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2018 Georgia Code 33-34-3 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 33 INSURANCE

Section 34. Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations, 33-34-1 through 33-34-9.

ARTICLE 2 PREFERRED PROVIDER ARRANGEMENTS

33-34-3. Requirements for issuance of policies.

    1. All policies of motor vehicle liability insurance issued in this state must be in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. Such policies shall contain at least the minimum coverages required under this chapter and shall be issued for a minimum term of six months.
    2. All insurers authorized to transact or transacting insurance in this state or controlling or controlled by or under common control by or with an insurer authorized to transact or transacting insurance in this state which issue policies or contracts providing motor vehicle liability insurance coverage or any other similar coverage in any state or Canadian province shall include in the policies or contracts of insurance a provision which provides at least the minimum liability coverage required under Code Section 33-34-4 with respect to motorists insured under the policies or contracts who are involved in motor vehicle accidents in this state and, notwithstanding any provisions of the policies or contracts to the contrary, all such policies or contracts of insurance shall be deemed to satisfy the minimum requirements of this chapter if a motorist insured under the policies or contracts of insurance is involved in a motor vehicle accident in this state.
    3. Nothing contained in this Code section shall be deemed to prohibit a nonadmitted insurer not otherwise required by paragraph (2) of this subsection to provide the minimum liability coverage required by Code Section 33-34-4 from providing such coverage for its insured motorists who are involved in motor vehicle accidents in this state and, to the extent that such coverage is provided, such policies or contracts shall be deemed to provide the minimum liability coverage required by this chapter.
      1. No insurer shall issue a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance without requiring advance payment for the first 30 days of coverage. Insurers may rely on the insured's statements in the policy application for the purpose of calculating the initial payment required by this paragraph. This paragraph shall not apply to any renewal or continuation of a policy, to any replacement of a policy where there is no lapse of coverage, or to any personal automobile policy issued in connection with an employer sponsored payroll deduction plan. This paragraph shall apply only to personal automobile or family-type automobile liability insurance policies.
      2. If an insurer, agent, or premium finance company collects such advance payment in the form of a check or money order which is not honored upon initial presentation, such insurer, agent, or premium finance company shall be deemed to have complied with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and may, thereafter, cancel for nonpayment of premium as provided in Code Section 33-24-44.
  1. Nothing in Code Section 33-34-4 shall be construed to prohibit the issuance of policies providing coverage more extensive than the minimum liability coverage required by that Code section.
  2. Policies purporting to satisfy the requirements of Code Section 33-34-4 shall contain a provision which states that, notwithstanding any of the other terms and conditions of the policy, the coverage afforded shall be at least as extensive as the minimum liability coverage required.
  3. Each policy of liability insurance issued in this state providing coverage to motor vehicles owned by a person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of selling at retail new and used motor vehicles shall provide that, when an accident involves the operation of a motor vehicle by a person who is neither the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident nor an employee of the owner and the operator of the motor vehicle is an insured under a complying policy other than the complying policy insuring the motor vehicle involved in the accident, primary coverage as to all coverages provided in the policy under which the operator is an insured shall be afforded by the liability policy insuring the said operator and any liability policy under which the owner is an insured shall afford excess coverages.If the liability policy under which the owner is an insured and which affords excess coverage contains a provision which eliminates such excess coverage based on the existence of coverage provided in the operator's liability policy, such provision of the owner's liability policy shall be void.
  4. Each policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued in this state on or after October 1, 1991, shall provide that the requirement for giving notice of a claim, if not satisfied by the insured within 30 days of the date of the accident, may be satisfied by an injured third party who, as the result of such accident, has a claim against the insured; provided, however, notice of a claim given by an injured third party to an insurer under this subsection shall be accomplished by mail. Each policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued or renewed in this state on and after October 1, 1991, shall be deemed to include and construed as including the provision regarding the notice requirements provided in this subsection.

(Code 1981, §33-34-3, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 1.12; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1011, § 8; Ga. L. 2004, p. 430, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Restrictions on right of insurance companies to cancel certification showing proof of financial responsibility for the future, § 40-9-82.

Assigned risk plans, self-insurance, and "spot" insurance regarding motor vehicles, § 40-9-100 et seq.

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1995, substituted "employer sponsored" for "employer- sponsored" in the third sentence of subparagraph (a)(4)(A).

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of insurance law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 253 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarities of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3, and Ga. L. 1974, p. 113, § 5, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Constitutionality.

- Subsection (e) of former Ga. L. 1978, p. 2075, § 1 (see subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3) was not unconstitutional as being violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III). Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 245 Ga. 558, 266 S.E.2d 175 (1980) (decided under former Ga. L. 1978, p. 2075, § 1).

Provision that motor vehicle insurance policies issued by insurers authorized to transact business in the state are deemed to provide the minimum coverage required by Georgia law when the insured is involved in an accident in Georgia is shielded from attack under the Commerce Clause by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, and the provision does not retroactively impair obligations under the contract or violate equal protection in violation of the Georgia Constitution. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 267 Ga. 134, 475 S.E.2d 619 (1996).

Applicability of subsection (e).

- Language of subsection (e) of former § 33-34-3 (see now subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3) did not explicitly or expressly limit the statute's application to situations involving loaners or test-driver vehicles. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 182 Ga. App. 842, 357 S.E.2d 295 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

No coverage meant no application of § 33-34-3. - Because the declarations page of an automobile insurance policy unequivocally showed that no liability coverage was purchased for the covered vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 did not apply. Simalton v. AIU Ins. Co., 284 Ga. App. 152, 643 S.E.2d 553 (2007).

Nonowner driving with permission of insured.

- Passage of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance limited application of the "rule of election" by which one who was not the named insured of the policy was covered by the policy only if he or she so elected, so specific election of coverage was no longer required; thus, an insurer could not use a nonowner driver's failure to affirmatively seek coverage under the owner's policy to avoid the policy's contractual obligation and the insurer's liability was not limited to the statutory minimum coverage for compulsory insurance. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 264 Ga. 347, 444 S.E.2d 739 (1994) (decided under former Ga. L. 1978, p. 2075, § 1).

Dealer's insurance is excess when customer has own insurance protection.

- O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 provides, in effect, that every "policy of liability insurance" issued in Georgia providing "coverage" to vehicles owned by automobile dealers shall provide that when an accident involves a loaner (a temporary substitute vehicle furnished by a dealer) driven by a customer and the customer-driver has his or her own insurance protection other than under the dealer's policy, primary coverage as to "all coverages" provided by the driver's policy shall be afforded by that policy, and the dealer's insurance shall be excess. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 245 Ga. 558, 266 S.E.2d 175 (1980).

Insurance coverage on dealer "loaner" vehicle.

- Nothing required an insurer to provide excess insurance on a loaner car above the statutory minimum limits but the law required excess coverage in an amount not less than the limits; summary judgment reducing coverage below the limits was error. Hendrix v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 589, 588 S.E.2d 761 (2003).

Statute shifted primary coverage from the dealer's insurer in derogation of the general rule that automobile insurance followed the car; the test-driver's private automobile insurance afforded primary coverage and the dealer-owner's automobile policy afforded excess coverage. Motors Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 251 Ga. App. 661, 555 S.E.2d 37 (2001).

Rental cars.

- Operator's insurance was primary and the owner's insurance afforded excess coverage, if any, in the case of a rental car, even though the operator's policy contained an "excess insurance" clause which stated that any liability insurance provided by the company for a vehicle not owned by the insured should be in excess of any other collectible insurance. Jones v. Wortham, 201 Ga. App. 668, 411 S.E.2d 716, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 716 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Typically, when the owner and the driver are both covered by insurance and one of the policies contains an "excess insurance" clause pertaining to nonownership coverage, the owner's policy is primary and the other policy affords the excess coverage. Jones v. Wortham, 201 Ga. App. 668, 411 S.E.2d 716, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 411 S.E.2d 716 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Coverage for non-designated health-care providers.

- Nothing in former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-1 et seq. authorized the self-insurer to condition its statutory obligation to pay no-fault benefits upon the insured's submission of claims for services that had been rendered only by certain designated health-care providers or to exclude no-fault coverage for services that had been rendered by non-designated health-care providers. Oluyole Pius Olukoya v. American Ass'n of Cab Cos., 202 Ga. App. 251, 414 S.E.2d 275 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 907, 414 S.E.2d 275 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Settlement for the limits as stated in the policy satisfies the exhaustion requirement of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, even though under the "deemer" statute the tortfeasor's policy is deemed to provide greater coverage. Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998).

When the insured settles a claim with the tortfeasor's liability insurer for the limits stated in the policy, the underinsured motorist carrier may plead and prove the availability of additional available coverage under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3, and thus have its liability reduced by the amount the plaintiff waived. Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Statutory minimum coverage requirement for an insured's out-of-state policy was not affected by the insured's alleged status as a Georgia resident. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Gagnon, 174 Ga. App. 452, 330 S.E.2d 390 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Personal injury protection coverage when policy transaction out-of-state.

- When an insured's vehicle was registered in Georgia, but the insured's policy of insurance was solicited, negotiated, issued, and delivered out-of-state, the insurer was required to provide only $5,000 minimum personal injury protection coverage as specified in subparagraph (a)(2) of former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Gagnon, 174 Ga. App. 452, 330 S.E.2d 390 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Out of state accidents involving vehicles in Georgia for over 30 days.

- Paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 extends coverage only where the insured is involved in an accident in Georgia, and not to accidents occurring out of state in vehicles which may have been in Georgia for more than 30 days. Spicer v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 67, 418 S.E.2d 422 (1992).

Coverage for damage to vehicle loaned by automobile dealer not required.

- Public policy does not require that an insurer provide primary coverage for damage to a vehicle loaned to insured by an automobile dealer when the insurance policy provides only for liability coverage and not for collision coverage. Barfield v. Allstate Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 882, 324 S.E.2d 731 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3).

Insurance clause exempting company from liability if insured avoiding arrest.

- Clause in an automobile liability policy exempting insurance company from liability if the automobile is involved in an accident occurring while an insured is attempting to avoid apprehension or arrest is void as against public policy, but only to the extent of insurance required by the compulsory insurance law at the time of the collision. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985).

Pedestrian motorist.

- O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 does not refer only to those individuals actually riding in motor vehicles at the time the accident involving a motor vehicle occurs so that the estate of an insured who had stopped to make a telephone call and was killed by a truck upon the insured's return to the insured's vehicle was properly a motorist. Green v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 206 Ga. App. 478, 426 S.E.2d 3 (1992).

Subrogation rights of no-fault insurer under former law.

- Under former no-fault statutes, the no-fault insurer of a motorist injured in an automobile accident did not waive the insurer's subrogation rights against the tortfeasor by failing to intervene in the insured's tort action. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 218 Ga. App. 400, 461 S.E.2d 574 (1995).

Secondary insurer not liable.

- Car dealer's insurance was secondary under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(d), and no underinsured motorist (UM) benefits were paid to an injured party driving a car belonging to a car dealership, after stacking the UM coverages, when the injured party's own policy's UM benefits were sufficient to cover the liability limit set by the tortfeasor's policy. Crouch v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. App. 604, 571 S.E.2d 574 (2002).

Cited in Green v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 206 Ga. App. 478, 426 S.E.2d 3 (1992); Canal Indem. Company/Strickland Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App. 69, 427 S.E.2d 66 (1993); Mathews v. Continental Cas. Co., 228 Ga. App. 666, 492 S.E.2d 535 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Automobile insurance: pleading and proof as to value, 64 A.L.R. 172.

Liability or indemnity insurance as regards accident as "accident insurance,", 77 A.L.R. 1416.

Liability insurance: insurer's assumption of, or continuation in, defense of action brought against the assured waiver, or estoppel, as regards defense of noncoverage, or other defense existing at time of accident, 81 A.L.R. 1326; 38 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Liability insurance: limitation of time within which to sue insurer, 83 A.L.R. 748.

Refusal of automobile liability or indemnity insurer to assume defense of action against insured upon ground that claim upon which action is based is not within coverage of policy, 133 A.L.R. 1516; 49 A.L.R.2d 694; 50 A.L.R.2d 458.

Liability of insurer based upon its act of withdrawal after assumption of defense, 167 A.L.R. 243.

Waiver by insurance company of right to subrogation, 16 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Right to subrogation, as against primary insurer, of liability insurer providing secondary insurance, 31 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Rights and remedies of insurer paying loss as against insured who has released or settled with third person responsible for loss, 51 A.L.R.2d 697.

Apportionment of liability between automobile liability insurers where one of the policies has an "excess insurance" clause and the other a "proportionate" or "pro rata" clause, 76 A.L.R.2d 502.

Liability insurer's rights and duties as to defense and settlement as affected by its having issued policies covering parties who have conflicting interests, 18 A.L.R.3d 482.

Subrogation rights of insurer under medical payments provision of automobile insurance policy, 19 A.L.R.3d 1054.

Validity and effect of "loan receipt" agreement between injured party and one tortfeasor, for loan repayable to extent of injured party's recovery from a cotort-feasor, 62 A.L.R.3d 1111.

When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer against third-party tortfeasor, 91 A.L.R.3d 844.

Druggist's civil liability for injuries sustained as result of negligence in incorrectly filling drug prescriptions, 3 A.L.R.4th 270.

Liability insurer's postloss conduct as waiver of, or estoppel to assert, "no-action" clause, 68 A.L.R.4th 389.

Application of automobile insurance "entitlement" exclusion to family member, 25 A.L.R.5th 60.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Cotton States Mut. Ins. v. Neese, 329 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 98 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 30, 1985 | 254 Ga. 335, 49 A.L.R. 4th 311

...other things, the policy provides and the owner has bodily injury liability insurance in at least the amount of $10,000 per person in any one accident and $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident (in 1981, the year in issue here). OCGA §§ 33-34-3, 33-34-4, 40-9-37 (a); Pearce v....
...otherwise the legislature would not have stated, "Nothing in Code Sections 33-34-4 and 33-34-5 shall be construed to prohibit the issuance of policies providing coverage more extensive than the minimum coverage required by those Code sections." OCGA § 33-34-3 (b)....
...provides that insurers shall make optional coverage available. OCGA § 33-34-5. Their statute specifically exempts excess coverage and our statute provides that nothing in §§ 33-34-4 and 33-4-5 shall be construed to prohibit excess coverage. OCGA § 33-34-3 (b)....
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Integon Indem. Corp. v. Canal Ins. Co., 353 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 55 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 24, 1987 | 256 Ga. 692

...At the time of Robinson's collision, her husband was using their Ford. In February 1984, Integon filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of no coverage under its policy in the pending suits. Canal counterclaimed asking that Integon be declared the primary insurance carrier pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3 (e)....
...egon meets minimum coverages required by the Georgia Code. Both Integon and Canal agree that if Integon's policy provides coverage for Robinson's involvement in the accident in question, then Integon is the primary liability carrier pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3 (e)....
...." (Emphasis supplied.) This language envisions policies which afford the extended coverage and polices which do not. We find that Integon's policy met the minimum coverages required by the Georgia Code. Since it did not provide coverage for the collision in question, it cannot be held to be primary coverage pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3 (e)....
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Prot. Ins. v. Johnson, 352 S.E.2d 760 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 13, 1987 | 256 Ga. 713

..."All policies of motor vehicle liability insurance issued in this state must be in accordance with the requirements of this chapter; and no insurer shall issue a policy ... that does not contain at least the minimum coverages required under this chapter." OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (1)....
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St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Nixon, 314 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 4, 1984 | 252 Ga. 469

...The law provides that statutory provisions control insurance policies and if the policy is inconsistent with insurance law the statute will prevail. Nelson v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804 (147 SE2d 424) (1966). The Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (Code Ann. § 56-3401b), clearly states that all policies and applications must meet the statutory requirements, OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (Code Ann....
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Carter v. Banks, 330 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 1985 | 254 Ga. 550

...The Court of Appeals reversed, Banks v. Carter, 173 Ga. App. 93 (325 SE2d 453) (1984), holding there had been no assignment of the claim from Banks to Nationwide and there existed no subrogation rights in Nationwide because Ga. Laws 1978, p. 2075, an amendment to what is presently OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1), abolished those rights....
...llision coverage of the policy and not under the no-fault property damage coverage. Therefore, Nationwide is entitled to subrogation. In Auto-owners Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 245 Ga. 558 (266 SE2d 175) (1980), this court held that OCGA § 33-34-3 (e), a 1976 amendment to the 1974 No-fault Act, which prescribed which policy would be primary and which would be excess in situations involving retail new and used motor vehicle dealers and their customers and others included all coverages in the insurance policies involved....
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Duncan v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 482 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 17, 1997 | 267 Ga. 646, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 883

...514. [12] See Fields, 18 F.3d at 835. [13] Compare OCGA § 34-9-11.1(b) (requiring complete compensation of injured employee before employer or employer's insurer can exercise the right of subrogation granted by OCGA § 34-9-11(b)), with former OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1), as amended by Ga....
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McGlohon v. Ogden, 308 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 9, 1983 | 251 Ga. 625

...Ins. Co. v. Five Transp. Co., 246 Ga. 447, supra at 452, involved a plaintiff with optional PIP benefits who was killed by a truck. There this court pointed out that neither Hall nor Lee *627 considered Section 5(d) of the Act as amended in 1978, OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1) (Code Ann....
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Smith v. Se. Fid. Ins., 365 S.E.2d 105 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 25, 1988 | 258 Ga. 15

..."All policies of motor vehicle liability insurance issued in this state must be in accordance with the requirements of this chapter; and no insurer shall issue a policy ... that does not contain at least the minimum coverage required under this chapter." OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (1)....
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Daniels v. Johnson, 509 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 4, 1998 | 270 Ga. 289, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 4104

...Daniels then sought additional sums from his UM carrier. The trial court granted the UM carrier's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Daniels had failed to exhaust availability coverage, a condition precedent to the UM claim, because under OCGA § 33-34-3(a)(2), the "deemer" statute, the Chrysler policy was deemed to provide $15,000 in coverage....
...I am authorized to state that Chief Justice BENHAM and Justice HUNSTEIN join in this special concurrence. NOTES [1] Daniels v. Johnson, 226 Ga.App. 789, 487 S.E.2d 504 (1997). [2] See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 267 Ga. 134, 475 S.E.2d 619 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of OCGA § 33-34-3(a)(2))....
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Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 320 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 6, 1984 | 253 Ga. 269

...-7 (a), supra. Certified question answered as aforesaid. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents. NOTES [1] Our no-fault law requires that insurers' policies provide "at least" the minimum coverages required by the no-fault law. OCGA § 33-34-3....
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Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Martin, 264 Ga. 347 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 27, 1994 | 444 S.E.2d 739, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 2214

...With the passage in 1974 of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance came a shift in the focus of insurance coverage. Compulsory insurance required that no motor vehicle registered in Georgia could operate unless the owner had minimum liability insurance. OCGA § 33-34-3 (a)....
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Smith v. Employers'fire Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 11, 1986 | 255 Ga. 596

...The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals read McGlohon, supra, as simply preventing a plaintiff from receiving a double recovery in a situation where the plaintiff's insurer is entitled to subornation. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit [1] and thus reach the following question of the proper application of OCGA § 33-34-3 *597 (d) (1): Where Smith's insurer has paid him to the limits of his policy, and he is still not fully compensated for his injuries, does he get the first shot at the tortfeasor's insurance to compensate him fully, or does his insurer rec...
...for dealing with financially responsible and financially irresponsible tortfeasors. Financially responsible means insured or self-insured. OCGA § 40-9-2. Since this case involves a financially responsible tortfeasor, we look to the portion of OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) which governs actions involving that type of tortfeasor. The original forerunner of present OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) appeared as Section 5 (d) of the Reparations Act, Ga....
...islature in the 1976 amendment. In 1978, the legislature again altered Section 5 (d), and the wording, for the purposes of financially responsible tortfeasors, reverted back almost identically to the wording found in the original Section 5 (d). OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1)....
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Se. Fid. Ins. Co. v. Chaney, 381 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 13, 1989 | 259 Ga. 474

...affirmed. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Chaney, 189 Ga. App. 625 (376 SE2d 710) (1988). We granted certiorari. 1. Owners of motor vehicles are required to obtain automobile liability insurance with statutory minimum coverage. OCGA §§ 33-34-4; 33-34-3 (a) (1)....
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Doran v. Travelers Indem. Co., 326 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 1985 | 254 Ga. 63

...an receiving workers' compensation benefits under his employer's workers' compensation policy with Travelers. On December 8, 1980, Doran presented claims to Travelers for uninsured motorist benefits and $5,000 in benefits under OCGA §§ 33-34-1 and 33-34-3 (A) (2) for basic no-fault coverage, also known as personal injury protection (PIP)....
...re to pay his claim or notify him within thirty days of the Supreme Court decision constituted a bad faith refusal to pay a claim under OCGA § 33-34-6. "In his April 1982 claim, the plaintiff also sought $45,000 additional PIP benefits under OCGA §§ 33-34-3(a) (2) and 33-34-5, pursuant to Jones v....
...hicles registered in Georgia to provide certain minimum coverages. OCGA § 33-34-4 (a). It requires insurers who issue insurance policies in Georgia to conform those policies to the requirements of the no-fault law including optional coverages. OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (1)....
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Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Binns, 313 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 14, 1984 | 252 Ga. 289

...liability .... The Authority shall contract for adequate insurance...."). When it was authorized by the 1971 amendment of the MARTA Act to act as self-insurer, MARTA was not authorized to thereby limit its liability. Further, our no-fault act, OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (1) (Code Ann....
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Bankers Ins. v. Taylor, 475 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 23, 1996 | 267 Ga. 134, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3371

...Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Alan Gantzhorn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Freedman & Sinowski, Marc H. Bardack, Atlanta, for amici curiae. FLETCHER, Presiding Justice. In this declaratory judgment action, Bankers Insurance Co. contends that O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution....
...The Baileys sued Taylor for personal injuries they suffered in the accident and made demand upon Bankers for payment under the policy. Bankers denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action. The trial court denied Bankers' motion for summary judgment and granted the Baileys' cross-motion based on O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2), which requires insurers authorized to transact business in Georgia to provide its insured with the minimum coverage required under Georgia law when the insured is involved in an accident in Georgia, even though the policy was purchased out-of-state. 1. Under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) motor vehicle insurance policies issued by insurers authorized to transact business in this state are deemed to provide the minimum coverage required under Georgia law when the insured is involved in an accident in Georgia. [1] Under the plain language of § 33-34-3(a)(2), Bankers' policy of insurance on Taylor's car is deemed to provide this minimum coverage....
...[5] In Western & Southern Life Insurance, the United States Supreme Court expressly held that "Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the States to regulate and tax the business of Insurance when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson *621 Act." [6] Furthermore, courts have recognized that laws like O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) that mandate specific benefits within insurance contracts are laws that "regulate the business of insurance." [7] Because O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) is a law regulating the business of insurance, it is shielded from Commerce Clause attack by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 2. Bankers also contends that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not remove Commerce Clause restrictions from laws that have an effect wholly outside the state. O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2), however, does not have a wholly extraterritorial effect because it becomes operative only when personal injury or property damage occurs in Georgia. Furthermore, even if this law's effect were wholly extraterritorial, the McCarran-Ferguson Act limits the viability of a challenge under the Commerce Clause. [8] 3. O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) does not unconstitutionally impair Bankers' obligations under its contract....
...Therefore, the terms of the statute are read into the contract, and the statute has no retroactive application that impairs Bankers' obligations under the policy. [10] 4. Finally, Bankers also raises an equal protection challenge under the state constitution to O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2)....
...Bankers has not, however, established that the statute treats similarly situated persons differently. All insurers doing business in this state must provide the same minimum coverage in motor vehicle liability policies. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) provides, All insurers authorized to transact or transacting insurance in this state or controlling or controlled by or under common control by or with an insurer authorized to transact or transacting insurance in this state...
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Allstate Ins. v. Bohannon, 365 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 1988 | 258 Ga. 131

...The issue in Carter hinged on the meaning of the 1978 amendment to Section 5 (d) of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act of 1974, stating that "[i]nsurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections 33-34-3 and 33-34-4 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided....
...However, where the insurer's statutory subrogation rights are extant and enforceable, such subrogation rights authorize the insurer to recover both mandatory and optional no-fault benefits. Five Transp. Co., supra; McGlohon, supra. And, prior to the 1978 Amendment to § 5 of the Act, OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1), the insurer's subrogation rights were to be exercised by intercompany agreements between insurance carriers or by binding intercompany arbitration....
...2075 undertake to govern subrogation rights for benefits paid under Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 does not govern subrogation rights for benefits paid under collision coverage. Those rights are still governed by the pre-No-Fault Act. ..." Carter v. Banks, 254 Ga. 550, 554 (330 SE2d 866) (1985). [3] Ga. Laws 1984, p. 516 (OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) (B)) removed the prohibition against subrogation relating to compensation without regard to fault for damage to the insured motor vehicle....
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Jordan v. T G & Y Stores Co., 342 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 24, 1986 | 256 Ga. 16

...rded only $36,323.09 for these claims. The legal problem in this case arises from the jury's award of only $36,323.09 for claims for which the no-fault insurer had already paid $50,000. "Because appellee's vehicle exceeded 6500 pounds unloaded, OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) applies, and the appellee moved to reduce the verdict and judgment by the $50,000 previously paid to Jordan in no-fault benefits....
...insurer; or "(2) $36,323.09, the amount set forth in the special verdict for past and present medical expenses and past and present lost wages?" (Footnote deleted.) As noted by the court in its certified question, the applicable law is found in OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) (as it existed prior to the 1984 amendment, Ga....
...The defendant contends the verdict should be reduced by the total amount of no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff by his no-fault insurer, $50,000. We first observe that whatever subrogation rights exist are determined by the statute in question, OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1)....
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Prudential Com. Ins. v. Michigan Mut. Ins., 261 Ga. 637 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 1991 | 410 S.E.2d 30

...ility.2 Prudential then filed this action in the State Court of Fulton County, and the case was removed to the Federal District Court. Prudential seeks to recover from Michigan Mutual all sums Prudential has paid to the Kimerlings, pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) (B).3 The District Court granted summary judgment for Michigan Mutual, and Prudential appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified to this Court the two questions under consideration. 1....
...Michigan Mutual also argues that any subrogation right held by Prudential is limited by OCGA § 33-34-5 to a maximum dollar amount of $50,000 per injured person. Such a reading conflicts with the plain language of our no-fault subrogation statute, OCGA § 33-34-3, and Jordan v. T G & Y Stores Co., 256 Ga. 16 (342 SE2d 665) (1986). OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) (B) reads in pertinent part: “The right of recovery and the amount of recovery shall be determined on the basis of tort law between the insurers or self-insurers involved.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (2) then provides: Nothing contained in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be deemed to increase or enlarge the bodily injury liability, *640personal injury protection, or medical payments limits of any policy of motor vehicle liability insurance in this state. Decided November 1, 1991. Edward M. Harris, Jr., Vicki M. Knott, for appellants. Mozley, Finlayson & Loggins, Sewell K. Loggins, D. Keith Calhoun, Claude P. Czaja, for appellee. As we stated in Jordan v. T G & Y Stores Co., supra, 256 Ga. at 18: . . . [Where subrogation under OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) applies] the statute, by clear implication subrogates the no-fault insurer to the rights of its insured against a third party tort-feasor to the extent of no-fault benefits paid....
...There is no need to look to other insurance law provisions, or to create an artificial limit to subrogation based upon the statutory requirement for insurers (issuing relevant policies in Georgia) to offer optional benefits and coverages under OCGA § 33-34-5. We read OCGA § 33-34-3 as establishing the right of a lawful subrogee under the statute to seek recovery from the insurer of a tort-feasor the subrogee’s legitimate payments made pursuant to the no-fault provisions of its policy with the injured, up to the aggregate of the bodily injury liability, personal injury protection, and medical payments provisions of the policy being subrogated against. Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) provides in pertinent part: Insurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections 33-34-4 and 33-34-5 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided except: (A) In those motor vehicle accidents involving two or more vehicles, at least one of which is a motor vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds unloaded; . . . The order approving the settlement was entered on May 24, 1988. OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) (B) provides in pertinent part: “The right of recovery and the amount of recovery shall be determined on the basis of tort law between the insurers or self-insurers involved.”
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Prudential Com. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 410 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1991).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 1991 | 261 Ga. 637

...ity. [2] Prudential then filed this action in the State Court of Fulton County, and the case was removed to the Federal District Court. Prudential seeks to recover from Michigan Mutual all sums Prudential has paid to the Kimerlings, pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1)(B)....
...Michigan Mutual also argues that any subrogation right held by Prudential is limited by OCGA § 33-34-5 to a maximum dollar amount of $50,000.00 per injured person. Such a reading conflicts with the plain language of our no-fault subrogation statute, OCGA § 33-34-3, and Jordan v. TG & Y Stores Co., 256 Ga. 16, 342 S.E.2d 665 (1986). OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1)(B) reads in pertinent part: "The right of recovery and the amount of recovery shall be determined on the basis of tort law between the insurers or self-insurers involved." (Emphasis supplied). OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(2) then provides: Nothing contained in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be deemed to increase or enlarge the bodily injury liability, personal injury protection, or medical payments limits of any policy of motor vehicle liability insurance in this state. As we stated in Jordan v. TG & Y Stores Co., supra, 256 Ga. at 18, 342 S.E.2d 665: ... [Where subrogation under OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1) applies] the statute, by clear implication subrogates the no-fault insurer to the rights of its insured against a third party tort-feasor to the extent of no-fault benefits paid....
...There is no need to look to other insurance law provisions, or to create an artificial limit to subrogation based upon the statutory requirement for insurers (issuing relevant policies in Georgia) to offer optional benefits and coverages under OCGA § 33-34-5. We read OCGA § 33-34-3 as establishing the right of a lawful subrogee under the statute to seek recovery from the insurer of a tort-feasor the subrogee's legitimate payments made pursuant to the no-fault provisions of its policy with the injured, up to the aggregate of the bodily injury liability, personal injury protection, and medical payments provisions of the policy being subrogated against. Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1) provides in pertinent part: Insurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections 33-34-4 and 33-34-5 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided except: (A) In those motor vehicle accidents involving two or more vehicles, at least one of which is a motor vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds unloaded; ... [2] The order approving the settlement was entered on May 24, 1988. [3] OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part: "The right of recovery and the amount of recovery shall be determined on the basis of tort law between the insurers or self-insurers involved."