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2018 Georgia Code 21-5-30 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 21-5-30 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 21-5-30

TITLE 21 ELECTIONS

Section 5. Ethics in Government, 21-5-1 through 21-5-76.

ARTICLE 2 CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

21-5-30. Contributions made to candidate or campaign committee or for recall of a public officer.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (e) of Code Section 21-5-34, no contributions to bring about the nomination or election of a candidate for any office shall be made or accepted except directly to or by a candidate or such candidate's campaign committee which is organized for the purpose of bringing about the nomination or election of any such candidate; and no contributions to bring about the recall of a public officer or to oppose the recall of a public officer or to bring about the approval or rejection by the voters of a proposed constitutional amendment, state-wide referendum, or proposed question at the state, municipal, or county level shall be made or accepted except directly to or by a campaign committee organized for that purpose.
  2. Each candidate shall maintain records and file reports as required by this chapter or shall have a campaign committee for the purposes of maintaining records and filing reports as required by this chapter. Every campaign committee shall have a chairperson and a treasurer, except that the candidate may serve as the chairperson and treasurer. Before a campaign committee accepts contributions, the name and address of the chairperson and treasurer shall be filed with the commission. When a candidate has been elected to public office, the registration of that candidate's campaign committee with the commission shall remain in effect so long as the candidate remains in office until and unless the registration is canceled by the campaign committee or the candidate. The same person may serve as chairperson and treasurer. No contributions shall be accepted by or on behalf of the campaign committee at a time when there is a vacancy in the office of chairperson or treasurer of the campaign committee.
  3. Contributions of money received pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section shall be deposited in a campaign depository account opened and maintained by the candidate or the campaign committee. The account may be an interest-bearing account; provided, however, that any interest earned on such account shall be reported and may only be used for the purposes allowed for contributions under this chapter. Those who elect the separate accounting option as provided in Code Section 21-5-43 may also open, but are not required to open, a separate campaign depository account for each election for which contributions are accepted and allocated beyond their next upcoming election.
  4. Unless otherwise reported individually, where separate contributions of less than $100.00 are knowingly received from a common source, such contributions shall be aggregated for reporting purposes. For purposes of fulfilling such aggregation requirement, members of the family, members of the same firm or partnership, or employees of the same person, as defined in paragraph (19) of Code Section 21-5-3, shall be considered to be a common source; provided, however, that the purchase of tickets for not more than $25.00 each and for or attendance at a fundraising event by members of the family, members of the same firm or partnership, or employees of the same person shall not be considered to be contributions from a common source except to the extent that tickets are purchased as a block.
  5. The making and acceptance of anonymous contributions are prohibited. Any anonymous contributions received by a candidate or campaign committee shall be transmitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the state treasury, and the fact of such contribution and transmittal shall be reported to the commission.
    1. For purposes of this subsection, the term:
      1. "Public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission" includes, but is not limited to, an electric membership corporation.
      2. "Electric membership corporation" means a public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission operating as an electric membership corporation under the provisions of Article 4 of Chapter 3 of Title 46.
    2. Except as limited by Code Section 21-5-30.1 or this subsection, a public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission shall be allowed to make contributions to political campaigns. Any contributions made by a public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission to a political campaign shall not be included as recoverable costs in any rate-making or rate-setting proceedings before the Public Service Commission. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Code section or any other provision of law to the contrary, no electric membership corporation and no nonprofit corporation, group, or association, the membership of which consists of electric membership corporations, shall be authorized to make any contribution to a political campaign. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit a nonprofit corporation, group, or association, the membership of which consists of electric membership corporations, from establishing, administering, and soliciting contributions for a political action committee from officers, directors, employees, agents, contractors, and members of such entities so long as such actions and contributions do not otherwise violate the provisions of this chapter.
  7. Neither a candidate who is not a public officer nor his or her campaign committee may lawfully accept a campaign contribution until the candidate has filed with the commission a declaration of intention to accept campaign contributions which shall include the name and address of the candidate and the names and addresses of his or her campaign committee officers, if any; provided, however, that a candidate, as defined in subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph (22) of Code Section 21-5-3, shall make filings of the same kind and in the same manner as provided in this subsection for other public officers except that filings under this subsection shall be made with the election superintendent of the county in the case of public officers as defined in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (22) of Code Section 21-5-3 and shall be made with the municipal clerk in the municipality of election or, if there is no clerk, with the chief executive officer of the municipality in the case of public officers as defined in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (22) of Code Section 21-5-3. The election superintendent, municipal clerk, or chief executive officer, as applicable, shall transmit electronically by eFiling or eFax a copy of each such declaration of intention to the commission not later than ten days after the close of the reporting period.

(Code 1981, §21-5-30, enacted by Ga. L. 1986, p. 957, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 297, § 9; Ga. L. 1987, p. 458, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 603, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 922, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075, § 4; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1402, § 18; Ga. L. 1994, p. 258, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1092, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 859, § 10/HB 48; Ga. L. 2006, p. 69, § 1/SB 467; Ga. L. 2010, p. 863, § 3/SB 296; Ga. L. 2010, p. 1173, § 10/SB 17; Ga. L. 2011, p. 569, § 1/SB 160; Ga. L. 2014, p. 9, § 1/SB 297.)

The 2006 amendment, effective April 14, 2006, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, in subsection (a), substituted "directly to or by a candidate" for "directly to a candidate" near the beginning, and substituted "except directly to or by a campaign committee" for "except directly by a campaign committee" near the end.

The 2010 amendments. The first 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, substituted "state treasurer" for "director of the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services" in the middle of the second sentence of subsection (e). The second 2010 amendment, effective January 10, 2011, substituted "$100.00" for "$101.00" in the first sentence of subsection (d); and deleted "or appropriate local filing officer" following "with the commission" in subsection (g). See Editor's notes for applicability.

The 2011 amendment, effective May 12, 2011, rewrote subsection (f).

The 2014 amendment, effective January 31, 2014, in subsection (g), added the proviso at the end of the first sentence, and added the last sentence.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2005, p. 859, § 28, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall not apply to any violation occurring prior to January 9, 2006.

Ga. L. 2010, p. 1173, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act of 2010.'"

Ga. L. 2010, p. 1173, § 30, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment to this Code section applies to all reports filed on and after January 10, 2011.

Law reviews.

- For article, "Georgia Campaign Finance and Disclosure Law," see 27 Ga. St. B.J. 175 (1991). For article on 2005 amendment of this Code section, see 22 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 119 (2005). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 247 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- Due to the similarity of provisions and the possible continuing applicability of decisions under the former chapter (see Code Section 21-5-10), decisions under the former chapter are included in the annotations to this Code section.

Subsection (e) is not unconstitutional, as it does not take private property without compensation. An anonymous contribution never becomes the property of the candidate or the candidate's committee. Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472, 208 S.E.2d 68 (1974) (decided under provisions of Ga. L. 1974, p. 155 similar to subsection (e) of this Code section).

Liability for failure to report "common source" contributions.

- Candidate charged with failure to report certain "common source" contributions, as defined by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30, could not be penalized for such failure, even though the candidate knew the contributions were from a common source, where it was the candidate's campaign treasurer who was unaware of the common source of the contributions and who filed the campaign report as authorized by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34(a)(3). State Ethics Comm'r v. Moore, 214 Ga. App. 236, 447 S.E.2d 687 (1994).

Attorney improperly held in contempt following delivery of anonymous campaign contribution.

- Attorney who delivered an anonymous campaign contribution on behalf of a client was improperly held in contempt for failing to disclose the client's name to the State Ethics Commission; the attorney invoked the self-incrimination privilege, and the trial court found the attorney in contempt without first determining whether the Commission's proposed questions might have been incriminating. Begner v. State Ethics Comm'n, 250 Ga. App. 327, 552 S.E.2d 431 (2001).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- Due to the similarity of provisions and the possible continuing applicability of opinions of the Attorney General decided under the former chapter (see Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-50 and Code Section 21-5-10), opinions decided under the former chapter are included in the annotations to this Code section.

Effect of federal legislation.

- The prohibition against for-hire motor carriers regulated by the Public Service Commission from contributing to a political campaign is still applicable despite the partial preemption provisions contained in the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601. 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96-1.

Registration at time committee is formed.

- Campaign committees must register with the Secretary of State at the time the committee is formed, regardless of the amount of money to be raised or expended. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-51 (decided under the former chapter).

Dollar amount of state bank contributions not disclosed to state commission.

- Assuming campaign contributions are made by state banks, there is no dollar amount that must be disclosed to the State Campaign and Financial Disclosure Commission (now the State Ethics Commission). 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-109 (decided under the former chapter).

Private carriers are not included within the purview of the Public Service Commission's general supervision, and are not subject to the prohibition against political contributions set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30 (f). 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-32.

Public Utility Corporations

Editor's notes.

- Due to the similarity of the provisions of former Code Section 21-5-10 to subsection (f) of this Code section and the possible continuing applicability of opinions of the Attorney General decided under that former Code section (see Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-50 and Code Section 21-5-10), opinions decided under former Code Section 21-5-10 are included in the annotations to this Code section.

Constitutionality.

- Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62, as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127 does not unconstitutionally infringe guarantees of freedom of speech and association. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-56 (decided under Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62 as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127).

Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62, as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127 does not unconstitutionally deny equal protection to common carriers. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-56 (decided under Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62 as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127).

The differential treatment between regulated and nonregulated corporations imposed by Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62, as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120-1127 can be justified on the ground that in granting and protecting the monopolies of public utilities, the state has the duty also to see that the power so granted is not abused and does not even appear to have a corrupting influence on the political process. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-56 (decided under Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62 as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127).

"Public utility" and "regulated" defined.

- "Public utility" is a business organization which regularly supplies the public with some commodity or service; "regulated" is defined in former Code 1933, § 93-307 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-2-20). 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-53.

"Public utility corporation regulated by the Public Service Commission."

- An electric membership corporation falls within the definition of a "public utility corporation, regulated by the Public Service Commission." 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-35.

"Common carrier of persons or property" is a "public utility". 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-56 (decided under Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62 as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127).

Public utility may not provide logistical assistance.

- Public utility corporations regulated by the Public Service Commission are prohibited under the Campaign and Financial Disclosure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 5, T. 21, from rendering logistical assistance, including utility-compensated employee services of any kind, to a political campaign. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-1.

Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62 as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127 is a strict prohibition of any person acting on behalf of a regulated utility from making any contribution to any political campaign. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-56 (decided under Ga. L. 1974, pp. 155-62 as amended by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1120, 1127).

Public utility employee may not provide services to campaign on utility time.

- The value of any services performed by employees of a regulated public utility corporation on behalf of a campaign would constitute prohibited contributions, if those employees are performing such services on company time, while they are on duty, drawing or eligible for their salary or hourly pay. This would include a situation in which a regulated public utility employee collects personal contributions from other employees and forwards those contributions to a political campaign, if this activity is being done on company time. It would also apply to secretarial or any other services performed toward this end. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-1.

Attorneys who represent regulated public utilities are prohibited from making contributions to political campaigns on behalf of the regulated public utility, but are not prohibited from contributing to political campaigns in their personal capacity. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-34.

Contributions by political action committee funded by employees of utility.

- Former § 21-5-10 did not prohibit political action committees, formed and operated pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, and funded by voluntary personal contributions from employees and persons affiliated with public utility corporations regulated by the Public Service Commission, which do not receive any assistance whatsoever from the regulated public utility corporation, from making political contributions to state and local political campaigns in Georgia; however, each situation must be determined on its own factual basis. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-2.

Regulated utility not prohibited from publicizing views on tax referendum.

- Former Code 1933, § 40-3808.2 does not prohibit a public utility regulated by the Public Service Commission from contributing to efforts to publicize views with respect to a referendum on the imposition of a county sales tax. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-54 (decided under former Code 1933, § 40-3808.2).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Elections, § 462 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 29 C.J.S., Elections §§ 350 et seq., 562 et seq.

ALR.

- Solicitation or receipt of funds by public officer or employee for political campaign expenses or similar purposes as bribery, 55 A.L.R.2d 1137.

Constitutional validity of state or local regulation of contributions by or to political action committees, 24 A.L.R.6th 179.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961, 159 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10166 (2010), that government may not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, 65 A.L.R.6th 503.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961, 159 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10166 (2010), that government may not prohibit independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, 65 A.L.R.6th 503.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Post v. State v. State v. State, 298 Ga. 241 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 16, 2015 | 779 S.E.2d 624

...than that of general supporters and contributors. Under Georgia law, each election campaign committee is required to have a chairperson and a treasurer, whose names and addresses must be filed with the Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission. See OCGA § 21-5-30 (b).9 If there is a vacancy in either position, the committee is barred from accepting campaign contributions....
...ounts of all deposits and of all withdrawals made to the separate campaign depository and of all interest earned 9 The same person may serve as both chairperson and treasurer, and that person may be the candidate himself. See OCGA § 21-5-30 (b). 17 on any such deposits,” unless the candidate performs those tasks himself. OCGA § 21-5-32 (a)....
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Gwinn v. State Ethics Comm'n, 426 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1993 | 262 Ga. 855, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1260

...Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, C. Theodore Lee, for appellees. HUNT, Presiding Justice. The State Ethics Commission determined that appellant Southern General Insurance Company and its president, appellant Gwinn, violated the "Ethics in Government Act," specifically OCGA § 21-5-30.1, [1] by placing a full-page newspaper ad supporting the candidacy of the incumbent insurance commissioner who was seeking re-election. [2] The State Ethics Commission concluded that the purchase of *856 the ad was a "contribution" under OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (2), and that the phrasing of the ad, clearly indicating it was expressing the opinion of the insurance company, demonstrated the contribution was made on behalf of an insurer for the benefit of the campaign of a candidate for insurance commissioner, an act prohibited by OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b)....
...l protection. We granted appellants' application for discretionary review to address the validity of the statute under the constitutions of the United States and Georgia. [3] 1. The use of funds to support a political candidate is "speech," and OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) limits "political expression `"at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."' [Cits.]" Austin v....
...To decide whether the statute's restriction on Southern's political *857 expenditures is constitutionally permissible, we must determine whether the restriction burdens the exercise of political speech and, if so, whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. 2. Since OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b)'s prohibition against Southern making a campaign contribution to the Commissioner of Insurance or a candidate for that office does burden expressive activity, and is "intimately related to the process of governing," the State must justify the burden by establishing a compelling state interest....
...Prohibiting contributions by the regulated entity to anyone holding or seeking to hold that office eliminates the threat perceived by the legislature. Inasmuch as the regulated entity is free to contribute to all other political campaigns, we conclude that OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) is narrowly tailored to meet the threat to the democratic process perceived by the General Assembly. 4. Southern also contends that OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) permits an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights without due process....
...possess regarding the capabilities of a candidate for the office of insurance commissioner, they run the risk that the voters might elect an insurance commissioner who would initiate policies adversely affecting appellants' business interests. OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) does not prohibit a Southern employee, who is not acting on behalf of the corporation, from contributing to *858 the campaign of anyone seeking the office of insurance commissioner; [5] and OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) does not prevent the dissemination of information by Southern, as long as the dissemination is not done for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of an individual to the office of insurance commissioner, or encouraging the current commissioner to seek reelection. Thus, enforcement of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) does not work the danger to due process that appellants foresee. We conclude that OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the freedom of speech as guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and Georgia....
...Clarke, C. J., Fletcher, Sears-Collins, JJ., and Judge Frank C. Mills III concur; Benham and Hunstein, JJ., concur specially. BENHAM, Justice, concurring specially. While I agree with the majority's insightful analysis of the constitutionality of OCGA § 21-5-30.1, I write separately in order to closely scrutinize the statute and measure appellants' actions against it. Upon review of the statutory scheme, I conclude that appellants' actions did not violate OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b). The State Ethics Commission was authorized to assess a fine for violation of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) (see OCGA § 21-5-6 (14)), and did impose a fine of $250 on each appellant after finding they had violated the law....
...162 (6) (366 SE2d 293) (1988). There is no question that Gwinn was acting on behalf of Southern General, an insurer, when he placed the newspaper ad. The question is whether the placement of the ad constituted a forbidden "contribution," as that term is defined in OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (2)....
...In construing the statute, I am mindful that the cardinal rule is to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute, and then give that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose. City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. EMC, 233 Ga. 759 (1) (213 SE2d 596) (1975). The passage of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 and its subsequent amendment to include all elected constitutional officers in the executive branch (Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075; OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (3)) evince a legislative intent to do away with the possibility that a regulated entity might make campaign contributions in an effort to have influence with the elected official by whom it is regulated....
...the first sentence since the insurer did not transfer or convey anything of value to the commissioner or his campaign committee. Since appellants' act of placing a newspaper ad urging the reelection of the insurance commissioner did not violate OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b), I believe the State Ethics Commission erred when it concluded that appellants' act had violated OCGA § 21-5-30.1....
...Because appellants have never contested the finding that they were guilty of violating the statute, I concur with the majority's affirmance of the judgment of the superior court. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence. NOTES [1] At the time of the incident involved herein, OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) stated: No ......
...[insurer] shall make a contribution to or on behalf of a person holding office as [Commissioner of Insurance] or to or on behalf of a candidate for the office of [Commissioner of Insurance] or to or on behalf of a campaign committee of any such candidate. OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (d) contained the proviso that the statute should not be construed to prevent any person employed by an industrial loan licensee or insurer from voluntarily making a campaign contribution from that person's private funds....
...way — by reducing costs. We support and hope you will vote for Warren Evans for Insurance Commissioner August 7th. SOUTHERN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY [3] Because appellants have never argued that their conduct did not constitute a violation of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) and admitted on appeal to the superior court that they were guilty of violating the statute, we assume, without deciding, that their conduct was violative of the statute....