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2018 Georgia Code 23-3-40 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 23 EQUITY

Section 3. Equitable Remedies And Proceedings Generally, 23-3-1 through 23-3-127.

ARTICLE 3 QUIA TIMET

23-3-40. Purpose of quia timet.

The proceeding quia timet is sustained in equity for the purpose of causing to be delivered and canceled any instrument which has answered the object of its creation or any forged or other iniquitous deed or other writing which, though not enforced at the time, either casts a cloud over the complainant's title or otherwise subjects him to future liability or present annoyance, and the cancellation of which is necessary to his perfect protection.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3153; Code 1868, § 3165; Code 1873, § 3232; Code 1882, § 3232; Civil Code 1895, § 4892; Civil Code 1910, § 5465; Code 1933, § 37-1407.)

Law reviews.

- For article discussing the problems associated with acquiring good title, see 15 Ga. B.J. 281 (1953). For article, "Tracing Georgia's English Common Law Equity Jurisprudential Roots: Quia Timet," see 14 The Journal of Southern Legal History 135 (2006). For annual survey on local government law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 199 (2016).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

A plaintiff in an action to quiet title must assert that he holds some current record title or current prescriptive title, and not only an expectancy, in order to maintain his suit. Gilmore v. Hunt, 137 Ga. 272, 73 S.E. 364 (1910); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979).

The petition must contain a request for cancellation of an instrument, otherwise it is defective and, thus, subject to motion to dismiss. Tucker v. Ezell, 148 Ga. 47, 95 S.E. 672 (1918).

And the petition should contain not mere conclusions but statements of fact showing that claimant is the true owner. Weyman v. City of Atlanta, 122 Ga. 539, 50 S.E. 492 (1905).

No right to jury trial.

- Special master did not err by denying a property owner a right to a jury trial in a buyer's quiet title action as the action was brought under the conventional quia timet statute and the owner had no right to a jury trial. Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 281 Ga. 250, 637 S.E.2d 1 (2006).

Delinquent taxpayer had no right to a jury trial in a transferee's action to remove any clouds as to the title on the delinquent taxpayer's property, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40, to which the transferee obtained title to by the order of a special master. Human v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 281 Ga. 372, 637 S.E.2d 684 (2006).

When one seeks conventional quia timet, one is not entitled to trial by jury under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43; when one seeks quia timet against all the world, however, one is entitled by the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 23-3-66 to a jury trial, but there is no right to a jury trial when a suit at law is converted by amendment into an equitable proceeding. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).

Trial court properly appointed a special master in a quiet title action and a corporation, who was unsuccessful in the corporation's claim for the property, was properly held not entitled to a jury trial because the suing bank had amended the bank's petition to provide for an action only for conventional quia timet by the time the petition was heard by the special master; therefore, no jury trial was available under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).

Quiet title action from tax sale.

- Because a tax sale listed the wrong owner of the property to be sold and the description of the property was inconsistent, such that it was unclear which property was being sold, the bidder's deed was defective, as was the quitclaim deed of the purchaser of the property from the bidder, and accordingly, there was no merit to the purchaser's claim that it was due summary judgment on the issue of whether the owner's executrix had a right to redeem the property or whether it was barred under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45; after the tax sale, the bidder quitclaimed the deed to the purchaser, which occurred prior to the sheriff's "administrative cancellation" of the tax sale due to procedural errors, and the purchaser's action to quiet title, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 et seq., resulted in summary judgment to the executrix. Harpagon Co. v. Gelfond, 279 Ga. 59, 608 S.E.2d 597 (2005).

Action not one to quiet title.

- Action to set aside a deed that conveyed a property interest did not fit within this section's definition, since the plaintiff was not seeking to cancel an instrument that placed a cloud on her title or subjected her to future liability. Wilson v. United States, 781 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1992).

The principle upon which equity will lend its aid to remove a cloud upon title is that one in the rightful possession of property is entitled to the full, quiet, and peaceful enjoyment of the same, without present annoyance and harassment, or threatened molestation. Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 68 S.E.2d 699 (1952).

Allegations in petition, seeking a cancellation of a deed as a cloud upon the plaintiffs' title to an undivided two-sevenths' interest in the land, were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action as a proceeding quia timet under this section, where the petition did not allege that the deed purported to convey a complete title to a full interest in the tract. Clark v. Woody, 197 Ga. 683, 30 S.E.2d 181 (1944).

Although it is the general rule that, in order for a plaintiff to maintain an equitable petition to remove a cloud upon his title, he must allege and prove possession in himself, where there is any other distinct head of equity jurisdiction sufficient to support the action, possession of the plaintiff is not required. Sweat v. Arline, 186 Ga. 460, 197 S.E. 893 (1938); Moore v. Moore, 188 Ga. 303, 4 S.E.2d 18 (1939).

Where plaintiff seeks specific performance of an oral contract for the devise of property of which he is in possession but which is owned by his aunt, and alleges that distress warrants for rent have been taken against him by her, it is shown that his interest in the property is put in jeopardy by the deed. Harp v. Bacon, 222 Ga. 478, 150 S.E.2d 655 (1966).

A court of equity has jurisdiction to cancel an execution illegally issued, and this is especially true where there is nothing in the record showing or tending to show that the execution sought to be canceled had been levied on any of the plaintiff's property when the litigation was instituted. Lenett v. Lutz, 215 Ga. 369, 110 S.E.2d 628 (1959).

Recovery of rents and profits.

- In a suit to recover and cancel the deeds of the defendant as clouds on the plaintiff's title, the plaintiff, if entitled to recover the land, may also recover the rents and profits while possession of the land was wrongfully withheld by the defendant. Marshall v. Pierce, 136 Ga. 543, 71 S.E. 893 (1911).

Summary judgment proper once security deed paid in full.

- In an action to remove a cloud from title, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a bank and cancelled a recorded deed in favor of a holder, as: (1) the holder could no longer claim any legal title to the subject property once the underlying debt thereto was paid; (2) no evidence of valid renewal or extension of the note existed; and (3) the holder lacked standing to challenge any foreclosure on the debt. Northwest Carpets, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 280 Ga. 535, 630 S.E.2d 407 (2006).

Employed against deed or writing.

- Special master erred in concluding that the property purchaser's action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet employed to quiet title, as that action was used to quiet title as to a deed or other writing which casts a cloud over a title, whereas the property purchaser's action was a quia timet action against all the world; however, no error occurred in denying the property claimant's motion for a jury trial even though an action against the entire world allowed for one, as the evidence did not present a question of fact that required a jury. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003).

Prerequisites not met.

- Plaintiff's claim failed because plaintiff had not alleged that plaintiff paid off the mortgage loan in full to satisfy the Security Deed or that plaintiff's signature on the Security Deed was false. Bowman v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2013).

Decedent's estate administrator's claim for conventional quiet title failed because the decedent did not hold some current record title or current prescriptive title upon execution of a security deed when the amount thereunder had not been fully paid. Shannon v. Albertelli Firm, P.C., F.3d (11th Cir. May 7, 2015)(Unpublished).

State immune from suit.

- Sovereign immunity barred a conventional quiet title action against the state, which was immune from suit. TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107 (2016).

Cited in Thompson v. Etowah Iron Co., 91 Ga. 538, 17 S.E. 663 (1893); Felder v. Paulk, 165 Ga. 135, 139 S.E. 873 (1927); Simpson v. Ray, 180 Ga. 395, 178 S.E. 726 (1935); Allen v. Bemis, 193 Ga. 556, 19 S.E.2d 516 (1942); Stow v. Hargrove, 203 Ga. 735, 48 S.E.2d 454 (1948); McDaniel v. Bagby, 204 Ga. 750, 51 S.E.2d 805 (1949); Todd v. Conner, 220 Ga. 173, 137 S.E.2d 614 (1964); Giddings v. Starks, 242 Ga. 457, 249 S.E.2d 203 (1978); Walker v. Walker, 266 Ga. 414, 467 S.E.2d 583 (1996); Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 283 Ga. 539, 661 S.E.2d 545 (2008); Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp., 287 Ga. 849, 700 S.E.2d 583 (2010); Richards v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 325 Ga. App. 722, 754 S.E.2d 770 (2014).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims, §§ 2, 16, 63.

C.J.S.

- 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 40.

ALR.

- Doctrine of after-acquired title as between one who took before and one who took after common grantor or mortgagor acquired title, 25 A.L.R. 83.

Right of vendor in contract for sale or exchange of real property to bring suit for forfeiture, foreclosure, or rescission, or to quiet title or recover possession, without first giving notice, or making demand for possession, 94 A.L.R. 1239.

Joinder of claims to separate parcels in suit to quiet or to remove cloud on title, or to determine adverse claims to land, 118 A.L.R. 1400.

Common source of title doctrine, 5 A.L.R.3d 375.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Tharp v. Harpagon Co., 604 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 12, 2004 | 278 Ga. 654, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3325

...Harpagon dismissed its remaining claims and the trial court awarded it $36,028 in attorney fees and costs against both Tharp and his counsel. This appeal ensued. 1. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court in this appeal from a judgment entered in a conventional quia timet action, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., brought to remove a cloud from the title of real property caused by equities of redemption following a tax sale....
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Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp., 700 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 4, 2010 | 287 Ga. 849, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3184

...The trial court appears to have concluded that Yale obtained a valid security interest in a one-half undivided interest in the property as a bona fide purchaser for value, but, in our view, whether or not Yale occupies that status is not determinative. OCGA § 23-3-40 provides that a deed may be cancelled on grounds of forgery....
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Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 637 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 2006 | 281 Ga. 250, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3179

...her right to redeem the property through a private process server. Davis, however, failed to redeem the property by paying the statutory redemption amount. OCGA § 48-4-42. On April 21, 2004, Harpagon filed a petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40....
...In a separate related case, Davis now appeals that order as well. Case No. S06A0895 1. Davis contends that the special master erred by denying her right to a jury trial in Harpagon's quiet title action. Because this action was brought pursuant to the conventional quia timet statute, OCGA § 23-3-40, Davis had no right to a jury trial....
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Nw. Carpets, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Chatsworth, 630 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 18, 2006 | 280 Ga. 535, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1546

...("Northwest") from the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff First National Bank of Chatsworth ("FNBC") in its "Petition to Remove Cloud from Title" to real property in Gordon County, in which it sought to have cancelled a recorded security deed in favor of Northwest. See OCGA § 23-3-40....
...allenge the foreclosure proceeding. See Rockmart Bank v. Doster, 233 Ga. 748, 213 S.E.2d 645 (1975); Stewart Bros., Inc. v. General Improvement Corp., 143 Ga.App. 258, 238 S.E.2d 259 (1977). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 23-3-40 provides: The proceeding quia timet is sustained in equity for the purpose of causing to be delivered and canceled any instrument which has answered the object of its creation or any forged or other iniquitous deed or other writing which,...
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Ansley v. Raczka-Long, 293 Ga. 138 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 3, 2013 | 744 S.E.2d 55, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1675

...On April 14, 2011, the probate court awarded Raczka-Long title to both lots as year’s support. On March 17, 2012, the administrator of Long’s estate filed a Petition for Quia Timet to Cancel a Fraudulent Deed against Ansley in Sumter County Superior Court. See OCGA § 23-3-40....
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Hamilton v. Renewed Hope, Inc., 589 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 17, 2003 | 277 Ga. 465, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 3392

...After expiration of the time specified in the notice for redemption, Ms. Hamilton filed this declaratory judgment action seeking an order that she was still entitled to redeem the property. Appellee counterclaimed for a decree in quia timet pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq....
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Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 264 Ga. 755 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 17, 1994 | 449 S.E.2d 85, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3410

...Under the conventional quiet title action, for example, the general rule was that a person had to prove actual possession of the land to bring a petition to cancel an instrument that cast a cloud on the title. See Hale v. Turner, 183 Ga. 593, 595 (189 SE 10) (1936); OCGA §§ 23-3-40 to 23-3-42....
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Vatacs Grp., Inc. v. U. S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2013 | 738 S.E.2d 83, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 176

...We find no merit in these claims of error, and we affirm the judgment below. 1. We turn first to the question of a jury trial. To quiet title to real property, one may seek relief under the procedures and standards for conventional quia timet, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., or under those for quia timet against all the world, see OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq....
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Walker v. Walker, 467 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1996 | 266 Ga. 414, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 1025

...ncrease of common property or a common fund." [Cit.] Alford v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 237 Ga. 194, 197-198, 226 S.E.2d 905 (1976). This case began as an action for a bill quia timet, which although a statutory action, is an action in equity. OCGA § 23-3-40....
...ng under section 44-6-140. [3] Nor does the fact that the action began as a quia timet action under the Quiet Title Act of 1966, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., authorize the trial court to convert the action to a "conventional" quia timet action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40. [4] Even if such a conversion were possible, the statutory procedures under section 23-3-40 do not authorize an award of attorney's fees....
...fund). [2] Werner v. Werner, 196 Ga. 1, 25 S.E.2d 676 (1943). [3] The distinction between law and equity is still viable in the separate forms of action for partitioning land. Burnham v. Lynn, 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975). [4] An action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 may be brought only by one in actual possession....
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Davis v. Harpagon Co., 283 Ga. 539 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 19, 2008 | 661 S.E.2d 545, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1692

...her right to redeem the property through a private process server. Davis, however, failed to redeem the property by paying the statutory redemption amount. OCGA § 48-4-42. On April 21, 2004, Harpagon filed a petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40....
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Johnson v. Red Hill Assocs., Inc., 602 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 13, 2004 | 278 Ga. 334, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2949

...2000. After a year had passed, Red Hill sent barment notices to begin the process of foreclosing the right to redeem. More than a year later, Red Hill filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County an equitable petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., and had appellant George M....
...He enumerates as error the failure of the trial court to conduct a jury trial, citing as authority the provision in OCGA § 23-3-66 for jury trial in an action for quia timet against all the world. This action, however, was brought pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., the conventional quia timet statute....
...rial. Since Red Hill Associates was not seeking to establish superior title to all the world, but to remove clouds on the title in the form of specific instruments and liens, "the cancellation of which is necessary to [its] perfect protection" (OCGA § 23-3-40), the present action was properly prosecuted as a conventional quia timet action....
...East Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749(1), 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003), and Paul v. Keene, 272 Ga. 357, 529 S.E.2d 135 (2000), do not require a contrary conclusion. In Gurley, this Court held that the action in that case, though ostensibly a conventional quia timet action under OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., was in substance an action *574 for quia timet against all the world because the plaintiff there "sought to quiet title to land purchased at a tax sale, and establish that [it] held superior title to all the world in the subject p...
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Tdga, LLC. v. Cbira, LLC, 298 Ga. 510 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 22, 2016 | 783 S.E.2d 107

...Decided: February 22, 2016 S15A1638. TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC et al. MELTON, Justice. This case requires a determination of whether conventional actions for quiet title, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., where the State of Georgia asserts an interest in the property at issue, are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity....
...Department of Revenue and the Georgia Department of Labor (Departments), each of which held recorded tax liens against the property. Following the completion of this procedure, which the Departments do not contest, TDGA filed the current quiet title action pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40, conventional quia timet, again naming all parties with any recorded interest in the underlying property....
...Neither the statutory provisions regarding foreclosure of the right of redemption nor conventional quiet title actions contain an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. For this reason, the State and its agencies are immune from suit under OCGA § 23-3-40 This does not mean, however, that there is no mechanism for quieting title against all potential claimants, including the State....
...rty is the only defendant and sovereign immunity is not applicable, prevent this problem.4 Therefore, for all of the reasons set forth above, we find that sovereign immunity does bar a conventional quiet title action against the State, OCGA § 23-3-40, but sovereign immunity is not applicable to an in rem quiet title action against all the world....
...But it is also apparent from the text of the Land Registration Law that the General Assembly intended that any claims the State may have to the land at issue would be subject to adjudication by the court. The same cannot be said of conventional quiet title actions, see OCGA § § 23-3-40 to 23-3-44, which pre-date the Land Registration Law, are not 2 brought in rem, and operate on particular instruments allegedly casting a cloud on title....
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Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Veatch, 710 S.E.2d 744 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2011 | 288 Ga. 808, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 753

...nistration of the estate of Raymond Wesley Veatch, Jr., he filed in the Fulton County land records an affidavit stating that the Executor's and Quitclaim deeds were false. He then filed in the superior court the present petition to quiet title. OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq....
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Gurley v. East Atlanta Land Co., Inc., 583 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 10, 2003 | 276 Ga. 749, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2178

...er writing which, though not enforced at the time, either casts a cloud over the complainant's title or otherwise subjects him to future liability or present *867 annoyance, and the cancellation of which is necessary to his perfect protection." OCGA § 23-3-40....
...OCGA § 23-3-43, which was enacted in 2000, provides that for actions in conventional quia timet "there shall be no right to a jury trial." While the legislature has, as in other equity cases, precluded the right to jury trial in conventional quia timet actions under OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., it has taken no such action for suits in quia timet against all the world....
...Thus, the right to jury trial for quia timet against all the world has been preserved. See OCGA § 23-3-66; Paul v. Keene, 272 Ga. 357, 529 S.E.2d 135 (2000); Addison v. Reece, 263 Ga. 631, 436 S.E.2d 663 (1993). The special master found that this case, ostensibly filed under OCGA § 23-3-40, was a suit in conventional quia timet....
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Harpagon Co. v. Gelfond, 279 Ga. 59 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2005 | 608 S.E.2d 597, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 351

...This is an appeal by plaintiff, The Harpagon Company, LLC (“Harpagon”), from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Alicia Gelfond as the Executrix of the Estate of William A. Gelfond et al. (collectively “Gelfond”), in a petition, pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., to quiet title to real property acquired by quitclaim deed following a tax sale....
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Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 7, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 402

...Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 300 Ga. App. 644 (686 SE2d 259) (2009). We disagree. In Davis, the Harpagon Company, LLC (“Harpagon”), purchased at a tax sale a property formerly owned by Davis. Harpagon filed a petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 of the Quiet Title Act (OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq.) to obtain the property, and a special master was appointed to preside over the matter....
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Crippen & Lawrence Inv. Co., Inc. v. A Tract of Land Being Known as 444 Lemon Street, 850 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 19, 2020 | 310 Ga. 171

...trial court determined that the estate was entitled to notice of foreclosure and dismissed the petition to quiet title. Crippen appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding in an unpublished opinion4 that Crippen had no standing to claim that the 2 See generally OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq. 3 The estate appeared through Rubin Lee Dixon, the executor of the estate, and Evelyn Dixon, the alternate executrix. 4 Crippen & Lawrence Investment Co., Inc....
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La Chona, LLC v. Aberra, 300 Ga. 670 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2017 | 797 S.E.2d 895

...orded, it should be returned to Hutchins). Hutchins was never called as a witness regarding the matter. Aberra never heard from La Chona regarding the amount due for redemption. On March 25, 2014, La Chona filed a petition to quiet title under OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., alleging that it had barred the defendants’ rights of redemption in the property by virtue of the barment notices it served on the defendants in January 2014 and that it therefore was the fee simple owner of the property under the tax deed....
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Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC, 291 Ga. 549 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2012 | 731 S.E.2d 683, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2746

...ens on the Property that she had purchased in 2004. In February 2011, Reliance filed a quiet title action in the Superior Court of Fulton County to establish that it was the fee simple owner of the Property free and clear of all adverse claims. OCGA § 23-3-40....
...Harpagon Co., 278 Ga. 654 (3) (604 SE2d 156) (2004). In any event, even if the issue had been properly preserved, “because [Reliance’s] action was brought ‘to remove clouds on [its] title’pursuant to the conventional quia timet statute, OCGA § 23-3-40, [Karlen] had no right to a jury trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Human v....
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Human v. Harpagon Co., 281 Ga. 372 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 20, 2006 | 637 S.E.2d 684, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3567

...Human did not redeem the property within the redemption period (see OCGA § 48-4-42), and on February 20, 2004 Heartwood conveyed the property to the Harpagon Company, LLC (“Harpagon”). On April 21, 2004, Harpagon filed a petition to quiet title to the property pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40....
...Human contends that the special master erred by denying his right to a jury trial in Harpagon’s quiet title action. However, because this action was brought “to remove clouds on [Harpagon’s] title” pursuant to the conventional quia timet statute, OCGA § 23-3-40, Human had no right to a jury trial....