O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65 (2019)
Notice; process; service by publication; filing of adverse pleading; appointment of disinterested representative
(a) Upon the filing of all evidence with him, the master shall:
(1) Determine who is entitled to notice, including, but not limited to, all adjacent landowners and all adverse claimants as to whose adverse claims petitioner has actual or constructive notice; (2) Cause process to issue, directed to all persons who are entitled to notice and to all other persons whom it may concern. (b) Process shall be served upon known persons whose residence is ascertainable by the sheriff or his deputy as provided by law. In all cases where service by publication is permitted under the laws and where the respondent or other party resides outside this state or whose residence is unknown and it is necessary to perfect service upon such person by publication, upon the fact being made to appear to the judge or clerk of the court in which the action is pending, the judge or clerk may order service to be perfected by publication in the paper in which sheriffs’ advertisements are printed, four times within the ensuing 30 days, publications to be weekly. The published notice shall contain the name of the petitioner and respondent with a caption setting forth the court, the character of the action, the date the action was filed, the date of the order for service by publication, and a notice directed and addressed to the party to be thus served, commanding him to be and appear at the court in which the action is pending within 30 days of the date of the order for service by publication, and shall bear teste in the name of the judge and shall be signed by the clerk of the court. The date upon which the nonresident or party whose residence is unknown is called upon to appear shall be the appearance day of the case. (c) Any adverse party shall be entitled to have at least 30 days after completion of service to file any pleading he desires in the matter before the court. (d) If, upon the filing of the petition or of the evidence required by him, the master finds that there are persons under a disability, or minors, or persons not in being, unascertained, or unknown who may have an interest, he shall appoint a disinterested person, in the nature of a guardian ad litem, who shall be served with copies of the notice prescribed and who shall represent these interests.
History
Ga. L. 1966, p. 443, § 5.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Service by publication not authorized. - Service on lender by publication was not authorized by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65(b), nor did it comport with due process, where it did not appear that an attempt to locate the lender would have been fruitless, since there were obvious channels of information available. Floyd v.
Gore, 251 Ga. App. 803, 555 S.E.2d 170 (2001). Purchasers, who bought the subject property at a tax sale, failed to pursue the obvious and fruitful channels of information that would have allowed the purchasers to ascertain the property owners’ current address with minimal effort and
effect personal service and, thus, service by publication of the purchasers’ action to quiet title did not meet the constitutional requirements of due process. Dukes v. Munoz, 346 Ga. App. 319, 816 S.E.2d 164 (2018). Quiet title proceeding procedurally deficient and demonstrated failure to serve. - In a purchaser’s quiet title action against the executor of a testatrix’s estate, the trial court did not err in adopting the report of a special master and in decreeing that fee simple title to the land was vested in the purchaser because the trial court was authorized to find that the executor’s prior quiet title action failed to convey any interest in the property to the executor and to decree that the judgment entered in that action be removed as a cloud upon the purchaser’s title when the prior quiet title proceeding was procedurally deficient; the quiet title petition was not verified as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62(b), it did not include a plat of survey of the land as required by § 23-3-62(c), a lis pendens was not filed contemporaneously with the filing of the petition as required by § 23-3-62(d), the petition was not submitted to an authorized special master as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63, and the record failed to establish service on any party as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65(b). Mann v. Blalock, 286 Ga. 541, 690 S.E.2d 375 (2010). Special master not appointed therefore no service. - Default judgment against owners in a quiet title action based on their failure to answer was improper because, once the in rem proceeding was instituted, the trial court was required, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63, to submit the matter to a special master, and a special master was never appointed such that service could have properly been completed pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq.; since the Quiet Title Act provided specific rules of practice and procedure with respect to an in rem
quiet title action against all the world, the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et. seq., was inapplicable. Woodruff v. Morgan County, 284 Ga. 651, 670 S.E.2d 415 (2008). Trial court erred to the extent that the court concluded that the defendants, a homeowners association and one of the association’s members, were in default because proper service had not yet occurred as under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65 a special master would need to determine who was entitled to notice and cause process to issue with respect to the quiet title claim against all the world and it was undisputed that at the time of the default judgment order this procedure had not yet been completed and, therefore, the defendants were not yet required to answer the complaint. Richards v. Bose, 354 Ga. App. 801, 841 S.E.2d 78 (2020). Standing. - In a quiet title action brought by a homeowner with regard to a road, a developer and a county did not lack standing as possible adverse claimants. The county had a direct interest in the proceeding because the owner of the subdivision where the homeowner lived had expressly dedicated all streets delineated in the recorded subdivision plat, including the road in question, to public use; the developer also had a stake in the outcome of the case because of the developer’s interest in paving the remainder of the road to provide access to the developer’s new development. Harbuck v. Houston County, 284 Ga. 4, 662 S.E.2d 107, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 641, 172 L.Ed.2d 613 (2008). Cited in Pittard v. McMillon, 225 Ga. 239, 167 S.E.2d 644 (1969); Barrett v. Simmons, 235 Ga. 600, 221 S.E.2d 25 (1975); Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass’n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Resseau v. Bland, 268 Ga. 634, 491 S.E.2d 809 (1997); Brown v. Fokes Props. 2002, Inc., 283 Ga. 231, 657 S.E.2d 820 (2008); Brown v. Fokes Props. 2002, Inc., 283 Ga. 231, 657 S.E.2d 820 (2008).
RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Right to secure new or successive notice of lis pendens in same or new
action after loss or cancellation of original notice, 52 A.L.R.2d 1308.