Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1895, p. 306, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Recreational Property Act.

- Applying the Recreational Property Act (RPA), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., to a municipal sidewalk does not place the RPA in conflict with O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93, which sets forth circumstances in which a city may be liable for defects in its streets and sidewalks; simply stated, the RPA will control when the sidewalk is used for a "recreational purpose" and the other requirements of the RPA are satisfied, and § 32-4-93 will apply in other cases. City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999).

Ordinance denying liability unconstitutional.

- Insofar as charter provisions relieve a city from liability for negligence in the maintenance of the city's streets, such provision is inconsistent with general law in this state, and the inhibition contained in Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. IV, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV) against the passage of special laws conflicting with existing general law precluded raising such charter provisions as a defense to a personal injury action against the city. City of Macon v. Harrison, 98 Ga. App. 769, 106 S.E.2d 833 (1958).

When legal duty exists in favor of third persons, city may by ordinance regulate the matter of the duty's performance. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) applies to sidewalks and constructive notice of a defect may be imputed through the knowledge of the city's employees or agents, or may be shown by testimony as to how long the defect existed prior to the injury, objective evidence that the defect existed over time, or evidence that others were injured as a result of the same condition over a period of years. Clark v. City of Atlanta, 322 Ga. App. 151, 744 S.E.2d 122 (2013).

Duty to maintain streets and sidewalks.

- Municipal corporation has the duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the municipality's streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition so that a person can pass along the streets and sidewalks in the ordinary methods of travel with reasonable safety. City of East Point v. Christian, 40 Ga. App. 633, 151 S.E. 42 (1929); City of Silvertown v. Harcourt, 51 Ga. App. 160, 179 S.E. 772 (1935); City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27, 197 S.E. 342 (1938); Harris v. City of Rome, 59 Ga. App. 279, 200 S.E. 337 (1938).

Municipalities generally have a ministerial duty to keep their streets in repair, and municipalities are liable for injuries resulting from defects after actual notice, or after the defect has existed for a sufficient time to infer notice. Bush v. City of Gainesville, 105 Ga. App. 381, 124 S.E.2d 667 (1962).

Obligation of a city to maintain portions of the state highway system within the city's corporate limits if the city has "constructed or agreed to perform the necessary maintenance of such roads" applies to public sidewalks. Williams v. City of Social Circle, 225 Ga. App. 746, 484 S.E.2d 687 (1997).

Constructive notice of uneven sidewalk pavers.

- Trial court erred by granting a city summary judgment in a pedestrian's negligence suit seeking damages for a slip and fall on uneven sidewalk pavers because the evidence showed that the uneven and defective condition existed at least seven months prior to the fall; thus, a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the city had constructive notice. Clark v. City of Atlanta, 322 Ga. App. 151, 744 S.E.2d 122 (2013).

City was liable for defect in sidewalk.

- Since a victim was injured on the city's sidewalk, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city as the pleadings were sufficient to raise the inference that the city, having repaired the sidewalk, had implied knowledge of the defect therein. English v. City of Macon, 259 Ga. App. 766, 577 S.E.2d 837 (2003).

City was not entitled to summary judgment on the pedestrian's claims for injuries suffered when a tree limb crashed on the pedestrian as the pedestrian walked on a city street because maintenance of the streets was a ministerial duty, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b), required by O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a), and there was evidence that the tree was visibly decayed or dying. City of Fitzgerald v. Caruthers, 332 Ga. App. 731, 774 S.E.2d 777 (2015).

City was not liable for injuries to plaintiff who stepped in a hole in a grassy area about nine feet from the edge of the paved street since the evidence showed that the hole was not located on a city street or sidewalk. City of Vidalia v. Brown, 237 Ga. App. 831, 516 S.E.2d 851 (1999).

City was relieved of liability for the injuries sustained by the injured parties when the parties were hit by a motor vehicle at an intersection that was dark due to a loose hinge on a streetlight, under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a), as the city did not have actual notice of the problem, and the problem had not existed for any appreciable length of time so as to give the city constructive notice of the problem. Roquemore v. City of Forsyth, 274 Ga. App. 420, 617 S.E.2d 644 (2005).

No evidence of city liability.

- Trial court did not err by dismissing a pedestrian's slip and fall claims against a city because there was no evidence that the city owned any part of the sidewalk and no evidence that the city performed any maintenance, repairs, or renovations to the sidewalk; thus, the pedestrian presented no evidence to support the contention that the city had or breached a duty to maintain the sidewalk. Hagan v. Ga. DOT, 321 Ga. App. 472, 739 S.E.2d 123 (2013).

City had no notice or knowledge of drainage problem.

- Motorist's failure to show a city's knowledge or notice of a roadway drainage problem, which caused a traffic accident, defeated the motorist's negligence and nuisance claims against the city. Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 274 Ga. App. 1, 616 S.E.2d 219 (2005).

City immune for operation of a fountain.

- City was entitled to sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 in a pedestrian's claim against the city for negligent maintenance of a fountain which the pedestrian argued resulted in ice forming on a sidewalk where the pedestrian slipped and fell. The pedestrian failed to point to specific evidence of the city's actual or constructive notice of any defect in the fountain. Naraine v. City of Atlanta, 306 Ga. App. 561, 703 S.E.2d 31 (2010).

Duty exists as to travel both by day and by night.

- General rule of law is that a municipal corporation must keep the municipality's streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for travel in the ordinary mode by night as well as by day. If the municipality fails to do so, the municipality is liable in damages for injuries sustained in consequence. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48, 197 S.E. 494 (1938).

City responsible for maintaining annexed highways.

- Where a territory is lawfully annexed to a city, the new area becomes a part of the city for all municipal purposes, the public highways therein become streets of the city, and the city becomes chargeable with the duty of using reasonable diligence in seeing that the streets are placed and kept in such condition as will make passage thereon reasonably safe. Bush v. City of Gainesville, 105 Ga. App. 381, 124 S.E.2d 667 (1962).

Maintenance of portions of state highway system.

- When the Department of Transportation fails to maintain those portions of the state highway system lying within a municipality's corporate limits as required by law, a municipality can be held liable for such failure where the municipality agreed to perform the necessary maintenance. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58, 372 S.E.2d 245, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 911, 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

Even though a city agreed to maintain a portion of a state highway, the city was not responsible for correcting design and construction deficiencies. Duncan v. City of Macon, 221 Ga. App. 710, 472 S.E.2d 455 (1996).

City was not responsible for maintenance of a traffic signal device at the intersection of a city street and a state highway, where the Department of Transportation engineered, constructed, maintained, and set the timing sequence for the device and the city had no discretion or decision-making power with regard to the device's location, sequencing, or timing. McPherson v. City of Fort Oglethorpe, 200 Ga. App. 129, 407 S.E.2d 99 (1991).

No authority to maintain overgrown area bordering intersection.

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err in finding the Georgia Department of Transportation immune from suit from liability to the decedent's estate and survivors for failing to maintain an overgrown area of shrubbery that bordered an intersection, as neither O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2, when read in concert with O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93, nor O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8) imposed liability on the department; hence, maintenance of the area did not constitute a "substantial" or "other major" maintenance activity. Welch v. Ga. DOT, 283 Ga. App. 903, 642 S.E.2d 913 (2007).

Failure of city to erect a stop sign at an intersection was not a "defect" which would exempt the city from claiming immunity under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93. McKinley v. City of Cartersville, 232 Ga. App. 659, 503 S.E.2d 559 (1998).

Defects for which liability arises generally.

- Defects in the municipality's streets for which a municipal corporation may be held liable have been held to include objects adjacent to, and suspended over, the municipality's streets and sidewalks, the presence of which renders the use of these thoroughfares more hazardous. City of Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453, 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951); Richards v. Mayor of Americus, 158 Ga. App. 693, 282 S.E.2d 122 (1981).

Municipal corporation is liable for defects which are gradually brought about by the forces of nature, and for defects or obstructions created in or placed on a public street by strangers which render such street unsafe for normal travel, where the municipality had notice of such defect or obstruction and failed to exercise ordinary care in remedying or removing the defect or obstruction, or where the defect or obstruction had existed for a sufficient length of time, and when taken in connection with the nature of the defect or obstruction, it could be reasonably said that the city should have known, and had reasonable time to repair or remove the defect or obstruction. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27, 197 S.E. 342 (1938).

Municipality is bound to keep the municipality's streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel by night as well as by day, and is responsible if the municipality fails to exercise ordinary care to accomplish safety, where the municipality knows or should know that the street is in an unsafe condition. Where a defect in a street has existed for so long a time that the city in the exercise of ordinary diligence ought to have discovered and remedied the defect, actual notice is unnecessary. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48, 197 S.E. 494 (1938); Mason v. Crowe, 88 Ga. App. 191, 76 S.E.2d 432 (1953).

Where the defective condition of a sidewalk is due to the failure to repair the sidewalk or due to the negligent acts of third persons, a city is not liable unless it had actual notice of the defect, or unless the city appears from the facts in the case that the defect could have been ascertained by the exercise of ordinary care, as when the defect existed for such a length of time that notice will be implied. City of Rome v. Stone, 46 Ga. App. 259, 167 S.E. 325 (1933).

Liability for minor defects.

- Defect in a city sidewalk, as described in a petition suing a municipality for personal injuries, although of a size and nature ordinarily classed as a "minor defect," was not minor enough to require holding as a matter of law on demurrer (now motion to dismiss) that the defendant was not negligent in performing the defendant's legal duty to keep the defendant's public streets and sidewalks reasonably safe enough for passage, when it appeared that the defendant knew or should have known of the defect in time to repair the defect or set up warning signals. City of Rome v. Richardson, 62 Ga. App. 85, 7 S.E.2d 927 (1940).

Liability for acts of agents and employees.

- Municipal corporation is liable for defects and obstructions existing in one of the municipality's public streets created in or placed thereon by the municipality's own agents or employees, which renders such street unsafe to persons passing along such street. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27, 197 S.E. 342 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 69-301).

Agency relationship between municipality and state.

- Where a municipal corporation selected and paid a contractor to grade the municipality's streets although the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) agreed to pay part of the costs, and the work was to be performed under an engineer appointed by the municipality, whose selection, plans, and specifications had to be approved by the department, and the department was to inspect the work only in a general way to see that the plans and specifications were complied with, the municipality, in performing the work, was an independent contractor, and not the agent of the department, regardless of whether the portion of the street graded, within the municipality, had become a state-aid road. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89, 155 S.E. 214 (1930) (decided under former Code 1910, § 828).

City liable although state prescribed specifications for grading.

- When the owner of property abutting upon the street graded by a municipality sustained damage to the value of the owner's property because the municipality changed the grade of the street in accordance with plans and specifications prescribed by the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) the municipality is not relieved of liability to the property owner merely because the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) prescribed the plans and specifications. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89, 155 S.E. 214 (1930) (decided under former Code 1910, § 828).

Distinction between discretionary nonfeasance and negligent maintenance by city.

- Clear line is drawn between discretionary nonfeasance and negligent maintenance of something erected by the city, in the city's discretion, in such manner as to create a dangerous nuisance, and which amounts to misfeasance. Christensen v. Floyd County, 158 Ga. App. 274, 279 S.E.2d 723 (1981).

Deciding whether to erect or not to erect a traffic control sign or to maintain the sign after installation is an exercise of a governmental function by a municipality, and the municipality is not liable for any negligent performance of this function. Christensen v. Floyd County, 158 Ga. App. 274, 279 S.E.2d 723 (1981).

Traffic controls which are government functions for safety.

- Operation and maintenance of traffic lights and other traffic control devices is a governmental function conducted on behalf of the public safety and for the negligent performance of which municipal corporations are not liable. Barnett v. City of Albany, 149 Ga. App. 331, 254 S.E.2d 481 (1979).

Driver's allegations of negligence against a city for negligent maintenance of a stop sign, which was allegedly obscured by foliage, were subject to summary judgment based on the city's sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b). The driver's nuisance claim was barred because the driver failed to show the city's awareness of a problem with the stop sign. Albertson v. City of Jesup, 312 Ga. App. 246, 718 S.E.2d 4 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 245 (Ga. 2012).

Traffic controls which are unrelated to street maintenance.

- Operation and maintenance of traffic lights and other traffic control devices are not related to the maintenance of the streets as such, and liability of a municipality for the negligent failure to maintain a stop sign after the stop sign is once erected cannot be predicated on the theory that the stop sign is a part of street maintenance. Barnett v. City of Albany, 149 Ga. App. 331, 254 S.E.2d 481 (1979).

City liable for defect despite franchise granted to power company.

- After a bus passenger is injured when the passenger's arm, which is propped in an open bus window, is wedged between the bus window frame and a power pole installed by an electric company under a franchise agreement with a city, and the city asserts that the city granted the franchise an exercise of the city's legislative powers for which the city cannot be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1, the city's claim of governmental immunity is not the issue; the issue instead is the liability of the city under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 for the alleged defect in a public road in the city's municipal street system. Kicklighter v. Savannah Transit Auth., 167 Ga. App. 528, 307 S.E.2d 47 (1983).

City not liable when railroad negligently placed warning device.

- City was not liable in public nuisance action for injuries to plaintiff arising out of train and car collision allegedly due to negligent placement of warning device at railroad where the road and warning device in question were constructed and maintained by the county or railroad company and where there was no evidence that the city had assumed responsibility for maintenance of that section of the road in question. Peluso v. Central of Ga. R.R., 165 Ga. App. 215, 299 S.E.2d 51 (1983).

Liability of owner whose property abuts street on highway.

- Owner of property abutting upon a street or highway is not, by virtue thereof, liable for defects in the streets or highways. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

If a city ordinance can be taken and construed as meaning that the owner of any improved or vacant premises of whatever character and size, within the limits of a city, becomes instantly liable for injuries to third persons from the moment any trash, banana peeling, ice, snow, or other object falls upon the abutting sidewalk, without fault or knowledge on the part of such owner, it would manifestly be a rule so harsh and unconscionable as would render such municipal ordinance unconstitutional and void as violative of Ga. Const. 1877, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I). Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

When abutting property owner owes no duty to third person because of a defective condition of the sidewalk against which the property abuts, unless, the defect was brought about by such owner personally, the city could not by ordinance, under guise of police regulation, impose the city's own liability upon such property owner or make the owner liable to third persons for acts other than the owner's own. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

Rule that an owner of property abutting upon a street or highway is not, because of ownership, liable for defects in the street or highway does not apply when the owner of abutting property creates a defect or nuisance in a street or highway. In this event the owner is liable, not because the owner owns the abutting property, but because the owner creates or maintains the things from which injury results. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

Liability for injury sustained during punitive road work.

- City is not liable in damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff after the plaintiff had been convicted of a penal offense in the city's police court and sentenced to work on the city's public streets, although the plaintiff's injury occurred while the plaintiff was thus engaged in such work, and resulted solely from the city's negligence, as keep and maintenance of the convict and the work the convict was required to perform upon the city's public streets is a governmental function, for the negligent performance of which the city is not liable to the convict/plaintiff in damages for a resulting injury. Hurley v. City of Atlanta, 208 Ga. 457, 67 S.E.2d 571 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 917, 72 S. Ct. 650, 96 L. Ed. 1331 (1952).

Removal of warning devices by third persons.

- If proper guards are erected or proper lights or signals are placed by city to give warning of danger caused by excavation or obstruction in a street, and such guards or signals are removed or rendered ineffective by third parties, or from causes over which the city has no control, the city is absolved from resultant damage unless the city fails, after notice of the removal of such warnings, to replace the warnings within a reasonable time. City of Rome v. Alexander, 63 Ga. App. 301, 11 S.E.2d 52 (1940).

Defect where street abuts state highway.

- Notwithstanding that a city was not negligent in construction of an asphalt street, it would, if negligent in maintaining a dangerous hole or defect where the asphalt pavement joined cement state highway, be responsible for any injury sustained by an occupant of an automobile if the hole or defect caused the car to go out of control and to swerve along the asphalt street, although the street was reasonably safe for automobile travel in the usual and ordinary mode. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48, 197 S.E. 494 (1938).

Lighting of streets.

- In the absence of any statutory requirement, a municipal corporation need not light the municipality's streets with lamps, and no liability results from the municipality's decision whether or not to light the municipality's streets. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655, 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

If a city performs the city's duty to keep the city's streets in a reasonably safe condition, the mere absence of an ordinary street light at a given point will not constitute such negligence as to render the city liable. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655, 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

Operation of a traffic light conducted in behalf of the public safety is a governmental function in the exercise of the police power for the negligent performance of which a city is not liable. Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108, 97 S.E.2d 330 (1957).

Street used for school access only.

- Street situated entirely on property owned by a municipal corporation and devoted entirely by the municipality to school purposes, which street serves only as an entrance to the school buildings situated thereon, and which exists for the use of the general public only in the sense that any member of the general public desiring access to the school buildings and grounds could use the street, is not such a public street that the city will be held liable for the street's negligent construction and maintenance. City of Atlanta v. Keiser, 50 Ga. App. 600, 179 S.E. 192 (1935).

Planning and construction of safety zone.

- In the planning and the construction of a safety zone on a city street, the city is engaged in a governmental function and could not be held liable for any error in judgment in such planning. Beall v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. App. 760, 34 S.E.2d 918 (1945).

For a discussion of liability for maintenance of safety zone, see Beall v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. App. 760, 34 S.E.2d 918 (1945).

Power lines.

- When, in a city street about 80 feet wide, the city has authorized the erection and maintenance, longitudinally down the middle of the street, of a series of poles supporting electrical wires, and on either side of the poles there remains a driveway approximately 40 feet in width each, and the poles cause no substantial danger or interference with the lawful use of the road, the maintenance of the poles in the street is not negligence, either as a matter of law or in fact. South Ga. Power Co. v. Smith, 42 Ga. App. 100, 155 S.E. 80 (1930).

Because material fact questions remained regarding the quality of a utility company's inspection and whether the company had constructive knowledge of an electrical wiring defect outside of a homeowner's home, summary judgment was properly denied. Schuessler v. Bennett, 287 Ga. App. 880, 652 S.E.2d 884 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 230 (Ga. 2008).

Tree overhanging sidewalk.

- Even if a tree actually grew in a park so that the tree's maintenance is a governmental function, if some of the tree's limbs overhung a sidewalk not part of a park so that the sidewalk was not in a reasonably safe condition, so that persons could pass along the sidewalk in the ordinary methods of travel with reasonable safety, a municipality would be liable for any injuries caused by such unsafe condition, if other requirements of notice and negligence obtained. Mayor of Savannah v. Harvey, 87 Ga. App. 122, 73 S.E.2d 260 (1952) (decided under former Ga. L. 1895, p. 306).

City park and tree commission liability for negligently maintained trees.

- Act creating a park and tree commission for a city does not relieve the city of the city's duty to keep the city's sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition so that persons could pass along the sidewalks in the ordinary methods of travel with reasonable safety, and a petition, alleging injuries due to the negligence of the city in performing such duty, states a cause of action as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Mayor of Savannah v. Harvey, 87 Ga. App. 122, 73 S.E.2d 260 (1952).

City maintenance of drainage culverts.

- Summary judgment was granted in favor of a city upon a father's claim of negligence under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) because: (1) there was no showing that the city had a legal duty to expand the culvert pipe in which the child drowned, to widen the shoulder of the street, or to erect a guardrail, as no statute required the city to take these actions, and the city's construction code did not impose a duty with regard to the culvert; (2) there was no evidence that the city negligently maintained the culvert; and (3) the city had no actual or constructive notice of flooding problems near the culvert or of defects in the culvert. Walden v. City of Hawkinsville, F.3d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2005).

Photographs of roadway taken after accident insufficient to show city's notice of defect.

- In a driver's action against a city under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-91, alleging that an accident occurred because an area of broken pavement around a manhole caused the driver's vehicle to veer into oncoming traffic, photographs of the area taken two weeks after the accident did not constitute evidence of the city's notice of the defect under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a). City of Macon v. Brown, 343 Ga. App. 262, 807 S.E.2d 34 (2017).

Cited in Broadnax v. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. App. 611, 255 S.E.2d 86 (1979); City of Social Circle v. Sims, 228 Ga. App. 582, 492 S.E.2d 240 (1997); City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 769 S.E.2d 320 (2015).

Allegation that walkway is part of municipal streets and sidewalks.

- When it is alleged that the walkway on which the plaintiff was injured is a part of the sidewalk and street system of a municipal corporation there must be some evidence that the walkway was intended and maintained by the city for such use. Kesot v. City of Dalton, 94 Ga. App. 194, 94 S.E.2d 90 (1956).

Evidence as to presence or character of city safeguard.

- If the question is whether a city has performed the city's duty in regard to keeping a street in a reasonably safe condition, or whether the city has been negligent in that regard, and in respect to failing to erect proper safeguards or to placing proper lights at a dangerous place where an injury occurs, the character of the light at that point, or the light's absence, may be shown as a circumstance bearing on the question of negligence. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655, 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

If a municipality obstructs a street or allows the street to remain obstructed, or out of repair, or in a dangerous condition, the fact of the absence of lights or safeguards of any character at the place or that a street light established at that point has been allowed to remain unlit for a number of nights before an injury occurred to a pedestrian may be considered, along with the other evidence, in determining whether there is negligence in failing to keep the street in a reasonably safe condition. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655, 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

Evidence which raises fact question of implied notice to city.

- Evidence that a power pole was maintained in the same location for many years and that the pole bore scrape marks from passing vehicles is sufficient to raise a fact question of implied notice to the city. Kicklighter v. Savannah Transit Auth., 167 Ga. App. 528, 307 S.E.2d 47 (1983).

Evidence of notice required.

- Because there was a lack of evidence that the city had actual or constructive knowledge of a defect created by a sewer overflow resulting in the absence of the manhole cover, the issue of negligence became a matter of law. Quinn v. City of Cave Spring, 243 Ga. App. 598, 532 S.E.2d 131 (2000).

Evidence needed to defeat summary judgment.

- Once a city put forth evidence showing that the city had installed pipes in a culvert through which a creek ran under a street in compliance with municipal standards for culvert work, it was incumbent upon a resident claiming negligence to come forward with some evidence of negligent installation of the pipes in order to defeat summary judgment; as the resident had not done so, it was proper to grant summary judgment for the city. Gilbert v. City of Jackson, 287 Ga. App. 326, 651 S.E.2d 461 (2007).

Notice of defect.

- County water and sewer authority was not liable to motorist injured when street pavement collapsed, since the authority had no duty to inspect water lines under the street in the absence of any actual or constructive notice of a defect. Andrews v. City of Macon, 191 Ga. App. 745, 382 S.E.2d 739 (1989).

Constructive notice.

- While the question of constructive notice is ordinarily one for the jury, in the absence of any evidence as to constructive notice there is no reasonable ground for two opinions, and thus the issue of negligence is a matter of law, not a question of fact for the jury. Andrews v. City of Macon, 191 Ga. App. 745, 382 S.E.2d 739 (1989).

In an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when plaintiff stepped in a hole on the right-of-way maintained by the city, the plaintiff's opinion that "the hole appeared to have been there for a significant period of time," without other evidence of how long the hole had been in existence, was insufficient to raise a factual question as to the city's constructive notice of the hole. Brumbelow v. City of Rome, 215 Ga. App. 321, 450 S.E.2d 345 (1994).

Even though the size of the depression in which the plaintiff tripped and the grass growing over the depression presented some evidence of age, the factors did not establish that the depression was so old as to provide a basis for concluding that the city had constructive knowledge of the hazard. Rischack v. City of Perry, 223 Ga. App. 856, 479 S.E.2d 163 (1996).

Summary of means of showing implied or constructive notice of a defect.

- See Crider v. City of Atlanta, 184 Ga. App. 389, 361 S.E.2d 520, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 909, 361 S.E.2d 520 (1987).

When notice presumed.

- If a defect has existed in a sidewalk for such a length of time that by reasonable diligence in the performance of their duties the defect ought to have been known by the proper authorities, notice will be presumed, and proof of actual knowledge will not be necessary in order to render the municipality liable for injuries occasioned thereby. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

Knowledge on the part of a city of a defect in one of the city's sidewalks will be presumed when the defect has continued for such a length of time that, by reasonable diligence in the performance of the city's duties, the defect's existence should have become known to the proper authorities. City of Silvertown v. Harcourt, 51 Ga. App. 160, 179 S.E. 772 (1935).

Time needed for implied notice depends on defect and location.

- Length of time that must elapse from the creation or placing of an obstruction in the street or sidewalk of a municipality, in order to authorize a finding of negligence against the municipality, will vary according to the location and nature of the defect. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27, 197 S.E. 342 (1938).

It was error to overrule the city's motion for judgment n.o.v. in the case of a bus passenger who was injured when a portion of street pavement collapsed, where a crack in the pavement which could have existed for three days prior to the collapse was not itself the defect, when three days was not a sufficient time for surface or rainwater entering the crack to have undermined the pavement, and when there was nothing to indicate that if the city had investigated the crack that the cavity which caused plaintiff's injuries would have been discovered. City of Atlanta v. Hightower, 177 Ga. App. 140, 338 S.E.2d 683 (1985).

Jury questions.

- In an action against a municipal corporation for injuries sustained while running along a certain street in the city after dark, which street was alleged to have been in a defective and unsafe condition, questions of whether the city was negligent in failing to keep the street and walkway in question in a reasonably safe condition, whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in running along the street and walkway on the occasion in question, and what negligence constituted the proximate cause of the injury, are questions which should have been submitted to a jury. Harris v. City of Rome, 59 Ga. App. 279, 200 S.E. 337 (1938).

When an action is brought against a municipality for injuries alleged to have been brought about by the existence of an obstruction in a public street of the municipality which was not shown to have been placed there by the city, when no actual notice of the obstruction is shown, the issue of whether or not the obstruction had existed for a sufficient length of time to charge the city with negligence in failing to discover and remove the obstruction should be generally left to the jury. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27, 197 S.E. 342 (1938); City of Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453, 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951).

Whether a defect or hole in a city street gave a right of action to a person injured thereby is ordinarily a question for the jury, because it is a complicated question of fact, involving the depth of the hole or defect, the defect's appearance to travelers on the street, and the danger which might have been anticipated and guarded against by the city in the exercise of reasonable forethought. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48, 197 S.E. 494 (1938).

When it appears that a city has permitted an excavation in a street, it becomes a question for the jury to determine as to the extent and character of the warnings or signals placed which are necessary and sufficient to give notice to members of the public using such street of the presence of such excavation or obstruction. City of Rome v. Alexander, 63 Ga. App. 301, 11 S.E.2d 52 (1940).

While it is true that a city would not be liable for the existence of a latent defect not discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, whether the defect was such as the municipality should have discovered the defect in the exercise of ordinary care in keeping the streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition is a question for the jury. City of Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453, 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951).

In a wrongful death case, the trial court properly denied a city summary judgment on the plaintiffs' negligence and nuisance claims based on the obstruction in the line of sight caused by a tree as a jury had to determine whether the tree located on the city's right of way obstructed the view of oncoming traffic such that the tree was a defect within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Herrera, 343 Ga. App. 424, 808 S.E.2d 416 (2017).

C.J.S.

- 39A C.J.S., Highways, § 162.

40 C.J.S., Highways, § 327 et seq.

ALR.

- Responsibility of county for injury from defect in highway, 2 A.L.R. 721.

Applicability of statute or ordinance requiring notice of claim for damages from injuries in street as affected by the conditions which caused the injury, 10 A.L.R. 249.

Liability of a municipal corporation for injuries caused by the unsafe condition of a street resulting from or incidental to work performed under a permit authorizing the construction, alteration, repair, or demolishing of a building or its appurtenances, 11 A.L.R. 1343.

Liability of municipality for act of employee engaged in sprinkling or cleaning streets or removing garbage or rubbish, 14 A.L.R. 1473; 32 A.L.R. 988; 52 A.L.R. 187; 60 A.L.R. 101; 156 A.L.R. 692; 156 A.L.R. 714.

Negligent or unlawful use of road as a defect within statute rendering county, town, or other political division liable for damages, 22 A.L.R. 588.

Liability of municipality for injury from ice or snow on crosswalk, 32 A.L.R. 1293.

Liability of municipality for damages by fire because of condition of streets delaying or impeding fire department, 33 A.L.R. 694.

Duty to make highway safe for children as including duty to prevent their leaving it at a place of danger, 36 A.L.R. 309.

Personal liability of public official for personal injury on highway, 40 A.L.R. 39; 57 A.L.R. 1037.

Municipal liability for drowning of child in pond created by its failure to provide drainage in constructing highway embankment, 40 A.L.R. 488.

Liability of municipality for condition of the part of private driveway which is within the street, 42 A.L.R. 1281.

Liability of municipality for injury to lateral support in grading street, 44 A.L.R. 1494.

Liability of municipal corporation for injury incident to coasting in street, 46 A.L.R. 1434.

Liability of municipality for injury to traveler in alley, 48 A.L.R. 434.

Notice of condition of street due to acts of municipal employees as condition precedent to municipal liability, 50 A.L.R. 1193.

Liability of municipality for injury or damage due to sprinkling of street, 51 A.L.R. 575.

Liability of municipality for negligence not affecting the condition of the street itself by its agents or servants while engaged in making street improvements, 52 A.L.R. 524.

Liability of municipal corporations and their licensees for the torts of independent contractors, 52 A.L.R. 1012.

Duty and liability of public authorities as to conditions beyond limits of highway which affect safety or comfort of travel, 53 A.L.R. 764.

Liability for conditions in space between lot lines and sidewalk actually within limits of street, but apparently part of the abutting property, 56 A.L.R. 220.

Duty of municipality to remedy conditions due to traffic rendering roadway dangerous for automobiles, 63 A.L.R. 208.

Duty and liability as to construction or maintenance of bridge as respects weight of load, 68 A.L.R. 605.

Liability for injury by stepping or falling into opening in sidewalk while doors are open or cover off, 70 A.L.R. 1358.

Liability of municipality for injury due to defective catch-basin covers, and the like, maintained in street in connection with drainage or sewer system, 71 A.L.R. 753.

Municipal liability for injuries from snow and ice on sidewalk, 80 A.L.R. 1151; 39 A.L.R.2d 782.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give required notice of claim of injury to municipality, county, or other governmental agency or body, 82 A.L.R. 749; 159 A.L.R. 329; 65 A.L.R.2d 1278.

Liability of municipality for injury to person or property due to improper plan for or defects in original construction of street or highway, 90 A.L.R. 1502.

Failure of municipality to adopt, or to enforce, traffic regulations as ground of its liability for damage to property or person, 92 A.L.R. 1495; 161 A.L.R. 1404.

Liability of municipality for injury or damage by automobile colliding with temporary obstruction in connection with alteration or repair of street, 100 A.L.R. 1386.

Abandonment or discontinuance of use of rails, poles, wires, or other obstructions having previous lawful situs in street as affecting liability of municipality or another for personal or property damage resulting therefrom, 102 A.L.R. 677.

Liability of public for injury or damage from slides or fall of object from embankment at side of highway, 107 A.L.R. 596.

Municipal liability for injury due to condition of street, 109 A.L.R. 605.

Degree of inequality in sidewalk which makes question for jury or for court, as to municipality's liability, 119 A.L.R. 161; 37 A.L.R.2d 1187.

Liability of municipality or other governmental body to pedestrian for injury in street closed or partially closed during construction or repairs, 119 A.L.R. 841.

Duty and liability of municipality, or other political subdivision, as regards condition of streets as extending to place or structure not strictly part of street but commonly used by public as an extension of or by-pass between streets, 126 A.L.R. 443.

Liability of municipality for injury or damage due to pole maintained by third person in street or highway, 128 A.L.R. 1269.

Liability for injury to pedestrian predicated upon slope or contour of sidewalk or crosswalk, or slippery nature of material of which it is constructed, 133 A.L.R. 1026.

Scope of employment of municipal employee engaged in work in street or highway, or in directing traffic, as regards municipal responsibility for his tort, 136 A.L.R. 1361.

Liability for injury to pedestrian due to condition of street or highway as affected by his blindness or other physical disability, 141 A.L.R. 721.

Duty of municipality to children playing in street, 154 A.L.R. 1330.

Cleaning and sprinkling of streets as governmental or private function as regards municipal immunity from liability for tort, 156 A.L.R. 692.

Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way, 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Liability of municipality for damage caused by fall of tree or limb, 14 A.L.R.2d 186.

Liability of municipal corporation to pedestrian for slippery condition of sidewalk caused by deposits of earth or mud thereon, 16 A.L.R.2d 1290.

Liability of municipal corporation for injury or death occurring from defects in, or negligence in construction, operation, or maintenance of its electric street-lighting equipment, apparatus, and the like, 19 A.L.R.2d 344.

Liability for injury on parking or strip between sidewalk and curb, 19 A.L.R.2d 1053; 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Installation or operation of parking meters as within governmental immunity from tort liability, 33 A.L.R.2d 761.

Liability of municipality for injury resulting from slippery condition of walk concurring with defects therein, 41 A.L.R.2d 739.

Liability for negligence of public body or political subdivision operating toll bridge, 43 A.L.R.2d 550.

Duty and liability of municipality as regards barriers for protection of adult pedestrians who may unintentionally deviate from street or highway into marginal or external hazards, 44 A.L.R.2d 633.

Liability of municipality for failure to erect traffic warnings against entering or using street which is partially barred or obstructed by construction or improvement work, 52 A.L.R.2d 688.

Liability for injury or damage by tree or limb overhanging street or highway, 54 A.L.R.2d 1195.

Liability of state, municipality, or public agency for vehicle accident occurring because of accumulation of water on street or highway, 61 A.L.R.2d 425.

Municipal liability for injury or death from collision with rope or clothesline across sidewalk or street, 75 A.L.R.2d 565.

Liability of municipal corporation to person injured in fall because of slippery substance such as paint or oil deliberately placed upon surface of street or sidewalk, 81 A.L.R.2d 1194.

Liability of municipality for injury or death resulting from temporary condition or obstruction in street in connection with holiday, entertainment, parade or other special event, 84 A.L.R.2d 508.

Liability of municipality for injury or death from defects or obstructions in sidewalk to one riding thereon on bicycle, tricycle, or similar vehicle, 88 A.L.R.2d 1423.

Liability for injury from defective condition or improper operation of lift bridge or drawbridge, 90 A.L.R.2d 105.

Existence of actionable defect in street or highway proper as question for court or for jury, 1 A.L.R.3d 496.

Liability of highway authorities arising out of motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by failure to erect or properly maintain traffic control device at intersection, 34 A.L.R.3d 1008.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries or damage resulting from tree or limb falling onto highway from abutting land, 95 A.L.R.3d 778.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from ice or snow on surface of highway or street, 97 A.L.R.3d 11.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from failure to repair pothole in surface of highway or street, 98 A.L.R.3d 101.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from defect or obstruction on roadside parkway or parking strip, 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from design, construction, or failure to warn of narrow bridge, 2 A.L.R.4th 635.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury, death, or property damage resulting from defect or obstruction in shoulder of street or highway, 19 A.L.R.4th 532.

Governmental liability for failure to reduce vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing or at street or highway intersection, 22 A.L.R.4th 624.

Liability of governmental entity for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision between vehicle and domestic animal at large in street or highway, 52 A.L.R.4th 1200.

Duty of public authorities to erect and maintain warning signs or devices for curves in highway, 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Governmental tort liability as to highway median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.

Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th 1249.

State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L.R.4th 204.