728 S.E.2d 868, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 533 (2012). Actions not brought in connection with adoption proceeding. - Proceeding for termination of parental rights brought for the purpose of awarding custody to the Department of Family and Children Services so that children could be placed for adoption some time in the future was not brought in connection with a petition for adoption; therefore, jurisdiction was proper in the juvenile court. In re C.D.C., 230 Ga. App. 237, 495 S.E.2d 872, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 96 (1998). Welfare and best interests of child in custody disputes. - Court, having jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to fullest extent granted the court under adoption statute, and is confronted with one paramount question, which, in all controversies or proceedings for custody of children, is welfare and best interests of child. Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291, 73 S.E.2d 572, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 670 (1952), overruled, Davey v. Evans, 156 Ga. App. 698, 275 S.E.2d 769, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3175 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405). Termination of father’s parental rights. - Trial court had jurisdiction over an action to terminate a father’s parental rights pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2, which granted exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and made venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside. Rokowski v. Gilbert, 275 Ga. App. 305, 620 S.E.2d 509, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 953 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0163, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 27 (Ga. Jan. 17, 2006). Error to grant adoption petition. - Because the evidence showed that the

child’s needs could be equally met in either the mother’s or the grandparent’s home, the trial court abused the court’s discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-810(a), (b)(1), (2), and § 15-11-94(b)(4) and granting the grandmother’s and the stepgrandfather’s petition for adoption under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2. McCollum v. Jones, 274 Ga. App. 815, 619 S.E.2d 313, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 785 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C2021, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 64 (Ga. Jan. 17, 2006). Construction with other law. - Trial court erred in denying an aunt and uncle’s petition to adopt their nephew under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-8, and should have applied O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7 as: (1) the former was not intended to be a general rule regarding the adoption of foreign children; (2) the aunt and uncle satisfied the jurisdictional and venue requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2 by filing the adoption

petition in the superior court of their county of residence; and (3) as the child’s aunt and uncle, they were relatives eligible to adopt under § 19-8-7(a). In re Adoption of D.J.F.M., 284 Ga. App. 420, 643 S.E.2d 879, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 343 (2007). Full faith and credit. - Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant full faith and credit to a Georgia court’s judgment of adoption making the petitioner a legal parent of the children that the petititoner and the respondent had raised together where neither the statute upon which it relied, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-5(a), nor the Georgia courts indicated that the statute was jurisdictional and, thus, there was nothing to rebut the presumption that the Georgia judgment was issued by a court with jurisdiction. V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 136 S. Ct. 1017, 194 L. Ed. 2d 92, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1653 (2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 74-405 are included in the annotations for this Code section. When superior court may terminate parent-child relationship in adoption proceeding. - Although both superior and juvenile courts have jurisdiction to terminate parent-child relationship, the superior court may do so only in

conjunction with an adoption proceeding which has been filed in that court. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405). Juvenile court termination of parental rights. - Only juvenile court can terminate parental rights without concomitant adoption proceeding in process. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U77-52 (decided under former Code 1933, § 74-405).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, §§ 53, 56. C.J.S. 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Persons, § 78.

ALR. Requirements as to residence or domicil of adoptee or adoptive parent for purposes of adoption, 33 A.L.R.3d 176.

The 13 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSnyder v. Carter, 623 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“We disagreed and held that “OCGA § 19-8-2 (a) confers on the superior courts exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption, except such jurisdiction as may be granted to the juvenile courts.”
2
GREENH. C. S. v. Grebel, 321 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 19-8-2 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“OCGA § 39-4-1 et seq. In contesting the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision, the appellants point out that as nonresidents of Georgia they cannot institute adoption proceedings in the courts of this state.”
3
GREENStanfield v. Alizota, 756 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. 2014).
cites § 19-8-2 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“See OCGA § 19-8-2 (a). 5 As we find that the issue of termination of Alizota’s parental rights was raised for the first time in conjunction with the Stanfields’ adoption petition, we hold the doctrine of priority jurisdiction did not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction…”
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of priority jurisdiction provides that where different tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, the first court to exercise jurisdiction will retain it.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENRokowski v. Gilbert, 620 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“36 The applicable Code section, OCGA § 19-8-2, grants exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and makes venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside.”
Later courts cite it for
“the applicable code section, ocga 19-8-2, grants exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and makes venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENMcCollum v. Jones, 619 S.E.2d 313 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“This adoption proceeding was brought in superior court in accordance with OCGA § 19-8-2. “Granting or refusing a continuance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent a clear showing of abuse, [an appellate] court will not reverse for refusing to…”
Later courts cite it for
“incarceration does not 856 per se give rise to justifiable cause for failure to pay support, rather it is simply one factor to be considered.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENIn re Adoption of D. J. F. M., 643 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 19-8-2 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“OCGA § 19-8-2. They assert that the child’s citizenship and the parents’ residency are irrelevant to the court’s jurisdiction.”
7
GREENEdgar v. Shave, 422 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“OCGA § 19-8-2 (a) confers on the superior courts “exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption, except such jurisdiction as may be granted to the juvenile courts.”
8
GREENIn the Interest of C. D. C., 495 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“She claims the juvenile court is without jurisdiction because Chapter 8 of Title 19 of the Georgia Code provides the Superior Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to terminate parental rights in connection with adoption proceedings.”
Later courts cite it for
“merely a termination of parental rights so that . . . the children may be placed for adoption at some time in the future” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENIn re Bas, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 19-8-2 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“[39] See OCGA § 19-8-2(a). [40] See former OCGA § 19-9-43(a)(4)(A).”
The case’s holding
A parent's repeated incarceration, extensive criminal history, and lack of parental contact or support can support termination of parental rights based on present unfitness.
10
NO FLAGJohnson v. Stills, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 1 case
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
11
GREENBarr v. Gregor, 728 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
““The applicable Code section, OCGA § 19-8-2, grants exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and makes venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside.”
12
NO FLAGLokin Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P., No. A26A0470 (Ga. Ct. App. June 15, 2026).
cites § 19-8-2 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
“”); OCGA § 19-8-2(a) (“The superior courts of the several counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption.”
13
GREENLaura Barr v. Richard Gregor, No. A12A0366 (Ga. Ct. App. June 15, 2012).
cites § 19-8-2 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-2
““The applicable Code section, OCGA § 19-8-2, grants exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts in all adoption proceedings, and makes venue proper in the county in which the adopting parents reside.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420052026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2005. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.11Ga.2
By subsection
(a)2 cases
In re Bas, 563 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).“[39] See OCGA § 19-8-2(a). [40] See former OCGA § 19-9-43(a)(4)(A).”
Lokin Crook v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P., No. A26A0470 (Ga. Ct. App. June 15, 2026).“”); OCGA § 19-8-2(a) (“The superior courts of the several counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

O.C.G.A. Home  |  Search Georgia  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com