Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 23-3-43 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 23 EQUITY

Section 3. Equitable Remedies And Proceedings Generally, 23-3-1 through 23-3-127.

ARTICLE 3 QUIA TIMET

23-3-43. Special master.

At the option of the complainant as prayed for in the complaint, the court, upon receipt of the complaint, shall submit the same to a special master as provided for in Code Sections 23-3-63 through 23-3-68, except that as in other equity cases there shall be no right to a jury trial.

(Code 1981, §23-3-43, enacted by Ga. L. 2000, p. 1408, § 1.)

Effective date.

- This Code section became effective July 1, 2000.

Law reviews.

- For article, "The New Special Master Rule - Uniform Superior Court Rule 46: Life Jackets for the Courts in the Perfect Storm," see 15 (No. 4) Ga. St. B. J. 20 (2009). For annual survey on real property, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (2013).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Payment of special master's fees not prerequisite to appeal.

- Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22(c) requiring the payment of auditors' fees prior to the filing of an appeal did not apply to special masters appointed under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-43 and23-3-63, and an appeal was not dismissed due to failure to pay the special master's fees. Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 300 Ga. App. 644, 686 S.E.2d 259 (2009) was overruled to the extent it was to the contrary. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).

No notice or hearing required.

- When a defendant who asserted a quiet title claim against the plaintiffs requested a special master, the trial court was required to submit the claim to a special master, and no notice or hearing on the matter was required; once submitted, the special master had complete jurisdiction to determine the quiet title claim. Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675 (2014).

Sua sponte appointment improper.

- Trial court's sua sponte appointment of a special master, over the siblings' objection, was in direct contravention of Georgia law. Patel v. Patel, 342 Ga. App. 81, 802 S.E.2d 871 (2017).

Jury trial unavailable.

- While a special master erred in concluding the property purchaser's action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet action, and, thus, no jury trial was available to the property claimant, the claimant was not harmed by the error; although a jury trial was available regarding the property purchaser's action in quia timet as against all the world, the property claimant did not show that the evidence presented a question of fact, and, thus, the intervention of a jury was not required. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003).

Trial court properly appointed a special master in a quiet title action and a corporation, who was unsuccessful in the corporation's claim for the property, was properly held not entitled to a jury trial because the suing bank had amended the bank's petition to provide for an action only for conventional quia timet by the time it was heard by the special master; therefore, no jury trial was available under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).

Cases Citing Georgia Code 23-3-43 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 7

La Chona, LLC v. Aberra

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-03-06

Citation: 300 Ga. 670, 797 S.E.2d 895, 2017 WL 875095, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 165

Snippet: referred the case to a special master, see OCGA § 23-3-43, who ruled in favor of La Chona on February 6,

Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-11-07

Citation: 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 727

Snippet: pursuant to the Quiet Title *94Act (see OCGA §§ 23-3-43 and 23-3-63), which is entirely separate from the

Boyd v. Johngalt Holdings, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-03

Citation: 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 357, 2014 WL 819430, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 171

Snippet: hearing were therefore unnecessary, because OCGA § 23-3-43 says that where, as here, the plaintiff in a conventional

Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U. S. Bank, N.A.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-02-04

Citation: 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 176, 2013 WL 399136, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 110

Snippet: timet, he is not entitled to trial by jury. OCGA § 23-3-43. See also Johnson v. Red Hill Assoc., 278 Ga. 334

Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-09-10

Citation: 291 Ga. 549, 731 S.E.2d 683, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2746, 2012 WL 3890210, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 692

Snippet: the Superior Court granted the request. OCGA § 23-3-43. Following a May 2011 hearing which was not transcribed

Johnson v. Red Hill Associates, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-09-13

Citation: 602 S.E.2d 572, 278 Ga. 334, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2949, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 634

Snippet: the conventional quia timet statute. In OCGA § 23-3-43, the special master provisions of OCGA §§ 23-3-63

Gurley v. East Atlanta Land Co., Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-07-10

Citation: 583 S.E.2d 866, 276 Ga. 749, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2178, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 621

Snippet: every interest therein." OCGA § 23-3-60. OCGA § 23-3-43, which was enacted in 2000, provides that for actions