O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43 (2019)

Special master

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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At the option of the complainant as prayed for in the complaint, the court, upon receipt of the complaint, shall submit the same to a special master as provided for in Code Sections 23-3-63 through 23-3-68, except that as in other equity cases there shall be no right to a jury trial.

History

Code 1981, § 23-3-43, enacted by Ga. L. 2000, p. 1408, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘The New Special Master Rule - Uniform Superior Court Rule 46: Life Jackets for the Courts

in the Perfect Storm,’’ see 15 (No. 4) Ga. St. B. J. 20 (2009). For annual survey on real property, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (2013).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Authority of special master and judge. - In submitting a quiet title case to the special master, the trial court did not cede jurisdiction to render a final decision as although the trial court was not required to hear exceptions to the special master’s report, the trial court had to independently evaluate the correctness of the report before adopting the report as judgment and it was the trial court, not the special master, who ordered disbursement of excess funds following the tax sale. Republic Title Company, LLC v. Freeport Title and Guaranty, Inc., 351 Ga. App. 408, 829 S.E.2d 172 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1616, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 168 (Ga. 2020). Payment of special master’s fees not prerequisite to appeal. - Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22(c) requiring the payment of auditors’ fees prior to the filing of an appeal did not apply to special masters appointed under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-43 and 23-3-63, and an appeal was not dismissed due to failure to pay the special master’s fees. Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 300 Ga. App. 644, 686 S.E.2d 259 (2009) was overruled to the extent it was to the contrary. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016). No notice or hearing required. - When a defendant who asserted a quiet title claim against the plaintiffs requested a special master, the trial court was required to submit the claim to a special master, and no notice or hearing on the

matter was required; once submitted, the special master had complete jurisdiction to determine the quiet title claim. Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675 (2014). Sua sponte appointment improper. - Trial court’s sua sponte appointment of a special master, over the siblings’ objection, was in direct contravention of Georgia law. Patel v. Patel, 342 Ga. App. 81, 802 S.E.2d 871 (2017). Jury trial unavailable. - While a special master erred in concluding the property purchaser’s action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet action, and, thus, no jury trial was available to the property claimant, the claimant was not harmed by the error; although a jury trial was available regarding the property purchaser’s action in quia timet as against all the world, the property claimant did not show that the evidence presented a question of fact, and, thus, the intervention of a jury was not required. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003). Trial court properly appointed a special master in a quiet title action and a corporation, who was unsuccessful in the corporation’s claim for the property, was properly held not entitled to a jury trial because the suing bank had amended the bank’s petition to provide for an action only for conventional quia timet by the time it was heard by the special master; therefore, no jury trial was available under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U. S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2003–2021 · leading case: Patel Et Al. v. Patel, 802 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
Patel Et Al. v. Patel, 802 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 6× “” OCGA § 23-3-43. Here, the trial court’s sua sponte invocation of OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq.”
Gurley v. East Atlanta Land Co., Inc., 583 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 23-3-43, which was enacted in 2000, provides that for actions in conventional quia timet “there shall be no right to a jury trial.”
Boyd v. Johngalt Holdings, LLC, 755 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 2× “But the appointment of a special master was mandatory, and notice and a hearing were therefore unnecessary, because OCGA § 23-3-43 says that where, as here, the plaintiff in a conventional quiet title action requests a special master, “the court, upon receipt of the complaint,…”
Vatacs Grp., Inc. v. U. S. Bank, N.A., 738 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “To quiet title to real property, one may seek relief under the procedures and standards for conventional quia timet, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq.”
La Chona, LLC v. Aberra, 797 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 4× “The trial court referred the case to a special master, see OCGA § 23-3-43, who ruled in favor of La Chona on February 6, 2015.”
Johnson v. Red Hill Assocs., Inc., 602 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 2× “In OCGA § 23-3-43, the special master provisions of OCGA §§ 23-3-63 through 23-3-68 are adopted for conventional quia timet, but the right to a jury trial is specifically excluded.”
Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 793 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 2× “The Quiet Title Act has its own, self-contained set of provisions for the appointment of special masters that are separate and apart from those relating to the appointment of auditors under Title 9. Furthermore, whereas OCGA § 9-7-22 (c) requires that the fees of an auditor…”
Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC, 731 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 23-3-43. Following a May 2011 hearing which was not transcribed, and after Karlen acknowledged that she had received proper service of the quiet title action, the special master allowed Karlen additional time to file an amended answer and extended the time for Karlen to…”
Repub. Title Co. v. Freeport Title & Guar., Inc., 829 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “]" OCGA § 23-3-43. [T]he special master shall have complete jurisdiction within the scope of the pleadings to ascertain and determine the validity, nature, or extent of petitioner's title and all other interests in the land, or any part thereof, which may be adverse to the title…”
William Davidson v. Lindfield Holdings, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 6× “640, 643 (2) ( 755 SE2d 675 ) (2014) (special master’s jurisdiction limited to quiet title claim); OCGA §§ 23-3-43, 23-3-66. We fail to see, therefore, how the trial court’s order adopting the special master’s report renders the fraud claim moot.”
La Chona, LLC v. Aberra (Ga. 2017). · cites it 3× “The trial court referred the case to a special master, see OCGA § 23-3-43, who ruled in favor of La Chona on February 6, 2015.”
Repub. Title Co., LLC v. Freeport Title & Guar., Inc., as Tr. of the New Stokes Avenue Land Trust (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “]” OCGA § 23-3-43. [T]he special master shall have complete jurisdiction within the scope of the pleadings to ascertain and determine the validity, nature, or extent of petitioner’s title and all other interests in the land, or any part thereof, which may be adverse to the title…”
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