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2018 Georgia Code 23-3-62 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 23 EQUITY

Section 3. Equitable Remedies And Proceedings Generally, 23-3-1 through 23-3-127.

ARTICLE 3 QUIA TIMET

23-3-62. Venue; contents, verification and filing of petition; filing in lis pendens docket.

  1. The proceeding in rem shall be instituted by filing a petition in the superior court of the county in which the land is situated.
  2. The petition shall be verified by the petitioner and shall contain a particular description of the land to be involved in the proceeding, a specification of the petitioner's interest in the land, a statement as to whether the interest is based upon a written instrument (whether same be a contract, deed, will, or otherwise) or adverse possession or both, a description of all adverse claims of which petitioner has actual or constructive notice, the names and addresses, so far as known to the petitioner, of any possible adverse claimant, and, if the proceeding is brought to remove a particular cloud or clouds, a statement as to the grounds upon which it is sought to remove the cloud or clouds.
  3. With the petition there shall be filed (1) a plat of survey of the land, (2) a copy of the immediate instrument or instruments, if any, upon which the petitioner's interest is based, and (3) a copy of the immediate instrument or instruments of record or otherwise known to the petitioner, if any, upon which any person might base an interest in the land adverse to the petitioner.
  4. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall contemporaneously file with the clerk of the court a notice for record in the lis pendens docket pursuant to Code Sections 44-14-610 through 44-14-613.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 443, § 2.)

Law reviews.

- For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Tax sale of property proper.

- In a purchaser's quiet title action against the executor of a testatrix's estate, the trial court did not err in adopting the report of a special master and in decreeing that fee simple title to the land was vested in the purchaser because the purchaser acquired title to the property by virtue of a tax sale and deed, which was conducted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 48-4-1 et seq.; a title search showed the testatrix's nephew as holding record title to the property, but out of caution, both the nephew and the executor were served with notice of the tax sale, the tax commissioner met with the executor prior to the sale and offered to accept payment for the back taxes, but the executor failed to do so, and the property was sold to the purchaser, with the overage going to the nephew, and the executor did not timely seek to exercise a right of redemption under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40. Mann v. Blalock, 286 Ga. 541, 690 S.E.2d 375 (2010).

Quiet title proceeding procedurally deficient.

- In a purchaser's quiet title action against the executor of a testatrix's estate, the trial court did not err in adopting the report of a special master and in decreeing that fee simple title to the land was vested in the purchaser because the trial court was authorized to find that the executor's prior quiet title action failed to convey any interest in the property to the executor and to decree that the judgment entered in that action be removed as a cloud upon the purchaser's title when the prior quiet title proceeding was procedurally deficient; the quiet title petition was not verified as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62(b), it did not include a plat of survey of the land as required by § 23-3-62(c), a lis pendens was not filed contemporaneously with the filing of the petition as required by § 23-3-62(d), the petition was not submitted to an authorized special master as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63, and the record failed to establish service on any party as required by O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65(b). Mann v. Blalock, 286 Ga. 541, 690 S.E.2d 375 (2010).

Owner had granted deeds to secure debt had no legal title to property.

- In a borrower's quiet title action against two lenders, the documents attached to the complaint and answer reflected that the borrower had granted two deeds to secure debt to the lenders, and the borrower therefore did not have legal title to the property absent evidence that the borrower had satisfied the debts; therefore, dismissal of the borrower's petition under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62 was proper. The trial court was not required to refer the case to a special master prior to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Montia v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 341 Ga. App. 867, 801 S.E.2d 907 (2017).

Evidence did not establish rightful owner of property.

- Trial court erred in finding that a neighbor was the rightful owner of certain property because there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the neighbor owned the disputed property either by deed or by adverse possession; the legal description of the property contained in the neighbor's deed did not include the disputed property, and since the evidence showed that, at most, the neighbor made a claim to the disputed property for only eighteen years before being challenged by the landowners, the neighbor's claim to have gained prescriptive title to the property through adverse possession under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161 and44-5-165 failed as a matter of law. Washington v. Brown, 290 Ga. 477, 722 S.E.2d 65 (2012).

Evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that landowners did not own the disputed property because the landowners' occasional maintenance and use of the disputed property did not amount to the type of exclusive possession for twenty years that would support a claim for prescriptive title under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161 and44-5-165. Washington v. Brown, 290 Ga. 477, 722 S.E.2d 65 (2012).

Cited in Selby v. Gilmer, 240 Ga. 241, 240 S.E.2d 80 (1977); Middleton v. Robinson, 241 Ga. 174, 244 S.E.2d 7 (1978); Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994); Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., 266 Ga. 472, 467 S.E.2d 517 (1996); Resseau v. Bland, 268 Ga. 634, 491 S.E.2d 809 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Statute requiring filing of formal notice of lis pendens in certain classes of cases as affecting common-law doctrine of lis pendens in other cases, 10 A.L.R. 306.

Right of one not in possession to maintain suit to remove cloud on title in case of fraud, 36 A.L.R. 698.

Right to secure new or successive notice of lis pendens in same or new action after loss or cancellation of original notice, 52 A.L.R.2d 1308.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62

Total Results: 11  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 498 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 23, 1998 | 269 Ga. 109, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 631

...to Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. (Piedmont). The special master's report concluded that the Woelpers were not entitled to relief, because their complaint contained no description of the land and did not, therefore, comply with the requirements of OCGA § 23-3-62(b)....
...the tenor thereof and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons named therein, known or unknown." OCGA § 23-3-67. On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court, citing the Woelpers'"complete lack of diligence" in complying with OCGA § 23-3-62(b), as well as their failure to provide a transcript of the hearing before the special master which might have shown that the "easement was established through other evidence....." Woelper v....
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Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 1996 | 266 Ga. 472, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 865

...t Cotton Mills, Inc. The case was submitted to a special master. The special master's findings of fact and conclusions of law, as supplemented, determined that the Woelpers were not entitled to the relief sought because they did not comply with OCGA § 23-3-62....
...he land involved in the proceedings, and that the petition did not specify the Woelpers' interest in the land or whether the interest was based on a written instrument or adverse possession. The special master opined that if the requirements of OCGA § 23-3-62 had been met the Woelpers would have been entitled to an easement. The day after the ruling, the Woelpers filed a "Motion to Extend Discovery" in an effort to amend their petition to meet the requirements of OCGA § 23-3-62....
...812, 813, 400 S.E.2d 622 (1991); Ambassador College v. Goetzke, 244 Ga. 322, 260 S.E.2d 27 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1029, 62 L.Ed.2d 762 (1980). We find no abuse. Piedmont raised the issue of the Woelpers' failure to comply with provisions of OCGA § 23-3-62 in its answer and in a subsequent response to the Woelpers' request for discovery more than a year prior to the special master's ruling....
...ion that [they] be permitted to amend the petition to include a particular description of the easement." However, the record is devoid of any such recommendation. The special master merely stated that if the Woelpers had met the requirements of OCGA § 23-3-62 they would have been entitled to the relief requested....
...The Woelpers also contend that the superior court erred in adopting what they allege was the special master's finding that the location of the proposed easement had to be defined by "metes and bounds" in order to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 23-3-62(b)....
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Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 264 Ga. 755 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 17, 1994 | 449 S.E.2d 85, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3410

...anning many years, the legislature made the proceeding in rem against all the world. OCGA § 23-3-61. As an in rem proceeding, the case is instituted by "filing a petition in the superior court of the *756 county in which the land is situated." OCGA § 23-3-62 (a)....
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Woodruff v. Morgan Cnty., 670 S.E.2d 415 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 17, 2008 | 284 Ga. 651, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3672

...Here, the Quiet Title Act provides specific rules of practice and procedure with respect to an in rem quiet title action against all the world. Specifically, once the proceeding in rem is instituted "by filing a petition in the superior court of the county in which the land is situated" (OCGA § 23-3-62(a)), the trial "court, upon receipt of the petition together with the plat and instruments filed therewith, shall submit the same to a special master who shall be a person who is authorized to practice law in this state and is a resident o...
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GHG, INC. v. Bryan, 566 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 15, 2002 | 275 Ga. 336, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2097

...The trial court adopted the findings and recommendation of the special master and decreed that fee simple title is in the petitioners. GHG appeals. 1. GHG asserts that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under OCGA § 23-3-62(b), a petition to quiet title must contain a particular description of the land, a specification of the petitioner's interest in the land, and whether that interest is based upon a written instrument, adverse possession, or both. In addition, the petition should be accompanied by a plat of survey and copies of any written instruments upon which petitioner's interest or that of an adverse claimant is based. OCGA § 23-3-62(c). A petition is subject to dismissal only when on the face of the pleadings it appears that it is in noncompliance with OCGA § 23-3-62....
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Childs v. Sammons, 516 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 1999 | 271 Ga. 161, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2068

...The petition alleged that Childs' interest in the land is based upon written instruments consisting of a deed dated July 15, 1967, and an agreement between Childs' predecessor-in-title and the Sammonses' predecessor-in-title, which was memorialized on a recorded plat (those documents were attached as required by OCGA § 23-3-62(c))....
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Resseau v. Bland, 491 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 14, 1997 | 268 Ga. 634, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 3764

...It does not require that all potentially interested persons, adverse or otherwise, be joined as parties to the suit, but only that the petitioner provide descriptions of adverse claims and names and addresses of possible adverse claimants of which petitioner has actual or constructive notice, which was done here. [4] OCGA § 23-3-62(b), (c)....
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Washington v. Brown, 290 Ga. 477 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 6, 2012 | 722 S.E.2d 65, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 346

...and the survey showed an area of overlap between Washington’s property and her own. Both parties claimed that the area of overlap was included in their respective deeds. In 2003, Washington and his wife filed a quiet title action pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-621 in the Superior Court of McIntosh County seeking to establish they had legal title to the disputed land....
...20 years”) (citation omitted). Decided February 6, 2012. Adam S. Poppell III, for appellants. Joseph H. Ferrier, James W. Smith, Crystal R. Ferrier, for appellees. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 23-3-62 (a) provides that “[t]he proceeding in rem shall be instituted by filing a petition in the superior court of the county in which the land is situated.” In this connection, the Special Master also found that a previously recorded deed...
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Davis v. Merritt, 265 Ga. 160 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 13, 1995 | 454 S.E.2d 515

Carley, Justice. Pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-62, plaintiff filed a petition to quiet title to several tracts of real property, alleging that he held prescriptive title which was superior to defendants’ record title....
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Williamson v. Fain, 274 Ga. 413 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 22, 2001 | 554 S.E.2d 175, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3156

...The trial court entered an order in which it quieted title to the disputed land in Fain as against the Williamsons and all the world. 1. The Williamsons contend the trial court erred when it denied their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in which they claimed Fain failed to comply with OCGA § 23-3-62 (c), which requires certain documentation to be filed with a quia timet petition. OCGA § 23-3-62 (c) states: With the petition there shall be filed (1) a plat of survey of the land, (2) a copy of the immediate instrument or instruments, if any, upon which the petitioner’s interest is based, and (3) a copy of the immediate instrumen...
...and attached to the amendment a copy of the instrument by which the Williamsons obtained their interest in the land adjoining Fain’s land. Appellants contend the copy of the 1949 Childree survey was not sufficient to meet the requirements of OCGA § 23-3-62 (c) (1) and the trial court should have granted their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Civil Practice Act (CPA) is applicable to this special statutory proceeding....
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Mann v. Blalock, 690 S.E.2d 375 (Ga. 2010).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 8, 2010 | 286 Ga. 541, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 328

...l the world. OCGA § 23-3-60 et seq. Based on undisputed evidence, the Special Master was authorized to find that the 2004 quiet title proceeding was procedurally deficient as a matter of law because the petition was not verified as required by OCGA § 23-3-62(b); it did not include a plat of survey of the land as required by OCGA § 23-3-62(c); a lis pendens was not filed contemporaneously with the filing of the petition as required by OCGA § 23-3-62(d); the petition was not submitted to an authorized special master as required by OCGA § 23-3-63; and the record fails to establish service on any party as required by OCGA § 23-3-65(b)....