Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3739, former Code 1873, § 3792, Code 1882, § 3792, former Civil Code 1895, § 5197, former Penal Code 1895, §§ 1005, 1006, former Penal Code 1910, § 1031, former Code 1933, § 38-420, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

History generally.

- The opinion of Judge Lumpkin in Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341 (1848), had been since followed, and from it and its successors on the same line the provisions of the former statute were drawn; in fact the former version of this section embodied principles, long previously established by the common-law courts, and were merely declaratory of these principles. Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. 818 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792).

Reason for the rule.

- All confessions should be received with care and caution, not on account of the character of the testimony, but on account of the fact of their transmission through one or two different channels with consequent liability of mistake as to what was said, and liability of mistake in repeating. Calvin v. State, 118 Ga. 73, 44 S.E. 848 (1903) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005).

That a witness is liable to misunderstand the language of the one making the confession is another reason for the rule. Minton v. State, 99 Ga. 254, 25 S.E. 626 (1896) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, §§ 1005, 1006).

Discretion of court.

- While admissions should be scanned with care, admissions are evidence; and when a jury bases a verdict thereon, and the trial judge approves the finding, the reviewing court will not interfere with the judge's discretion in refusing a new trial. Burk v. Hill, 119 Ga. 38, 45 S.E. 732 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5197).

When trial judge resolves issues in favor of admissibility, such factual and credibility determinations must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 835, 286 S.E.2d 427 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

It is not required that admissions be corroborated by other evidence in the case, as are confessions of the crime. Sheffield v. State, 188 Ga. 1, 2 S.E.2d 657 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 476 S.E.2d 583 (1996);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

While admissions are to be scanned with care and considered, along with other evidence, for what the admissions are worth, it is not required that the admissions be corroborated by other evidence as are confessions to a crime. Brown v. State, 167 Ga. App. 851, 307 S.E.2d 737 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38); Williams v. State, 246 Ga. App. 347, 540 S.E.2d 305 (2000);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Defendant's statement in which the defendant did not admit every essential element of the charged offense constituted an admission rather than a confession for which no corroboration was required. Stowers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 518, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992), cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Herrington v. State, 243 Ga. App. 265, 533 S.E.2d 133 (2000), appeal dismissed, 265 Ga. App. 454, 594 S.E.2d 682 (2004);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Standard for determining admissibility of confessions is preponderance of the evidence. Bassett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 829, 285 S.E.2d 260 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Applicable rules when state relies on defendant's statements to show intent.

- When the state solely relies upon the extrajudicial statements of the accused alone to show intent to commit the crime charged and no other evidence is introduced to show such intent there are two rules which apply: one rule holds that the defendant's explanation of the crime charged must be accepted since the defendant's statement is consistent with the physical facts shown, and the other rule holds that the defendant's explanation may be rejected by the trial court when the defendant's statement is not consistent with and does not explain the other direct and circumstantial evidence. Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 278 S.E.2d 398 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Fact that language of confession indicates commission of other offense.

- It is no valid ground of objection to the admission in evidence of an incriminatory statement or confession made by the accused in a criminal case that the language indicated that the accused had committed also another and separate offense. Laney v. State, 159 Ga. App. 609, 284 S.E.2d 114 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Admission is not inadmissible on grounds that it was written by someone else from defendant's dictation, even if defendant had not signed the statement as defendant's own because the officer who interviewed defendant would be permitted to testify to the content of the verbal statement voluntarily given the officer by defendant. Graves v. State, 180 Ga. App. 446, 349 S.E.2d 519 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Admission defined.

- Admissions relate to any fact material to the issue, and are to be scanned with care and considered, with any other evidence, for what the admissions are worth. Sheffield v. State, 188 Ga. 1, 2 S.E.2d 657 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

An admission as applied to criminal cases, is the avowal of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, but only tending to prove the offense charged, and not amounting to a confession of guilt. Oliphant v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105, 182 S.E. 523 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Unless the statement of the defendant is broad enough to comprehend every essential element necessary to make out the case against the defendant, it cannot be said to be an admission of guilt. Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

An admission as applied to a criminal case is the statement made by the defendant of a fact or facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with other facts and circumstances, to prove the guilt of the accused, but which does not contain all the essential elements of the crime. Johns v. State, 79 Ga. App. 429, 54 S.E.2d 142 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

An admission of the main fact from which the essential elements of the criminal act may be inferred amounts to an admission of the crime itself. Jones v. State, 223 Ga. 157, 154 S.E.2d 228, rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 24, 88 S. Ct. 4, 19 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Confession defined.

- Confession is a voluntary admission of guilt. Oliphant v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105, 182 S.E. 523 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

The requirements to constitute a confession are that the facts admitted must comprise all the essential elements necessary to make out the case against the defendant, yet a confession is sufficiently plenary in substance, and responsive to the requirement that it contain all the essential elements necessary to make out the case, when the confession, though lacking in a recital of the many details constituting the crime, does disclose certain facts from which the main fact of guilt is revealed. Meriwether v. State, 63 Ga. App. 667, 11 S.E.2d 816 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Confession is a person's admission of declaration of the person's agency or participation in a crime, and is restricted to admissions of guilt. Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Confession is an admission of the main fact in a charge of crime, without any exculpatory explanation. Johns v. State, 79 Ga. App. 429, 54 S.E.2d 142 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Incriminating statements and confessions distinguished.

- There is a difference between an incriminating statement and a confession of guilt. In the former only one or more facts entering into the criminal act is admitted, while in the latter the entire criminal act is confessed. Cumberlander v. State, 53 Ga. App. 276, 185 S.E. 379 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

A confession is a voluntary statement acknowledging guilt of a criminal offense, and the term admission ordinarily signifies the avowal or acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred and only tending to prove the offense charged, but not amounting to a confession of guilt. Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479, 157 S.E.2d 784 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

An incriminating statement, to be the equivalent of a confession of guilt, must be so comprehensive as to include every essential element of the offense. Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420) Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479, 157 S.E.2d 784 (1967);.

Admission as constituting high degree of evidence.

- There was nothing in the provisions of the former statute, nor in any other statute of the state, which declared that when an admission was established to the satisfaction of the jury the admission constituted a high degree of evidence and the jury should give it great weight. Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Allen, 106 Ga. 572, 32 S.E. 622 (1899) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5197).

Confession alone may be evidence.

- Since it is unnecessary that a confession be corroborated by independent proof in all its details and particulars, and since a confession is direct evidence and not circumstantial evidence, a confession is sufficient to prove the manner and means of death as charged in an indictment, without independent corroborating evidence, just as it is the rule that once the requirements of the corpus delicti are met, the confession of the accused is available to identify the person confessing as the criminal agent. McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Ambiguous admissions.

- Admissions contained in a letter are to be scanned with care if the admissions are susceptible of more than one construction, and if, in order to discover their true meaning, attention should be directed to the precise terms employed by the writer. Richmond & D.R.R. v. Kerler, 88 Ga. 39, 13 S.E. 833 (1891) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792).

Admissions in pleas.

- Fact that an admission made; by the defendant in a plea which had been stricken by amendment and was put in evidence by the introduction of the plea containing the admission had, before the plea was amended, possessed the character of an admission in judicio, does not relieve the admission from the application of the rule of law (generally applicable to all admissions) that admissions should be scanned with care and it was not error for the court so to charge. Griffin v. Browning, 51 Ga. App. 743, 181 S.E. 801 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Admissions by infants.

- In general, infants are not bound by their admissions. Howard v. Hall, 112 Ga. App. 247, 145 S.E.2d 70 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

While the decision of whether a child, or "infant," is competent to testify is one made in the sound discretion of the judge, based upon the capacity of the child to know the nature of the oath rather than upon the child's years, the admission in evidence of an infant's admission against interest must be very carefully scanned because of the child's immaturity and the deleterious effect such admissions would have. Howard v. Hall, 112 Ga. App. 247, 145 S.E.2d 70 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Confessions of juveniles are scanned with more care and received with greater caution. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 301 S.E.2d 280 (1983);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Conviction not required to admit similar transaction evidence.

- While former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 did not allow a conviction based solely on an uncorroborated confession, such a limitation did not apply to the admission of prior similar transaction evidence regarding a defendant's involvement in a similar uncharged robbery as the defendant did not have to be convicted for such evidence to be admissible. Dean v. State, 292 Ga. App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Accomplices.

- Confession made by the accused and supported by evidence of the corpus delicti will serve as sufficient corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice. Westbrook v. State, 91 Ga. 11, 16 S.E. 100 (1892) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792) Allen v. State, 91 Ga. 189, 16 S.E. 980 (1893); Schaefer v. State, 93 Ga. 177, 18 S.E. 552 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792);(decided under former Code 1882, § 3792).

Proof of the corpus delicti, even though independent of the confession or evidence of an accomplice, does not at all corroborate the testimony of the confessing accomplice so as to authorize a conviction of another accomplice who has not confessed. Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Mere fact that the defendant had accomplices in the commission of a crime does not change the rule that proof of the corpus delicti may be sufficient corroboration of a confession of guilt to sustain a verdict of guilty, as it relates to the amount of evidence, other than the testimony of an accomplice, necessary to corroborate the confession in order to support a verdict of guilty. Moreover, evidence of the confessions is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice so as to support a verdict of guilty against the confessor. Motes v. State, 66 Ga. App. 543, 18 S.E.2d 497 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

While it is the rule that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by circumstances definitely connecting the accused with the perpetration of the crime, this is not the rule in reference to the corroboration of a confession. Lastinger v. State, 84 Ga. App. 760, 67 S.E.2d 411 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Trial court's findings upheld on appeal.

- Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal. Bassett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 829, 285 S.E.2d 260 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-410).

Corroboration of admission not required.

- Defendant's statement to an officer that the defendant's license was suspended was an admission and not a confession requiring corroboration under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53, because the defendant's statement did not include an admission to driving on a highway of the state, which was an essential element of the offense of driving with a suspended license under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121(a). Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 692 S.E.2d 7 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Sufficiency of corroboration.

- Corroborating testimony need not show the fact beyond a reasonable doubt, but is adequate if the testimony tends materially to corroborate the confession and to connect the defendant with the crime. Douglas v. State, 6 Ga. App. 157, 64 S.E. 490 (1909); Navarra v. State, 51 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E. 375 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Sufficient corroboration of defendant's confession existed in the form of additional evidence regarding the manner in which the victim was killed and the victim's body disposed. Walsh v. State, 269 Ga. 427, 499 S.E.2d 332 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Store owner's testimony and the videotape concerning the commission of the burglary corroborated defendant's confession to entering the store with a shirt over defendant's head, stealing beer and cigarettes, and then selling them. Ward v. State, 242 Ga. App. 246, 529 S.E.2d 378 (2000), appeal dismissed, 299 Ga. App. 63, 682 S.E.2d 128 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's cocaine possession conviction was affirmed as the defendant's statement that the defendant and two other men went to the victim's house to buy cocaine, that the victim came out of the victim's house with the cocaine and gave it to the defendant, and that the defendant split the cocaine with the defendant's accomplices was corroborated by proof that cash was found on the victim's bed next to several bags of a substance that later tested positive for crack cocaine. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 424, 606 S.E.2d 871 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's statement to the police was in the nature of an admission and defendant's conviction for malice and felony murder was corroborated by showing that the gun that defendant carried to the scene was the same gun that fired the fatal shot, that the defendant had access to the weapon, and that the defendant arranged the meeting with the victim. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 609 S.E.2d 346 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Because defendant's confession was videotaped and defendant admitted to attacking the victim because defendant wanted money to buy drugs, the admission of defendant's confession via videotape was held to have been sufficiently corroborated because the two interviewing police officers both testified at the trial and established the corpus delicti of each crime, thereby providing the requisite corroboration to sustain the convictions for aggravated assault, armed robbery, kidnapping, and hijacking a motor vehicle. Cummings v. State, 272 Ga. App. 886, 614 S.E.2d 121 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's confessions were sufficiently corroborated by the victim and the officer's testimony, and a confession to eight armed robberies was corroborated by testimony confirming when the crimes occurred, defendant's conduct during the crimes, and the use of a stolen car to flee. Robinson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 502, 623 S.E.2d 711 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict regarding at least five counts of the indictment charging four counts of aggravated child molestation and three counts of child molestation because the verdicts were not based solely on the defendant's uncorroborated confession. The evidence corresponded to the defendant's confession and was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely that the crimes actually occurred, because it showed more than two improper sexual acts by the defendant against the defendant's child: the (1) testimony of a social worker; (2) the victim's audiotaped statement, in which the victim described how the defendant abused the victim; (3) the victim's trial testimony that the victim told the social worker the truth; and (4) evidence that the victim's behavior was typical of an abused child, were sufficient for the jury to find that the victim had been abused on numerous occasions. Hargrove v. State, 289 Ga. App. 363, 657 S.E.2d 282 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0970, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 500 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Evidence that the defendant possessed the murder weapon was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 to corroborate the defendant's confession that the defendant pointed a gun at a clerk in a convenience store and ultimately murdered the clerk. Moore v. State, 285 Ga. 157, 674 S.E.2d 315 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-40(a)(2) and16-8-41(a) were appropriate because the defendant's own confessions to participating in the crimes were corroborated by the testimony of the victims, among other evidence. Likewise, the defendant's codefendants' statements and testimony implicating the defendant in the crimes were corroborated by the defendant's confessions and the victims' testimony. Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga. App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's confession was corroborated by independent evidence that the victim was found dead on the floor, that the victim died from manual strangulation, that the defendant was present at the time of the victim's death, and that the defendant previously had threatened to kill the victim in the victim's sleep. Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 737 S.E.2d 673 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the defendant admitted to committing the armed robbery and there was sufficient evidence corroborating the defendant's confession as the victim was working at a gas station; the defendant, with whom the victim was familiar with as a repeat customer, entered the gas station and asked the victim to retrieve something from behind the counter; when the victim turned the victim's back to the counter, the defendant, who was not disguised, was pointing a gun at the victim; the defendant threatened to kill the victim and demanded that the victim give the defendant the cash from the register; the victim complied; and the victim identified the defendant from a photo line-up and in court. Spratlin v. State, 336 Ga. App. 872, 785 S.E.2d 427 (2016).

Evidence demonstrating that the defendant shot and killed the victim did not consist only of the defendant's uncorroborated confessions to the defendant's aunt and ex-wife because the defendant did not make confessions, but made admissions; and, even if the defendant's statements were confessions, the corroborating evidence was ample as the victim obtained a protective order because the victim feared the defendant; the defendant stated that if the defendant could not have the victim no one could; the defendant argued with the victim only minutes before the defendant shot the victim; and the defendant followed the victim as the victim left a close friend's place of employment and continued to do so as the victim drove down Washington Street. McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 794 S.E.2d 118 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of the defendant's accomplice in an attempted armed robbery because the defendant told the accomplice's brother that the defendant, the accomplice, and another individual went to an apartment complex with the intent to rob the putative armed robbery victim, that the defendant knew the accomplice was armed, and that the accomplice was shot during the confrontation with the putative victim; the defendant admitted to being a party to the attempted armed robbery; and there was evidence corroborating the defendant's confession, including participation with the accomplice in renting the car found at the crime scene. Muckle v. State, 302 Ga. 675, 808 S.E.2d 713 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in commission of a felony because, whether the defendant's three statements that the defendant shot two people amounted to confessions or merely admissions, other evidence sufficiently corroborated the defendant's participation in the crimes as one witness saw the defendant don a mask and jacket and take out a gun immediately before the shooting; a mask and jacket were recovered from the scene, with the defendant's keys in the pocket; and a trash bag outside of the defendant's former apartment contained a box of the same brand and caliber of ammunition used in the murder, along with personal papers in the defendant's name. Mitchell v. State, 303 Ga. 491, 813 S.E.2d 367 (2018)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Sufficient corroboration of confession of murder when no body was found.

- Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53, a defendant's confession was sufficiently corroborated by evidence that the victim disappeared near the time of the Super Bowl, that the victim left with the defendant to go to the Super Bowl, that the defendant always carried a .380 handgun, and that the defendant had shot the other victim. Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 401, 721 S.E.2d 864 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

All essential facts must be proved.

- Amount of corroboration necessary to support the conviction is in every case a question of fact for the jury. But even if incriminatory admissions, supplemented by other circumstances, be equivalent to a confession, evidence that the accused confessed the commission of an offense would not be sufficient to authorize a conviction, unless all of the facts essential to establish that the alleged offense was in fact committed are satisfactorily proved. Boyd v. State, 4 Ga. App. 58, 60 S.E. 801 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); West v. State, 6 Ga. App. 105, 64 S.E. 130 (1909); Harvey v. State, 8 Ga. App. 660, 70 S.E. 141 (1911) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Davenport v. State, 12 Ga. App. 102, 76 S.E. 756 (1912);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031).

When juvenile defendants confessed to entering a vacant home and causing damage therein, and a police officer testified to the condition of the home and the damage the officer found upon investigation, together with witness statements from people who were with defendants prior to and after the acts, wherein the witnesses' testified that defendants indicated the defendants' intent to damage the house, there was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2; there was sufficient corroborative evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 to support the conviction as well. In the Interest of Q.D., 263 Ga. App. 293, 587 S.E.2d 336 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Corroboration of confession in any particular.

- Although an uncorroborated confession cannot support a conviction under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53, corroboration of a confession in any particular satisfied the requirements of the former statute. Sands v. State, 262 Ga. 367, 418 S.E.2d 55 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Miller v. State, 268 Ga. 1, 485 S.E.2d 752 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Although an uncorroborated confession cannot support a conviction under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53, corroboration of a confession in any particular satisfied the requirements of the former statute; thus, when defendant's detailed confessions to two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault, three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who ultimately identified defendant as the person who placed a knife to the victim's neck during the robbery of the victim's spouse's store and forced the victim to the back of the store and secured the victim with duct tape, such evidence more than amply authorized the convictions. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Failure to corroborate.

- When the evidence pertaining to one count of the indictment was supported only by a confession, which was not corroborated by any evidence, the court committed reversible error in denying the motion for a new trial as to that count. Chapman v. State, 90 Ga. App. 845, 84 S.E.2d 485 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Even though the defendant confessed to the crime of possession of cocaine, since the state did not offer the alleged cocaine in evidence or offer any other evidence that the substance found was cocaine, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Johnson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 760, 423 S.E.2d 702 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Question for jury.

- Former statute did not fix the amount of evidence necessary to corroborate a confession but left the question of its corroborative sufficiency entirely with the jury, who may consider the confession along with other facts and circumstances independent of and separate from the confession in determining whether or not the corpus delicti had been established to the jury's satisfaction. Murray v. State, 43 Ga. 256 (1871) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3739); Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 43 (1872); Smith v. State, 64 Ga. 605 (1880) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3739); Cook v. State, 9 Ga. App. 208, 70 S.E. 1019 (1911); Perdue v. State, 24 Ga. App. 50, 99 S.E. 797 (1919) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3792); Hinson v. State, 152 Ga. 243, 109 S.E. 661 (1921); Gilder v. State, 219 Ga. 495, 133 S.E.2d 861 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Navarra v. State, 51 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E. 375 (1935); Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Kicklighter v. State, 76 Ga. App. 246, 45 S.E.2d 719 (1947); Figures v. State, 80 Ga. App. 832, 57 S.E.2d 629 (1950) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Gilder v. State, 219 Ga. 495, 133 S.E.2d 861 (1963); Stephens v. State, 127 Ga. App. 416, 193 S.E.2d 870 (1972) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Hilliard v. State, 128 Ga. App. 157, 195 S.E.2d 772 (1973); Griswold v. State, 159 Ga. App. 22, 282 S.E.2d 679 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 393, 301 S.E.2d 306 (1983); Singleton v. State, 195 Ga. App. 119, 393 S.E.2d 6 (1990) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Amount of evidence necessary to corroborate a confession is left entirely within the province of the jury and corroboration in any material particular satisfies the requirements of the law. Reynolds v. State, 168 Ga. App. 555, 309 S.E.2d 867 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Defendant's confession was significantly corroborated by the victim's testimony that the defendant was the person who robbed the victim. Although the defendant challenged the accuracy of the identification, this was a credibility issue for the jury to resolve. Burns v. State, 288 Ga. App. 507, 654 S.E.2d 405 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-38).

Proof of corpus delicti sufficient corroboration.

- Conviction may be lawfully had upon a free and voluntary confession though the confession be not otherwise corroborated than by proof of the corpus delicti. Johnson v. State, 86 Ga. 90, 13 S.E. 282 (1890) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792); Westbrook v. State, 91 Ga. 11, 16 S.E. 100 (1892); Allen v. State, 91 Ga. 189, 16 S.E. 980 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792); Schaefer v. State, 93 Ga. 177, 18 S.E. 552 (1893); Simmons v. State, 18 Ga. App. 104, 88 S.E. 904 (1916) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792); Millen v. State, 175 Ga. 283, 165 S.E. 226 (1932); Mathis v. State, 55 Ga. App. 727, 191 S.E. 272 (1937) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3792); Wilson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 839, 197 S.E. 48 (1938); Burns v. State, 188 Ga. 22, 2 S.E.2d 627 (1939) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); Miller v. State, 60 Ga. App. 682, 4 S.E.2d 729 (1939); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); Moore v. State, 193 Ga. 877, 20 S.E.2d 403 (1942); Byars v. State, 73 Ga. App. 727, 38 S.E.2d 53 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Webb v. State, 73 Ga. App. 748, 38 S.E.2d 54 (1946); Reddick v. State, 202 Ga. 209, 42 S.E.2d 742 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Jackson v. State, 77 Ga. App. 635, 49 S.E.2d 198 (1948); 335 U.S. 905, 69 S. Ct. 403, 93 L. Ed. 439 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Grimes v. State, 204 Ga. 854, 51 S.E.2d 797 (1949); McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Davenport v. State, 81 Ga. App. 787, 60 S.E.2d 190 (1950); Lastinger v. State, 84 Ga. App. 760, 67 S.E.2d 411 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Moon v. State, 85 Ga. App. 212, 68 S.E.2d 617 (1952); Barksdale v. State, 88 Ga. App. 861, 78 S.E.2d 82 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Davis v. State, 211 Ga. 76, 84 S.E.2d 46 (1954); Poythress v. State, 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 165 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Gray v. State, 135 Ga. App. 253, 217 S.E.2d 482 (1975); Soggins v. State, 156 Ga. App. 652, 275 S.E.2d 676 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Rosser v. State, 157 Ga. App. 161, 276 S.E.2d 672 (1981); Christian v. State, 190 Ga. App. 667, 379 S.E.2d 807 (1989) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Montijo v. State, 238 Ga. App. 696, 520 S.E.2d 24 (1999);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Conviction may be lawfully had upon a free and voluntary confession although corroborated only by proof of the corpus delicti. Brown v. State, 167 Ga. App. 851, 307 S.E.2d 737 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Kirksey v. State, 177 Ga. App. 428, 339 S.E.2d 401 (1986); Ryan v. State, 179 Ga. App. 210, 346 S.E.2d 3 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Nation v. State, 180 Ga. App. 460, 349 S.E.2d 479 (1986);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

When the testimony of the victims established the corpus delicti of each crime a defendant was charged with, the testimony provided the requisite corroboration of the defendant's confession to charges of rape, sodomy, assault, and burglary. Smith v. State, 195 Ga. App. 486, 393 S.E.2d 743 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Testimony by a victim who survived a robbery in which the victim's companion was killed was sufficient to corroborate defendant's confession that defendant was one of four men who committed the robbery and that defendant shot the victim who died when the victim grabbed the barrel of a gun the defendant was holding, and the state supreme court affirmed defendant's convictions for felony murder and armed robbery. Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Confession is corroborated by the testimony of the victim who establishes the corpus delicti. Patrick v. State, 169 Ga. App. 302, 312 S.E.2d 385 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 509, 314 S.E.2d 909 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); McCloud v. State, 210 Ga. App. 69, 435 S.E.2d 281 (1993);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Corroborated by defendant's confession, the victim's testimony that defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim when the victim was 14 sufficed to sustain the conviction. Bankston v. State, 249 Ga. App. 118, 548 S.E.2d 25 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Corpus delicti may be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence. Davis v. State, 105 Ga. 808, 32 S.E. 158 (1898) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Harvey v. State, 8 Ga. App. 660, 70 S.E. 141 (1911); Tolver v. State, 10 Ga. App. 33, 72 S.E. 516 (1911) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Sutton v. State, 17 Ga. App. 713, 88 S.E. 122 (1916); Thomas v. State, 18 Ga. App. 101, 88 S.E. 917 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Underwood v. State, 51 Ga. App. 735, 181 S.E. 500 (1935); Brown v. State, 98 Ga. App. 350, 105 S.E.2d 785 (1958) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005);(decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Corpus delicti must be proved independently of confession.

- Corpus delicti cannot be proved by the extrajudicial confession of the accused, but must be shown by evidence aliunde the confession or incriminatory admissions. West v. State, 6 Ga. App. 105, 64 S.E. 130 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Moon v. State, 12 Ga. App. 614, 77 S.E. 1088 (1913); Sims v. State, 12 Ga. App. 551, 77 S.E. 891 (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); 14 Ga. App. 28, 79 S.E. 1133 (1913); Wilburn v. State, 141 Ga. 510, 81 S.E. 444 (1914), later appeal, Pyant v. State, 46 Ga. App. 490, 167 S.E. 922 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); Navarra v. State, 51 Ga. App. 321, 180 S.E. 375 (1935); Underwood v. State, 51 Ga. App. 735, 181 S.E. 500 (1935) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); Grimes v. State, 204 Ga. 854, 51 S.E.2d 797 (1949); Williams v. State, 96 Ga. App. 833, 101 S.E.2d 747 (1958) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Jury may consider the confession along with other facts and circumstances independent of and separate from the confession it in determining whether or not the corpus delicti has been established to the jury's satisfaction. Stephens v. State, 127 Ga. App. 416, 193 S.E.2d 870 (1972).

Jury may believe only portions of confessions.

- Every confession necessarily contains incriminatory admissions, and though a statement as a whole may amount to a confession, still it is within the province of the jury to disbelieve that part which would constitute it a confession, and believe only the portion thereof which amounted to incriminatory admissions. Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292, 34 S.E.2d 28 (1945), overruled on other grounds, Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 18, 262 S.E.2d 789 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Two confessions.

- Even two positive confessions of guilt, without independent proof of the corpus delicti, are not sufficient to authorize a conviction. Bines v. State, 118 Ga. 320, 45 S.E. 376 (1903) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005).

To prove the corpus delicti in a charge of murder, in order to corroborate a confession, it is essential to establish that the person alleged to have been killed is actually dead, and that death was caused or accomplished by violence or other direct criminal agency of another human being; that is, it was not accidental, nor due to natural causes, nor to the act of the deceased, and that the accused caused the death in the manner charged. Grimes v. State, 204 Ga. 854, 51 S.E.2d 797 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Evidence sufficient to corroborate confession to burglary.

- When defendant admitted both defendant's presence at the scene of the crime and that the defendant had cut defendant's hand on a broken windowpane there, and there was also testimony that broken bloodstained glass was found within the burglarized home, such evidence was sufficient to corroborate the defendant's confession. Carter v. State, 160 Ga. App. 299, 287 S.E.2d 313 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for burglary and entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft because there was evidence corroborating defendant's confession regarding how defendant gained entry into both a warehouse and a car. Morris v. State, 274 Ga. App. 41, 616 S.E.2d 829 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Because the defendant's statement was sufficiently corroborated by evidence that a bullet from the 9 mm handgun in the defendant's possession killed the victim, and by the defendant's admission to both being involved in the commission and planning of the robbery of the victim, sufficient evidence existed to find the defendant guilty as a party to the crime of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Valentine v. State, 289 Ga. App. 60, 656 S.E.2d 208 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Testimony of an accomplice was not required to be corroborated since the store clerk (victim) was able to testify positively that the defendant was one of the two men who entered the store and performed the robbery. Welch v. State, 179 Ga. App. 221, 346 S.E.2d 4 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Hearsay cannot corroborate confession.

- Since hearsay lacks any probative value, hearsay cannot provide the material evidence necessary to corroborate a defendant's confession, which, without such corroboration, is insufficient to support a conviction. The argument that hearsay is rendered trustworthy and admissible because corroborated by the defendant's confession, while the confession is simultaneously corroborated by the hearsay, is unpersuasive. This would sanction admission of otherwise unreliable evidence by mutual bootstrapping. Shaver v. State, 199 Ga. App. 428, 405 S.E.2d 281, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 405 S.E.2d 281 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Confession found to be sufficiently corroborated. Steele v. State, 166 Ga. App. 24, 303 S.E.2d 462 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Hunt v. State, 166 Ga. App. 524, 304 S.E.2d 576 (1983); Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Barnes v. State, 260 Ga. 398, 396 S.E.2d 207 (1990); White v. State, 266 Ga. 134, 465 S.E.2d 277 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); McCant v. State, 234 Ga. App. 433, 506 S.E.2d 917 (1998); Kirkland v. State, 271 Ga. 217, 518 S.E.2d 687 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

When on a trial for leaving the scene of an accident, in addition to the defendant's "confession," evidence was adduced at trial showing the corpus delicti, one witness placed defendant near the scene of the accident in question on the night the accident occurred, and evidence was also produced showing that defendant's automobile was damaged at approximately the same time the accident took place, the trial court was authorized to find that the confession was corroborated as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53. Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 393, 301 S.E.2d 306 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Following evidence of corroboration of the defendant's confession to murder satisfied the requirement of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53: (1) a bloody claw hammer matching the description of the hammer the defendant confessed defendant used to kill the victim was found near the victim's body; and (2) the paint samples taken from the defendant's truck were similar to those taken from the crime scene. Brown v. State, 253 Ga. 363, 320 S.E.2d 539 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's conviction of financial transaction card fraud was affirmed since evidence that a VISA card was used without the owner's authorization to obtain goods and money established the corpus delicti, and the owner's testimony that defendant had access to the owner's mail and that the signatures on the charge slips closely paralleled defendant's handwriting provided sufficient corroboration of defendant's confession. Goswick v. State, 201 Ga. App. 799, 412 S.E.2d 293 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

State presented sufficient independent evidence to corroborate the defendant's confessions after it was shown that the victim died from gunshot wounds inflicted by another human being using a .38 caliber weapon or a .357 Magnum shortly after the defendant was seen in the victim's company. Blackwell v. State, 270 Ga. 509, 512 S.E.2d 233 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Evidence that defendant gave several false statements about the victim's whereabouts, contributing to the victim's body not being discovered, sufficiently corroborated defendant's confession to concealing a death in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-31. Howard v. State, 262 Ga. App. 214, 585 S.E.2d 115 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Despite the fact that the defendant did not admit to every element of the charged offenses, the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate the admissions made; specifically, that the victim died from manual strangulation inflicted by another human being shortly after the defendant was in the victim's company, and presented ample evidence of the defendant's intent to take the victim's life. Sheffield v. State, 281 Ga. 33, 635 S.E.2d 776 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Because the defendant's statement to a police investigator was corroborated by both the victim and an eyewitness as well as evidence of the defendant's fingerprint on the victim's stolen car, the defendant's claim that the evidence was not corroborated as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 was rejected. Sheely v. State, 287 Ga. App. 92, 650 S.E.2d 762 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Evidence that a vehicle was, in fact, stolen from a location reported by a juvenile involved in a high-speed chase with a state trooper, and abandoned after crashing into a pole in an apartment complex was sufficient to corroborate the juvenile's confession under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53. In the Interest of L.A., 292 Ga. App. 101, 663 S.E.2d 420 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

With regard to a defendant's malice murder conviction arising from the suffocation death of the defendant's newborn daughter, the defendant's confession was legally sufficient to support the convictions since the state produced independent evidence to corroborate the confession, namely, the recovered physical evidence and the witness testimony regarding the defendant's comments, appearance, and behavior before and after the victim's birth. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1123, 130 S. Ct. 1076, 175 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Defendant's statement to police and the defendant's trial testimony regarding two charges of child molestation, alleging that the defendant had the victims' touch the defendant's sexual organ with their hands, were sufficiently corroborated because the evidence showed that the defendant engaged in a series of text messages with the teenage victims which culminated in the defendant arriving at the house where the victims were staying between 1:00 and 1:30 A.M.; the defendant and the first victim went into a bedroom together and engaged in sexual activity; and the defendant then left that bedroom and went into another bedroom with the second victim, and engaged in sexual activity with the second victim until the defendant ejaculated. Jackson v. State, 330 Ga. App. 822, 769 S.E.2d 567 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of necrophilia because the state presented evidence corroborating the defendant's confession; the victim's body was found in the room registered to the defendant at the hotel where the defendant told the police the defendant took the victim; and the physical evidence found at the crime scene and testimony from the medical examiner corroborated the defendant's statements about the manner in which the defendant killed the victim, the items used to kill the victim, and the multiple days the defendant spent with the victim's body after the defendant killed the victim. Norman v. State, 298 Ga. 344, 781 S.E.2d 784 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Evidence was sufficient to warrant an instruction based on O.C.G.A.

§ 24-3-53. - See Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 112 S.E. 724 (1922) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); Southern Ry. v. Bullock, 42 Ga. App. 495, 156 S.E. 456 (1931); Timbs v. State, 71 Ga. App. 141, 30 S.E.2d 290 (1944) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1005); McDowell v. State, 78 Ga. App. 116, 50 S.E.2d 633 (1948);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Charge did not shift burden of proof.

- Trial court did not err in charging the jury to consider with great care and caution the evidence of any statement the defendant made, and the jury charge did not improperly shift the burden away from the state, as the charge clearly referred to the jury's consideration of the defendant's custodial statement and not the defendant's testimony, and was given immediately after an explanation of how to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial statement; moreover, the charge impressed upon the jury its duty to determine the credibility of the statement, instructing that a statement unsupported by any other evidence was not sufficient to justify a conviction. Ford v. State, 281 Ga. App. 114, 635 S.E.2d 391 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for robbery, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the jury should consider with great care and caution the evidence of any statement made by the defendant as former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 provided the authority for such an instruction. However, the appellate court suggested that to avoid any possibility of confusion, the suggested pattern instruction authorized by former § 24-3-53 should be modified to refer to incriminatory statements only, for example, admissions and confessions. McKenzie v. State, 293 Ga. App. 350, 667 S.E.2d 142 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Failure to give instruction.

- In the absence of any timely written request, the failure to charge the jury on the law of the former statute was not reversible error, since there was evidence, independent of such confessions or admissions, to sustain the conviction. Walker v. State, 118 Ga. 34, 44 S.E. 850 (1903) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1005); Cooner v. State, 16 Ga. App. 539, 85 S.E. 688 (1915); Denson v. State, 150 Ga. 618, 104 S.E. 780 (1920) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); 258 U.S. 608, 42 S. Ct. 316, 66 L. Ed. 788 (1922); Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 112 S.E. 724 (1922), appeal dismissed, Williamson v. State, 29 Ga. App. 283, 114 S.E. 919 (1922) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S.E. 36 (1926); Whitfield v. State, 51 Ga. App. 439, 180 S.E. 630 (1935) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939); Anderson v. State, 190 Ga. 455, 9 S.E.2d 642 (1940) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Davis v. State, 66 Ga. App. 877, 19 S.E.2d 543 (1942); Mika v. State, 196 Ga. 473, 26 S.E.2d 616 (1943) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1031); Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292, 34 S.E.2d 28 (1945); Brandt v. Eckman, 79 Ga. App. 47, 52 S.E.2d 665 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Elvine v. State, 205 Ga. 528, 54 S.E.2d 626 (1949); Staggers v. State, 101 Ga. App. 463, 114 S.E.2d 142 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Pryor v. State, 113 Ga. App. 660, 149 S.E.2d 401 (1966); Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Simonton v. State, 151 Ga. App. 431, 260 S.E.2d 487 (1979); Jackson v. State, 596 Ga. App. 596, 260 S.E.2d 565 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Absent a timely request, the trial court did not err in failing to charge on the evidentiary weight to be given admissions and confessions or in failing to charge that an uncorroborated confession is insufficient to support a conviction. Hunt v. State, 166 Ga. App. 524, 304 S.E.2d 576 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the state's burden of proving the corpus delicti since defendant filed no written request to charge, and the subject of defendant's oral request regarding the state's burden of proving the corpus delicti was fully satisfied by the trial court's charge regarding the presumption of defendant's innocence and the state's burden of proving all elements of the crime. Barnes v. State, 260 Ga. 398, 396 S.E.2d 207 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Trial court's decision not to give defendant's requested instruction on the jury considering defendant's admissions with caution, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53, was not reversible; defendant acquiesced in the counsel's request that a standard charge on credibility be given instead, and defendant was not entitled to acquiesce in that decision and later complain about the decision on appeal. Lummus v. State, 274 Ga. App. 636, 618 S.E.2d 692 (2005), overruled on other grounds, McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Failure to give a jury charge regarding the corroboration of confessions did not constitute plain error because the defendant's statements were admissions, not confessions, as the defendant did not confess to the murder or the arson; and, even if the defendant's statements to the witnesses were confessions, the defendant did not show that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings as there was ample corroborating evidence, including a witness's testimony that the defendant was alone with the victim shortly before the murder; testimony that a neighbor saw the defendant flee through the neighbor's yard, and the defendant's request on a recorded tape that two witnesses fabricate an alibi defense for the defendant for the time of the crime. English v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 796 S.E.2d 258 (2017)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Court not required to give instruction absent specific request.

- Because the defendant failed to request a charge on voluntariness of confessions and consideration of statements, admissions, and confessions, the defendant was precluded from asserting error on that basis; the trial court did not need to give an instruction on voluntariness of confessions absent a specific request therefor. Thorpe v. State, 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Failure to charge the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 when there had been an admission, but not a "confession," was not error. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746, 353 S.E.2d 342 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53); Gay v. State, 199 Ga. App. 80, 403 S.E.2d 895 (1991);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Trial court did not err in failing to charge the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53 since the defendant's statement, while an admission, was not a confession to the crime of murder, inasmuch as the defendant contended that the killing was justified and the court's charge informed the jury that the statement should be examined closely for voluntariness. Houston v. State, 253 Ga. 696, 324 S.E.2d 183 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Omission in instructions.

- Fact that charge omits an instruction as to the weight to be given to confessions is not cause for new trial, in the absence of a request therefor. Williams v. State, 196 Ga. 503, 26 S.E.2d 926 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Request to charge on principle of corroboration properly denied.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested charge on the principle of corroboration since the charge was not adjusted to the evidence. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 609 S.E.2d 346 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-53).

Language used in charging former O.C.G.A.

§ 24-3-53 was discussed in the following cases. - See Ford v. Kennedy, 64 Ga. 537 (1880); Ocean S.S. Co. v. McAlphin, 69 Ga. 437 (1882); Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Allen, 106 Ga. 572, 32 S.E. 622 (1899); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Bradford, 135 Ga. 522, 69 S.E. 870 (1910); Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292, 34 S.E.2d 28 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Williams v. State, 199 Ga. 504, 34 S.E.2d 854 (1945); Elvine v. State, 205 Ga. 528, 54 S.E.2d 626 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Figures v. State, 80 Ga. App. 832, 57 S.E.2d 629 (1950); Reece v. State, 212 Ga. 609, 94 S.E.2d 723 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); Beard v. State, 151 Ga. App. 724, 261 S.E.2d 404 (1979); Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 271 S.E.2d 802 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420); 451 U.S. 923, 101 S. Ct. 2001, 68 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-420).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 765, 766, 1394.

C.J.S.

- 31A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 523, 524.

ALR.

- Proof of entire conversation containing alleged confession, 2 A.L.R. 1017; 26 A.L.R. 541.

Confession by one who has been subjected to or threatened with physical suffering, 24 A.L.R. 703.

Confession as circumstantial evidence, 40 A.L.R. 571.

Duty of court to institute preliminary investigation as to voluntary or involuntary character of confession, 102 A.L.R. 605.

Presumption and burden of proof as to voluntariness of nonjudicial confession, 102 A.L.R. 641.

Right of witness to state his conclusion or opinion that confession was voluntary or involuntary, 114 A.L.R. 974.

Detective or other person participating in crime to obtain evidence as accomplice within rule requiring corroboration of, or cautionary instruction as to, testimony of accomplice, 119 A.L.R. 689.

Propriety of instruction, or requested instruction, in civil case, as to caution in considering testimony of oral admissions, or as to weight of such admissions as evidence, 126 A.L.R. 66.

Corroboration of confession, 127 A.L.R. 1130; 45 A.L.R.2d 1316.

Admissibility and weight of party's admissions as to tort occurring during his absence, 54 A.L.R.2d 1069.

Admissibility of inculpatory statements made in presence of accused to which he refuses to reply on advice of counsel, 77 A.L.R.2d 463.

Admission of liability as affecting admissibility of evidence as to the circumstances of accident on issue of damages in a tort action for personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage, 80 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Admissibility of confession as affected by its inducement through artifice, deception, trickery, or fraud, 99 A.L.R.2d 772.

Plea of guilty or conviction as resulting in loss of privilege against self-incrimination as to crime in question, 9 A.L.R.3d 990.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs, 25 A.L.R.4th 419.

Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect's relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 A.L.R.4th 495.

Sufficiency of corroboration of confession for purpose of establishing corpus delicti as question of law or fact, 33 A.L.R.5th 571.