O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7 (2019)

Adoption by certain relatives related to child by blood or marriage

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) A child may be adopted by a relative who is related by blood or marriage to the child as a grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, or sibling only if each living parent and guardian of such child has voluntarily and in writing surrendered to that relative and any spouse of such relative all of his or her rights to the child for the purpose of enabling that relative and any such spouse to adopt the child. (b) In the case of a child 14 years of age or older, the written consent of the child to his or her adoption shall be given and acknowledged in the presence of the court. (c) The surrender of rights specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (e) of this Code section shall be executed following the birth of the child, and the pre-birth surrender specified in paragraph (3) of subsection (e) of this Code section shall be executed prior to the birth of the child. Each surrender shall be executed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness. A copy of the surrender shall be provided to the individual signing the surrender at the time of the execution thereof. (d) An individual signing a surrender of rights pursuant to this Code section shall have the right to revoke such surrender within four days as provided in subsection (a) of Code Section 19-8-9. (e)(1) The surrender of rights by a parent or guardian specified in subsection (a) of this Code section shall meet the requirements of subsection (e) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such surrender shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness. (2) A biological father who is not a legal father of the child may surrender all his rights to the child for purposes of an adoption pursuant to this Code section. Such surrender shall meet the requirements of subsection (d) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such surrender shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness. (3)(A) A biological father who is not a legal father of a child may execute a surrender of his rights to the child prior to the birth of the child for the purpose of an adoption pursuant to this Code section. A pre-birth surrender shall serve to relinquish an alleged biological

father’s rights to the child and to waive an alleged biological father’s right to notice of any proceeding with respect to the child’s adoption, custody, or guardianship. The court in any adoption proceeding shall have jurisdiction to enter a final order of adoption of the child based upon the pre-birth surrender and in other proceedings to determine the child’s legal custody or guardianship shall have jurisdiction to enter an order for those purposes. (B) The rights and responsibilities of an alleged biological father shall be permanently terminated only upon an order from a court of competent jurisdiction terminating such rights or the entry of a final order of adoption. An individual executing a pre-birth surrender pursuant to this Code section shall have the right to revoke such surrender within four days from the date of execution thereof, notwithstanding the date of birth of the child. (C) If a final order of adoption is not entered after the execution of a pre-birth surrender and paternity is established by acknowledgment, by administrative order, or by judicial order, then an alleged biological father shall be responsible for child support or other financial obligations to the child or to a legal mother, or to both. (D) The pre-birth surrender shall not be valid for use by a legal father. (E) The pre-birth surrender may be executed at any time after the biological mother executes a sworn statement identifying such individual as an alleged biological father of the biological mother’s unborn child meeting the requirements of subsection (m) of Code Section 19-8-26. (F) The pre-birth surrender shall meet the requirements of subsection (f) of Code Section 19-8-26 and shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness. (f) A surrender of rights shall be acknowledged by the individual who surrenders those rights by also signing an acknowledgment meeting the requirements of subsection (g) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such acknowledgment shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness. (g)(1) A legal mother who surrenders her parental rights pursuant to this Code section shall execute an affidavit meeting the requirements of subsection (h) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public. (2) A legal mother who is the adoptive mother of the child and who surrenders her parental rights pursuant to this Code section shall execute an affidavit meeting the requirements of subsection (i) of

Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public. (h) Whenever rights are surrendered pursuant to this Code section, the representative of each petitioner or the representative of the individual signing such surrender shall execute an affidavit meeting the requirements of subsection (k) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public. (i) A surrender of rights pursuant to this Code section may be given by any parent or biological father who is not a legal father of the child regardless of whether such individual is a citizen of the United States, a resident of this state, or has reached the age of 18 years. Such surrender given by such individual shall be binding upon him or her as if the individual were in all respects sui juris and shall include a consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any action filed under this article. Such surrender shall state that such individual agrees to be bound by a decree of adoption. (j) In any surrender of rights pursuant to this Code section, Chapter 4 of Title 39, relating to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, if applicable, shall be complied with. (k) A biological father or a legal father who signs a surrender of rights may execute an affidavit regarding his Native American heritage and military service meeting the requirements of subsection (n) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public.

History

Code 1981, § 19-8-7, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1640, § 3; Ga. L. 1999, p. 252, § 6; Ga. L. 2003, p. 503, § 3; Ga. L. 2007, p. 342, §§ 5, 6/HB 497; Ga. L. 2008, p. 324, § 19/SB 455; Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 12/SB 64; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 1-1/HB 159.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2016, p. 304, § 18/SB 64, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall not be construed to affect a voluntary acknowledgment of legitimation that was valid under the former provisions of Code Section 19-7-21.1, nor any of the rights or responsibilities flowing therefrom, if it was executed on or before June 30, 2016.”

For application of this statute in 2020 and 2021, see Executive Orders 04.09.20.01, 06.30.21.02, 07.22.21.02, 08.19.21.02, and 09.20.21.02. Law reviews. For case comment, “In re Baby Girl Eason: Balancing Three Competing Interests in Third Party Adoptions,” see 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1217 (1988). For comment, “The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers in Georgia: In re Baby Girl Eason,” see 5 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 591 (1989). For article, “Who is Georgia’s Mother? Gestational Surrogacy: A Formulation for Georgia’s Legislature,” see 38 Ga. L. Rev. 395 (2003).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Relinquishment not determinative of adoption petition. - Fact that the child’s father surrendered his rights to the child over to the paternal grandparents pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7(a) was not determinative of the adoption petition filed by the paternal grandparents; since there was evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the paternal grandparents would have denied the maternal grandparents contact with the child if the adoption petition were granted, and that the granting of the petition was not in the child’s best interests, the denial of the petition was affirmed. Madison v. Barnett, 268 Ga. App. 348, 601 S.E.2d 704, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 762 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1904, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 887 (Ga. Oct. 12, 2004). Relinquishment was sufficient because it met the standards of the state in which it was signed. - Relatives of the mother of a child born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome were not required to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7 as the father’s relinquishment of the father’s rights was valid because it was knowingly and voluntarily made in accordance with New Mexico law pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-9-922). Rokowski v. Gilbert, 275 Ga. App. 305, 620 S.E.2d 509, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 953 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0163, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 27 (Ga. Jan. 17, 2006). Petition properly denied. - Trial court did not err in finding that it would not be in the child’s best interest for appellant’s adoption petition to be granted because the mother’s personal situation

changed for the better in that the mother had been sober for some time, had a fulltime job, obtained a GED, married and had another child which the mother was taking care of in a loving and nurturing environment, and recognized it would not be good for the child if custody were immediately transferred to the mother but wanted to be reintroduced into the child’s life over time. Newlin v. Adamar, 363 Ga. App. 456, 871 S.E.2d 458, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (2022). Construction with other law. - Superior court properly dismissed a grandmother’s adoption petition on collateral estoppel grounds based on the juvenile court’s previous order granting temporary custody to the maternal grandfather and grant of visitation rights to the grandmother; as a result, the superior court was not authorized to readjudicate the issue of permanent custody involving the child at issue. Smith v. Hutcheson, 283 Ga. App. 117, 640 S.E.2d 690, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1563 (2006). Trial court erred in denying an aunt and uncle’s petition to adopt their nephew under O.C.G.A. § 19-8-8, and should have applied O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7 as: (1) the former was not intended to be a general rule regarding the adoption of foreign children; (2) the aunt and uncle satisfied the jurisdictional and venue requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-2 by filing the adoption petition in the superior court of their county of residence; and (3) as the child’s aunt and uncle, they were relatives eligible to adopt under § 19-8-7(a). In re Adoption of D.J.F.M., 284 Ga. App. 420, 643 S.E.2d 879, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 343 (2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Rights and obligations resulting from

human artificial A.L.R.4th 295.

insemination,

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 25 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: In re Adoption of D. J. F. M., 643 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

In re Adoption of D. J. F. M., 643 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 24× “pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-7 (a), which governs the adoption of a child by a relative.”

In Re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 4× “Under the requirements of OCGA § 19-8-7 (a) notice was given to Scharlach prompting his petition for legitimation pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-7 (c).”

H. C. S. v. Grebel, 321 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 8× “In addition, the Court of Appeals held that in this case the petition does not purport to give, nor indicate that there has been given to the appellee, the notice required by OCGA § 19-8-7. Since the docketing of this appeal, the guardian ad litem has filed a motion for an order…”

Johnson v. Hauck., 812 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 6× “" OCGA § 19-8-7 (a). The law nevertheless authorizes the superior court to terminate a biological parent's rights and allow a relative to adopt the child in a single action without the parent's surrender if there is clear and convincing evidence 9 that the parent, "for a period…”

Hooper Et Al. v. Hedgepath, 796 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 5× “and, therefore, could adopt the child under OCGA § 19-8-7 (a), 1 or whether she was required to pursue a third-party adoption under OCGA § 19-8-5 (a).”

Sapp v. Solomon, 314 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 4× “The parental rights of a putative father may be terminated without notice where the putative father cannot be found and he "has not lived with the child, nor contributed to its support, nor made any attempt to legitimate the child, and ... he did not provide support for the…”

Rokowski v. Gilbert, 620 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “In this regard, OCGA§ 19-8-7, which governs relative adoptions, states that the surrender of parental rights must meet the requirements of OCGA § 19-8-26.”

Cowdell v. Doe, 483 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “ion covered by the law, whether through the Department of Human Resources or any child-placing agency as provided in OCGA § 19-8-4, whether by a third party who is neither the stepparent nor relative of the child as provided in OCGA § 19-8-5, whether by the spouse of a parent as…”

Taylor v. Taylor, 623 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 2× “For example, under Georgia law, a parent may relinquish parental powers of control over a child by voluntary contract pursuant to which the child is released to a third party, OCGA § 19-7-1(b); may surrender or terminate parental rights by consenting to the adoption of the…”

Madison v. Barnett, 601 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “8 We note that, contrary to the Madisons’ position, the fact that their son surrendered his rights to the child over to his parents pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-7 (a) (which allows a child to be adopted by a relative with the surviving parent’s consent), is not determinative.”

Owen v. Watts, 695 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “Note that OCGA § 19-8-18 (d) would apply in the event Watts’ pending petition for adoption (brought pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-7) were denied, but even then the trial court would be authorized to leave the child in Watts’ custody if she were fit to have custody.”

In re H. C. S., 170 Ga. App. 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 12× “Thus, appellees assert that, because they eventually plan to adopt the child in Colorado, their instant petition to terminate appellant’s rights is made “in connection with adoption proceedings” and that the superior court would have jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-7. We…”

Show all 25 citing cases →

— 19-8-7(a) — 1 case

In Re Cb, 684 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.