O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22 (2019)

Auditor’s fees

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The fees of an auditor to whom a case, whether legal or equitable, has been referred shall be determined and fixed by the trial judge making the referral or by any other judge having jurisdiction of the case and serving in the place and stead of the trial judge. The fees so determined and fixed may be apportioned between and among the parties at the discretion of the judge. (b) The court with consent of the parties may fix the fees of the auditor in advance and incorporate the same in the order making the appointment. (c) The fees of an auditor, as determined and fixed by the judge, shall be included in and made a part of the judgment of the court. The fees of the auditor shall be assessed as court costs and shall be paid prior to the filing of any appeal from the judgment of the court; provided, however, that if such fees have not been determined and assessed at the time of filing any such appeal, the same shall be paid within 30 days from the date of assessment.

History

Ga. L. 1894, p. 123, § 22; Civil Code 1895, §§ 4602, 4603; Civil Code 1910, §§ 5148, 5149; Code 1933, §§ 10-501, 10502; Ga. L. 1963, p. 620, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 9; Ga. L. 1988, p. 408, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For annual survey of law on real property, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 283 (2010).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Construction with Quiet Title Act. - Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22(c) requiring the payment of auditors’ fees prior to the filing of an appeal did not apply to special masters appointed under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-43 and 23-3-63, and an appeal was not dismissed due to failure to pay the special master’s fees. Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 300 Ga. App. 644, 686 S.E.2d 259 (2009) was over-

ruled to the extent it was to the contrary. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 727 (2016). Apportionment of fees. - In the allowance of auditor’s fees under this section, the court may in its discretion apportion the fees between the parties. Moore v. Dickenson & Williams, 117 Ga. 887, 45 S.E. 241, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 380 (1903); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Central Trust Co.,

135 Ga. 472, 135 Ga. 473, 69 S.E. 708, 1910 Ga. LEXIS 7 (1910) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22). Apportionment will stand unless judge abuses discretion. - In an equitable proceeding, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to award the costs of court as the facts may warrant; and, unless the judge’s discretion is abused in so doing, the judge’s judgment will not be disturbed. Logan v. Mobley, 170 Ga. 615, 153 S.E. 763, 1930 Ga. LEXIS 207 (1930). In equity cases, the judge in the judge’s discretion may apportion an auditor’s fee between the parties, or even award it against the successful party; and the Supreme Court will not interfere unless discretion has been abused. Hicks v. Atlanta Trust Co., 187 Ga. 314, 200 S.E. 301, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 787 (1938); Brown v. Parks, 190 Ga. 540, 9 S.E.2d 897, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 517 (1940). Judge did not abuse judicial discretion in dividing auditor’s fee and stenographic costs equally between parties, where it did not appear that the defendant administrator participated in any alleged fraud by the claimant wife in procuring the letters of administration, and the orders and proceedings for an accounting showed that there were matters of bona fide disputes between the

parties, as to a part of which the defendant administrator prevailed. Brown v. Parks, 190 Ga. 540, 9 S.E.2d 897, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 517 (1940). Entire fee may be taxed upon either party. Fitzpatrick v. McGregor, 133 Ga. 332, 65 S.E. 859, 1909 Ga. LEXIS 211 (1909). This section provides how fee may be fixed in advance. Avera Loan & Inv. Co. v. National Sur. Co., 32 Ga. App. 319, 123 S.E. 45, 1924 Ga. App. LEXIS 367 (1924) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22). Fees need to be included in final judgment. - In an action concerning dissolution of an LLC, pretermitting whether the order was sufficiently specific for the appellate court to decide whether the trial court considered the factors in Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 46(H)(3) or whether the court abused the court’s discretion in allocating the entirety of the fees to the defendants under Rule 46 and O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22(a), the trial court erred by requiring the defendants to pay the special master’s fees prior to final judgment because the fees were in the nature of costs and needed to be included in the final judgment. A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, 359 Ga. App. 271, 856 S.E.2d 704, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 180 (2021).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 196. 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 196.

ALR. Amount of master’s fee in divorce proceedings, 89 A.L.R.2d 377.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 793 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 2016).
Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 793 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 10× “On appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on statutes that relate to “auditors” being considered to be special masters, and ignored the specific statutes of the Quiet Title Act relating to the appointment and payment of special masters, to find that Davis’ failure to pay the…”
Gwinnett Cnty. v. Vaccaro, 376 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 4× “Gwinnett County's argument that compliance with the court's injunction intrudes upon its fiscal management could well be heard from any defendant compelled to clean up the nuisance he has created. We find no error in either the trial judge's appointment at county expense of a…”
Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 686 S.E.2d 259 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 6× “Harpagon moves to dismiss the appeal, pursuant to OCGA § 9-7-22 (c), arguing that Davis has failed to pay special master’s fees that are required to be paid prior to any further appeal.”
Interfinancial Midtown, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 806 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 9-7-22 (c). 15 Based upon Choate's claim for expenses of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11, the trial court did not err by denying appellants' motion for directed verdict in connection with these fees.”
Sorrentino v. Boston Mut. Life Ins., 426 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Appellee asserts that appellants have not complied with OCGA § 9-7-22 (c), which requires that auditor’s fees “shall be assessed as court costs and shall be paid prior to the filing of any appeal.”
E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Waters, 681 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “” But OCGA § 9-7-22 provides that fees, which are to be assessed as court costs, “shall be determined and fixed by the trial judge” and apportioned among the parties at the discretion of the judge.”
In Re Est. of Hawkins, 762 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). “, OCGA § 53-2-3 (2) (A), enumerating five methods by which a father may legitimate; OCGA § 19-7-51, providing for visitation privileges upon a determination of paternity, albeit by court order; OCGA § 9-7-22 (c), specifically providing for inheritance.”
Prenita Alimchandani v. a & M Hospitalities, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 8× “” The subsequent special master/auditor order stated the same, adding that “the [c]ourt previously considered the fairness of imposing likely expenses on the parties and further finds that the entry of this order and the [limited receiver o]rder 18 OCGA § 9-7-22 (a). 19 OCGA §…”
A&m Hospitalities, LLC v. Prenita Alimchandani (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 8× “; see also OCGA § 9-7-22 (c) (providing that the fees of an auditor “shall be assessed as court costs”).”
Zep, Inc. v. Yolanda Devost, as Duly Appointed Rep. of the Est. of Clarence Glenn (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 6× “See also OCGA § 9-7-22(a) (“The fees of an auditor to whom a case, whether legal or equitable, has been referred shall be determined and fixed by the trial judge making the referral or by any other judge having jurisdiction of the case and serving in the place and stead of the…”
Williams Et Al. v. Minerva Tax Receivables, LLC Et Al., 792 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “Under OCGA § 9-7-22 (c): The fees of an auditor, as determined and fixed by the judge, shall be included in and made a part of the judgment of the court.”
Interfinancial Midtown, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 9-7-22 (c).15 Based upon Choate’s claim for expenses of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11, the trial court did not err by denying appellants’ motion for directed verdict in connection with these fees.”
— 9-7-22(a) — 1 case
Zep, Inc. v. Yolanda Devost, as Duly Appointed Rep. of the Est. of Clarence Glenn (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “See also OCGA § 9-7-22(a) (“The fees of an auditor to whom a case, whether legal or equitable, has been referred shall be determined and fixed by the trial judge making the referral or by any other judge having jurisdiction of the case and serving in the place and stead of the…”
— 9-7-22(c) — 1 case
Zep, Inc. v. Yolanda Devost, as Duly Appointed Rep. of the Est. of Clarence Glenn (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “See also OCGA § 9-7-22(a) (“The fees of an auditor to whom a case, whether legal or equitable, has been referred shall be determined and fixed by the trial judge making the referral or by any other judge having jurisdiction of the case and serving in the place and stead of the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.