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2018 Georgia Code 23-3-43 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 23 EQUITY

Section 3. Equitable Remedies And Proceedings Generally, 23-3-1 through 23-3-127.

ARTICLE 3 QUIA TIMET

23-3-43. Special master.

At the option of the complainant as prayed for in the complaint, the court, upon receipt of the complaint, shall submit the same to a special master as provided for in Code Sections 23-3-63 through 23-3-68, except that as in other equity cases there shall be no right to a jury trial.

(Code 1981, §23-3-43, enacted by Ga. L. 2000, p. 1408, § 1.)

Effective date.

- This Code section became effective July 1, 2000.

Law reviews.

- For article, "The New Special Master Rule - Uniform Superior Court Rule 46: Life Jackets for the Courts in the Perfect Storm," see 15 (No. 4) Ga. St. B. J. 20 (2009). For annual survey on real property, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (2013).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Payment of special master's fees not prerequisite to appeal.

- Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22(c) requiring the payment of auditors' fees prior to the filing of an appeal did not apply to special masters appointed under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-43 and23-3-63, and an appeal was not dismissed due to failure to pay the special master's fees. Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 300 Ga. App. 644, 686 S.E.2d 259 (2009) was overruled to the extent it was to the contrary. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).

No notice or hearing required.

- When a defendant who asserted a quiet title claim against the plaintiffs requested a special master, the trial court was required to submit the claim to a special master, and no notice or hearing on the matter was required; once submitted, the special master had complete jurisdiction to determine the quiet title claim. Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675 (2014).

Sua sponte appointment improper.

- Trial court's sua sponte appointment of a special master, over the siblings' objection, was in direct contravention of Georgia law. Patel v. Patel, 342 Ga. App. 81, 802 S.E.2d 871 (2017).

Jury trial unavailable.

- While a special master erred in concluding the property purchaser's action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet action, and, thus, no jury trial was available to the property claimant, the claimant was not harmed by the error; although a jury trial was available regarding the property purchaser's action in quia timet as against all the world, the property claimant did not show that the evidence presented a question of fact, and, thus, the intervention of a jury was not required. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003).

Trial court properly appointed a special master in a quiet title action and a corporation, who was unsuccessful in the corporation's claim for the property, was properly held not entitled to a jury trial because the suing bank had amended the bank's petition to provide for an action only for conventional quia timet by the time it was heard by the special master; therefore, no jury trial was available under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43

Total Results: 7  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Boyd v. Johngalt Holdings, LLC, 294 Ga. 640 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 3, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 675, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 357

...The Boyds complain that the trial court appointed a special master and required the parties to appear before him “for all further proceedings,” without prior notice or opportunity to be heard. But the appointment of a special master was mandatory, and notice and a hearing were therefore unnecessary, because OCGA § 23-3-43 says that where, as here, the plaintiff in a conventional quiet title action requests a special master, “the court, upon receipt of the complaint, 5 In light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to address JohnGalt’...
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Vatacs Grp., Inc. v. U. S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2013 | 738 S.E.2d 83, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 176

...To quiet title to real property, one may seek relief under the procedures and standards for conventional quia timet, see OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., or under those for quia timet against all the world, see OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq. When one seeks conventional quia timet, he is not entitled to trial by jury. OCGA § 23-3-43....
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Johnson v. Red Hill Assocs., Inc., 602 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 13, 2004 | 278 Ga. 334, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2949

...He enumerates as error the failure of the trial court to conduct a jury trial, citing as authority the provision in OCGA § 23-3-66 for jury trial in an action for quia timet against all the world. This action, however, was brought pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40 et seq., the conventional quia timet statute. In OCGA § 23-3-43, the special master provisions of OCGA §§ 23-3-63 through 23-3-68 are adopted for conventional quia timet, but the right to a jury trial is specifically excluded....
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Gurley v. East Atlanta Land Co., Inc., 583 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 10, 2003 | 276 Ga. 749, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2178

...hing that certain named persons are the owners of all the interests in land ... so that there shall be no occasion for land in this state to be unmarketable because of any uncertainty as to the owner of every interest therein." OCGA § 23-3-60. OCGA § 23-3-43, which was enacted in 2000, provides that for actions in conventional quia timet "there shall be no right to a jury trial." While the legislature has, as in other equity cases, precluded the right to jury trial in conventional quia timet a...
...Reece, 263 Ga. 631, 436 S.E.2d 663 (1993). The special master found that this case, ostensibly filed under OCGA § 23-3-40, was a suit in conventional quia timet. Accordingly, the special master denied Gurley's motion for a jury trial, citing OCGA § 23-3-43....
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Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 7, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 402

...771, 772 (2) (426 SE2d 594) (1992)]. . . . Accordingly, Davis’s appeal is hereby dismissed. See id. Id. at 646 (1). We find the Court of Appeals’ reasoning to be flawed. As an initial matter, the special master was appointed pursuant to the Quiet Title *94Act (see OCGA §§ 23-3-43 and 23-3-63), which is entirely separate from the Code provisions relating to the appointment of auditors under Title 9 of the Georgia Code....
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La Chona, LLC v. Aberra, 300 Ga. 670 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2017 | 797 S.E.2d 895

...ount due, as calculated under OCGA § 48-4-42, that La Chona had never waived its right to payment of the redemption price, and that Aberra’s right to redeem the property was barred. The trial court referred the case to a special master, see OCGA § 23-3-43, who ruled in favor of La Chona on February 6, 2015....
...ng on Aberra’s motion for reconsideration. This contention is incorrect for several reasons. First, OCGA § 9-7-14, which governs objections to auditors’reports, is inapplicable in this case, as the special master was appointed pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-43....
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Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC, 291 Ga. 549 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2012 | 731 S.E.2d 683, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2746

...Fulton County to establish that it was the fee simple owner of the Property free and clear of all adverse claims. OCGA § 23-3-40. Reliance requested that the matter be submitted to a special master, and the Superior Court granted the request. OCGA § 23-3-43....