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Call Now: 904-383-7448The proceedings and records of medical review committees shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee; and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of such committee or any members thereof. However, information, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources shall not be construed as immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were presented during proceedings of such committee; nor shall any person who testifies before such committee or who is a member of such committee be prevented from testifying as to matters within his knowledge, provided that such witness may not be questioned regarding his testimony before such a committee or opinions formed by him as a result of such committee hearings.
(Ga. L. 1975, p. 739, § 4; Code 1981, §31-7-143, enacted by Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 22.)
Georgia peer review and medical review statutes, which establish the privilege for the proceedings and records of peer review organizations and medical review committees, also provide for immunity to participants and witnesses in such proceedings under: (1) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-130, which sets forth the intent of the Georgia General Assembly; (2) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-132(a), which provides immunity from liability for peer review; (3) O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133(a) and31-7-141, which provide immunity for medical review committee members from claims for damages filed by health care providers; and (4) O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143, which provides that peer review and medical review proceedings are both absolutely privileged. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 260 Ga. App. 202, 581 S.E.2d 551 (2003).
Limited peer review materials were discoverable by a doctor who was reviewed because the Georgia peer review privilege, O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133 and31-7-143, could not be used under Fed. R. Evid. 501 to prevent the doctor from discovering peer review materials that could be relevant to rebut a claimed immunity defense by a clinic and the clinic's doctors. Adeduntan v. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2005).
In a case involving the Georgia medical review and peer review statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133(a) and31-7-143, the trial court erred in determining that nothing in a medical center's credentialing files was subject to discovery because, to the extent that the credentialing process involved a peer review committee's evaluation of a doctor's performance of medical procedures, the information was not discoverable; however, to the extent that there was information in the doctor's credentialing files that did not involve evaluations of the doctor's performance of these procedures, that information was discoverable. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta v. Meeks, 294 Ga. App. 629, 669 S.E.2d 667 (2008), aff'd, 285 Ga. 521, 678 S.E.2d 71 (2009).
- Georgia law did not allow for a self-critical analysis privilege; the fact that the peer review privilege is limited to review organizations within the healthcare field weighs heavily against extending such privilege to a corporate organization. Lara v. Tri-State Drilling, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
Plaintiffs in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for a death of an inmate were granted a motion to compel disclosure of a morbidity and mortality report generated by a jail medical official and related correspondence and documents under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 37 because the court refused under Fed. R. Evid. 501 to recognize the medical peer review privilege of O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133 and31-7-143 in that the need for probative evidence in a civil rights action outweighed the need for privilege. Jenkins v. Dekalb County, 242 F.R.D. 652 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
Malice exception does not apply to the discovery privileges set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133 and31-7-143. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 246 Ga. App. 4, 539 S.E.2d 526 (2000).
- General Assembly has placed an absolute embargo upon the discovery and use of all proceedings, records, findings, and recommendations of peer review groups and medical review committees in civil litigation. The source of peer review information is irrelevant. Emory Clinic v. Houston, 258 Ga. 434, 369 S.E.2d 913 (1988).
In a case involving the Georgia medical review and peer review statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133(a) and31-7-143, the trial court erred in creating additional discovery exceptions not allowed by the statutes because the Georgia General Assembly placed an absolute embargo upon the discovery and use of all proceedings, records, findings, and recommendations of peer review groups and medical review committees in civil litigation. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta v. Meeks, 294 Ga. App. 629, 669 S.E.2d 667 (2008), aff'd, 285 Ga. 521, 678 S.E.2d 71 (2009).
- Purpose for the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143 is to foster the delivery of quality medical services by preserving the candor necessary for the effective functioning of hospital medical review committees; it embraces the goal of medical staff candor at the cost of impairing litigants' access to evidence. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 260 Ga. App. 202, 581 S.E.2d 551 (2003).
Failure of a medical review committee to strictly adhere to bylaws does not strip the committee of the protection of confidentiality otherwise afforded by O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 246 Ga. App. 4, 539 S.E.2d 526 (2000).
- See Poulnott v. Surgical Assocs., 179 Ga. App. 138, 345 S.E.2d 639 (1986).
Information obtainable from "original sources," that is, hospital medical records and information within the knowledge of an infection rate nurse, under O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133 and31-7-143, is discoverable. Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Martin, 208 Ga. App. 326, 430 S.E.2d 604 (1993).
O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143 does not prevent disclosure of information, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources because those items were presented during medical review committee proceedings. Emory Univ. Hosp. v. Sweeney, 220 Ga. App. 502, 469 S.E.2d 772 (1996).
- O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133 and31-7-143 did not prevent discovery of recorded data pertaining to hospital's infection incidence because it was factual data from the original hospital records which the infection rate nurse used to compile the information the nurse presented to the peer review committee. Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Martin, 208 Ga. App. 326, 430 S.E.2d 604 (1993).
- In an action involving plaintiff physician's alleged drug usage prior to applying for disability insurance from defendant, information in the possession of hospitals regarding decisions to suspend plaintiff's privileges was shielded from discovery by peer review and medical review statutes. Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
- Unless the credentialing information involves the evaluation of the quality and efficiency of actual medical services, the information does not come within the peer review and medical review privileges of O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-133(a) and31-7-143. Accordingly, information in a physician's credentialing files was discoverable to the extent that the information did not involve a peer review or medical review committee's evaluation of actual medical services provided by the physician. Hosp. Auth. v. Meeks, 285 Ga. 521, 678 S.E.2d 71 (2009).
- Proceedings and records of medical review committees which are not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143 do not lose their protected status as the result of being disclosed to an authorized public agency or by virtue of the inclusion into its report by such agency. Emory Univ. Hosp. v. Sweeney, 220 Ga. App. 502, 469 S.E.2d 772 (1996).
- There is no viable basis for asserting that the privilege created by O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143 can or should be judicially extended to the internally generated personnel records and evaluations of those who have allegedly given negligent tax advice. DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 370 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 370 S.E.2d 194 (1988).
- Medical peer review privilege, such as that in O.C.G.A. § 31-7-143, did not apply in plaintiff physician's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 racial discrimination case; thus, summary judgment to defendant hospital after limiting discovery of reviews to only the physician's department was reversed. Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, mot. granted, 552 U.S. 1131, 128 S. Ct. 903, 169 L. Ed. 2d 785 (2008).
Cited in Davenport v. Kutner, 182 Ga. App. 467, 356 S.E.2d 67 (1987).
- Scope and extent of protection from disclosure of medical peer review proceedings relating to claim in medical malpractice action, 69 A.L.R.5th 559.
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