Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 33-24-41 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 33-24-41 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 33-24-41

TITLE 33 INSURANCE

Section 24. Insurance Generally, 33-24-1 through 33-24-98.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

33-24-41. Payment of claims under policies - Discharge of insurer by payment generally.

Whenever the proceeds of or payments under a life or accident and sickness insurance policy or annuity contract become payable in accordance with the terms of the policy or contract or the exercise of any right or privilege under the policy or contract and the insurer makes payment of the proceeds or payments in accordance with the terms of the policy or contract or in accordance with any written assignment of the policy or contract, the person then designated in the policy or contract or by the assignment as being entitled to the proceeds or payments, if legally competent, shall be entitled to receive the proceeds or payments and to give full acquittance for the proceeds or payments and the payments shall fully discharge the insurer from all claims under the policy or contract unless, before payment is made, the insurer has received at its home office written notice by or on behalf of some other person that the other person claims to be entitled to the payment or some interest in the policy or contract.

(Code 1933, § 56-2424, enacted by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of insurance law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2005). For annual survey of insurance law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 181 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41 does not apply to vehicle insurance policies. JCS Enter., Inc. v. Vanliner Ins., 227 Ga. App. 371, 489 S.E.2d 95 (1997).

This section is not retroactive as to payments made prior to the statute's effective date, to wit, January 1, 1961. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 145 S.E.2d 63 (1965).

Loan receipt agreement between plaintiff and tortfeasor is covenant not to sue.

- Loan receipt agreement between a plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor in exchange for a forbearance to sue is an absolute payment and not a loan; as such, the agreement constitutes a covenant not to sue and not a release. American Chain & Cable Co. v. Brunson, 157 Ga. App. 833, 278 S.E.2d 719 (1981).

Applicability of

§ 13-4-81 only to parties with whom covenant is made. - While O.C.G.A. § 13-4-81 provides that a covenant never to sue is equivalent to a release, § 13-4-81 applies to the parties with whom the covenant is made and not to another tortfeasor; a covenant not to sue one tortfeasor will not bar actions against another tortfeasor. American Chain & Cable Co. v. Brunson, 157 Ga. App. 833, 278 S.E.2d 719 (1981).

Notice obligations.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41 clearly discharged the insurer from liability when an individual did not notify the insurer that the individual sought the proceeds of the insurance on the individual's father's life, the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Heveder, 274 Ga. App. 377, 618 S.E.2d 39 (2005).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 1765.

C.J.S.

- 46A C.J.S., Insurance, § 1978.

ALR.

- What rights are waived by insurer who pays money into court, 15 A.L.R. 1260.

Necessity and sufficiency of tender to avoid interest on insurance premiums, 35 A.L.R. 1252.

Right of court or insurer to require bond as condition of paying policy where there is not conclusive proof of insured's death, 61 A.L.R. 824.

Settlement with insurance company for less than face of valued policy as bar to recovery of difference where total loss shown, 109 A.L.R. 1485.

Judgment as res judicata as to whether insured is "permanently disabled" within contemplation of insurance policy, 142 A.L.R. 1170.

Right of insurer to restitution of payments made under mistake, 167 A.L.R. 470.

Liability of life insurer which pays proceeds of policy direct to beneficiary, for the portion of estate or succession tax attributable to such proceeds, 10 A.L.R.2d 657.

Rights and remedies of insurer paying loss as against insured who has released or settled with third person responsible for loss, 51 A.L.R.2d 697.

Duty of liability insurer to appeal, 69 A.L.R.2d 690.

Insured's exercise of election afforded under life insurance policy as affected by his death before complete consummation of option, 15 A.L.R.3d 1317.

Liability insurer's duty to defend action against an insured after insurer's full performance of its payment obligations under policy, 27 A.L.R.3d 1057.

Allocation of defense costs between primary and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th 107.

Credit life insurer's punitive damage liability for refusing payment, 55 A.L.R.4th 246.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Daniels v. Johnson, 509 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 4, 1998 | 270 Ga. 289, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 4104

...Johnson was covered personally by a $10,000 liability policy and her rental car was covered by a $10,000 policy from Chrysler Insurance through the rental car agency in New York. Daniels settled with Johnson's insurance providers for $10,000 each and executed releases pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...uninsured to "the difference between the available coverages under the bodily injury liability insurance ... and the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage." Furthermore, the requirement of exhaustion is seen in the legislative scheme in OCGA *43 § 33-24-41.1(a), and (d), which provide that, when multiple insurance carriers are involved, a claimant may settle with one for "the limits of [the] policy" and grant a limited release without compromising claims under any other policy of insurance....
...We conclude that a settlement for the limits as stated in the policy satisfies the exhaustion requirement, even though under the deemer statute the Chrysler policy provides $15,000 in coverage. This rule is most consistent with the purpose behind OCGA § 33-24-41.1, the statute permitting a limited release. The legislature enacted OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in 1992 to make meaningful the ability of a claimant to settle with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier while preserving his UM claim....
...s of the liability policy limits before fixing coverage under its policy. [4] Therefore, a claimant could not maintain an action against his own UM carrier if he had settled with the tortfeasor's carrier without the agreement of the UM carrier. OCGA § 33-24-41.1(c) changed this circumstance by expressly providing that UM policies cannot require permission of the UM carrier before a claimant settles with a liability carrier....
...The special concurrence would hold that any settlement for less than the policy limits satisfies the exhaustion requirement, as long as it is in good faith. Such a rule, however, would subvert the legislatively created exhaustion requirement. In enacting OCGA § 33-24-41.1, the legislature carefully preserved the exhaustion requirement by providing that a limited release under one policy will not compromise the claim under other policies when the settlement is for "the limits of such policy." [5] It is wi...
...ounsel's thought processes, and may even require discovery from the settling carrier. For these reasons we hold that if the plaintiff settles for the limits of the policy as stated in the policy and executes a limited release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1, the plaintiff may pursue its UM claim....
...Uninsured motorist statutes are, by nature, remedial and are to be broadly construed to accomplish the legislative goal. Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Ins. Co., 267 Ga. 516, 517, 480 S.E.2d 842 (1997). As the majority acknowledges, the legislature enacted OCGA § 33-24-41.1, allowing a limited release, in order to provide a meaningful mechanism whereby a claimant/insured could settle with the tortfeasor's insurer and still avail himself of his UM coverage....
...NOTES [1] Daniels v. Johnson, 226 Ga.App. 789, 487 S.E.2d 504 (1997). [2] See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 267 Ga. 134, 475 S.E.2d 619 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of OCGA § 33-34-3(a)(2)). [3] See 11 Ga.St.L.Rev. 200 (1994) (legislative history of OCGA § 33-24-41.1). [4] Id.; Jenkins & Miller, Georgia Automobile Insurance Law § 13-5 (1997). [5] OCGA § 33-24-41.1(a), (d).
Copy

Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 295 Ga. 487 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2014 | 761 S.E.2d 261

...This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 (739 SE2d 750) (2013), to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA § 33-24-41.1.1 Finding that the Court of 1 OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...3 coverage before recovering under a UM policy.” Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290 (1) (509 SE2d 41) (1998). And, that Court was also correct to note that the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the...
...by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of “a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. . . .” OCGA § 33-24-41.1(a), (b)....
...personal liability while preserving the claimant's right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor for the purpose of collecting against other available insurance coverage including underinsured motorist coverage. OCGA § 33-24-41.1(b). [Cits.] Carter, supra at 273-274. However, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCGA § 33-24-41.1 requires that there be no allocation of payments to punitive damages. It is certainly true that punitive damages cannot be recovered under UM insurance, as the public policy involved is to provide for compensatory damages only....
...123 (392 SE2d 1) (1990); 4 Bonamico v. Kisella, 290 Ga. App. 211, 213 (659 SE2d 666) (2008); Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App 219, 219-222 (2), (3) (393 SE2d 83) (1990). But that does not mean that there is a prohibition found in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 against an allocation such as that made in the release at issue....
...to such claimant or claimants” and “from all personal liability from any and all claims arising from the occurrence on which the claim is based except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims.” OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) & (2)....
...This the release did, and it is uncontroverted that the $30,000 paid represented the limits of Oliviera’s policy. Progressive argues that payment for the punitive damages cannot be considered to be “based on injuries” to Carter, or to be “claims arising from the occurrence,” under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) & (2)....
...of punitive damages from the liability carrier to the underinsured motorist carrier, contrary to the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.” Carter, supra at 274-275. However, such concern is ill-founded; the statutory scheme effectively prevents such a shifting. Under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (d) (2), “the amount paid [under a limited release] shall be admissible as provided by law as evidence of the offset against the liability of an uninsured motorist carrier and as evidence of the offset against any verdict of the tr...
Copy

Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 9, 2009 | 285 Ga. 24, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 417

...Bacon was covered by a liability insurance policy with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. In consideration of $100,000, Appellants individually and as husband and wife executed a limited release of Bacon and the liability insurer from any and all claims pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...must exhaust available liability coverage before recovering under a UM policy[,]" and that a plaintiff may pursue his UM claim if he "settles for the limits of the policy as stated in the policy and executes a limited release in accordance with OCGA § 33-24-41.1...." Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290(1), 291(2), 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998). Both of these requirements had to be fulfilled before Mr. Thompson could pursue his UM claims. He undisputedly met one requirement when he executed the limited release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1....
...ing settlement exhaust available liability coverage. See Holland v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga.App. 365, 367(2), 646 S.E.2d 477 (2007). Instead, that language confirms the nature of the document as a limited release which complies with OCGA § 33-24-41.1 and identifies UM carriers as entities which are not released....

Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins. (Ga. 2014).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 11, 2014 | 285 Ga. 24, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 417

...This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271 (739 SE2d 750) (2013), to determine if that Court properly applied the motor vehicle insurance limited liability release provision of OCGA § 33-24-41.1.1 Finding that the Court of 1 OCGA § 33-24-41.1 reads: (a) In any instance where a claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident is covered by two or more insurance carriers, one such carrier may tender, and the claimant may accept, the limits of such policy;...
... motorist insurance requires “that a party must exhaust available liability coverage before recovering under a UM policy.” Daniels v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 289, 290 (1) (509 SE2d 41) (1998). And, that Court was also correct to note that the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the...
...by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of “a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants. . . .” OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (a), (b)....
...personal liability while preserving the claimant's right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor for the purpose of collecting against other available insurance coverage including underinsured motorist coverage. OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b). [Cits.] Carter, supra at 273-274. However, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCGA § 33-24-41.1 requires that there be no allocation of payments to punitive damages. It is certainly true that punitive damages cannot be recovered under UM insurance, as the public policy involved is to provide for compensatory damages 4 only....
...Weathers, 260 Ga. 123 (392 SE2d 1) (1990); Bonamico v. Kisella, 290 Ga. App. 211, 213 (659 SE2d 666) (2008); Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App. 219, 219-222 (2), (3) (393 SE2d 83) (1990). But that does not mean that there is a prohibition found in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 against an allocation such as that made in the release at issue....
...claimants based on injuries to such claimant or claimants” and “from all personal liability from any and all claims arising from the occurrence on which the claim is based except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims.” OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) and (2)....
...limits of Oliviera’s policy. Progressive argues that payment for the punitive damages cannot be 5 considered to be “based on injuries” to Carter, or to be “claims arising from the occurrence,” under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (b) (1) and (2)....
...attach. Punitive damages may not be recovered where there is no entitlement to compensatory damages.” Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 (2) (416 SE2d 274) (1992) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, nothing in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 precludes a statement in the release that a portion of the payment be allocated to punitive damages. 6 In its decision below, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that inclusion of an...
...of punitive damages from the liability carrier to the underinsured motorist carrier, contrary to the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.” Carter, supra at 274-275. However, such concern is ill-founded; the statutory scheme effectively prevents such a shifting. Under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (d) (2), “the amount paid [under a limited release] shall be admissible as provided by law as evidence of the offset against the liability of an uninsured motorist carrier and as evidence of the offset against any verdict of the tr...