Preemption.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-132(a), a peer reviewer is immune unless the reviewer is motivated by malice toward any person affected by such activity, and under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-141, a medical review committee member is immune if the committee member acts without malice or fraud; to the extent that peer review and medical review immunity are conditioned upon the absence of malice and deception, the statutes are preempted by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a), under which bias is irrelevant. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 260 Ga. App. 202, 581 S.E.2d 551 (2003).

To the extent that peer review and medical review immunity under O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-132(a) and31-7-141 are conditioned upon the absence of malice and deception, the statutes are preempted by the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq., under which bias is irrelevant. Cancel v. Medical Center of Central Ga., Inc., 345 Ga. App. 215, 812 S.E.2d 592 (2018).

Immunity from claims filed by health care providers.

- Georgia peer review and medical review statutes, which establish the privilege for the proceedings and records of peer review organizations and medical review committees, also provide for immunity to participants and witnesses in such proceedings under: (1) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-130, which sets forth the intent of the Georgia General Assembly; (2) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-132(a), which provides immunity from liability for peer review; (3) O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133(a) and31-7-141, which provide immunity for medical review committee members from claims for damages filed by health care providers; and (4) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143, which provides that peer review and medical review proceedings are both absolutely privileged. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 260 Ga. App. 202, 581 S.E.2d 551 (2003).

ALR.

- Tort liability of medical society or professional association for failure to discipline or investigate negligent or otherwise incompetent medical practitioner, 72 A.L.R.4th 1148.