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2018 Georgia Code 33-24-41.1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 33-24-41.1 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 33-24-41.1

TITLE 33 INSURANCE

Section 24. Insurance Generally, 33-24-1 through 33-24-98.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

33-24-41.1. Motor vehicle accident claim covered by two or more insurance carriers; limited release.

  1. In any instance where a claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident is covered by two or more insurance carriers, one such carrier may tender, and the claimant may accept, the limits of such policy; and, in the event of multiple claimants, the settling carrier may tender, and the claimants may accept, the limits of the policy pursuant to a written agreement between or among the claimants.Such claimant or claimants may execute a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants including, without limitation, claims for loss of consortium or loss of services asserted by any person.
  2. The limited release provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall:
    1. Release the settling carrier from all liability from any claims of the claimant or claimants based on injuries to such claimant or claimants; and
    2. Release the insured tort-feasor covered by the policy of the settling carrier from all personal liability from any and all claims arising from the occurrence on which the claim is based except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims.
  3. No policy of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage issued in this state after July 1, 1994, shall prohibit any claimant from settling any claim with a liability carrier as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section or require the permission of the uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier to so settle any claim with the liability carrier.
  4. The limited release of the settling carrier provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall not:
    1. Bar a claimant's recovery against any other tort-feasor or under any other policy of insurance or release any other insurance carrier providing applicable coverage unless specifically provided for in such release;
    2. Be admissible in evidence before the trier of fact in the trial of a tort action, but the amount paid thereunder shall be admissible as provided by law as evidence of the offset against the liability of an uninsured motorist carrier and as evidence of the offset against any verdict of the trier of fact;
    3. Affect any duty the settling carrier owes to its insured under its policy including, without limitation, the duty to defend a subrogation claim brought against its insured; or
    4. Release the tort-feasor from personal liability to the extent that there is other insurance in effect which covers the said claim or claims, but only to the extent of such other insurance.
  5. The provisions of this Code section shall not be construed so as to interfere with the obligation of the insured to cooperate in his or her defense with the insurance carrier as provided in the policy of insurance.
  6. The provisions of this Code section shall not be construed to interfere with a claimant's right to pursue claims or an insurance company's obligation to pay claims based on a negligent or bad faith refusal to settle a claim or claims; provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any new claim not otherwise provided by law.

(Code 1981, §33-24-41.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2514, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 91, § 33; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1156, § 1.)

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1994, "this Code section" was substituted for "this Code Section" and "provided, however," was substituted for "provided however" in subsection (f).

Law reviews.

- For annual survey article discussing developments in insurance law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (1999). For annual survey on insurance, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (2009). For annual survey of law on insurance, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 139 (2010). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 305 (2012). For annual survey on insurance, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 135 (2013). For annual survey of insurance law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2015). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 200 (1994).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Effect of general release.

- Insured defeated the ability to collect underinsured motorist benefits from the insurer by executing a general release to the tortfeasor, rather than a limited release. Rodgers v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 228 Ga. App. 499, 492 S.E.2d 268 (1997).

Reformation of release.

- When an insured signed a general release believing that the release would not affect the insured's claim against the insured's underinsured motorist carrier, reformation of the release would be warranted if mutual mistake of law could be proved. Superior Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 229 Ga. App. 45, 494 S.E.2d 208 (1997).

Because the insured exercised reasonable diligence in relying on representations made by both the insured's insurer's agent and the tortfeasor's agent, the trial court should have reformed the settlement and release to reflect the parties' intent to only release the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurer from liability rather than granting summary judgment. Clark v. Byrd, 254 Ga. App. 826, 564 S.E.2d 742 (2002).

Evidence did not show limited release.

- Plaintiff failed to take those steps which would have indicated, without equivocation, that the plaintiff's release of the automobile accident tortfeasor was intended to allow the plaintiff to retain the right to sue the carriers of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle coverage. Cook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 Ga. App. 400, 514 S.E.2d 48 (1999).

Dismissal with prejudice barred recovery.

- Insureds' dismissal with prejudice claim against the defendant driver, rather than merely executing a limited liability release against the defendant, defeated the insureds' ability to recover damages from the insureds' underinsured motorist carrier. Kent v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 Ga. App. 564, 504 S.E.2d 710 (1998).

Settlement does not prevent application of underinsured motorist coverage.

- Settlement for the limits as stated in the policy satisfies the exhaustion requirement of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, and the insured may then pursue a claim against the insured's underinsurance carrier, even though under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-41.1 and33-34-3, the "deemer" statute, the tortfeasor's policy is deemed to provide greater coverage. Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998).

Because the insured accepted the limits of liability insurance coverage of the first defendant and executed a limited-liability release, the insured exhausted the liability limits of the first defendant and was entitled to pursue underinsured motorist benefits to the extent the first defendant was underinsured; the insured's settlement with the dismissed defendants precluded the insured's ability to pursue underinsured motorist benefits against those defendants, but it did not preclude the insured from seeking underinsured motorist benefits based on the possibility that the first defendant was underinsured. Wade v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Co., 324 Ga. App. 491, 751 S.E.2d 153 (2013).

Release did not extinguish uninsured motorist carrier's subrogation rights.

- Injured insured's uninsured motorist insurer could sue a tortfeasor in subrogation as provided in O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f) even after the insured had released the tortfeasor from personal liability, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, except to the extent that insurance coverage, other than the tortfeasor's personal liability policy, existed. Ramos-Silva v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 300 Ga. App. 699, 686 S.E.2d 345 (2009).

Settlement for less than policy limit.

- To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, a carrier must offer and a claimant must accept an amount equal to the limit stated in the policy, not an amount less than the limit stated in the policy; accordingly, when an insured settled with a second person's carrier for less than the policy limit, the insured did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement and was not entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage from the insured's own insurer. Holland v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. App. 365, 646 S.E.2d 477 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1403, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 619 (Ga. 2007).

Acceptance of settlement offer.

- Trial court erred in granting the insureds' motion to enforce a settlement agreement a parent and an administrator allegedly reached with an insurer because the insurer's tender was not sufficient to constitute acceptance of the settlement offer; assuming that the offer by the parent and the administrator contemplated a legal impossibility or was in "tension" with the governing law, it did not follow that the insurer could accept something other than the offer made. Kitchens v. Ezell, 315 Ga. App. 444, 726 S.E.2d 461 (2012).

Insurance company, on defendant's behalf, accepted plaintiff's offer by providing a limited release that adhered to plaintiff's specifications and by tendering a check for $100,000. Thus, the defendant and the insurance company's compliance with the demands of the plaintiff's offer constituted an acceptance and the settlement agreement was enforceable. Arnold v. Neal, 320 Ga. App. 289, 738 S.E.2d 707 (2013).

Insurer complied with the terms of an injured driver's settlement offer by submitting a $25,000 check within the offer's deadline, and the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion to enforce the settlement agreement based on the insurer's inclusion of a general release rather than a limited release with its letter because the insurer's language regarding the release was precatory rather than mandatory. Newton v. Ragland, 325 Ga. App. 371, 750 S.E.2d 768 (2013).

Injury claim and spouse's loss of consortium claim were injury to one person.

- An injured wife and her husband satisfied the exhaustion requirement of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 and could proceed against their UM insurer; the husband's loss of consortium claim arose out of the wife's claim, so by settling both their claims for $25,000, the other driver's per person limit, the couple exhausted the available coverage. Mullinax v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 303 Ga. App. 76, 692 S.E.2d 734 (2010).

Cited in Integon Indem. Corp. v. Henry Medical Ctr., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 97, 508 S.E.2d 476 (1998); Edmond v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 249 Ga. App. 338, 548 S.E.2d 450 (2001).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Daniels v. Johnson, 509 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 4, 1998 | 270 Ga. 289, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 4104

...Johnson was covered personally by a $10,000 liability policy and her rental car was covered by a $10,000 policy from Chrysler Insurance through the rental car agency in New York. Daniels settled with Johnson's insurance providers for $10,000 each and executed releases pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...uninsured to "the difference between the available coverages under the bodily injury liability insurance ... and the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage." Furthermore, the requirement of exhaustion is seen in the legislative scheme in OCGA *43 § 33-24-41.1(a), and (d), which provide that, when multiple insurance carriers are involved, a claimant may settle with one for "the limits of [the] policy" and grant a limited release without compromising claims under any other policy of insurance....
...We conclude that a settlement for the limits as stated in the policy satisfies the exhaustion requirement, even though under the deemer statute the Chrysler policy provides $15,000 in coverage. This rule is most consistent with the purpose behind OCGA § 33-24-41.1, the statute permitting a limited release. The legislature enacted OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in 1992 to make meaningful the ability of a claimant to settle with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier while preserving his UM claim....
...s of the liability policy limits before fixing coverage under its policy. [4] Therefore, a claimant could not maintain an action against his own UM carrier if he had settled with the tortfeasor's carrier without the agreement of the UM carrier. OCGA § 33-24-41.1(c) changed this circumstance by expressly providing that UM policies cannot require permission of the UM carrier before a claimant settles with a liability carrier....
...The special concurrence would hold that any settlement for less than the policy limits satisfies the exhaustion requirement, as long as it is in good faith. Such a rule, however, would subvert the legislatively created exhaustion requirement. In enacting OCGA § 33-24-41.1, the legislature carefully preserved the exhaustion requirement by providing that a limited release under one policy will not compromise the claim under other policies when the settlement is for "the limits of such policy." [5] It is wi...
...ounsel's thought processes, and may even require discovery from the settling carrier. For these reasons we hold that if the plaintiff settles for the limits of the policy as stated in the policy and executes a limited release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1, the plaintiff may pursue its UM claim....
...Uninsured motorist statutes are, by nature, remedial and are to be broadly construed to accomplish the legislative goal. Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Ins. Co., 267 Ga. 516, 517, 480 S.E.2d 842 (1997). As the majority acknowledges, the legislature enacted OCGA § 33-24-41.1, allowing a limited release, in order to provide a meaningful mechanism whereby a claimant/insured could settle with the tortfeasor's insurer and still avail himself of his UM coverage....
...NOTES [1] Daniels v. Johnson, 226 Ga.App. 789, 487 S.E.2d 504 (1997). [2] See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 267 Ga. 134, 475 S.E.2d 619 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of OCGA § 33-34-3(a)(2)). [3] See 11 Ga.St.L.Rev. 200 (1994) (legislative history of OCGA § 33-24-41.1). [4] Id.; Jenkins & Miller, Georgia Automobile Insurance Law § 13-5 (1997). [5] OCGA § 33-24-41.1(a), (d).
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Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 295 Ga. 487 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2014 | 761 S.E.2d 261

...This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 (739 SE2d 750) (2013), to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA § 33-24-41.1.1 Finding that the Court of 1 OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...3 coverage before recovering under a UM policy.” Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290 (1) (509 SE2d 41) (1998). And, that Court was also correct to note that the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the...
...by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of “a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. . . .” OCGA § 33-24-41.1(a), (b)....
...personal liability while preserving the claimant's right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor for the purpose of collecting against other available insurance coverage including underinsured motorist coverage. OCGA § 33-24-41.1(b). [Cits.] Carter, supra at 273-274. However, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCGA § 33-24-41.1 requires that there be no allocation of payments to punitive damages. It is certainly true that punitive damages cannot be recovered under UM insurance, as the public policy involved is to provide for compensatory damages only....
...123 (392 SE2d 1) (1990); 4 Bonamico v. Kisella, 290 Ga. App. 211, 213 (659 SE2d 666) (2008); Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App 219, 219-222 (2), (3) (393 SE2d 83) (1990). But that does not mean that there is a prohibition found in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 against an allocation such as that made in the release at issue....
...to such claimant or claimants” and “from all personal liability from any and all claims arising from the occurrence on which the claim is based except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims.” OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) & (2)....
...This the release did, and it is uncontroverted that the $30,000 paid represented the limits of Oliviera’s policy. Progressive argues that payment for the punitive damages cannot be considered to be “based on injuries” to Carter, or to be “claims arising from the occurrence,” under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) & (2)....
...of punitive damages from the liability carrier to the underinsured motorist carrier, contrary to the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.” Carter, supra at 274-275. However, such concern is ill-founded; the statutory scheme effectively prevents such a shifting. Under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (d) (2), “the amount paid [under a limited release] shall be admissible as provided by law as evidence of the offset against the liability of an uninsured motorist carrier and as evidence of the offset against any verdict of the tr...
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Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 9, 2009 | 285 Ga. 24, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 417

...Bacon was covered by a liability insurance policy with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. In consideration of $100,000, Appellants individually and as husband and wife executed a limited release of Bacon and the liability insurer from any and all claims pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...must exhaust available liability coverage before recovering under a UM policy[,]" and that a plaintiff may pursue his UM claim if he "settles for the limits of the policy as stated in the policy and executes a limited release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1...." Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290(1), 291(2), 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998). Both of these requirements had to be fulfilled before Mr. Thompson could pursue his UM claims. He undisputedly met one requirement when he executed the limited release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...ing settlement exhaust available liability coverage. See Holland v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga.App. 365, 367(2), 646 S.E.2d 477 (2007). Instead, that language confirms the nature of the document as a limited release which complies with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 and identifies UM carriers as entities which are not released....

Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins. (Ga. 2014).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2014 | 285 Ga. 24, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 417

...This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 (739 SE2d 750) (2013), to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA § 33-24-41.1.1 Finding that the Court of 1 OCGA § 33-24-41.1 reads: (a) In any instance where a claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident is covered by two or more insurance carriers, one such carrier may tender, and the claimant may accept, the limits of such policy;...
... motorist insurance requires “that a party must exhaust available liability coverage before recovering under a UM policy.” Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290 (1) (509 SE2d 41) (1998). And, that Court was also correct to note that the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the...
...by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of “a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. . . .” OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (a), (b)....
...personal liability while preserving the claimant's right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor for the purpose of collecting against other available insurance coverage including underinsured motorist coverage. OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b). [Cits.] Carter, supra at 273-274. However, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCGA § 33-24-41.1 requires that there be no allocation of payments to punitive damages. It is certainly true that punitive damages cannot be recovered under UM insurance, as the public policy involved is to provide for compensatory damages 4 only....
...Weathers, 260 Ga. 123 (392 SE2d 1) (1990); Bonamico v. Kisella, 290 Ga. App. 211, 213 (659 SE2d 666) (2008); Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App. 219, 219-222 (2), (3) (393 SE2d 83) (1990). But that does not mean that there is a prohibition found in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 against an allocation such as that made in the release at issue....
...claimants based on injuries to such claimant or claimants” and “from all personal liability from any and all claims arising from the occurrence on which the claim is based except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims.” OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) and (2)....
...limits of Oliviera’s policy. Progressive argues that payment for the punitive damages cannot be 5 considered to be “based on injuries” to Carter, or to be “claims arising from the occurrence,” under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) and (2)....
...attach. Punitive damages may not be recovered where there is no entitlement to compensatory damages.” Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 (2) (416 SE2d 274) (1992) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, nothing in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 precludes a statement in the release that a portion of the payment be allocated to punitive damages. 6 In its decision below, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that inclusion of an...
...of punitive damages from the liability carrier to the underinsured motorist carrier, contrary to the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.” Carter, supra at 274-275. However, such concern is ill-founded; the statutory scheme effectively prevents such a shifting. Under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (d) (2), “the amount paid [under a limited release] shall be admissible as provided by law as evidence of the offset against the liability of an uninsured motorist carrier and as evidence of the offset against any verdict of the tr...