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Call Now: 904-383-7448The proceeding quia timet is sustained in equity for the purpose of causing to be delivered and canceled any instrument which has answered the object of its creation or any forged or other iniquitous deed or other writing which, though not enforced at the time, either casts a cloud over the complainant's title or otherwise subjects him to future liability or present annoyance, and the cancellation of which is necessary to his perfect protection.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 3153; Code 1868, § 3165; Code 1873, § 3232; Code 1882, § 3232; Civil Code 1895, § 4892; Civil Code 1910, § 5465; Code 1933, § 37-1407.)
- For article discussing the problems associated with acquiring good title, see 15 Ga. B.J. 281 (1953). For article, "Tracing Georgia's English Common Law Equity Jurisprudential Roots: Quia Timet," see 14 The Journal of Southern Legal History 135 (2006). For annual survey on local government law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 199 (2016).
A plaintiff in an action to quiet title must assert that he holds some current record title or current prescriptive title, and not only an expectancy, in order to maintain his suit. Gilmore v. Hunt, 137 Ga. 272, 73 S.E. 364 (1910); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979).
The petition must contain a request for cancellation of an instrument, otherwise it is defective and, thus, subject to motion to dismiss. Tucker v. Ezell, 148 Ga. 47, 95 S.E. 672 (1918).
And the petition should contain not mere conclusions but statements of fact showing that claimant is the true owner. Weyman v. City of Atlanta, 122 Ga. 539, 50 S.E. 492 (1905).
- Special master did not err by denying a property owner a right to a jury trial in a buyer's quiet title action as the action was brought under the conventional quia timet statute and the owner had no right to a jury trial. Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 281 Ga. 250, 637 S.E.2d 1 (2006).
Delinquent taxpayer had no right to a jury trial in a transferee's action to remove any clouds as to the title on the delinquent taxpayer's property, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40, to which the transferee obtained title to by the order of a special master. Human v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 281 Ga. 372, 637 S.E.2d 684 (2006).
When one seeks conventional quia timet, one is not entitled to trial by jury under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43; when one seeks quia timet against all the world, however, one is entitled by the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 23-3-66 to a jury trial, but there is no right to a jury trial when a suit at law is converted by amendment into an equitable proceeding. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).
Trial court properly appointed a special master in a quiet title action and a corporation, who was unsuccessful in the corporation's claim for the property, was properly held not entitled to a jury trial because the suing bank had amended the bank's petition to provide for an action only for conventional quia timet by the time the petition was heard by the special master; therefore, no jury trial was available under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).
- Because a tax sale listed the wrong owner of the property to be sold and the description of the property was inconsistent, such that it was unclear which property was being sold, the bidder's deed was defective, as was the quitclaim deed of the purchaser of the property from the bidder, and accordingly, there was no merit to the purchaser's claim that it was due summary judgment on the issue of whether the owner's executrix had a right to redeem the property or whether it was barred under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45; after the tax sale, the bidder quitclaimed the deed to the purchaser, which occurred prior to the sheriff's "administrative cancellation" of the tax sale due to procedural errors, and the purchaser's action to quiet title, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 et seq., resulted in summary judgment to the executrix. Harpagon Co. v. Gelfond, 279 Ga. 59, 608 S.E.2d 597 (2005).
- Action to set aside a deed that conveyed a property interest did not fit within this section's definition, since the plaintiff was not seeking to cancel an instrument that placed a cloud on her title or subjected her to future liability. Wilson v. United States, 781 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
The principle upon which equity will lend its aid to remove a cloud upon title is that one in the rightful possession of property is entitled to the full, quiet, and peaceful enjoyment of the same, without present annoyance and harassment, or threatened molestation. Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 68 S.E.2d 699 (1952).
Allegations in petition, seeking a cancellation of a deed as a cloud upon the plaintiffs' title to an undivided two-sevenths' interest in the land, were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action as a proceeding quia timet under this section, where the petition did not allege that the deed purported to convey a complete title to a full interest in the tract. Clark v. Woody, 197 Ga. 683, 30 S.E.2d 181 (1944).
Although it is the general rule that, in order for a plaintiff to maintain an equitable petition to remove a cloud upon his title, he must allege and prove possession in himself, where there is any other distinct head of equity jurisdiction sufficient to support the action, possession of the plaintiff is not required. Sweat v. Arline, 186 Ga. 460, 197 S.E. 893 (1938); Moore v. Moore, 188 Ga. 303, 4 S.E.2d 18 (1939).
Where plaintiff seeks specific performance of an oral contract for the devise of property of which he is in possession but which is owned by his aunt, and alleges that distress warrants for rent have been taken against him by her, it is shown that his interest in the property is put in jeopardy by the deed. Harp v. Bacon, 222 Ga. 478, 150 S.E.2d 655 (1966).
A court of equity has jurisdiction to cancel an execution illegally issued, and this is especially true where there is nothing in the record showing or tending to show that the execution sought to be canceled had been levied on any of the plaintiff's property when the litigation was instituted. Lenett v. Lutz, 215 Ga. 369, 110 S.E.2d 628 (1959).
- In a suit to recover and cancel the deeds of the defendant as clouds on the plaintiff's title, the plaintiff, if entitled to recover the land, may also recover the rents and profits while possession of the land was wrongfully withheld by the defendant. Marshall v. Pierce, 136 Ga. 543, 71 S.E. 893 (1911).
- In an action to remove a cloud from title, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a bank and cancelled a recorded deed in favor of a holder, as: (1) the holder could no longer claim any legal title to the subject property once the underlying debt thereto was paid; (2) no evidence of valid renewal or extension of the note existed; and (3) the holder lacked standing to challenge any foreclosure on the debt. Northwest Carpets, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 280 Ga. 535, 630 S.E.2d 407 (2006).
- Special master erred in concluding that the property purchaser's action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet employed to quiet title, as that action was used to quiet title as to a deed or other writing which casts a cloud over a title, whereas the property purchaser's action was a quia timet action against all the world; however, no error occurred in denying the property claimant's motion for a jury trial even though an action against the entire world allowed for one, as the evidence did not present a question of fact that required a jury. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003).
- Plaintiff's claim failed because plaintiff had not alleged that plaintiff paid off the mortgage loan in full to satisfy the Security Deed or that plaintiff's signature on the Security Deed was false. Bowman v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2013).
Decedent's estate administrator's claim for conventional quiet title failed because the decedent did not hold some current record title or current prescriptive title upon execution of a security deed when the amount thereunder had not been fully paid. Shannon v. Albertelli Firm, P.C., F.3d (11th Cir. May 7, 2015)(Unpublished).
- Sovereign immunity barred a conventional quiet title action against the state, which was immune from suit. TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107 (2016).
Cited in Thompson v. Etowah Iron Co., 91 Ga. 538, 17 S.E. 663 (1893); Felder v. Paulk, 165 Ga. 135, 139 S.E. 873 (1927); Simpson v. Ray, 180 Ga. 395, 178 S.E. 726 (1935); Allen v. Bemis, 193 Ga. 556, 19 S.E.2d 516 (1942); Stow v. Hargrove, 203 Ga. 735, 48 S.E.2d 454 (1948); McDaniel v. Bagby, 204 Ga. 750, 51 S.E.2d 805 (1949); Todd v. Conner, 220 Ga. 173, 137 S.E.2d 614 (1964); Giddings v. Starks, 242 Ga. 457, 249 S.E.2d 203 (1978); Walker v. Walker, 266 Ga. 414, 467 S.E.2d 583 (1996); Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 283 Ga. 539, 661 S.E.2d 545 (2008); Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp., 287 Ga. 849, 700 S.E.2d 583 (2010); Richards v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 325 Ga. App. 722, 754 S.E.2d 770 (2014).
- 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims, §§ 2, 16, 63.
- 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 40.
- Doctrine of after-acquired title as between one who took before and one who took after common grantor or mortgagor acquired title, 25 A.L.R. 83.
Right of vendor in contract for sale or exchange of real property to bring suit for forfeiture, foreclosure, or rescission, or to quiet title or recover possession, without first giving notice, or making demand for possession, 94 A.L.R. 1239.
Joinder of claims to separate parcels in suit to quiet or to remove cloud on title, or to determine adverse claims to land, 118 A.L.R. 1400.
Common source of title doctrine, 5 A.L.R.3d 375.
Total Results: 19
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-03-06
Citation: 300 Ga. 670, 797 S.E.2d 895, 2017 WL 875095, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 165
Snippet: Chona filed a petition to quiet title under OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., alleging that it had barred the defendants’
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-11-07
Citation: 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 727
Snippet: quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 of the Quiet Title Act (OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq.) to obtain the property
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-22
Citation: 298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 165
Snippet: conventional actions for quiet title, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., where the State of Georgia asserts an
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-06-03
Citation: 293 Ga. 138, 744 S.E.2d 55, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1675, 2013 WL 2372243, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 499
Snippet: Ansley in Sumter County Superior Court. See OCGA § 23-3-40. The complaint alleged the quitclaim deeds that
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-02-04
Citation: 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 176, 2013 WL 399136, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 110
Snippet: standards for conventional quia timet, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., or under those for quia timet against
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-09-10
Citation: 291 Ga. 549, 731 S.E.2d 683, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2746, 2012 WL 3890210, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 692
Snippet: Property free and clear of all adverse claims. OCGA § 23-3-40. Reliance requested that the matter be submitted
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-03-18
Citation: 710 S.E.2d 744, 288 Ga. 808, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 753, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 264
Snippet: court the present petition to quiet title. OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq. The *745 trial court appointed a Special
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-10-04
Citation: 700 S.E.2d 583, 287 Ga. 849, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3184, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 647
Snippet: occupies that status is not determinative. OCGA § 23-3-40 provides that a deed may be cancelled on grounds
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-05-19
Citation: 283 Ga. 539, 661 S.E.2d 545, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1692, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 423
Snippet: filed a petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40. The case was presided over by a special master
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-11-20
Citation: 281 Ga. 372, 637 S.E.2d 684, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3567, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 966
Snippet: quiet title to the property pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40. Following a hearing, a special master concluded
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-10-16
Citation: 637 S.E.2d 1, 281 Ga. 250, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3179, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 838
Snippet: filed a petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40. The case was presided over by a special master
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-05-18
Citation: 630 S.E.2d 407, 280 Ga. 535, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1546, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 341
Snippet: security deed in favor of Northwest. See OCGA § 23-3-40.[1] For the reasons which follow, we affirm the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2005-02-07
Citation: 279 Ga. 59, 608 S.E.2d 597, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 351, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 113
Snippet: “Gelfond”), in a petition, pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., to quiet title to real property acquired
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-10-12
Citation: 604 S.E.2d 156, 278 Ga. 654, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3325, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 844
Snippet: in a conventional quia timet action, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., brought to remove a cloud from the title
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-09-13
Citation: 602 S.E.2d 572, 278 Ga. 334, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2949, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 634
Snippet: equitable petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., and had appellant George M. Johnson served
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-11-17
Citation: 589 S.E.2d 81, 277 Ga. 465, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 3392, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 999
Snippet: for a decree in quia timet pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq. that it held fee simple title to the property
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-07-10
Citation: 583 S.E.2d 866, 276 Ga. 749, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2178, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 621
Snippet: is necessary to his perfect protection." OCGA § 23-3-40. In contrast, quia timet as against all the world
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1996-03-15
Citation: 467 S.E.2d 583, 266 Ga. 414, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 1025, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 124
Snippet: OCGA § 23-3-40.4 Even if such a conversion were possible, the statutory procedures under § 23-3-40 do not
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1994-10-17
Citation: 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3410, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 837
Snippet: 183 Ga. 593, 595 (189 SE 10) (1936); OCGA §§ 23-3-40 to 23-3-42. In contrast, the 1966 Act eliminates