O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Statute text
It is the intent of the General Assembly to provide protection for those individuals who are members of peer review groups which evaluate the quality and efficiency of professional health care providers and to protect the confidentiality of their records.
History
(Code 1933, § 84-7601, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1282, § 1.)
Annotations
Law reviews. - For article, "The Shield Remains: An Overview of the Georgia Peer Review Privilege," see 11 Ga. St. B. J. 16 (2005).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Legislative intent. - General Assembly did not intend to eliminate, through peer review immunity, a hospital's responsibility to the hospital's patients to exercise reasonable care in ensuring that medical care providers using the hospital's facilities are qualified. McCall v. Henry Med. Ctr., Inc., 250 Ga. App. 679, 551 S.E.2d 739 (2001).
Georgia peer review and medical review statutes, which establish the privilege for the proceedings and records of peer review organizations and medical review committees, also provide for immunity to participants and witnesses in such proceedings under: (1) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-130, which sets forth the intent of the Georgia General Assembly; (2) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-132(a), which provides immunity from liability for peer review; (3) O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133(a) and 31-7-141, which provide immunity for medical review committee members from claims for damages filed by health care providers; and (4) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143, which provides that peer review and medical review proceedings are both absolutely privileged. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 260 Ga. App. 202, 581 S.E.2d 551 (2003).
Purpose of hospital medical review committees. - Purpose for establishment of hospital medical review committees is to foster delivery of quality health care services by providing a method for in-house review of clinical work performed in a hospital. Eubanks v. Ferrier, 245 Ga. 763, 267 S.E.2d 230 (1980).
No immunity for negligence when peer review not involved. - Health care organization was not engaging in peer review, and thus, was not immune from liability for the organization's negligence under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-130, when a Medicaid patient died as the result of having been denied an operation based on allegedly negligent precertification review of the patient's case by the organization. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Dawson, 270 Ga. 376, 509 S.E.2d 28 (1998).
Cited in Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Dawson, 270 Ga. 376, 509 S.E.2d 28 (1998); Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 246 Ga. App. 4, 539 S.E.2d 526 (2000).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR. - Scope and extent of protection from disclosure of medical peer review proceedings relating to claim in medical malpractice action, 69 A.L.R.5th 559.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
12
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case:
Emory Clinic v. Houston, 369 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. 1988).
Emory Clinic v. Houston, 369 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. 1988).
· cites it 24× “" Thus the whole truth may never be known and the appellants can create an absolute barrier to discovery by asserting that the information is "relative to medical or peer review proceedings," an extremely broad construction that cannot be found in OCGA §§ 31-7-130 et seq.”
McCall v. Henry Med. Ctr., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “*680 The trial court granted summary judgment to the Medical Center because it found that OCGA § 31-7-130 et seq; and OCGA § 31-8-140 [sic] both provide protection in peer review proceedings.”
Emory Univ. v. Houston, 364 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 10× “The clinic filed a timely written response to the requests, asserting the attorney/client privilege, the work product rule, and objecting further “to the extent that the [request] calls for disclosure of documents generated by a medical peer review committee and which are, as…”
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Dawson, 509 S.E.2d 28 (Ga. 1998).
· cites it 8× “The stated legislative intent, as set forth at OCGA § 31-7-130, is to "provide protection for those individuals who are members of peer review groups which evaluate the quality *31 and efficiency of professional health care providers and to protect the confidentiality of their…”
Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 581 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 4× “(the “Act”), and under Georgia’s peer review and medical review statutes, OCGA §§ 31-7-130 et seq. and 31-7-140 et seq.”
Cancel v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc., 812 S.E.2d 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “But *599 the fact that a plaintiff seeks to avoid an immunity defense by alleging the applicability of the malice exception does not convert the action into one alleging violation of OCGA §§ 31-7-130 - 133 so as to provide for an exception to the confidentiality mandate.”
Dominy v. Shumpert, 510 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “[He also opined that Spectrum was not an entity that] performed peer review under the statute [OCGA § 31-7-130 et seq].” At his deposition, Dr.”
Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
· cites it 2× “Plaintiff and non-party Macon Northside Hospital contend that any information in the possession of the institutions regarding the events surrounding the decisions by the institutions to suspend plaintiffs privileges is shielded from discovery by Georgia’s peer review statute,…”
Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 539 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 2× “The hospital objected to the discovery requests on the grounds that such information was not discoverable pursuant to the peer review statutes and the medical review statutes, OCGA §§ 31-7-130 et seq. and 31-7-140 et seq.”
Crosby v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta, 873 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
· cites it 2× “” O.C.G.A. § 31-7-130 (1991). One specific protection shields “professional health care providers” from all criminal or civil liability, under any law, for their participation in “peer review activities.”
Baldwin Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Wright, 413 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 2× “and the peer review statute, OCGA § 31-7-130 et seq. As to the privilege from discovery, however, the Supreme Court has held that both proceedings are absolutely privileged.”
Emory Healthcare, Inc. v. Jason H. Harms (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
· cites it 2× “202, 204-05 (1)(a), 206-09(1)(c) ( 581 SE2d 551 ) (2003) (discussing immunities and privileges afforded to peer review and medical review proceedings by OCGA §§ 31-7-130 et seq.; 31-7-140 et seq.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.