Service by publication not authorized.

- Service on lender by publication was not authorized by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65(b), nor did it comport with due process, where it did not appear that an attempt to locate the lender would have been fruitless, since there were obvious channels of information available. Floyd v. Gore, 251 Ga. App. 803, 555 S.E.2d 170 (2001).

Purchasers, who bought the subject property at a tax sale, failed to pursue the obvious and fruitful channels of information that would have allowed the purchasers to ascertain the property owners' current address with minimal effort and effect personal service and, thus, service by publication of the purchasers' action to quiet title did not meet the constitutional requirements of due process. Dukes v. Munoz, 346 Ga. App. 319, 816 S.E.2d 164 (2018).

Quiet title proceeding procedurally deficient and demonstrated failure to serve.

- In a purchaser's quiet title action against the executor of a testatrix's estate, the trial court did not err in adopting the report of a special master and in decreeing that fee simple title to the land was vested in the purchaser because the trial court was authorized to find that the executor's prior quiet title action failed to convey any interest in the property to the executor and to decree that the judgment entered in that action be removed as a cloud upon the purchaser's title when the prior quiet title proceeding was procedurally deficient; the quiet title petition was not verified as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62(b), it did not include a plat of survey of the land as required by § 23-3-62(c), a lis pendens was not filed contemporaneously with the filing of the petition as required by § 23-3-62(d), the petition was not submitted to an authorized special master as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63, and the record failed to establish service on any party as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65(b). Mann v. Blalock, 286 Ga. 541, 690 S.E.2d 375 (2010).

Special master not appointed therefore no service.

- Default judgment against owners in a quiet title action based on their failure to answer was improper because, once the in rem proceeding was instituted, the trial court was required, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63, to submit the matter to a special master, and a special master was never appointed such that service could have properly been completed pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq.; since the Quiet Title Act provided specific rules of practice and procedure with respect to an in rem quiet title action against all the world, the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et. seq., was inapplicable. Woodruff v. Morgan County, 284 Ga. 651, 670 S.E.2d 415 (2008).

Standing.

- In a quiet title action brought by a homeowner with regard to a road, a developer and a county did not lack standing as possible adverse claimants. The county had a direct interest in the proceeding because the owner of the subdivision where the homeowner lived had expressly dedicated all streets delineated in the recorded subdivision plat, including the road in question, to public use; the developer also had a stake in the outcome of the case because of the developer's interest in paving the remainder of the road to provide access to the developer's new development. Harbuck v. Houston County, 284 Ga. 4, 662 S.E.2d 107 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 641, 172 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2008).

Cited in Pittard v. McMillon, 225 Ga. 239, 167 S.E.2d 644 (1969); Barrett v. Simmons, 235 Ga. 600, 221 S.E.2d 25 (1975); Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Resseau v. Bland, 268 Ga. 634, 491 S.E.2d 809 (1997); Brown v. Fokes Props. 2002, Inc., 283 Ga. 231, 657 S.E.2d 820 (2008); Brown v. Fokes Props. 2002, Inc., 283 Ga. 231, 657 S.E.2d 820 (2008).

ALR.

- Right to secure new or successive notice of lis pendens in same or new action after loss or cancellation of original notice, 52 A.L.R.2d 1308.