O.C.G.A. homeSearch Georgia
O.C.G.A.Title 32Chapter 3

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-16 (2019)

Appeal to jury; evidence to be heard on appeal; subsequent review of issues not brought before jury

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2019 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest cited 1983–2010 12citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 12 opinions since 1983.

(a) After the notice of appeal has been filed as provided in Code Section 32-3-14, it shall be the duty of the court at the next term thereof, which shall convene not earlier than 30 days subsequent to the date of service, as provided for in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9, to cause an issue to be made and tried by a jury as to the value of the property or interest taken and the consequential damages to property or interests not taken, with the same right to move for a new trial and file a notice of appeal as in other cases at law, provided that an interlocutory award has not become final pursuant to Code Section

(b) When an appeal has been filed pursuant to Code Section 32-3-14, all subsequent proceedings thereon shall have the nature of a de novo investigation with the right of either party, under the rules of evidence as provided for in the general laws of this state, to introduce evidence concerning:

(1) The fair market value of the property or interest taken or other evidence of just and adequate compensation;

(2) The prospective and consequential damages to the remaining property or interests by reason of the taking and use of the property or interest for the purposes for which taken; and

(3) The consequential benefits accruing to such remaining property or interests by reason of such taking and use, provided that such consequential benefits, if any, may be offset against such consequential damages, if any; but, in no event, shall consequential benefits be offset against the value of the property or interest actually taken.

(c) If, for any reason, the issues made by the filing of the notice of appeal provided for in this Code section are not tried by a jury as to the value of the property or interest taken and the consequential damages to the property or interests not taken, at the next term of the court after the filing of such appeal, such fact shall not be cause for dismissal of the appeal and the issues made by such appeal shall be subject to trial at any future term of the court.

History

Code 1933, § 95A-612, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. - Further provi-

sions regarding evidence to be considered in determining just and adequate compensation, §§ 22-2-109, 22-2-137.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Interlocutory awards of estimated compensation appealable. - Any interpretation of this section allowing interlocutory awards of estimated compensation to become nonappealable final judgments is contrary to the legislative scheme. Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560, 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977). Failure to make issue at trial of alleged error. - If alleged error was never made an issue at trial, no question is presented for review on appeal. DeKalb County v. Cowan, 151 Ga. App. 753, 261 S.E.2d 478 (1979). Issue of whether or not property is unique is a jury question. DOT v. 19.646 Acres of Land, 178 Ga. App. 287, 342 S.E.2d 760 (1986). Condemnor not bound by original estimate upon condemnee’s appeal to jury. - When a condemnee is dissatisfied with the compensation originally estimated by the condemnor and elects to appeal that issue to a jury, the condemnor is not bound by the condemnor’s original estimate but can present evidence de novo

as to the fair market value and consequential damages. Morrison v. DOT, 166 Ga. App. 144, 303 S.E.2d 501 (1983). Evidence of sales of comparable property in condemnation proceedings which is not too remote in point of time could become relevant as the basis of an expert’s explanation as to how the expert arrived at the valuation and, when such use is made of evidence of comparable sales, no foundation need be laid concerning the similarity of the property. Panos v. Department of Transp., 162 Ga. App. 53, 290 S.E.2d 295 (1982). Improper exclusion of expert opinion. - Expert’s opinion as to what the expert would pay for condemned land was probative of the land’s fair market value and improperly excluded by the trial court. Jotin Realty Co. v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 809, 331 S.E.2d 605 (1985). Expert appraiser previously employed by another condemning authority. - In a condemnation action where the issue was just and adequate compensation, and the condemnees’ ex-

pert appraiser testified to having previously been employed by another condemning authority to appraise the same property, but the Department of Transportation did not object to the witness at trial, the issue may not be raised on appeal. DOT v. Bennett, 194 Ga. App. 789, 391 S.E.2d 724 (1990). Greater difficulty in ingress and egress which is occasioned by changing traffic patterns is not an appropriate item of damages in eminent domain proceedings. Department of Transp. v. Coley, 184 Ga. App. 206, 360 S.E.2d 924 (1987). Consequential damages provable. - In condemnation proceedings, the condemnee is entitled to prove every element of consequential damage that is relevant. Department of Transp. v. Coley, 184 Ga. App. 206, 360 S.E.2d 924 (1987). Because a condemnee did not claim lost profits or business losses, the trial court properly limited the condemnee’s evidence to the value of the property taken and consequential damages to the remainder; because the jury’s valuation was within the range of the evidence, the trial court properly denied the condemnee’s motion for a new trial. Thornton v. DOT, 275 Ga. App. 401, 620 S.E.2d 621 (2005). Business loss damages need not be specifically pled in notice of appeal. - Because there was no legislative requirement that, in a condemnation proceeding, a party seeking business loss damages had to specifically and separately plead for such in the notice of appeal, in accordance with the consent judgment that the Georgia Department of Transportation was bound by, a lessee’s appeal was to proceed to trial on the

lessee’s claims for business loss, damages to trade fixtures, and relocation expenses. DOT v. Camvic Corp., 284 Ga. App. 321, 644 S.E.2d 171 (2007). Use of ‘‘condemnee’’ rather than ‘‘condemnor’’ in burden of proof instruction. - When, in a condemnation action, the use of ‘‘condemnees’’ rather than ‘‘condemnor’’ in the charge explaining the burden of proof is clearly inadvertent, a slip of the tongue, the error is not likely to confuse or mislead the jury and, thus, is not so substantial as to require reversal. Morrison v. DOT, 166 Ga. App. 144, 303 S.E.2d 501 (1983). Jury charges constituting reversible error. - Jury charge that limited jury’s use of the replacementcost-less-depreciation method for establishing fair market value to situations where the market or income approaches were not suitable was incorrect and constituted reversible error. Jotin Realty Co. v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 809, 331 S.E.2d 605 (1985). Attorney’s fees and costs recoverable only in § 32-3-11 action. - Condemnee’s claim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses based on the fraud and bad faith that the condemnor allegedly exhibited during the condemnor’s acquisition of the property in question could only be raised in a proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 and not in an action seeking to establish just and reasonable compensation only. Department of Transp. v. Franco’s Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 497, 297 S.E.2d 72 (1982). Cited in Stephens v. Department of Transp., 170 Ga. App. 784, 318 S.E.2d 167 (1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Eminent domain: unity or contiguity of separate properties sufficient to allow damages for diminished value of

parcel remaining after taking of other parcel, 59 A.L.R.4th 308.

The 12 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 32-3-16 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDep't of Transp. v. Petkas, 377 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 32-3-16 4×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“" OCGA § 32-3-16 (a). If any effect is to be given to that clear legislative intent, it is not possible to construe the relevant language of OCGA § 32-3-19 (b) as being anything other than meaningless or mere surplusage.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may enter judgment on a condemnation jury verdict despite a pending motion for new trial, and erroneous admission or exclusion of value evidence requires a new trial.
2
GREENDep't of Transp. v. Camvic Corp., 644 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 32-3-16 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“The legislature directed in OCGA § 32-3-16 (a), “After the notice of appeal has been filed as provided in Code Section 32-3-14, it shall be the duty of the court.”
Later courts cite it for
“where, as here, a party's own action assisted in producing 12 a judgment, order, or ruling, generally, that party will not be heard to complain about it on appeal.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENJotin Realty Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 331 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 32-3-16 6×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“” OCGA § 32-3-16 (a). The “value” referred to is “the fair market value of the property or interest taken.”
4
GREENDep't of Transp. v. Franco's Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“A review of the record, however, reveals that DOT’s appraisers presented testimony about how they valued Franco’s leasehold interest and why they determined that leasehold interest had no value.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may assess attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA 9-15-14 only for proceedings before that trial court, not for proceedings before an appellate court of this state.
Later courts cite it for
“implicit in the language of ocga 9-15-14 is that a court of record of this state may impose reasonable and necessary attorney fees and expenses of litigation for proceedings before that court, which were brought for purposes of harassment or delay or lacked substantial justification.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENCNL APF Partners, LP v. Dep't of Transp., 705 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“I, Sec. Ill, Par. I (a) (except as otherwise provided therein, private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid); OCGA § 32-3-16 (a) (providing for jury trial on value of property or interest taken).”
Later courts cite it for
“the sole issue to be determined in a condemnation matter is the just and adequate compensation due for property taken.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENAiken v. Dep't of Transp., 319 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“§ 95A-612 [now OCGA § 32-3-16 (b)]. Therefore, since appellants were dissatisfied with the compensation originally estimated by DOT and elected to appeal that issue to a jury, DOT was not bound by its original estimate but could present evidence de novo as to fair market value…”
7
GREENStephens v. Dep't of Transp., 318 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“Therefore, during the course of the trial of the appeal it was not error to admit evidence concerning the extent of condemnees’ leasehold interest in the condemned property over the objection that that issue was res judicata as the result of the special master’s award.”
Later courts cite it for
“proceedings instituted pursuant to ocga 22-2-100 et seq. , the special master method, and those instituted pursuant to ocga 32-3-1 et seq. , the declaration of taking method, are each separate and distinct special statutory proceedings and, as such, are subject to their own unique special statutory procedural provisions. cits.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENMorrison v. Dep't of Transp., 303 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“the nature of a de novo investigation with the right of either party, under the rules of evidence as provided for in the general laws of this State, to introduce evidence concerning: (1) the fair market value of the property taken or other evidence of just and adequate…”
Later courts cite it for
“dot was not bound by its original estimate but could present evidence de novo as to fair market value and consequential damages” · 1 citing court
9
GREENGeorgia 400 Indus. Park, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 616 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“OCGA§ 32-3-16 (a). Dorsey, supra. Id.; Yusen, supra; OCGA § 32-3-7 (b) (nothing in that Code section shall be construed so as to deprive the owner of the property or interest of due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitutions of Georgia and of the United States).”
10
GREENCobb Cnty. v. Princeton Assocs., 421 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“See *73 generally OCGA §§ 32-3-16 (b) (2); 22-2-109 (c); 22-2-137 (c).”
11
GREENSimmons v. Dep't of Transp., 484 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“” OCGA § 32-3-16. The factors to be used in making this evaluation are not restricted to the agricultural or productive qualities of the land, “but inquiry shall be made as to all other legitimate purposes to which the land could be appropriated.”
12
NO FLAGDep't of Transp. v. Collins, 370 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 32-3-16 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-16
“OCGA § 32-3-16. The condemnation was of 1.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198319962010

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

O.C.G.A. Home  |  Search Georgia  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com