TITLE 33 INSURANCE

Section 24. Insurance Generally, 33-24-1 through 33-24-98.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

33-24-3. Insurable interest - Personal insurance.

An insurable interest, with reference to personal insurance, is an interest based upon a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage through the continued life, health, or bodily safety of another person and consequent loss by reason of such person's death or disability or a substantial interest engendered by love and affection in the case of individuals closely related by blood or by law.
An individual has an unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life, health, and bodily safety and may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on his or her own life, health, or bodily safety and have the policy made payable to whomsoever such individual pleases, regardless of whether the beneficiary designated has an insurable interest.
The trustee of a trust established by an individual settlor has an insurable interest in the life of that individual settlor and has the same insurable interest in the life of any other individual as does such individual settlor. The trustee of a trust has the same insurable interest in the life of any other individual as does any beneficiary of the trust with respect to proceeds of insurance on the life of such individual or any portion of such proceeds that are allocable to such beneficiary's interest in such trust. If multiple beneficiaries of a trust have an insurable interest in the life of the same individual, the trustee of such trust has the same aggregate insurable interest in such individual's life as such beneficiaries with respect to proceeds of insurance on the life of such individual or any portion of such proceeds that is allocable in the aggregate to such beneficiaries' interest in the trust.
A corporation, foreign or domestic, has an insurable interest in the life of any individual:
1. Holding at least 10 percent of the issued and outstanding shares of such corporation; or
2. In whom the shareholders holding a majority of the issued and outstanding shares have an insurable interest, whether arising out of their status as shareholders of the corporation or otherwise,
  and in the life or physical or mental ability of any of its directors, officers, or employees or the directors, officers, or employees of any of its subsidiaries or any other person whose death or physical or mental disability might cause financial loss to the corporation; or, pursuant to any contractual arrangement with any shareholder concerning the reacquisition of shares owned by him or her at the time of his or her death or disability, on the life or physical or mental ability of that shareholder for the purpose of carrying out such contractual arrangement; or, pursuant to any contract obligating the corporation as part of compensation arrangements or pursuant to a contract obligating the corporation as guarantor or surety, on the life of the principal obligor. The trustee of a trust established by a corporation for the sole benefit of the corporation has the same insurable interest in the life or physical or mental ability of any person as does the corporation. The trustee of a trust established by a corporation providing life, health, disability, retirement, or similar benefits to employees of the corporation or its affiliates and acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to such employees, retired employees, or their dependents or beneficiaries has an insurable interest in the lives of employees for whom such benefits are to be provided. As used in this subsection, the term "employee" shall include any and all directors, officers, employees, or retired employees. The term "employee" shall include any former employee, but only for the purpose of replacing existing life insurance that will be surrendered in exchange for new life insurance in an amount not exceeding the insurance being surrendered.
The insurable interest of a corporation or trustee which has been established pursuant to subsection (d) of this Code section shall be conveyed automatically to another corporation or to the trustee of a trust established by such other corporation for its sole benefit which has acquired by purchase, merger, or otherwise all or part of the first corporation's business. A corporation or the trustee of a trust established by such corporation for its sole benefit may exchange any policy of insurance issued to itself or to another corporation or the trustee of a trust established by such other corporation for its sole benefit from which the exchanging corporation has acquired by purchase, merger, or otherwise all or part of such other corporation's business for a new policy of insurance issued to itself without establishing a new insurable interest at the time of such exchange.
A shareholder in a corporation has an insurable interest in the life of any other shareholder pursuant to any contractual arrangement between or among such shareholders concerning the purchase by surviving shareholders of shares owned by a deceased or disabled shareholder, for the purpose of carrying out such contractual arrangement.
A partnership, limited liability company, business trust, or other business entity established under the laws of any state or of the United States shall have the same insurable interests as a corporation, as set forth in subsections (d) and (e) of this Code section, including, without limitation, insurable interests in such entity's partners, members, or holders of other equity ownership interests and in officers, directors, employees, and those of any subsidiaries of any such entity. The partners of a partnership, the owners of a limited liability company, and the owners of equity interests in any form of business entity have the same insurable interest in the lives of the other partners, members, or equity interest owners as do shareholders of corporations.
An insurable interest must exist at the time the contract of personal insurance becomes effective but need not exist at the time the loss occurs.
Any personal insurance contract procured or caused to be procured upon another individual is void unless the benefits under the contract are payable to the individual insured or such individual's personal representative or to a person having, at the time when the contract was made, an insurable interest in the individual insured. In the case of a void contract, the insurer shall not be liable on the contract but shall be liable to repay to the person or persons who have paid the premiums all premium payments without interest.
A charitable institution as defined under Sections 501(c)(3), 501(c)(6), 501(c)(8), and 501(c)(9) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall have an insurable interest in the life of any donor.
The insurable interests set forth in this Code section are not exclusive but are cumulative of and not in lieu of insurable interests existing in common law and not expressly set forth in this Code section. No part of this Code section specifically recognizing any insurable interest shall create any presumption or implication that such insurable interest did not exist prior to July 1, 2006. To the contrary, an insurable interest shall be presumed with respect to any life insurance policy issued prior to July 1, 2006, to any person whose insurable interest is recognized in this Code section.

(Code 1933, § 56-2404, enacted by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 317, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1109, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1123, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1721, § 3; Ga. L. 1995, p. 776, § 2; Ga. L. 2003, p. 482, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 869, § 1/HB 1484.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114, former Civil Code 1910, §§ 2496, 2498, and former Code 1933, §§ 56-901, 56-903, repealed by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, enacting this title, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Person with no insurable interest cannot procure insurance on another's life.

- Person who has no insurable interest in the life of another person cannot procure and maintain a policy of insurance on the life of such person, naming the first person as the beneficiary. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ga. App. 464, 183 S.E. 640 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 56-901, 56-903).

Contract of insurance entered into between a person named as beneficiary therein and an insurance company, insuring another in whose life the beneficiary has no insurable interest, is void from the contract's inception, being a wagering contract and against public policy. Wilson v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 61 Ga. App. 617, 7 S.E.2d 44 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 56-901, 56-903).

Void policy does not invalidate second valid policy to another.

- Insurance company may not take advantage of the company's own illegal and void contract to escape liability on a legal and binding one; hence the issuance of a first insurance contract on an orphaned child's life to the child's great-aunt, who had no insurable interest therein, did not invalidate a second policy, issued to the child's grandfather. Wilson v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 61 Ga. App. 617, 7 S.E.2d 44 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 56-901, 56-903).

One has an insurable interest in life of one's spouse under subsection (a) of this section. Beiter v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 222 Ga. 516, 150 S.E.2d 687 (1966).

Relationship of sibling is close enough to qualify for an insurable interest under subsection (a) of this section. United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hadden, 126 Ga. App. 362, 190 S.E.2d 638 (1972).

One has no insurable interest in life of one's brother-in-law merely because of the existence of such relationship. Chandler v. Mutual Life & Indus. Ass'n, 131 Ga. 82, 61 S.E. 1036 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114).

Relationship of uncle and nephew will not support an insurable interest. Doody Co. v. Green, 131 Ga. 568, 62 S.E. 984 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114).

Adult children.

- When a parent brought suit to recover the benefits under a policy of life insurance insuring the life of an adult son, the trial court erred in only partially denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment by holding that the insurer had waived the statutory requirement prohibiting the issuance of a valid life insurance policy without the written consent of the insured. Under circumstances not qualifying for an exception pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a)(1)-(4), the policy was void ab initio, and unenforceable by the courts; written consent of the insured may not be waived. Time Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 195 Ga. App. 452, 393 S.E.2d 734 (1990).

Insurable interest may be based upon pecuniary expectation instead of kinship.

- Insurable interest is not necessarily dependent upon marital relation or kinship by affinity or consanguinity. In a broad sense it may be said that anyone has an insurable interest in the life of another when one feels sufficient interest in another's welfare, for any reason, either to substantially assist the other during the other's life, or to make the other a gift after death, which one perhaps may not be able to do during life. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Barnard, 9 Ga. App. 71, 70 S.E. 678 (1911); McFarland v. Robertson, 137 Ga. 132, 73 S.E. 490 (1911), later appeal, 142 Ga. 266, 82 S.E. 643 (1914); Cherokee Life Ins. Co. v. Banks, 15 Ga. App. 65, 82 S.E. 597 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1019, § 2496).

As a general rule, a reasonable expectation of pecuniary gain or advantage through the continued life of another person and consequent loss by reason of that person's death creates an insurable interest. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Parker, 67 Ga. App. 1, 19 S.E.2d 409 (1942) (insurable interest in stepson shown as matter of law) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 56-401, 56-903).

One partner has insurable interest in life of other.

- As the continuance of a partnership affords a reasonable expectancy of advantage and benefit to one partner, a partner had an insurable interest in the life of the copartner, and as the beneficiary named in the policy issued on the life of such copartner, was entitled to receive and retain the entire proceeds thereof. Rush v. Howkins, 135 Ga. 128, 68 S.E. 1035 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114).

Creditor has limited insurable interest in life of debtor.

- Creditor has, for the purpose of indemnifying the creditor against loss, but for no other, an insurable interest in the life of a debtor, but this interest cannot exceed in amount that of the indebtedness to be secured. Such indebtedness may, however, include the cost of taking out and keeping up the insurance, if made a charge against the debtor, or the debtor's estate, or upon the proceeds of the policy when collected. Exchange Bank v. Loh, 104 Ga. 446, 31 S.E. 459, 44 L.R.A. 372 (1898) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114).

Conditions permitting employer to have insurable interest in employee.

- Employer does not have an insurable interest in the life of an employee solely because of the relationship of employer and employee, but in order for such to appear it must be shown that the employer had a substantial economic interest in the life of the employee; that is, that by virtue of the relationship the employer might be reasonably expected to reap a substantial pecuniary benefit through the continued life of such employee, and to sustain consequent loss upon the employee's death. Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S.E.2d 814 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

Mere fact that at the time policy was issued employee was under contract to an employer for a period of approximately one year does not, standing alone, disclose an insurable interest of the employer in the life of the employee. Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S.E.2d 814 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

For an employer to have an insurable interest in the life of an employee, it should appear from the nature and character of the employment and the services rendered, their importance to the business conducted, and the character and particular ability of the employee, that the employee's death would be reasonably expected to result in substantial pecuniary loss to the employer. Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S.E.2d 814 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

When an employer has a substantial economic interest in the life of an employee, that is, when the employer might be reasonably expected to reap a substantial pecuniary benefit through the continued life of such employee, and sustain consequent loss upon the employee's death, a policy of insurance taken out by the employer in good faith to protect the employer's interest in the employee should be upheld. Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S.E.2d 814 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

Performance of ordinary duties by employee is not enough.

- Small and insignificant economic readjustment which would normally follow the death of an employee performing ordinary duties requiring no special skill or knowledge would not give the employer an insurable interest in the life of the employee. Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S.E.2d 814 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

One may insure own life and assign to another not having insurable interest.

- One has a right to procure an insurance policy on one's own life and to assign it to another who has no insurable interest in the insured's life, provided it be not done by way of cover for a wagering contract. Quillian v. Johnson, 122 Ga. 49, 49 S.E. 801 (1905); Atlanta Sav. Bank v. Downing, 122 Ga. 692, 51 S.E. 38 (1905); Rylander v. Allen, 125 Ga. 206, 53 S.E. 1032, 6 L.R.A. (n.s.) 128, 5 Ann. Cas. 355 (1906); Sprouse v. Skinner, 155 Ga. 119, 116 S.E. 606 (1923); Hawkes v. Mobley, 174 Ga. 481, 163 S.E. 494 (1932); United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hadden, 126 Ga. App. 362, 190 S.E.2d 638 (1972).

Meaning of this section is that one may insure one's own life without qualification, but that one may not insure the life of another unless one has an interest in the continuance of the life of that other. Necessarily, in the first instance, the amount of the policy is to be paid someone other than the insured because ordinarily under the contract the amount is not payable until one's death. Union Fraternal League v. Walton, 109 Ga. 1, 34 S.E. 317, 77 Am. St. R. 350, 46 L.R.A. 424 (1899), later appeal, 112 Ga. 315, 37 S.E. 389 (1900) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114).

Person has an unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life, and when there is no intent to enter into a wagering contract, and classes of beneficiaries are not restricted, one may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on one's life and have the same made payable to whomsoever one pleases, regardless of whether the beneficiary so designated has an insurable interest in the insured's life. Quinton v. Millican, 196 Ga. 175, 26 S.E.2d 435 (1943).

One may make policy on one's life payable to paramour.

- Regular life insurance policy, issued to a person on the person's own life and in favor of a paramour, may, if not otherwise invalid, be collected by the paramour, and when the paramour is designated by name, although the words "whose relationship to me is that of wife" are added, the paramour rather than the lawful spouse is entitled to the proceeds. Quinton v. Millican, 196 Ga. 175, 26 S.E.2d 435 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

Assignment of policy to attending physician held not invalid.

- Assignment of a life insurance policy to a physician who is rendering professional services to the assignor, by an agreement that the physician will continue to render the services to the assignor and the assignor's spouse so long as both of them shall remain in life, when the policy had an infinitesimal cash surrender value and was about to lapse for nonpayment of the premium, and the assignment is bona fide and not the result of fraud, is not as a matter of law a wagering contract and invalid and unenforceable. Hall v. Simmons, 50 Ga. App. 634, 179 S.E. 272 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-901, 56-903).

"To be paid to assignee" construed.

- Ruling which interprets the words "to be paid to an assignee" to import that such assignee need not have an insurable interest is not construction, but is judicial amendment. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, 151 F. 276 (C.C.E.D. Ga.), aff'd, 157 F. 1002 (5th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 208 U.S. 617, 28 S. Ct. 569, 52 L. Ed. 647 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 2114).

Liability in naming person with no insurable interest as beneficiary.

- Insurer can incur no liability for increasing risk to life of insured by issuing to insured a policy designating as beneficiary a person with no insurable interest in the insured's life if the policy is procured with knowledge of and at the behest of the insured. Burton v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 592, 298 S.E.2d 575 (1982).

If duty of reasonable care not to increase risk of harm to insured in connection with issuance of life insurance policies does exist under Georgia law, such duty could arise only when insurance company issues a policy that both is prohibited by statute or common law and increases risk of danger to the insured's person. Burton v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 592, 298 S.E.2d 575 (1982).

Insurance company can breach no common law or statutory duty owed to insured by failing to inquire into insured's motive or intent in applying for insurance and naming as beneficiary a person with no insurable interest. Burton v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 592, 298 S.E.2d 575 (1982).

Cited in Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 433, 157 S.E.2d 807 (1967); Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Renew, 121 Ga. App. 883, 176 S.E.2d 103 (1970); First of Ga. Ins. Co. v. Josey, 129 Ga. App. 14, 198 S.E.2d 381 (1973); Bohannon v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1977); Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 151 Ga. App. 328, 259 S.E.2d 717 (1979).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Common law definition not broadened.

- General Assembly, in defining "insurable interest" in this section, did not intend to broaden the common law definition. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 469.

Insurable interest may be based on kinship or pecuniary advantage.

- Language, "a substantial interest engendered by love and affection in the case of individuals closely related by blood or by law," as used in subsection (a) of this Code section, was intended to embrace the common law concept of an insurable interest recognized in individuals closely related by blood or by law; that is to say that the relationships of husband and wife, father and mother, son and daughter, and vice versa would constitute an insurable interest by virtue of their relationship alone, without showing a pecuniary interest or advantage; also, others closely related by blood or law would come within this same classification in cases of special circumstances in which they are substituted for one of the individuals creating this same close relationship; all other persons, in order to show an insurable interest, must satisfy the first part of this section relating to a pecuniary advantage. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 469.

Aunt or grandmother must have financial relationship for insurable interest.

- Aunt does not have sufficient insurable interest in the life of her infant niece or nephew, there being no financial dependency between them, to entitle the aunt to apply for and obtain a policy of life insurance upon the life of such niece or nephew, and under the same circumstances, a grandmother may not apply for such insurance. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 469.

Lifetime owner of policy with right to change beneficiary must have insurable interest.

- When the applicant, the lifetime owner of the policy, has control of the policy and therefore may change beneficiaries at any time during the life of the insured without regard to any consent being given by the previous beneficiary or the insured, such lifetime owner must satisfy the requirements of subsection (c) of former Code 1933 § 56-2405 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-24-3) with reference to insurable interest as well as former Code 1933 § 56-2407 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6) with reference to consent of the insured. In order to satisfy subsection (c), the benefits of the policy must be payable to the individual insured or the insured's personal representative, or to a person having, at the time when such contract was made, an interest in the individual insured; in order to satisfy former Code 1933, § 56-2407, such lifetime owner, in order to come within the exception, must have an insurable interest in the life of the minor whose life is insured. The wording of "no life insurance . . . contract upon an individual . . . shall be made or effectuated . . ." clearly would include the applicant who is the lifetime owner regardless of whether such applicant or owner is the named beneficiary in the policy. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 469.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, §§ 938, 974, 975.

C.J.S.

- 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 317 et seq.

ALR.

- Effect on insurance contract of wagering assignment thereof, 5 A.L.R. 837; 53 A.L.R. 1403.

Who are "blood relatives" within statute or rules as to beneficiaries of insurance in mutual benefit societies, 10 A.L.R. 864.

Insurance: insurable interest of fiance or fiancee, 17 A.L.R. 580.

Right of insolvent to insure life for benefit of relatives, 31 A.L.R. 51; 34 A.L.R. 838.

Effect of erroneous designation of beneficiary of insurance as "wife,", 32 A.L.R. 1481.

Divorce decree as affecting a change of ownership or interest within policy of insurance, 48 A.L.R. 1232.

Insurable interest in life of co-obligor, 50 A.L.R. 366.

Divorce of insured and beneficiary as affecting the latter's right in life insurance, 52 A.L.R. 386; 175 A.L.R. 1220.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes relating to insurance on life of one person for benefit of another who has no insurable interest, 108 A.L.R. 449.

Life policy or collateral agreement under which benefits on death of one member of a group or class of policyholders who has no insurable interest in lives of one another are to be shared surviving members, as contrary to public policy as a wagering contract, 121 A.L.R. 725.

Insurable interest of employer in respect of injury or death of employee for which he is not legally responsible, 122 A.L.R. 1189.

Insurable interest of employer in life of employee, 125 A.L.R. 408.

Immoral relations between insured and beneficiary as affecting liability of insurer or rights in respect of proceeds policy, 173 A.L.R. 716.

Life insurance: right to raise question of lack of insurable interest, 175 A.L.R. 1276.

Rights and remedies under contract by party to procure insurance on his own life, 12 A.L.R.2d 983.

Insurable interest of partner or partnership in life of partner, 70 A.L.R.2d 577.

Insured's ratification, after loss, of policy procured without his authority, knowledge, or consent, 52 A.L.R.3d 235.

Payment of premiums by corporation on corporate officer's life insurance policy as affecting right to policy, 56 A.L.R.3d 1086.

Divorce: provision in decree that one party obtain or maintain life insurance for benefit of other party or child, 59 A.L.R.3d 9.

Insurable interest of brother or sister in life of sibling, 60 A.L.R.3d 98.

Estoppel of, or waiver by, issuer of life insurance policy to assert defense of lack of insurable interest, 86 A.L.R.4th 828.

Insurable interest of foster child or stepchild in life of foster or step parent, or vice versa, 35 A.L.R.5th 781.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-3

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Crum v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 880 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 25, 2022 | 315 Ga. 67

...But as it turns out, that case law was interpreting and applying old statutes. In 1960, our General Assembly repealed those statutes and replaced them with new statutory language that codified some, but not all, of the old decisional law. See OCGA § 33-24-3....

...The court acknowledged that Georgia’s statute addressing insurable interests in the context of life insurance did not appear to prohibit such a policy without the involvement of a third party at the time the policy was issued. Id. at *5, *7 (citing OCGA § 33-24-3 (b), (i))....

...policy and unenforceable as a general matter, OCGA § 13-8-2 (a) (4), the prohibition against wagering contracts in the context of life insurance has been incorporated into a specific statutory requirement: the “insurable interest” rule. See OCGA § 33-24-3. 6 Application of that rule, and not any broader foray into public policy untethered from this statute, must guide the analysis. This conclusion follows from the history of insurance-based gambling and the law’s response to it....

...of another person and consequent loss by reason of such person’s death . . . or a substantial interest engendered by love and affection in the case of individuals closely related by blood 12 or by law.” OCGA § 33-24-3 (a) (1995).4 Put more simply, a person has an insurable interest in the life of another if he can reasonably expect to be better off financially if the life continues, and worse off if it ends (or, in the case of close relations, if he has an interest in the life continuing based on love and affection). Further, “[a]n individual has an unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life.” OCGA § 33-24-3 (b) (1995). The statute also sets the rules about who must have insurable interests, and when....

...and have the policy made payable to whomsoever such individual pleases, regardless of whether the beneficiary designated has an insurable interest” too. OCGA § 33- 24-3 (b) (1995). On the other hand, if a life insurance policy is 4 The current version of OCGA § 33-24-3 is materially the same in all respects relevant to the certified questions here....

...13 “procured or caused to be procured upon another individual,” the person to whom “the benefits under the contract are payable” must have “an insurable interest in the individual insured,” or the policy is “void.” OCGA § 33-24-3 (e) (1995).5 Second, the rules about when: the insurable interest “must exist at the time the contract of [life] insurance becomes effective but need not exist at the time the loss occurs.” OCGA § 33-24-3 (d) (1995)....

...interest rules at the time it becomes effective may be assigned later to someone without an insurable interest, subject to the policy’s terms. See OCGA § 33-24-17. (c) We can now turn to the certified questions. For reasons we 5 In full, OCGA § 33-24-3 (e) (1995) (now OCGA § 33-24-3 (i)) says: Any personal insurance contract procured or caused to be procured upon another individual is void unless the benefits under the contract are payable to the individual insured or such individual’s per...

...includes the structure and history of the text and the broader context in which that text was enacted, including statutory and decisional law that forms the legal background of the written text.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). (i) We start with the text of OCGA § 33-24-3 (1995)....

...with the unilateral intent at that time to sell it to someone without an insurable interest. The statute is clear that a person “may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on his own life” because a person has an “unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life.” OCGA § 33-24-3 (b) (1995)....

...t the policy. Nor does the language of the statute’s prohibition against policies taken out on the life of another have anything to say about someone with the unilateral intent to sell a policy on his own life to a third party. Under OCGA § 33-24-3 (e) (1995), a life insurance policy “procured or caused to be procured upon another individual is 16 void unless the benefits under the contract are payable to” someone with an insurable interest in the life....

...273, 273 (1) (46 SE2d 138) (1948) (“A man has an unlimited insurable interest in his own life, and may ordinarily take out a policy of insurance upon his own life and make it payable to whomsoever he pleases, regardless of whether the beneficiary has an insurable interest in his life.”) with OCGA § 33-24-3 (a) (1995) (“An insurable interest, with reference to personal insurance, is an interest based upon a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage through the continued life, health, or bodily safety of another person and consequent loss by reason of such person’s death or disability or a substantial interest engendered by love and affection in the case of individuals closely related by blood or by law.”); OCGA § 33-24-3 (b) (1995) (“An individual has an unlimited insurable interest in his or 21 her own life, health, and bodily safety and may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on his own life, health, or bodily s...

...fety and have the policy made payable to whomsoever such individual pleases, regardless of whether the beneficiary designated has an insurable interest.”). The result was the statutory framework for insurable interests that now appears at OCGA § 33-24-3.6 This statutory history tells us how to address the decisional law interpreting the old insurable-interest statutes....

...utes as having incorporated the body of decisional law that interpreted the old statutory language, at least not wholesale. Cf. Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 236-237 (2) (c) (i) (806 SE2d 505) (2017) (in the context 6 The version of OCGA § 33-24-3 that was in force in 1999 is materially the same, in all respects relevant to the questions here, as the version of that statute enacted as part of the Insurance Code of 1960. Compare Ga. L. 1960, pp. 657-658, § 56-2404, with OCGA § 33-24-3 (1995)....

...The provisions of the current statute that define insurable interests in specific contexts, such as with respect to trustees, corporations, shareholders of corporations, noncorporation business associations, and charitable institutions, were added after 1999. See OCGA § 33-24-3 (c), (d), (f), (g), (j). 22 of constitutional interpretation, applying the prior-construction canon, which says that when language is enacted that had received an authoritative or definitive const...

...In short, if any of our body of decisional law interpreting the old statutes informs the meaning of the new Code, it is because a rule from particular decisional law was codified in the new Code. (iii) So, we are back where we started: the language of OCGA 24 § 33-24-3 (1995)....

...person, regardless of whether or not the latter has an insurable interest; insured has an unlimited insurable interest in his own life which is sufficient to support the policy.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied)) with OCGA § 33-24-3 (b) (1995) (“An individual has an unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life, 28 health, and bodily safety and may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on his own life, health, or bodily...

...carried forward nothing more broad than the “strawman” version of the “cover for a wager policy” proviso, because that subsection necessarily implies the existence of a third party who has “procured or caused to be procured” a policy on “another individual.” OCGA § 33-24-3 (e) (1995) (deeming “void” any life insurance contract “procured or caused to be procured upon another individual” if the benefits under the policy are not payable to the individual insured 7 In addition to relying on the decisional law’s language about the insured’s “intent,” Jackson suggests that its intent-based restriction is implicit in the decisional law’s references to “good faith.” But OCGA § 33-24-3 (1995) does not carry forward any reference to “good faith.” And the new Insurance Code also failed to carry forward earlier statutory language imposing on the insured a requirement that “[e]very application for insurance must be made in the utmost good faith.” Ga....

...8 This provision, written in passive voice, does not distinguish between an intermediary—such as a viatical settlement broker—and a subsequent purchaser. Anyone who “caused” the policy to be procured on the life of another would be subject to OCGA § 33-24-3 (e) (1995)....

...Parsley; Cozen O’Connor, Michael J. Miller, Michael J. Broadbent, for appellee. wagering contract if, at the time the policy was procured, a third party was “complicit in the procurement of the policy.” Crum, 25 F4th at 863. Under the plain language of OCGA § 33-24-3 (e) (1995), that generally would be true if a third party has “caused” the insured to procure a policy on his own life and name as beneficiary someone without an insurable interest....

Wilmington Trust, Nat'l Ass'n v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp (Ga. 2026).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 17, 2026 | 315 Ga. 67

...We understand those questions to seek direction regarding the circumstances that may be considered by a court in determining when a third party has “procured or caused to be procured” a life insurance policy on the life of another person under OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006)....

...” and that “the 13 prohibition against wagering contracts in the context of life insurance has been incorporated into a specific statutory requirement: the ‘insurable interest’ rule. See OCGA § 33-24-3.” Crum v....

...at 72 (punctuation and quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a life insurance policy constitutes an illegal wagering contract, “we look to the language of the insurable- interest statute in effect at the time the policy was issued.” Crum, 14 315 Ga. at 74. Here, OCGA § 33-24-3 (2006)2 outlines several situations in which a person has an insurable interest....

...advantage through the continued life ... of another person and consequent loss by reason of such person’s death ... or a substantial interest engendered by love and affection in the case of individuals closely related by blood or by law.” OCGA § 33-24-3(a) (2006). Moreover, the statute provides that “[a]n individual has an unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life.” OCGA § 33-24- 3(b) (2006). The statute also sets out rules that govern a person taking out a policy on his or her own life and a person taking out a policy on the life of another. Subsection (b) of § 33-24-3 (2006) concerns a person taking out insurance on his or her own life. Because “an individual 2 The current version of OCGA § 33-24-3 is materially identical to the 2006 version of the statute....

...e or she “may lawfully take out a policy of insurance on his or her own life,” and may “have the policy made payable to whomsoever such individual pleases, regardless of whether the beneficiary designated has an insurable interest.” OCGA § 33-24-3(b) (2006). Subsection (i) of § 33-24-3 (2006) concerns procuring insurance on the life of another....

...d unless the benefits under the contract are payable to the individual insured or such individual’s personal representative or to a person having, at the time when the contract was made, an insurable interest in the individual insured.” OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006)....

...estion that a policy would be void as an illegal wagering contract if, at the time the policy was procured, a third party” procured the policy or caused it to be procured. Id. at 81 n.9. We explained that, “[u]nder the plain language of OCGA § 33-24-3(e) (1995),” which is materially identical question has been certified regarding these provisions and because they were enacted after the insurance policy here was issued, we do not address the impact of these provisions on cases such as this one. 17 to OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006), “that generally would be true if a third party has ‘caused’ the insured to procure a policy on his own life and name as beneficiary someone without an insurable interest.” Crum, 315 Ga....

...g such a contract. See Maslenjak v. United States, 582 US 335, 341–42 (2017) (looking to materially identical dictionary definitions to conclude that the word “procure” in a statutory text meant “to obtain”).4 4 We note that OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006) is “written in the passive voice” and “does not distinguish between an intermediary—such as a … settlement 22 We next turn to the context in which these words appear. As noted above, part of the context of OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006) is its “statutory history and the decisional law interpreting prior versions of the statutory insurable-interest rule.” Crum, 315 Ga....

...Insurance Code” that “was no mere consolidation or restyling effort”; “the General Assembly did not reenact the same or materially identical language from those statutes.” Id. at 76. “The result was the statutory framework for insurable interests that now appears at OCGA § 33-24-3.” Crum, 315 Ga. at 76–77.5 Part of the context of OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006) is the decisional law interpreting the old insurable-interest statutes, and Crum laid the framework for evaluating how that body of decisional law informs the meaning of the new Insurance Code. There, we explained that “[b]ecause the General Assembly repealed those statutes and chose not to reenact materially similar language, we cannot read the new statutes as 5 We note that subsection (i) of OCGA § 33-24-3 (2006) is materially identical to the version of the statute enacted as part of the Insurance Code of 1960....

...y on another and thus precludes the quintessential “wager” on a human life that the 25 insurable-interest rules were designed to prevent. See Crum, 315 Ga. at 70–72. This decisional law is codified in OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006), which provides that any policy that a person procures or causes to be procured on the life of another is void (again, unless there is an insurable interest). Moreover, some of our pre-1960 cases more broadly dealt with a third party’s involvement with “insuring” the life of another....

...individual,’” it carried forward the “‘strawman’ version of the ‘cover for a wager policy’ proviso” of Walton and Rylander into the 1960 Insurance Code. Crum, 315 Ga. at 78–80. We thus conclude that those cases inform the meaning of OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006)....

...Crum, 315 Ga. at 79–80. 28 Considering the ordinary usage of “procured or caused to be procured” and the relevant context, we conclude that the “procured or caused to be procured” language of OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006) means that a third party has effectively obtained or acquired a life insurance contract on the life of another or has “serve[d] as cause” for obtaining such a contract, when circumstances indicate that the insured is acting as an instrumentality for a third party....

...life is insured played some part in the transaction, if that insured is ultimately determined to be merely an agent or strawman for the 6 We emphasize that the “‘strawman’ version of the ‘cover for a wager policy’ proviso,” Crum, 315 Ga. at 80, under OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006) contains two parts—a third party procuring a life insurance policy on the life of another or causing a policy to be procured and the lack of an insurable interest—and that here we are only dealing with the first issue. 29 third party....

...mean that a person who otherwise completes every step of the process of obtaining a life insurance policy on his or her own life but borrows the premium from a friend, with the intent to pay it back immediately, could fall within the ambit of OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006). For the foregoing reasons, courts evaluating whether a third party has procured or caused to be procured a life insurance contract on the life of another must consider the totality of the circumstances. 7 Amerita...

...e it unnecessary to answer the third one. 35 payable to the individual insured or such individual’s personal representative or to a person having ... an insurable interest in the individual insured.” OCGA § 33-24-3(i) (2006)....

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