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- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982).
- Common-law burglary was recognized as an offense against habitation, whereas robbery was classified as a species of aggravated larceny which violated social interest in safety and security of the person as well as social interest in protection of property rights. Moore v. State, 140 Ga. App. 824, 232 S.E.2d 264 (1976).
- To justify taking of property by force or intimidation, party taking must be owner of specific property taken or be entitled to its possession, or in good faith believe that the party is the owner or entitled to its possession. Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938).
Robbery is a crime against possession, and is not affected by concepts of ownership. That being so, when two of the alleged victims of armed robbery were husband and wife, the fact that the stolen property may have been jointly owned does not preclude the appellant from being convicted of two counts of armed robbery. Carter v. State, 156 Ga. App. 633, 275 S.E.2d 716 (1980).
Person from whom property was taken must be owner, person in possession, or person in control. DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 169 S.E.2d 801 (1969).
Identity of person alleged to have been robbed is not an essential element of offense and need not be proved by direct evidence. McKisic v. State, 238 Ga. 644, 234 S.E.2d 908 (1977); Rollins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 585, 269 S.E.2d 81 (1980).
Intent to steal is a substantive element of robbery. Sledge v. State, 99 Ga. 684, 26 S.E. 756 (1896); Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930); Thomas v. State, 54 Ga. App. 747, 189 S.E. 68 (1936); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938).
- To constitute robbery or larceny, it is unnecessary that taking of property should be directly from one's person, but it is sufficient if it is taken while in that person's possession and immediate presence. Osborne v. State, 200 Ga. 763, 38 S.E.2d 558 (1946); Banks v. State, 74 Ga. App. 449, 40 S.E.2d 103 (1946); Fincher v. State, 211 Ga. 89, 84 S.E.2d 76 (1954).
Taking from under personal protection of another, though not actually from physical body suffices. Clements v. State, 84 Ga. 660, 11 S.E. 505, 20 Am. St. R. 385 (1890); Jackson v. State, 114 Ga. 826, 40 S.E. 1001, 88 Am. St. R. 60 (1902).
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion to sever 12 counts of robbery and kidnapping because all 12 counts involved a distinctive modus operandi and took place over a period of less than a month in a single county and showed a common scheme, which justified the denial of the defendant's motion to sever. Fielding v. State, 299 Ga. App. 341, 682 S.E.2d 675 (2009).
- Subsequent prosecution of defendant for robbery after defendant pled guilty to fleeing to elude did not violate double jeopardy since the offenses involved wholly different elements and facts. Blackwell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 611, 496 S.E.2d 922 (1998).
- Under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), the force used to commit robbery must be employed contemporaneously with obtaining possession of the property. Dutton v. State, 199 Ga. App. 750, 406 S.E.2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 406 S.E.2d 85 (1991).
- Although defendant had custody of a necklace pursuant to the victim's consent, possession of the necklace did not change to the defendant until the victim, by means of violence, had been dissuaded from seeking its return. That being so, it was the force which effected the taking, authorizing a conviction for robbery by force. Cantrell v. State, 184 Ga. App. 384, 361 S.E.2d 689 (1987).
- When in single transaction, defendant robs another of property belonging to two individuals, only one robbery is committed. Jackson v. State, 236 Ga. 98, 222 S.E.2d 380 (1976).
- While state presented sufficient evidence of the victim's age to support assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), because the trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence of two burglaries the defendant committed in 1998 as similar transactions to help prove the issue of identity, defendant's aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, theft, and battery convictions were reversed. Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008).
- Although eleven years separated defendant's earlier robbery from this armed robbery, part of that time defendant was in prison, and it is the similarity of the offenses within the meaning of Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) that determines the admissibility of such evidence, not whether the span of time between offenses is brief. Nelson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 63, 528 S.E.2d 844 (2000).
- Where there is other evidence of accused's guilt, and the crime is of such a nature that acquisition of money may be regarded as a natural or ordinary result of its perpetration, evidence is admissible of the sudden acquisition of money by the defendant at or subsequent to time offense was committed, although source of the money is not definitely traced or identified by prosecution; the other basis for admitting money into evidence is to demonstrate a dramatic change of financial condition before and after robbery in question. United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).
- When a theft, whether by simple larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, recent unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference or presumption of fact sufficient to convict. Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 234 S.E.2d 831 (1977); Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416, 260 S.E.2d 374 (1979); Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981).
Unexplained possession of stolen goods without direct proof or other circumstantial evidence that the defendant committed the theft. Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 234 S.E.2d 831 (1977).
What constitutes recent possession is a question for jury, to be determined very largely from character and nature of property stolen. Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981).
Whether defendant's explanation of possession is satisfactory or reasonable is a jury question. Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 278 S.E.2d 31 (1981).
Admission of evidence that defendant had been the perpetrator of two similar offenses was not error, where it is apparent from the record that offenses in question were not merely similar but were virtually identical; each involved an elderly victim, who was robbed by a person identified as the defendant, and in each case, defendant had gained entry into the victim's home based upon the promise of a free stove inspection and had then applied a putty or compound to cure an alleged heat leak in the stove. Mitchell v. State, 179 Ga. App. 421, 347 S.E.2d 1 (1986).
Alleged evidence of a same or similar nature committed by a codefendant was properly excluded as the defendant's proffered evidence, via the testimony of the two victims of the other crime, failed to identify the codefendant as the perpetrator of that crime, and the defendant offered no evidence independent of these witnesses in an attempt to establish that the codefendant actually committed the other crime in question; moreover, the motive for the other crime and the murder and armed robbery defendant was charged with were different. Carr v. State, 279 Ga. 271, 612 S.E.2d 292 (2005).
- Because the affirmative defense of "claim of right" under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-10(2) was not, as a matter of law, available to a defendant in a prosecution for robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2), the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on that principle. Richards v. State, 276 Ga. App. 384, 623 S.E.2d 222 (2005).
- In a prosecution for robbery by force or intimidation, the victim alleged being punched in the jaw by the defendant to force the victim to leave the victim's car, which the defendant then stole. Testimony of the victim's parent about the victim's crying and acting hysterical on the day of the crime was relevant and was not improper bolstering. Bridges v. State, 293 Ga. App. 783, 668 S.E.2d 293 (2008).
- Robbery under Georgia law is a crime of violence and can be used as a predicate conviction for purposes of the career offender provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 896, 117 S. Ct. 241, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996).
Cited in Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 177 S.E.2d 79 (1970); Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 302, 190 S.E.2d 807 (1972); King v. State, 127 Ga. App. 83, 192 S.E.2d 392 (1972); Philpot v. State, 229 Ga. 636, 193 S.E.2d 844 (1972); Holcomb v. State, 230 Ga. 525, 198 S.E.2d 179 (1973); Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973); Munsford v. State, 129 Ga. App. 547, 199 S.E.2d 843 (1973); Lowe v. State, 133 Ga. App. 420, 210 S.E.2d 869 (1974); Martin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 323, 211 S.E.2d 11 (1974); Arnold v. State, 133 Ga. App. 451, 211 S.E.2d 404 (1974); Taylor v. State, 134 Ga. App. 9, 213 S.E.2d 162 (1975); Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 224 S.E.2d 856 (1976); Malone v. State, 142 Ga. App. 47, 234 S.E.2d 844 (1977); Jordan v. State, 239 Ga. 526, 238 S.E.2d 69 (1977); Key v. State, 147 Ga. App. 800, 250 S.E.2d 527 (1978); Crosby v. State, 150 Ga. App. 555, 258 S.E.2d 264 (1979); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979); Fann v. State, 153 Ga. App. 634, 266 S.E.2d 307 (1980); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 541, 268 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Durden v. State, 161 Ga. App. 314, 287 S.E.2d 767 (1982); Lemon v. State, 161 Ga. App. 692, 289 S.E.2d 789 (1982); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir. 1982); Bogan v. State, 165 Ga. App. 851, 303 S.E.2d 48 (1983); Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 645, 314 S.E.2d 480 (1984); Holmes v. State, 170 Ga. App. 92, 316 S.E.2d 491 (1984); Glass v. State, 171 Ga. App. 11, 318 S.E.2d 760 (1984); Byrd v. State, 171 Ga. App. 344, 319 S.E.2d 460 (1984); Wright v. State, 173 Ga. App. 408, 326 S.E.2d 584 (1985); Shepherd v. State, 173 Ga. App. 499, 326 S.E.2d 596 (1985); Kelly v. State, 174 Ga. App. 424, 330 S.E.2d 165 (1985); Geter v. State, 174 Ga. App. 694, 331 S.E.2d 68 (1985); Ford v. State, 180 Ga. App. 807, 350 S.E.2d 816 (1986); Nelson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 481, 352 S.E.2d 804 (1987); Boscaino v. State, 186 Ga. App. 133, 366 S.E.2d 789 (1988); Jones v. State, 188 Ga. App. 713, 374 S.E.2d 110 (1988); Pye v. State, 196 Ga. App. 531, 396 S.E.2d 250 (1990); Norman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 105, 441 S.E.2d 94 (1994); Cole v. State, 216 Ga. App. 68, 453 S.E.2d 495 (1994); Pennamon v. State, 216 Ga. App. 306, 454 S.E.2d 192 (1995); Gido v. State, 216 Ga. App. 330, 454 S.E.2d 201 (1995); Wright v. State, 222 Ga. App. 320, 474 S.E.2d 121 (1996); Bradford v. State, 223 Ga. App. 424, 477 S.E.2d 859 (1996); Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 445, 481 S.E.2d 238 (1997); Westmoreland v. State, 245 Ga. App. 482, 538 S.E.2d 119 (2000); Rogers v. State, 255 Ga. App. 416, 565 S.E.2d 583 (2002); In the Interest of B.M., 289 Ga. App. 214, 656 S.E.2d 855 (2008); Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008); Arnold v. State, 286 Ga. 418, 687 S.E.2d 836 (2010); Crowley v. State, 315 Ga. App. 755, 728 S.E.2d 282 (2012).
- In indictment for robbery, ownership of property taken may be laid in the person having actual lawful possession of it, although the possessor may be holding it merely as agent of another; and it is not necessary to set forth in indictment the fact that person in whom ownership is laid is holding it merely as agent of real owner. Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553, 176 S.E.2d 52 (1970); Cline v. State, 153 Ga. App. 576, 266 S.E.2d 266 (1980); Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 587, 271 S.E.2d 719 (1980); Kent v. State, 157 Ga. App. 209, 276 S.E.2d 881 (1981).
- While it is undoubtedly true that there can be no robbery unless money or goods are taken without consent of owner, it is not essential that words "without consent" be stated in indictment, if equivalent words are employed, or if offense is charged in such language as to exclude any thought other than that the taking was without consent of owner. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930).
- Indictment charging defendant with offense of robbery by force from named person was not subject to demurrer for reason that it valued articles collectively, and did not state separate value of each. Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 11 S.E.2d 350 (1940).
- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on an alleged insufficiency of the evidence based on what was stated in the indictment because there was no fatal variance when the indictment alleged that the armed robbery was committed by use of a handgun, and the evidence showed that the defendant used a BB gun. Palmer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 751, 650 S.E.2d 255 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1770, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 678 (Ga. 2007).
Because the testimony showed that the robbery victim referred to at trial was the same victim identified in the indictment, no fatal variance existed; while the state did not present any witnesses who referred to the victim by first and last name, the state did present testimony reflecting that a man had a backpack taken by force by the defendant, and the defendant referred to the victim by last name during the course of the defendant's own testimony. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (2010).
Robbery by actual force implies violence. If there is any injury done to the person or if there is a struggle to retain possession of property before it is taken, it is force. Rivers v. State, 46 Ga. App. 778, 169 S.E. 260 (1933).
Force implies actual personal violence, struggle, and personal outrage. If there is any injury done the person, or if there is any struggle by the person to keep possession of property before the property is taken from the person, there will be sufficient force or actual violence to constitute robbery. Wallace v. State, 159 Ga. App. 793, 285 S.E.2d 194 (1981).
- Under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), the force used to commit robbery must be employed contemporaneously with obtaining possession of the property. Dutton v. State, 199 Ga. App. 750, 406 S.E.2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 406 S.E.2d 85 (1991).
When fist fight ensued between the victim and the robber, offense is robbery by force, not by intimidation. Taylor v. State, 135 Ga. App. 916, 219 S.E.2d 629 (1975).
Force implies actual personal violence, a struggle, and a personal outrage. If there is any injury done to the person, or if there is any struggle to keep possession of property before the property is taken from the person, there will be sufficient force or actual violence to constitute robbery. Henderson v. State, 209 Ga. 72, 70 S.E.2d 713 (1952).
- Violent taking of money or property from person of another by force or intimidation, without consent of owner, for purpose of converting same to use of taker for payment of demand claimed to be due the person by one from whom money or property is so taken, constitutes offense of robbery. Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938).
Use of force or intimidation only in effecting escape does not change larceny into robbery. Jackson v. State, 114 Ga. 826, 40 S.E. 1001, 88 Am. St. R. 60 (1902).
Using force to prevent recapture of article taken does not change larceny into robbery. Fanning v. State, 66 Ga. 167 (1880); Davis v. State, 24 Ga. App. 327, 100 S.E. 767 (1919).
- If element of force necessary to constitute robbery is present, it avails accused nothing if person robbed makes no resistance. McIntyre v. State, 41 Ga. App. 352, 152 S.E. 914 (1930).
For robbery not by force, victim must be conscious. Williams v. State, 9 Ga. App. 170, 70 S.E. 890 (1911); Bowen v. State, 16 Ga. App. 110, 84 S.E. 730 (1915).
To constitute robbery by force, it is not essential that victim be conscious as when the victim is beaten to unconsciousness prior to taking. Bowen v. State, 16 Ga. App. 110, 84 S.E. 730 (1915); Hines v. State, 16 Ga. App. 411, 85 S.E. 452 (1915).
- Indictment for robbery by force, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), was defective because the indictment failed to allege the essential element that the defendant took the "property of another," defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-1(3), and the defendant could admit all the allegations in the indictment and not be guilty of a crime. Defendant's general demurrer should have been granted. Cooks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 426, 750 S.E.2d 765 (2013).
Evidence of force was shown when the defendant took two 12-packs of beer from a store cooler, knocked a cashier aside, and ran out of the store with the beer. Dutton v. State, 199 Ga. App. 750, 406 S.E.2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 406 S.E.2d 85 (1991).
Evidence that defendant grabbed the cashier's arm when the cashier opened the cash register to give the defendant change was sufficient to support a conviction of robbery by force, rather than theft by taking, even if the cashier managed to escape the defendant's grasp before the defendant took any money from the register. Watson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 650, 448 S.E.2d 718 (1994).
- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-40(a)(2) and16-8-41(a) were appropriate because the defendant's own confessions to participating in the crimes were corroborated by the testimony of the victims, among other evidence. Likewise, the defendant's codefendants' statements and testimony implicating the defendant in the crimes were corroborated by the defendant's confessions and the victims' testimony. Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga. App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (2009).
- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction where the defendant went into the victim's bedroom, grabbed the victim around the neck and demanded money, and then grabbed the victim's wallet and left. Spikes v. State, 247 Ga. App. 874, 545 S.E.2d 410 (2001).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery as it showed that defendant abducted the victim, that defendant agreed with two other assailants that they should cash a paycheck found on the victim's person, and that defendant drove the vehicle used to abduct the victim at least part of the time, including to a check-cashing store; thus, the evidence showed more than defendant's mere presence during the crime. Fulcher v. State, 259 Ga. App. 648, 578 S.E.2d 264 (2003).
Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for robbery by entering an elderly person's home and taking money from the person by force; even though the person described defendant by another name and testified that defendant took an amount other than the amount the person originally reported, the jury was authorized to disregard that testimony and credit the person's statements made right after the crime that identified defendant, and which was corroborated by trial witnesses. Currington v. State, 259 Ga. App. 654, 578 S.E.2d 270 (2003).
There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conviction of defendant for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40, where defendant's claim that defendant was coerced into participating in the crime was found to be lacking in credibility. There was no showing by defendant of injuries sustained pursuant to defendant's claim that a gang, who remained unidentified, beat defendant up in order to coerce defendant to participate, nor was the fact that defendant was the sole occupant of the getaway car which took police on a high speed chase consistent with defendant's defense of coercion, and defendant's version of events in the store where the robbery occurred were flatly contradicted by the store cashier. Menefield v. State, 264 Ga. App. 171, 590 S.E.2d 180 (2003).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence sufficed for the jury to conclude that defendant was guilty of robbery by force when the evidence revealed that defendant punched the victim in the face, which caused the victim to lose consciousness, where, prior to the attack, the victim had at least $1,200 in the victim's wallet, where no one else was in the bathroom with defendant and the victim at the time that defendant knocked the victim unconscious, and where defendant ran out of the door just before the victim's friend entered the bathroom to find the victim regaining consciousness and realizing that the victim's money had been stolen. Robinson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 634, 600 S.E.2d 729 (2004).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for malice murder and robbery by force because the defendant strangled the victim while the defendant and codefendant were riding in the victim's car and put the body in the trunk; the defendant told a friend that there were three people in the car, codefendant told the friend that the codefendant and defendant killed the victim, and they showed the friend the body; codefendant took money from the victim's sock, and the codefendant and defendant hid the body, retrieved it, and buried it, and defendant was driving the victim's car when the defendant was involved in an accident, which led to the discovery of the body. Shelton v. State, 279 Ga. 161, 611 S.E.2d 11 (2005).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction for robbery as a party under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as it was defendant's idea to rob a store; the statements of defendant's three accomplices corroborated each other and there was additional evidence to corroborate those statements, including defendant's admissions that the defendant entered the store to see how many people were inside and reported it to the others and that the defendant divided the proceeds and kept a portion personally. Moore v. State, 274 Ga. App. 432, 618 S.E.2d 122 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for malice murder, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another were supported by sufficient evidence because: (1) defendant broke into the office where the victim was living; (2) defendant hit the victim several times on the head and body with a pair of pliers; (3) defendant choked the victim with defendant's hands and arms, and with the pliers, until the victim was dead; (4) defendant took the victim's credit card and driver's license; and (5) defendant disposed of the victim's body. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).
Evidence was sufficient to support a robbery conviction based on the victim's testimony that the defendant threatened the victim with a knife and then threw the knife on the bed and where an officer found a knife lying on the bed; it was inconsequential that the defendant never touched the victim with the knife. Magana-Gonzalez v. State, 277 Ga. App. 195, 626 S.E.2d 167 (2006).
Defendant's confession, and a victim's testimony that the defendant and the codefendant threatened the victim with a knife and took the victim's money, were sufficient to support a conviction of robbery. Rivera v. State, 279 Ga. App. 1, 630 S.E.2d 152 (2006).
Defendant's convictions for robbery, battery, false imprisonment, and obstruction of an emergency telephone call were all upheld on appeal, as no error flowed from: (1) the trial court's admission of an audio recording of the attack on the victim and order granting the state two hearings regarding the admissibility of said recording; (2) the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction after the prosecutor injected a personal experience with domestic violence into the closing argument; (3) the trial court's failure to strike the testimony of similar transaction witnesses and issue a curative instruction; and (4) the trial court's order restricting the counsel's closing argument. Ellis v. State, 279 Ga. App. 902, 633 S.E.2d 64 (2006).
With regard to the defendant's conviction for robbery and related offenses, the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense of robbery; however, the victim's testimony was corroborated by that of another witness, whose credibility was for the jury to have determined. Bills v. State, 283 Ga. App. 660, 642 S.E.2d 352 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of juvenile delinquency based on robbery by force after the victim identified the juvenile defendant as the leader of a group who caused the victim to fall off the victim's bicycle, grabbed the victim and ordered the victim to hand over the victim's money, hit the victim with a beer bottle, and searched the victim's pockets and took $20; under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, it was not necessary that the victim's testimony be corroborated. In the Interest of E.G., 286 Ga. App. 137, 648 S.E.2d 699 (2007).
There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for robbery by use of force since the evidence established, via the testimony of the victim, that the defendant came into the victim's home to sell some items, that the defendant came into the victim's home uninvited, pushed the victim down, and took $500 from the victim's purse. Heath v. State, 291 Ga. App. 594, 662 S.E.2d 362 (2008).
Evidence that the defendant punched the victim in the jaw to force the victim to exit the victim's car, drove away, and admitted stealing the car to police was sufficient to convict the defendant of robbery by force or intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1). Bridges v. State, 293 Ga. App. 783, 668 S.E.2d 293 (2008).
Defendant was properly convicted of armed robbery because the circumstantial evidence strongly supported a finding that the victim's body had been moved after the victim was shot by the defendant and that someone had gone through the victim's pockets; that evidence, together with testimony that the defendant returned to the defendant's group's vehicle with counterfeit money to split up, was sufficient to authorize a jury to find that every reasonable hypothesis was excluded except for the defendant's guilt of armed robbery. White v. State, 287 Ga. 208, 695 S.E.2d 222 (2010).
Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and malice murder because the victim went missing shortly after coming into a substantial amount of cash, the defendant had access to the victim's home, and the defendant was seen driving around in the victim's two vehicles, selling the victim's property, and with a large amount of cash; the victim died from blunt trauma to the head, a mallet with blood on the mallet was found inside the house, and a witness testified that the defendant confided to the witness that the defendant killed the victim, placed the victim's body in a freezer, and took the victim's money. Cutrer v. State, 287 Ga. 272, 695 S.E.2d 597 (2010).
Rational trier of fact was authorized to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a party to the crime of robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-8-40 because the defendant's admission that the defendant was present at the scene of the robbery, in conjunction with the defendant's possession of the recently stolen item, which the jury could find was unsatisfactorily explained by the defendant, was sufficient to support the defendant's robbery conviction; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events because although the defendant contended that the defendant's videotaped police interview and the defendant's trial testimony created a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the defendant's interview and trial testimony were not consistent with one another in all material respects, and the defendant's statements also were inconsistent with the testimony of the pursuing patrol officers. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (2010).
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, because the defendant was not only present when a robbery was committed, but also actively aided and abetted the robbery's commission and received a portion of the money taken from the victim, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of robbery by force beyond a reasonable doubt under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1). Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 375, 724 S.E.2d 410 (2012).
Sufficient evidence supported a defendant's convictions of robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40 and simple battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23 when: (1) the defendant grabbed the victim by the throat, put the victim against a wall, and threw the victim onto a table; (2) the victim got a knife; (3) the defendant ran, taking the victim's gaming system and marijuana; and (4) the defendant's claim that the state's main witnesses were not credible was rejected as credibility was a jury matter. Slan v. State, 316 Ga. App. 843, 730 S.E.2d 565 (2012).
Evidence that the defendant and two others pulled the victim over, took the victim's vehicle and gun, grabbed the victim from behind and struck the victim, and took both the victim's vehicle and gun supported the defendant's convictions for robbery and theft by taking. Chambers v. State, 327 Ga. App. 663, 760 S.E.2d 664 (2014).
- Trial court properly consolidated the indictments charging the defendant with armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by receiving stolen property because joinder was not prejudicial or erroneous since evidence of the various, intertwined crimes would have been admissible against the defendant had the indictments been tried separately; the trial court was authorized to find that the events in the indictments committed within a two-day period and involving guns and a car constituted a series of connected acts, and the connection between the robberies and the assaults helped identify defendant. Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 796, 714 S.E.2d 584 (2011).
- There was no merger of robbery by force and armed robbery when the evidence showed that the theft of the victim's pistol was accomplished by force and, subsequently, the defendant used the pistol to strike the victim's head and shoulders prior to stealing the victim's pocketbook. Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 443 S.E.2d 300 (1994).
- Trial court properly charged the jury as to the lesser-included offense of robbery by intimidation as O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 unequivocally provided that robbery by intimidation was a lesser-included offense of the offense of armed robbery; thus, in light of the evidence that the defendant robbed the victim by use of a firearm as an offensive weapon, which would authorize a conviction of armed robbery, the robbery by intimidation jury charge and conviction were authorized. Lancaster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 752, 637 S.E.2d 131 (2006).
- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's request to charge on robbery by force as a lesser included offense of armed robbery since the person from whom the bank deposit was taken testified that the defendant was armed with a silver colored, stainless steel revolver. Regardless of whether a gun was ever recovered by law enforcement officers or placed in evidence, the evidence proved the greater offense or none at all. Coker v. State, 207 Ga. App. 482, 428 S.E.2d 578 (1993).
Because the evidence showed a completed act of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2). Waters v. State, 294 Ga. App. 442, 669 S.E.2d 450 (2008).
- Evidence showed that the defendant committed robbery either by use of a replica of a handgun or by intimidation and no evidence was presented that intimidation was not used in the robbery; therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of armed robbery and robbery by intimidation. Espinoza v. State, 243 Ga. App. 665, 534 S.E.2d 127 (2000).
- Although robbery by intimidation is a lesser included offense of armed robbery, it is not error in an armed robbery case to fail to charge on robbery by intimidation where there is evidence of robbery by use of an offensive weapon, but no evidence of robbery by intimidation. Hill v. State, 228 Ga. App. 362, 492 S.E.2d 5 (1997).
Because the evidence showed the completed offense of armed robbery, and because the defendant did not deny that defendant's accomplices were armed, defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Brinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 411, 537 S.E.2d 795 (2000).
Defendant's contention that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on armed robbery failed. The motion was mooted when defendant was convicted only of robbery, which does not require a weapon. Even if the trial court had directed a verdict on armed robbery, the lesser included charge of robbery by intimidation, which does not require evidence of the use of a weapon, would have still reached the jury. Smiley v. State, 260 Ga. App. 283, 581 S.E.2d 310 (2003).
When both robbery victims testified that the defendant wielded a gun during the robbery, and the defendant's accomplice, in a pretrial statement and in letters to the prosecutor, stated that the defendant used a gun to perpetrate the robbery, and when, even at trial, the accomplice did not deny that a gun was used during the robbery, the defendant, in a trial for armed robbery, was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Jordan v. State, 278 Ga. App. 126, 628 S.E.2d 221 (2006).
- When the defendant's kidnapping conviction was premised on the victim's testimony that after the defendant entered the victim's home without the victim's permission, the defendant forced the victim to move from a living room into the victim's bedroom with the insinuation that the defendant had a weapon, the crime of kidnapping was complete. Defendant's subsequent act of asking the victim for money and taking a bank envelope from the victim's purse without permission constituted the separate crime of robbery by intimidation. Hickey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 724, 601 S.E.2d 157 (2004).
Because a defendant forced the victim to drive to an abandoned house and then drove the victim through other neighborhoods before forcing the victim out of the car and refusing to return the victim's personal belongings, the defendant's convictions for kidnapping and robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40(a) and16-8-40 did not merge; pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(e), venue was proper in any county through which the vehicle traveled. Aldridge v. State, 310 Ga. App. 502, 713 S.E.2d 682 (2011).
- Trial court did not err in refusing to merge a defendant's robbery and aggravated battery offenses. The robbery offense required that the defendant, with intent to commit theft, took the property of the victim from the victim by use of force, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), and the aggravated battery charge required proof that the defendant maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim by seriously disfiguring the victim's body or a member thereof, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Taking property of the victim was not a fact required to establish aggravated battery, and causing serious disfigurement was not a fact required to establish robbery. Blanch v. State, 306 Ga. App. 631, 703 S.E.2d 48 (2010).
- Trial court did not err in failing to merge false imprisonment with robbery because robbery did not require proof that the victim was confined and detained without legal authority, and false imprisonment did not require a theft. Bonner v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011).
Because the single continuous act of simple battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23(a)(1), was the evidence required to show the "force" used to accomplish a robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), the defendant's battery convictions merged with the robbery conviction; the "use of force" charged in connection with the robbery was "hitting," which was the same type of force used in the continuous battery. Bonner v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011).
- Defendant's actions in taking the victim's cash and check card occurred simulationously and, thus, those counts should have merged but the taking of the car keys occurred at a separate time and thus did not merge. Andrews v. State, 328 Ga. App. 344, 764 S.E.2d 553 (2014).
- When evidence on behalf of the defendant denied the charge of armed robbery, and was such that the evidence would have authorized jury to find the defendant guilty of either of the two lesser offenses of robbery by intimidation or theft by taking, failure of the trial court to charge on robbery by intimidation and theft by taking requires the grant of new trial. Hensley v. State, 228 Ga. 501, 186 S.E.2d 729 (1972).
There is no error in failing to charge on robbery by intimidation as a lesser included offense of armed robbery when all the credible evidence showed completion of the greater offense and no request was made for the charge. Lawrence v. State, 235 Ga. 216, 219 S.E.2d 101 (1975).
It is not error in an armed robbery case to fail to charge on robbery by intimidation where there is evidence of robbery by use of an offensive weapon, but no evidence of robbery by intimidation. Bixby v. State, 234 Ga. 812, 218 S.E.2d 609 (1975).
When the defendant, convicted of armed robbery, not only denied using a knife but denied orally threatening the victim, the evidence did not authorize charges on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and theft by taking. Hunter v. State, 261 Ga. App. 276, 582 S.E.2d 228 (2003).
Offenses of robbery and armed robbery did not merge as a matter of law, where separate incidents (simple taking of the pistol and then taking the other items at gunpoint) involved different actions, different specific objectives or intents, and different victims. Millines v. State, 188 Ga. App. 655, 373 S.E.2d 838 (1988).
- It is not error to fail to charge defendant with theft by taking, as lesser offense included in charge of armed robbery or robbery by intimidation, unless evidence authorizes a finding of lesser offense. Sanders v. State, 135 Ga. App. 436, 218 S.E.2d 140 (1975).
- In a prosecution for robbery by sudden snatching, where there was evidence to support defendant's written request to charge on the lesser included offense of theft by taking, the trial court's failure to give the requested charge was reversible error. King v. State, 214 Ga. App. 311, 447 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
- In a prosecution for robbery by sudden snatching, where the evidence showed that defendant took cigarettes from the counter while the store clerk was distracted and did not show that the clerk was fraudulently induced to part with the cigarettes, the trial court's failure to give requested charge on theft by deception was not error. King v. State, 214 Ga. App. 311, 447 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
- In a probation revocation case when the defendant removed a wallet from the pocket of an extremely intoxicated victim, the evidence did not support a showing that the defendant committed the offense of robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a), only the lesser included offense of theft under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2; even if the evidence showed robbery by sudden snatching, the victim was not aware of the taking before the taking was completed and there was no evidence of constructive force supplied by intimidation, threat, or other means. Franklin v. State, 286 Ga. App. 288, 648 S.E.2d 746 (2007).
- In a prosecution for robbery by sudden snatching, defendant's requested charge on shoplifting was not a complete and accurate statement of the law and, even though due to a typographical error was properly refused by the trial court; nevertheless, circumstances in the case reasonably raised the inference that defendant committed theft by shoplifting and authorized a proper request to charge on that offense. King v. State, 214 Ga. App. 311, 447 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
- Since motor vehicle theft is not included under robbery as a matter of law, motor vehicle theft is a lesser included offense under robbery as a matter of fact in each case. Doucet v. State, 153 Ga. App. 775, 266 S.E.2d 554 (1980).
- Since simple battery focuses on injury to the person while robbery by force involves the taking of property from the person of another by doing physical violence to the victim, simple battery is not as a matter of law an offense included in robbery by force. Givens v. State, 184 Ga. App. 498, 361 S.E.2d 830, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 909, 361 S.E.2d 830 (1987).
- When the defendant struck the victim, this alone amounts to assault and battery; but, as this amounted to injury to person done by actual force, and other elements of robbery were superadded, assault and battery lost its identity and was merged into greater crime of robbery. Rivers v. State, 46 Ga. App. 778, 169 S.E. 260 (1933).
- Statutory definitions of burglary and robbery make it clear that legislature intended to prohibit two designated kinds of general conduct, and that the two crimes, which are codified in separate chapters, are not established by same proof of all facts, thus neither crime is a lesser, or included, offense of the other as a matter of law or fact. Moore v. State, 140 Ga. App. 824, 232 S.E.2d 264 (1976).
No double jeopardy violation occurred when defendant was convicted of and sentenced for both burglary and robbery. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984).
Neither burglary nor robbery is a lesser or included offense of the other as a matter of law or fact for the facts must differ to convict for each offense. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984); Williams v. State, 178 Ga. App. 581, 344 S.E.2d 247 (1986).
Kidnapping is not included in crime of robbery as a matter of law. Chambley v. State, 163 Ga. App. 502, 295 S.E.2d 166 (1982).
Aggravated assault conviction merged with robbery conviction where victim was placed in fear of receiving bodily injury before the victim's money was taken. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984).
Defendants' robbery and aggravated assault convictions, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-40, merged because, while aggravated assault did not require taking property from another, aggravated assault was proved by the same or less than all facts required to show robbery, as the assault forming the basis of the aggravated assault with intent to rob, which was pointing a pistol at the victim, was "contained within" the element of robbery requiring the defendants to have used force, intimidation, threat or coercion, or placed the victim in fear of immediate serious bodily injury. Washington v. State, 310 Ga. App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (2011).
- When the facts supporting robbery charge included taking of property in presence of boys, and facts showing appellant's additional conduct of forcing the boys into various rooms and the attic and tying the boys were incidental to, but not part of, the robbery, that conduct constituted a separate crime, kidnapping, which did not merge with the robbery as a matter of fact. Chambley v. State, 163 Ga. App. 502, 295 S.E.2d 166 (1982).
- See Hickey v. State, 125 Ga. 145, 53 S.E. 1026 (1906).
- Robbery by sudden snatching occurs where any other force is used than is necessary for thief to obtain possession of property from owner who is off guard and where there is no resistance by owner or injury to the owner's person. Rivers v. State, 46 Ga. App. 778, 169 S.E. 260 (1933); Edwards v. State, 224 Ga. 684, 164 S.E.2d 120 (1968).
Evidence showing that the defendant entered a restaurant and intentionally confused the cashier so that the cashier would give the defendant too much money in exchange for certain large bills, and that, when the cashier stated a need to get the manager, the defendant grabbed the restaurant's money from the cashier's hand and ran was sufficient for conviction of theft by snatching. Burns v. State, 245 Ga. App. 332, 537 S.E.2d 768 (2000).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for robbery by sudden snatching, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3), when the defendant admitted going to the victim's house, witnesses saw the defendant running from the house with a purse in the defendant's hand, and the victim was less than six feet from the purse when the purse was taken. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 793, 584 S.E.2d 64 (2003).
Although the victim never saw the defendant with the wallet, there was sufficient evidence to show that at the moment the defendant's companion darted in front of the victim's cart distracting the victim's attention, the defendant snatched the wallet from the victim's purse; despite the victim's detection of the defendant's efforts, nothing more was needed to prove the elements of the crime of robbery by sudden snatching. Andrews v. State, 270 Ga. App. 362, 606 S.E.2d 587 (2004).
Defendant's Georgia robbery by sudden snatching conviction counted as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 because that crime involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. If a sudden snatching victim perceives what is going on, the victim will ordinarily attempt to resist the snatching such that a violent encounter is reasonably likely to ensue, which presents a substantial risk of physical injury to the victim. United States v. Cooper, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017)(Unpublished).
Robbery by snatching involves element of force, and this must be included in charge to jury. Moore v. State, 20 Ga. App. 190, 92 S.E. 963 (1917).
Force is implicit in sudden snatching, both as a fact and as a legal proposition, the force being that effort necessary for the robber to transfer the property taken from the owner to the robber's possession. Dotson v. State, 160 Ga. App. 898, 288 S.E.2d 608 (1982).
- When the store clerk's testimony indicated that the clerk was aware the defendant was stealing cigarettes from the counter, this evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of robbery by sudden snatching. King v. State, 214 Ga. App. 311, 447 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
Elements of robbery by snatching were satisfied where the victim saw defendant when defendant "reached in and grabbed" the victim's bag from the floor of the victim's vehicle as both of them were standing by the passenger door. Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645, 481 S.E.2d 856 (1997).
Evidence that the victim heard someone hit the victim's shopping cart while the victim was turned away getting an item in a grocery store, and that the victim turned and saw defendant running away with the victim's purse was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery by sudden snatching. Moore v. State, 265 Ga. App. 511, 594 S.E.2d 734 (2004).
Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for robbery by snatching where the victim testified that the victim was aware of defendant getting close but did not want to tangle with defendant when defendant grabbed the victim's purse. Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 652, 598 S.E.2d 43 (2004).
Defendant's conviction of robbery by snatching, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3), was supported by sufficient evidence that, from a distance of about 10 feet, a store owner watched the defendant pull a money bag from under a display on the counter and put it in the defendant's coat, and that the owner immediately confronted the defendant. Kendrick v. State, 279 Ga. App. 263, 630 S.E.2d 863 (2006).
Because the undisputed facts showed that the victim was conscious of the crime as the crime was being committed, the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on theft by taking as a lesser-included offense of robbery by snatching was not erroneous. Bettis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 643, 647 S.E.2d 340 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1535, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 862 (Ga. 2007).
Evidence was sufficient to show that a wallet was taken from the victim's "immediate presence" and that the victim was conscious of the robbery as the robbery occurred since the victim saw the defendant take the wallet from a cart only six feet away; the victim of a robbery by sudden snatching need not become aware of the taking prior to the taking, and it is sufficient if the evidence shows that the victim became aware of the taking as the crime was being committed. Brown v. State, 309 Ga. App. 511, 710 S.E.2d 674 (2011).
- Since evidence showed the victim was less than six feet from her purse when the purse was taken, in a small, compact, mobile home, the purse was taken from her "immediate presence" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3). Perkins v. State, 256 Ga. App. 449, 568 S.E.2d 601 (2002).
Victim's unawareness that purse had been taken until the crime was completed precluded conviction for robbery by sudden snatching. McNearney v. State, 210 Ga. App. 582, 436 S.E.2d 585 (1993); Grant v. State, 226 Ga. App. 506, 486 S.E.2d 717 (1997).
Because the state's evidence failed to show that the robbery victim was aware that something was being taken before that taking was complete, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on a robbery by sudden snatching charge; however, given that: (1) the defendant gained entry to a back office by passing through a storage area, and the jury implicitly rejected an argument that the absence of an "Employees Only" sign meant, despite the victim's testimony to the contrary, that the defendant had permission to enter either the storage area or the office; and (2) the defendant admitted to entering the office without permission, took a cash bag, and reentered the store in a manner intended to hide the defendant from view, a burglary conviction was upheld. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 91, 635 S.E.2d 385 (2006).
- When the evidence showed that a store clerk, in charge of the store during the owner's absence, had attempted in a scuffle to prevent the defendant from stealing the money, the defendant was properly convicted of robbery by snatching. Crockett v. State, 177 Ga. App. 92, 338 S.E.2d 538 (1985).
Theft by taking was not lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching where the victim saw the defendant take her purse out of her grocery cart when it was no more than two feet away from her. Bryant v. State, 213 Ga. App. 301, 444 S.E.2d 391 (1994).
- Evidence as to commission of another robbery by snatching was erroneously admitted into evidence and did not tend to show that the robbery was a pattern crime and the handiwork of defendant. Where the only connection between the two crimes was that they both were robberies committed by sudden snatching of property from a victim, they were not closely related in time, having occurred 18 months apart, they were not related as to locality, having occurred only within the same county, they were not related as to the similarity of property stolen, and they were not related as to the modus operandi. Higginbotham v. State, 207 Ga. App. 424, 428 S.E.2d 592 (1993).
- Conviction of robbery by snatching from a person over age 65 in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3) and (c) was supported by sufficient evidence including: an eyewitness identification; defendant's unique clothing, which both the eyewitness and the victim identified; defendant's presence in the vicinity of the crime shortly after it occurred; and defendant's flight from the police. McDonald v. State, 256 Ga. App. 369, 568 S.E.2d 588 (2002).
- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for robbery by snatching, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a), as: (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict a codefendant of the same crime so it was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to that crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3); and (2) the fact that no one saw the defendant with the victim's wallet or with the codefendant was inapposite as the victim saw the two of them in the same vicinity simultaneously. Barker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 213, 620 S.E.2d 457 (2005).
Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of robbery by sudden snatching. A pedestrian identified the defendant from a photographic lineup as the driver who snatched the victim's purse; the victim took down the car's license number; an officer saw the defendant driving the car and learned that the defendant often used the car; and the defendant previously pled guilty to two separate incidents of robbery by sudden snatching of a purse. Russell v. State, 288 Ga. App. 372, 654 S.E.2d 185 (2007).
Even if the defendant did not ever have physical possession of the money bag, there was sufficient evidence to support a robbery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as: (1) after a struggle, the victim's money bag was taken by an assailant wearing a sweatshirt; (2) the victim identified the truck used in the robbery, the money bag, and the sweatshirt worn by the assailant; (3) the truck fled from police and then the suspects fled on foot; (4) defendant and codefendant were apprehended after a foot chase; and (5) the money bag was found in a nearby bush. Robertson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 231, 626 S.E.2d 206 (2006).
Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's robbery by snatching conviction as: (1) the victim got a good look at the defendant from about three feet away, immediately was able give a description to police, only a short time passed between the robbery and the identification, and the victim had a clear opportunity to see the robber up close during the middle of the day; and (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence regarding the cash found in the defendant's pocket as that motion would have been denied. Fitzgerald v. State, 279 Ga. App. 67, 630 S.E.2d 598 (2006).
Testimony of a purse snatching victim that a juvenile was the one who snatched her purse was sufficient to support the adjudication of the juvenile as delinquent for robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3), although another witness testified that the witness, not the juvenile, snatched the victim's purse. The victim had ample opportunity to observe the juvenile while the victim wrestled with the juvenile for the purse and afterward, when the juvenile was detained by a bystander. In the Interest of B.L.L., 300 Ga. App. 208, 684 S.E.2d 352 (2009).
Evidence that a perpetrator grabbed money from the open cash registers in two establishments in the presence of employees and limited evidence, permitted a jury to conclude that the defendant was the perpetrator, including the law-enforcement officer's testimony as well as the jury's ability to reach that same conclusion after viewing the surveillance videos was sufficient to support a conviction for robbery by sudden snatching. Owens v. State, 317 Ga. App. 821, 733 S.E.2d 16 (2012).
Evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction of robbery by sudden snatching as, despite the appellant's contention to the contrary, the appellant was seen as the man with a red jacket who had snatched a purse from a woman's restroom and was the man chased and arrested that night. Martinez v. State, 337 Ga. App. 374, 787 S.E.2d 308 (2016).
- Evidence supplied by both victims, which included identification of the defendant by both victims as the perpetrator in photo line-ups and at trial, similar transaction evidence, prior convictions, a videotape of the crime, and exculpatory statements made by the defendant, supported robbery by snatching and robbery by intimidation convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40. Felder v. State, 260 Ga. App. 27, 579 S.E.2d 28 (2003).
- Because the trial court erroneously commented on the defendant's refusal to make a post-arrest statement to police, and the error, absent a curative instruction, was not harmless or the result of inadvertence, the defendant's robbery by sudden snatching conviction was reversed; thus, the trial court erred in denying the defendant a new trial on those grounds. Wright v. State, 287 Ga. App. 593, 651 S.E.2d 852 (2007).
- See Huff v. State, 167 Ga. App. 831, 308 S.E.2d 20 (1983); Smith v. State, 168 Ga. App. 92, 308 S.E.2d 226 (1983); Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 308 S.E.2d 438 (1983); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Williams v. State, 178 Ga. App. 80, 342 S.E.2d 18 (1986); Brown v. State, 179 Ga. App. 538, 346 S.E.2d 908 (1986); Mitchell v. State, 179 Ga. App. 421, 347 S.E.2d 1 (1986); Jones v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 965, 107 S. Ct. 466, 93 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1986); Daniel v. State, 180 Ga. App. 179, 348 S.E.2d 720 (1986); Cunningham v. State, 182 Ga. App. 266, 355 S.E.2d 762 (1987); McCounly v. State, 191 Ga. App. 266, 381 S.E.2d 552 (1989); Keener v. State, 215 Ga. App. 117, 449 S.E.2d 669 (1994); Wright v. State, 222 Ga. App. 613, 475 S.E.2d 670 (1996); Hodges v. State, 222 Ga. App. 381, 474 S.E.2d 218 (1996); Davis v. State, 223 Ga. App. 346, 477 S.E.2d 639 (1996); Shropshire v. State, 224 Ga. App. 504, 480 S.E.2d 919 (1997); Jackson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 604, 487 S.E.2d 142 (1997); Anderson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 617, 492 S.E.2d 252 (1997); Locklin v. State, 228 Ga. App. 696, 492 S.E.2d 712 (1997); Boone v. State, 229 Ga. App. 379, 494 S.E.2d 100 (1997); In re M.G., 233 Ga. App. 23, 503 S.E.2d 302 (1998); Burks v. State, 239 Ga. App. 427, 521 S.E.2d 416 (1999); Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000); King v. State, 246 Ga. App. 100, 539 S.E.2d 614 (2000).
Testimony by the victim, in which the victim positively identified the defendant as the man who entered the victim's home, and committed the crimes of robbery by intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated battery and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, charged in the indictment and eyewitness testimony that defendant entered the victim's premises minutes before the attack of the victim was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of committing the crimes charged in the indictment. Mobley v. State, 211 Ga. App. 709, 441 S.E.2d 73 (1994).
In light of the overwhelming evidence produced at trial, even though one victim expressed some uncertainty regarding defendant's identity, a rational trier of fact could determine defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery, aggravated assault, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, attempting to elude a law enforcement officer and driving under the influence of drugs. Chisholm v. State, 231 Ga. App. 835, 500 S.E.2d 14 (1998).
Evidence in the form of testimony from defendant's accomplices that defendant repeatedly struck the victim in the face while asking the victim "where the money was" and choked the victim when the victim could not immediately find the money in the victim's truck after defendant took the victim to the truck because the victim told defendant that the money was there, coupled with defendant's possession of the victim's beeper, was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated battery. Rutledge v. State, 263 Ga. App. 308, 587 S.E.2d 808 (2003).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for robbery by intimidation where defendant demanded money from the victim while displaying a knife that, although closed, had a quick release button, and fearing for personal safety and that of the victim's spouse, the victim gave defendant money. Ogden v. State, 266 Ga. App. 399, 597 S.E.2d 491 (2004).
Notwithstanding the inability of a cab driver and a victim to positively identify defendant at trial, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's robbery conviction where: (1) a cab driver chased defendant from the time that defendant snatched the victim's purse until the driver caught defendant; (2) the cab driver did not lose sight of defendant during the chase; (3) the cab driver held defendant until the police took custody of the defendant; and (4) the cab driver and the victim identified defendant as the victim's assailant when the defendant was first captured. Lawrence v. State, 267 Ga. App. 515, 600 S.E.2d 444 (2004).
Evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant entered or remained in the victim's home without authority and for the purpose of committing theft, after a struggle by the front of the home, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for robbery and burglary. Dupree v. State, 303 Ga. 885, 815 S.E.2d 899 (2018).
- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of robbery, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a), and false imprisonment, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), after the defendant tricked a jailer into letting the defendant out of the defendant's cell, subsequently elbowed the jailer in the stomach, spun the jailer around, locked the jailer in the cell, and retrieved the jailer's key from the floor where it had fallen during the scuffle. Forehand v. State, 270 Ga. App. 365, 606 S.E.2d 589 (2004).
- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, robbery by intimidation, and criminal damage to property in the second degree were supported by sufficient evidence because, inter alia, defendant's sibling let the defendant and two others into a restaurant after hours, the defendant pointed a gun at the sibling's coworker, and then beat on a safe and pried open the cash registers looking for money; all four coconspirators involved, including the defendant, gave statements to police implicating themselves and their codefendants, and a bill was introduced showing that repair of the safe damaged during the robbery attempt cost $1,000.00. Polite v. State, 273 Ga. App. 235, 614 S.E.2d 849 (2005).
- Evidence showing that the defendant took the victim's property by attacking the victim with a stick was sufficient to support the defendant's robbery conviction. Hernandez v. State, 274 Ga. App. 390, 617 S.E.2d 630 (2005).
Because a victim's identification of the defendant as the robber was corroborated by other witnesses, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery as well as to provide probable cause for a search warrant; because it was proper for the witnesses to identify the defendant from a videotape, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motions to suppress and in limine. Bradford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 659, 618 S.E.2d 709 (2005).
- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and attempted robbery; the description of the crimes as the crimes occurred by a witness to a9-1-1 operator, the9-1-1 tape transcript of that call, the observations of the police officers who responded to the call of the witness that an African-American person was beating a Hispanic person with a baseball bat while trying to take money out of the Hispanic person's pockets, and the testimony of the witness at trial was sufficient to overcome evidence that the witness gave a false name to police, that the witness was unable to identify the defendant at trial, and that the victim did not testify at trial. Williams v. State, 275 Ga. App. 491, 621 S.E.2d 512 (2005).
Defendant's convictions for robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-40(a),16-7-1(a), and16-5-41(a), respectively, were supported by sufficient evidence because the victim and a codefendant both positively identified the defendant as a participant in a criminal event, wherein three individuals burst into the victim's apartment, robbed the victim at gunpoint, and tied the victim up; the lack of physical evidence did not alter the sufficiency as the identification testimony from a photographic line-up and at trial was within the trier of fact's credibility determination, and denial of the defendant's new trial motion under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23 was proper. Tucker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 611, 621 S.E.2d 562 (2005).
Because the state presented sufficient evidence from multiple witnesses that the defendant was the person who took the one victim's purse, including another victim's identification of the defendant the night of the robbery, and the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial, and the accuracy of their identifications, were matters for the jury, the defendant's robbery conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; hence, the defendant's "mere presence" argument was rejected. Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 463, 636 S.E.2d 177 (2006).
- There was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication for delinquency based on criminal attempt to commit robbery under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and16-8-40; a rational trier of fact was authorized to find that the defendant, in "reaching at" the victim and grabbing the victim's jacket prior to shooting the victim, attempted to take the victim's cigarettes by force, intimidation, or sudden snatching. In the Interest of B.S., 284 Ga. App. 680, 644 S.E.2d 527 (2007).
Although the victim could not identify the defendant as the robber, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's robbery conviction: witnesses saw the robber leave in a tan truck driven by someone else; the tan truck sped away from police officers; when officers stopped the truck, the defendant, the passenger, ran away; a money bag stolen in the robbery was found in a bush near the truck; the sweatshirt the robber wore was found in the truck; and the truck was registered to the defendant and was driven by a co-worker of the victim who was familiar with the victim's routine of making bank deposits. Lee v. State, 284 Ga. App. 435, 644 S.E.2d 196 (2007).
- In a case wherein a defendant confessed that after killing the defendant's mother the defendant took cash and blank checks from the mother's purse and drove away in the mother's car, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery and theft by taking a motor vehicle, in addition to the defendant's conviction for malice murder; as a result, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the counts charging armed robbery and theft by taking a motor vehicle. Hester v. State, 282 Ga. 239, 647 S.E.2d 60 (2007).
Because the state presented sufficient evidence supporting the convictions entered against the first two defendants, a letter one of the defendants wrote was admissible against all as a statement of a coconspirator; no error resulted from the admission of a red baseball bat; and the first defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective. The first defendant's convictions of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and the second defendant's convictions of the lesser included offense of robbery were upheld on appeal. Williamson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 779, 648 S.E.2d 118 (2007).
Defendant's aggravated assault and robbery convictions were upheld on appeal as evidence including the defendant's admission and flight from the scene authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant went to an apartment complex intending to participate in the robbery, and in fact participated in the robbery by acting as a lookout and an additional show of force; hence, the jury was authorized to infer criminal intent from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1717, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 80 (Ga. 2008).
- Defendant's conviction for armed robbery of a pizza delivery man was upheld on appeal since any error raised on appeal was not properly preserved for appellate review; even if preserved, any error was found harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt established by an accomplice's testimony and the identification of the defendant by the victim. Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 533, 652 S.E.2d 179 (2007).
Court rejected a defendant's argument that the victim had volunteered money and that there was thus no robbery in a case when the defendant had raped the victim and said that the victim would not be going home; the record showed that the victim feared that the victim would not see the victim's family again if the defendant and the victim left the area and that the victim had therefore reminded the defendant of the money on the victim's credit cards to keep the defendant from driving toward the interstate. Smith v. State, 287 Ga. App. 222, 651 S.E.2d 133 (2007).
- Evidence of a single eyewitness, specifically, the victim, was sufficient to support the defendant's robbery conviction. Scott v. State, 288 Ga. App. 738, 655 S.E.2d 326 (2007).
Upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that sufficient evidence was presented to support the defendant's malice murder and robbery convictions including evidence regarding the defendant's actions after the commission of the crimes, properly admitted DNA evidence, and the defendant's confession. Carter v. State, 283 Ga. 76, 656 S.E.2d 524 (2008).
Despite waiving error regarding a show up identification because: (1) a victim's identification of the defendant as one of the perpetrators of a burglary, robbery, and battery was sufficient and non-suggestive; and (2) the corroborating testimony from the defendant's two accomplices was admissible to support the defendant's convictions as both accomplices testified as to the defendant's involvement in the crimes, those convictions were upheld on appeal; thus, a new trial was properly denied. Carr v. State, 289 Ga. App. 875, 658 S.E.2d 419 (2008).
- Victim's testimony alone, including the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, was sufficient to establish the essential elements of robbery. Thomas v. State, 322 Ga. App. 734, 746 S.E.2d 216 (2013).
Bank teller's testimony, including the bank teller's identification of the defendant as the robber and the bank teller's description of being very scared, was sufficient, standing alone, to support the defendant's robbery conviction. Coleman v. State, 325 Ga. App. 700, 753 S.E.2d 449 (2014).
- Evidence was sufficient to support two defendants' conviction of felony murder based on robbery when the defendants and a third person arranged to meet the victim to buy marijuana but decided before the meeting to take the marijuana instead; the first defendant brought a pistol and handed the pistol to the third person; the defendants and the third person ran away after the victim handed them the marijuana; and the third person fatally shot the victim when the victim pursued the three. Allen v. State, 283 Ga. 304, 658 S.E.2d 580 (2008).
Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of burglary, kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by taking when a treating physician stated that the 86-year-old victim's injuries, including blood inside her vagina and bruises and contusions on her vagina, were consistent with forcible penetration; when the defendant admitted entering the victim's home, removing her clothing, restraining her with electrical cords, hitting her, putting a plastic bag over her head, forcing her from one room to another, and taking her money and her car; and when DNA from the defendant matched the DNA of two hair roots found on the victim's living room floor. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 662 S.E.2d 323 (2008).
- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for armed robbery of a grocery store as the state met the state's burden of proving that the fingerprints taken from a cash register that the robber touched and opened could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed and that the fingerprints matched the defendant's fingerprints. Moreover, the defendant's association with the car seen at the time of the robbery, the defendant's knowledge of a planned robbery, and the close match between the defendant's description and that of the robber all corroborated the fingerprint evidence against the defendant. Reid v. State, 293 Ga. App. 453, 667 S.E.2d 221 (2008).
- Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the defendant juvenile's statements to the police corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the juvenile struck a woman unconscious, caused her serious bodily injury, used force to steal her pocketbook, and dragged her down onto her front yard; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-40(a), and16-8-40(a)(1). In re D. T., 294 Ga. App. 486, 669 S.E.2d 471 (2008).
- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery because evidence was presented that the defendant and a codefendant entered a restaurant to rob the restaurant and shot two employees of the restaurant. In a statement to the police, the defendant admitted that the defendant entered the restaurant with a handgun to rob the restaurant, but the defendant claimed that the defendant heard gunshots and left the restaurant, while the codefendant gave a similar statement to the police. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder and armed robbery. One witness testified that the witness saw the defendant and the defendant's accomplice chasing the victim just prior to the shooting, while other witnesses testified that the witnesses saw the defendant and the defendant's accomplice fleeing the scene. Milford v. State, 291 Ga. 347, 729 S.E.2d 352 (2012).
Evidence that the defendant and an accomplice entered a store, and the defendant approached two women, pulled out a gun, forced the women and children to the back of the store, and forced them to lie on the floor while the defendant and the accomplice forced an employee to give them money was sufficient to support defendant's robbery and false imprisonment convictions. Taylor v. State, 318 Ga. App. 115, 733 S.E.2d 415 (2012).
Evidence including DNA evidence, the victim's testimony regarding the nature of the attack and description of the attacker, and the store surveillance video of an individual who wore clothing similar to that worn by the attacker and who appeared to be the same race as the attacker, supported the defendant's convictions for rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, theft by taking, and three counts of possession of a gun during the commission of a crime. Glaze v. State, 317 Ga. App. 679, 732 S.E.2d 771 (2012).
Evidence that the defendant's wallet was found on the victim's kitchen table, a plastic grocery bag containing the defendant's blood stained clothes were discovered, and DNA testing showed that the blood on the defendant's windbreaker came from the victim and the blood spatter was consistent with the wearer having struck the victim, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder and robbery. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. 701, 743 S.E.2d 6 (2013).
- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for robbery and aggravated assault because the defendant was advised that the mattresses that the defendant was loading into the defendant's truck belonged to the victim; and when the victim attempted to remove the mattresses from the defendant's truck, the defendant attacked the victim, punching the victim in the face, pushing the victim to the ground, and punching the victim in the chest. Aldridge v. State, 325 Ga. App. 774, 755 S.E.2d 19 (2014).
- Because the victim identified the defendant as the person who robbed the victim, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for robbery by intimidation. Smith v. State, 274 Ga. App. 852, 619 S.E.2d 358 (2005).
Because the defendant waived a Confrontation Clause, as well as any other constitutional objection, to testimony concerning a statement overheard from a woman fleeing the scene of the crime, and the victim's testimony, as well as the defendant's own admission, supported a robbery by intimidation conviction, such was upheld on appeal. Jordan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 85, 640 S.E.2d 672 (2006).
Even though the victim was the only witness who could testify that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of robbery by force and aggravated assault, the victim's testimony was enough to establish the defendant's identity as one of the assailants; moreover, the lack of corroboration went only to the weight of the evidence and the victim's credibility, matters which were solely within the purview of the jury. Thomas v. State, 282 Ga. App. 522, 639 S.E.2d 531 (2006).
- Defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were upheld on appeal because sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the defendant was the perpetrator of two taxi cab robberies; the victims had an opportunity to observe the defendant during the crimes and then provided accurate descriptions to the police along with identifying defendant in show-up and photographic line-ups without hesitation. Peeler v. State, 286 Ga. App. 400, 649 S.E.2d 775 (2007).
Evidence supported a conviction of robbery by intimidation or force when the defendant chased the victim in the defendant's vehicle and then attacked the victim to obtain a jogging suit that the defendant had lent to another victim. The fact that the jogging suit belonged to the defendant was irrelevant as robbery was a crime against possession; furthermore, as both victims testified that the defendant had taken a pair of sneakers after the attack, it was immaterial that the state did not introduce the actual sneakers at trial. Windham v. State, 294 Ga. App. 72, 668 S.E.2d 526 (2008).
Following evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated sodomy, rape, and robbery by intimidation: 1) the victim's testimony of being repeatedly raped by the defendant at knife point, forced to perform oral sex, beaten, robbed, and threatened with death; 2) a nurse's testimony that the victim was crying, rocking back and forth, and had bruised cheeks; and 3) evidence that the defendant's DNA matched sperm cell DNA found on the victim's body. Sanders v. State, 297 Ga. App. 897, 678 S.E.2d 579 (2009).
Evidence that the defendant with the defendant's armed codefendant entered a home the victim was visiting dressed as law enforcement officers and handcuffed and robbed the victim, then ordered the victim to retrieve a motorcycle from the victim's home, was sufficient to support a guilty verdict of robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2). Lyons v. State, 300 Ga. App. 254, 684 S.E.2d 388 (2009).
Evidence authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because the defendant and the defendant's codefendants entered an apartment masked and armed with an assault rifle, and the defendant fired the rifle at the victim and fatally wounded the victim. Zackery v. State, 286 Ga. 399, 688 S.E.2d 354 (2010).
There was some competent evidence to support each fact necessary to show that the defendant either committed a robbery or participated as a party to the crime because the victim testified that a gray car seemed to be following the victim before the robbery, one of the defendant's cousins testified that the defendant discussed the plan to rob a delivery van before the crime, and two of the defendant's cousins testified that immediately after the crime the defendant drove to an apartment building where stolen goods were loaded into the defendant's car. McKinley v. State, 303 Ga. App. 203, 692 S.E.2d 787 (2010).
Evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because it was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury was authorized to disbelieve the alibi defense the defendant proffered. Newsome v. State, 288 Ga. 647, 706 S.E.2d 436 (2011).
Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because although the defendant denied to police that the defendant had any contact with the silver car that was connected to the robbery, the defendant's fingerprints were found on the outside of the car, and an eyewitness's physical description of the second gunman from the robbery matched the defendant. Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223 (2011).
- With regard to a jail escape wherein the night jailer was overtaken by at least two inmates, the defendants' convictions for false imprisonment and robbery were reversed on appeal as the state failed to present evidence that either intentionally advised, encouraged, hired, counseled, or procured anyone to commit the crimes since the state presented evidence that only two inmates attacked the night jailer, none of which included the defendants. Under the circumstances presented, the state failed to present evidence which excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendants' guilt. Shearin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 794, 668 S.E.2d 300 (2008).
- Trial court did not err, in the defendant's robbery case, in declining to give the defendant's pattern instruction stating in part that intimidation involved creating fear in the victim of an apprehension to life and limb as the jury instruction the trial court gave was proper and the defendant's pattern instruction did not define intimidation but merely stated an alternative means by which robbery by intimidation may be committed. Kilpatrick v. State, 274 Ga. App. 645, 618 S.E.2d 719 (2005).
Omission of the element of "taking" from a jury charge definition of "robbery" by sudden snatching was harmless error, where the omission apparently was inadvertent and the jury otherwise was in fact clearly informed of all the elements of the offense. Whitehead v. State, 177 Ga. App. 259, 339 S.E.2d 365 (1985).
- Trial court's instruction to the jurors that the jurors could infer the defendant's guilt to robbery or auto theft from the defendant's possession of a victim's car keys unless there was a reasonable explanation for that possession did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. 82, 586 S.E.2d 306 (2003).
Failure to define robbery in charge is not error absent request. Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S.E. 36 (1926).
- Since intent to steal is a substantial element in commission of offense of robbery, failure to so instruct jury is error. Sanford v. State, 217 Ga. 825, 125 S.E.2d 478 (1962).
- See Rutherford v. State, 54 Ga. App. 750, 189 S.E. 67 (1936); Thomas v. State, 54 Ga. App. 747, 189 S.E. 68 (1936).
- Where the evidence showed that either an attempted robbery by sudden snatching occurred or that no crime at all was committed, there was no error in failing to charge the jury on the lesser offenses of theft by taking and criminal trespass. Whitehead v. State, 177 Ga. App. 259, 339 S.E.2d 365 (1985).
In a prosecution for armed robbery, even though defendant may have intended simple robbery, defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense where evidence showed defendant's accomplices committed armed robbery. Martin v. State, 213 Ga. App. 146, 444 S.E.2d 103 (1994).
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 as a lesser included offense of robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(1), (2) or as a sole defense because there was no evidence to support either instruction, when the defendant admitted to removing the victim's purse by force, which constituted robbery, allegedly as payment for drugs that the defendant had given to the victim. Miller v. State, 259 Ga. App. 244, 576 S.E.2d 631 (2003).
With regard to the defendant's conviction for armed robbery of a taxi driver, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching as, although there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant took the money from the taxi driver's pocket by snatching the money rather than through use of the gun, the evidence further showed without dispute that, by the time defendant completed the robbery, the defendant had taken additional money from the taxi meter after brandishing the handgun and hitting the taxi driver with the gun. Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga. App. 378, 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1851, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 2008).
Trial court did not err in failing to give a jury charge on robbery as a lesser offense of armed robbery because the evidence was uncontradicted that a video store was robbed at gunpoint, the gun was brandished throughout the incident, and the defendant participated in the robbery while the gun was being used to accomplish the robbery; in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, it was highly probable that the failure to give the lesser charge did not contribute to the verdicts. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010).
Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of theft by taking as the evidence showed that the codefendant admitted taking the victim's wallet and removing money without permission and that the victim resisted and was injured during the altercation, and the defendant admitted the defendant was concerned in the commission of the robbery, making the defendant a party to the crime. Bellamy v. State, 324 Ga. App. 319, 750 S.E.2d 395 (2013).
Trial court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching as the victim's testimony was sufficient to support the charge of robbery by snatching and the defense was that another individual committed the crime. Copeland v. State, 325 Ga. App. 668, 754 S.E.2d 636 (2014).
- When the state's evidence requires a verdict of guilty of robbery by sudden snatching, and the defendant's evidence if believed would require an acquittal on the ground of mistaken identity, it is not error to fail to charge on the offense of theft by taking. Teague v. State, 169 Ga. App. 285, 312 S.E.2d 818 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
With regard to the defendant's conviction for robbery by force, the trial court did not err by failing to give the defendant's requested instruction on the lesser included offense of theft-by-taking since all of the state's evidence showed the completed offense of robbery by use of force, and the defendant testified that the defendant committed no offense at all. Therefore, because all the evidence showed either the completed offense of robbery by use of force or no offense, there was no evidence to support an instruction on the lesser included offense of theft-by-taking. Heath v. State, 291 Ga. App. 594, 662 S.E.2d 362 (2008).
Evidence did not support a charge on theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, as a lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3), because the evidence showed that the victim was conscious of the crime as the crime was being committed; even if the victim did not actually see the defendant pick up the wallet, when the victim saw the defendant running toward the exit of a store with the wallet the victim gave chase but was unable to stop the defendant. Brown v. State, 309 Ga. App. 511, 710 S.E.2d 674 (2011).
Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on unarmed robbery or theft by taking as lesser-included offenses to armed robbery in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and the failure to give the lesser-included instructions neither created any reasonable likelihood that the state's burden of proving all essential elements of armed robbery was lessened, or that the charge as given likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. Boccia v. State, 335 Ga. App. 687, 782 S.E.2d 792 (2016).
- When state's evidence requires verdict of guilty of robbery by sudden snatching, and the defendant's evidence if believed would require acquittal on ground of mistaken identity, it is not error to fail to charge on offense of theft by taking. Hinton v. State, 127 Ga. App. 108, 192 S.E.2d 717 (1972).
- When one is indicted for robbery "by force and intimidation," and on trial it appears from evidence that, if robbery was committed, it was by force or violence and not by intimidation, it is not error for the court to fail to charge law relating to robbery by intimidation and punishment for one found guilty of robbery by intimidation. Perdue v. State, 225 Ga. 814, 171 S.E.2d 563 (1969).
- When the charge referred to the victim's "fear or apprehension of danger to his life or limb . . ." rather than to a victim's "fear of immediate serious bodily injury . . ." as set forth by O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40, the charge as given was not an erroneous statement of the law of robbery by intimidation. Turner v. State, 180 Ga. App. 141, 348 S.E.2d 572 (1986).
- Trial court does not err in charging the jury on robbery by intimidation as well as robbery by force. Daniel v. State, 180 Ga. App. 179, 348 S.E.2d 720 (1986); Anderson v. State, 207 Ga. App. 187, 427 S.E.2d 564 (1993).
- In a case of robbery by sudden snatching in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3), the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the "immediate presence" of the victim stretched very far and included objects under the victim's control. In this case, the defendant snatched money from a cash drawer as the cashier walked 10 to 11 feet away with the cashier's back turned. Sweet v. State, 304 Ga. App. 474, 697 S.E.2d 246 (2010).
- Trial court did not have the power to sentence the defendant, who was convicted of armed robbery after the defendant was already convicted of committing other felonies, to probation, or to suspend any part of the defendant's sentence, and because life in prison was the maximum penalty for armed robbery, the trial court properly sentenced the defendant to life in prison without parole. Thompson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 696, 595 S.E.2d 377 (2004).
- Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's use of prior felonies defendant committed in California to sentence him as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), as the elements of Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11054(f), 11350(a) (possession of cocaine) were sufficiently similar to those of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-26(1)(D),16-13-30(c); and the elements of Cal. Penal. Code § 211 (robbery) were sufficiently similar to those of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40. Williams v. State, 296 Ga. App. 270, 674 S.E.2d 115 (2009).
- Nothing in Georgia's First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 et seq., required the trial court sua sponte to consider defendant's status as a first offender; the trial court did not err by adopting a sentence that was consistent with the sentence the prosecutor agreed to recommend if defendant pled guilty to robbery by intimidation, and the appellate court refused to review the argument that defendant's sentence of five years' incarceration followed by five years' probation was excessive because the sentence fell within the statutory limits established by O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(b) Gibson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 134, 570 S.E.2d 437 (2002).
Defendant's 20-year prison sentence imposed on the defendant's robbery conviction was within that allowed by law and, thus, was not void; accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition that sought to correct the defendant's sentence on the ground the sentence was void. Daniel v. State, 262 Ga. App. 474, 585 S.E.2d 752 (2003).
State did not have the right to appeal sentences imposed by the trial court contrary to a plea agreement under O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(6) because the 15-year sentences, with five years to serve and the remainder on probation, were not void; they were within the 20-year range of punishments for robbery and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b) &16-8-40(b). State v. Harper, 279 Ga. App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006) was overruled. State v. King, 325 Ga. App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (2013).
Appellant failed to show that the sentence imposed for robbery was void because the appellant's 20-year sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(b). Williams v. State, 331 Ga. App. 46, 769 S.E.2d 760 (2015).
Magistrate determined that the defendant's sentence was properly enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because the defendant's Georgia robbery convictions remained predicate offenses while armed robbery and robbery by intimidation constituted separate offenses when armed robbery clearly had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, robbery by intimidation occurred when a person, by the use of threat or coercion, placed a person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to oneself or to another, and the defendant had one conviction for armed robbery and two convictions for robbery by intimidation. Green v. United States, F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2017).
- Lower court erred in sentencing the defendant to 20 years to serve on the criminal attempt to commit robbery count because the maximum sentence the defendant could have received was 10 years as convicted of the offense of criminal attempt to commit a felony, not punishable by death or life imprisonment, could be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than one-half the maximum period of time for which the defendant could have been sentenced if the defendant had been convicted of the crime attempted; the maximum sentence for robbery was 20 years; and half that time was 10 years. Ranger v. State, 330 Ga. App. 578, 768 S.E.2d 768 (2015).
- Evidence was sufficient to sustain an award of $800 restitution under O.C.G.A. § 17-14-7(b) as a special condition of probation because in the course of the robbery with which the defendant was charged under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2), the defendant took $500 cash and $300 in money orders from the car of the victim. Ezebuiro v. State, 308 Ga. App. 282, 707 S.E.2d 182 (2011).
- Inmate's supervised release was properly revoked and a sentence of imprisonment imposed because there was sufficient evidence to establish that the inmate committed a violation of a condition thereof by committing robbery and aggravated battery in Georgia. United States v. Hart, 552 Fed. Appx. 930, (11th Cir. 2014)(Unpublished).
- 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Robbery, § 1 et seq.
- 77 C.J.S., Robbery, § 1 et seq.
- Threat to arrest or prosecute and acts in connection therewith as force or putting in fear for purposes of robbery, 27 A.L.R. 1299.
What constitutes attempt to commit robbery, 55 A.L.R. 714.
Offense of larceny, embezzlement, robbery, or assault to commit robbery, as affected by defendant's intention to take or retain money or property in payment of, or as security for, a claim, or to collect a debt, or to recoup gambling losses, 116 A.L.R. 997.
Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, burglary, or robbery, 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.
Purse snatching as robbery or theft, 42 A.L.R.3d 1381.
What constitutes larceny "from a person,", 74 A.L.R.3d 271.
Retaking of money lost at gambling as robbery or larceny, 77 A.L.R.3d 1363.
Use of force or intimidation in retaining property or in attempting to escape, rather than in taking property, as element of robbery, 93 A.L.R.3d 643.
Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 100 A.L.R.3d 287.
Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the stolen property, 29 A.L.R.5th 59.
Robbery: Identification of victim as person named in indictment or information, 4 A.L.R.6th 577.
What is "property of another" within statute proscribing larceny, theft, or embezzlement of property of another, 57 A.L.R. 6th 445.
Construction and application of enhanced sentencing provision of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) - United States Supreme Court cases, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.
"Intimidation" as element of bank robbery under 18 USCA § 2113(a), 163 A.L.R. Fed. 225.
Total Results: 15
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-06-11
Snippet: presence of another . . . [b]y use of force[.]” OCGA 16-8-40 (a) (1). And it is “unlawful for any person to
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-05-14
Snippet: another . . . [b]y sudden snatching.” OCGA § 16-8-40 (a) (3). Gray asserts that Jones committed this
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-03-19
Snippet: 771-772 (2) (723 SE2d 915) (2012); see also OCGA §§ 16-8-40 (defining robbery as a felony) and 16-7-1 (defining
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-12-19
Snippet: robberies and burglaries, see OCGA §§ 16-7-1 and 16-8-40; 8 and (b) because it was not reasonably foreseeable
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-02-07
Snippet: 2006 conviction for robbery by force, see OCGA § 16-8-40 (a) (1), showing that at the time of the shootings
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-06-18
Citation: 815 S.E.2d 899
Snippet: charged with robbery by use of force. See OCGA § 16-8-40 (a) (1). "It is well-settled that a defendant commits
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-06-02
Citation: 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 1425, 2014 WL 2451318, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 445
Snippet: another person by force or intimidation. See OCGA § 16-8-40; see, e.g., Crawford v. State, 210 Ga. App. 36
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-02-06
Citation: 290 Ga. 643, 723 S.E.2d 658, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 356, 2012 WL 360526, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 152
Snippet: immediate presence of another . . . .” OCGA §§ 16-8-40 (a), 16-8-41 (a); Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1298,
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-11-01
Citation: 703 S.E.2d 609, 288 Ga. 364, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3497, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 824
Snippet: the immediate presence of another ....” OCGA § 16-8-40 (a). That statute clearly does not require that
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-02-01
Citation: 687 S.E.2d 836, 286 Ga. 418, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 252, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 112
Snippet: certain elements of the crime of robbery, see OCGA § 16-8-40(a)(1) and (2), it does not provide a factual basis
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-10-15
Citation: 571 S.E.2d 347, 275 Ga. 612, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2992, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 909
Snippet: not prevent a conviction for violating OCGA § 16-8-40 (a) (1). See Young v. State, supra at 157 (3).
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1999-02-08
Citation: 512 S.E.2d 269, 270 Ga. 607, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 561, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 100
Snippet: because none of the elements of a robbery, OCGA § 16-8-40, was present in the case. It is not error for a
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1998-09-21
Citation: 269 Ga. 826, 505 S.E.2d 21, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 3153, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 878
Snippet: Muscogee County to the felony of robbery, OCGA § 16-8-40 (a) (3). Although Horn requests a suspension, the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-03-14
Citation: 326 S.E.2d 748, 254 Ga. 101, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 624
Snippet: charge of robbing the victim of his wallet. OCGA § 16-8-40. There was evidence tending to show the victim
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1983-05-25
Citation: 303 S.E.2d 431, 251 Ga. 153, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 712
Snippet: that the idea for this crime was Young’s. OCGA § 16-8-40 (formerly Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1901) provides: “(a)