O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 29-4-2 (2019)

Qualifications of guardians selected for adults

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Only an individual may serve as guardian of an adult, except in the event a public guardian or the Department of Human Services is appointed pursuant to subsection (b.1) of Code Section 29-4-3. (b) No individual may be appointed as guardian of an adult who: (1) Is a minor, a ward, or a protected person; (2) Has a conflict of interest with the adult unless the court determines that the conflict of interest is insubstantial or that the appointment would be in the adult’s best interest; or (3) Is an owner, operator, or employee of a long-term care or other caregiving institution or facility at which the adult is receiving care, unless related to the adult by blood, marriage, or adoption. (c) No entity may be appointed as guardian of an adult which: (1) Has a conflict of interest with the adult unless the court determines that the conflict of interest is insubstantial or that the appointment would be in the adult’s best interest; or (2) Is a long-term care or other caregiving institution or facility at which the adult is receiving care.

History

(Code 1981, § 29-4-2, enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 509, § 2/HB 394; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 2-2/HB 228.)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2005, p. 509, § 9/HB 394, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: ‘‘This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2005, and all

appointments of guardians of the person made pursuant to former Title 29 shall continue in effect and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of this Act.’’

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-2 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Failure to explain reason for selection of county guardian. - Probate court, when selecting a new guardian for appellant, erred in failing to consider ap-

pellant’s next of kin; because the hearing was not recorded, and because the order failed to explain the reason the probate court selected the county guardian as the new guardian, the record supported appellant’s argument that the probate court failed to consider the statutory preferences of former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-2(c) in naming a new guardian. In re Phillips,

No. A02A2368, No. A02A2368, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1311 (Oct. 9, 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 29-5-2). Cited in Twitty v. Akers, 218 Ga. App.

467, 462 S.E.2d 418 (1995); Gary v. Weiner, 233 Ga. App. 284, 503 S.E.2d 898 (1998).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward, §§ 41, 42, 43, 46 et seq.

C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S., Mental Health, § 135 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: Muse v. Treadaway, 561 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
Muse v. Treadaway, 561 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 29-4-2 (a). And a natural guardian has no power to demand or receive the property of his child until the natural guardian becomes the legally qualified *168 guardian of the child’s property.”
Knowles v. Old Spartan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “This, Knowles argues, is relevant to the question of whether Old Spartan improperly paid the insurance proceeds to her father since he was not her “legally qualified guardian” under OCGA § 29-4-2 (b). Under that Code section, property valued in excess of $10,000 may not be…”
Hill v. Loren, 369 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 29-4-2 (a). Therefore, at the time guardianship was awarded to Hill in 1977, Loren was the natural guardian of both children.”
Hays v. Jeng, 360 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “Mai refused and after subsequent requests for the child were denied, the Jengs sought legal aid to recover their child.”
Brown v. King, 388 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Consequently, whether the court employed the legal standards in reaching its judgment is irrelevant.”
Grogan v. Lanier Bank & Trust Co., 464 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4× “The children contend that the court ignored the guardianship laws set forth in OCGA § 29-4-2. Pretermitting whether there is any evidence that OCGA § 29-4-2 is applicable to this case, this argument was never raised in the children’s complaint and it was not reached by the trial…”
In re Roscoe, 529 S.E.2d 897 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 29-4-2. OCGA § 29-4-4.1 (a) (1). OCGA § 29-4-4.”
In Re: Anise Dubois, Proposed Med. Consent Ward (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 29-4-2(a) specifies that only individuals may be appointed as a guardian of an adult, unless a public guardian or the Department is appointed, whereas OCGA § 29-8-18(i) includes no such exception for non- individuals, stating that the probate court may appoint an…”
— 29-4-2(a) — 1 case
In Re: Anise Dubois, Proposed Med. Consent Ward (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “OCGA § 29-4-2(a) specifies that only individuals may be appointed as a guardian of an adult, unless a public guardian or the Department is appointed, whereas OCGA § 29-8-18(i) includes no such exception for non- individuals, stating that the probate court may appoint an…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.