O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Statute text

As used in this chapter, the term:

(1) "Medical payments coverage" includes any coverage in which the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured and others for reasonable and necessary medical expenses and funeral expenses incurred as a result of bodily injury or death caused by a motor vehicle accident, without regard to the insured's liability for the accident. Coverage shall be available to the named insured, resident spouse, and any resident relative while occupying the covered motor vehicle, and to any other person legally occupying a covered motor vehicle. Expenses must be incurred for services rendered within three years from the date of the accident; provided, however, that nothing shall prevent an insurer from allowing a longer period of time. Any rule or regulation promulgated which expands or conflicts with this definition shall be null and void.

(2) "Motor vehicle" means a vehicle having more than three load-bearing wheels of a kind required to be registered under the laws of this state relating to motor vehicles designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads, and highways and driven by power other than muscular power. The term includes a trailer drawn by or attached to such a vehicle and also includes without limitation a low-speed vehicle.

(3) "Owner" means the natural person, corporation, firm, partnership, cooperative, association, group, trust, estate, organization, or other entity in whose name the motor vehicle has been registered. If no registration is in effect at the time of an accident involving the motor vehicle, the term means the natural person, corporation, firm, partnership, cooperative, association, group, trust, estate, organization, or other entity who holds the legal title to the motor vehicle or, in the event the motor vehicle is subject to a security agreement or lease with an option to purchase with the debtor or the lessee having the right to possession, the term means the debtor or the lessee.

(4) "Self-insurer" means any owner who has on file with the Commissioner an approved plan of self-insurance which provides for coverages, benefits, and efficient claims handling procedures substantially equivalent to those afforded by a policy of automobile liability insurance that complies with all of the requirements of this chapter.

History

(Code 1981, § 33-34-2, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 1.12; Ga. L. 1997, p. 683, § 4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 512, § 1; Ga. L. 2019, p. 386, § 111/SB 133.)

Annotations

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, deleted "of Insurance" following "Commissioner" near the beginning of paragraph (4).

Law reviews. - For article, "No-Fault Automobile Insurance In Georgia: Is Revision in Order?", see 27 Ga. St. B.J. 68 (1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2, and Ga. L. 1975, p. 1207, §§ 1, 2, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Farm tractor was "motor vehicle" based on uninsured motorist statute. - Farm tractor towing a mobile home on a county road was a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11. Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins. Co., 267 Ga. 516, 480 S.E.2d 842 (1997).

Lack of standing to pursue declaratory judgment action against rental defendants. - Trial court erred in denying the rental defendants' motion to dismiss because a declaratory judgment action was improper against the defendants as the widow had not shown standing since the widow sought declaratory judgment as to liability beyond that minimum amount and had no direct relationship with the rental defendants until (and if) the widow obtained a judgment in the underlying tort suit, thus, only a hypothetical and generalized economic interest existed. U-Haul Co. v. Rutland, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Feb. 22, 2019).

Ownership upon delivery even without compliance with recording and insurance statutes. - When a seller had delivered possession of the automobile to the buyer and the transaction was complete as between them even though compliance had not yet been made with recording and insurance statutes, the buyer was the "owner" of the automobile, and the buyer alone, and not the seller or the seller's insurer, was liable to a third party for injuries sustained in an accident while the buyer was driving the automobile. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979) (decided under former Ga. L. 1975, p. 1202, §§ 1, 2).

Plan and certificate of self-insurance serves as substantial equivalent of an insurance "policy" for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11. Unless the plan of self-insurance submitted to the commissioner of public safety rejects the minimum uninsured motorist coverage in writing, such coverage will be implied as contained in the plan. Twyman v. Robinson, 255 Ga. 711, 342 S.E.2d 313 (1986).

"Self-insured" who complies with self-insurance law is not financially irresponsible but rather is meeting the state's required minimum, and the self-insurer does not become financially irresponsible just because it chooses the state-permitted option not to insure above the minimum. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Parnham, 182 Ga. App. 823, 357 S.E.2d 139 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2).

Exclusion in a car rental agreement excluding liability coverage for violations of a use restriction pertaining to driving under the influence was invalid to the extent of the mandatory minimum liability coverage. Ryan v. Boyd, 911 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Ga. 1996).

Declaratory judgment as to whether rental company was self-insurer was improper. - In a widow's wrongful death action against rental truck companies, the widow's declaratory judgment claim under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 seeking a determination that the companies did not qualify as self-insurers under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-2(4) and 33-34-5.1 and, thus, could be liable for damages under O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3, should have been dismissed because the widow had no direct relationship with the companies, the widow had only a hypothetical and generalized economic interest, and the widow was not in a position of uncertainty. U-Haul Co. of Arizona v. Rutland, 348 Ga. App. 738, 824 S.E.2d 644 (2019).

No-fault benefits denied for homicide following vehicular abduction. - When the insured automobile was not used to murder the victim nor was the focus of the crime, but was simply used to transport the victim to another state, the use of the vehicle was too remote and attenuated to establish the required causal nexus, such that the spouse was not entitled to a survivor's no-fault benefits. USAA Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wilbur, 207 Ga. App. 57, 427 S.E.2d 49 (1993).

Cited in Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 264 Ga. 347, 444 S.E.2d 739 (1994); Hewell v. Walton County, 292 Ga. App. 510, 664 S.E.2d 875 (2008).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under Ga. L. 1974, p. 113, § 2, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Legislative intent regarding certification of self-insurers. - Manifest legislative intent, as it appears in the definition of "self-insurer" and as a whole, is for the Department of Public Safety to certify as self-insurers only those owners who undertake to provide reparations on the same terms and conditions as an insurer. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-86 (decided under Ga. L. 1974, p. 113, § 2; but see 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. 75-42).

Self-insurers deemed regulated entities. - Self-insurance funds for automobile liability are regulated entities for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30.1. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-20.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. - Motorcycle as within contract, statute, or ordinance in relation to motor cars, motor-driven cars, etc., 70 A.L.R. 1253.

Insurance against injuring property or person of third person as liability of indemnity insurance, 83 A.L.R. 677; 117 A.L.R. 239.

Trailers as affecting automobile insurance, 31 A.L.R.2d 298; 65 A.L.R.3d 804.

Meaning of "operate" or "being operated" within clause of automobile liability policy limiting its coverage, 51 A.L.R.2d 924.

Automobile insurance: when is a person "occupying" an automobile within meaning of medical payments provision, 42 A.L.R.3d 501.

What constitutes "commercial automobile" within exclusion from death or disability benefit provided by automobile policy, 66 A.L.R.3d 424.

Motorcycle as within automobile liability policy provision covering temporary or infrequent use of other automobiles, 66 A.L.R.3d 451.

Who is "named insured" within meaning of automobile insurance coverage, 91 A.L.R.3d 1280.

What constitutes "private passenger automobile" in insurance policy provisions defining risks covered or excepted, 11 A.L.R.4th 475.

Automobile insurance: what constitutes "occupying" under owned-vehicle exclusion on uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage of automobile insurance policy, 59 A.L.R.5th 191.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 125 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2022 · leading case: Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 470 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 470 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 52× “The insurer contended, and the trial court found, that this farm tractor was not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist law because the insurance code provision requiring liability insurance (OCGA § 33-34-2) designates a "motor vehicle" as being a vehicle having…”
Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 320 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 28× ““ ‘Pedestrian’ means any person not occupying a motor vehicle or a motorcycle or any other motor driven vehicle designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads, and highways or not in or upon a vehicle operated on stationary rails or tracks or not in or upon any…”
Reynolds v. Transp. Ins., 343 S.E.2d 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 38× “OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (2). [1] " `Accidental bodily injury' means bodily injury .”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Holmes, 333 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 16× “" OCGA § 33-34-2 (8) defines "occupying" for purposes of this chapter as being "in or upon a motor vehicle or engaged in the immediate act of entering into or alighting from the motor vehicle.”
Crider v. Zurich Ins., 474 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 16× “Automobile liability policies are purchased to provide coverage consistent with the statutes governing such policies, including the definition of a motor vehicle as being designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads and highways.”
Cole v. New Hampshire Ins., 373 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 15× “) OCGA § 33-34-2 as pertinent to this case defines the qualifying terms as follows: “(1) ‘Accidental bodily injury’ means bodily injury .”
Johnson v. Se. Fid. Ins., 343 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 20× “"Georgia's Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act requires and restricts payment of no-fault insurance benefits in and to those instances specified in OCGA § 33-34-7 as the terms therein used are defined in the no-fault act, OCGA § 33-34-2." Kelley v. Integon Indem.”
First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 394 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 16× “On September 30, 1988, a claim was made for the $2,500 in basic medical benefits provided by the policy; and on November 18, 1988, the appellant filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that Max's injuries were not covered because they had not arisen "out of…”
Collins v. Int'l Indem. Co., 349 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1986). · cites it 16× “OCGA § 33-34-2 (6). The statute does, however, afford protection to pedestrians, OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (3); and pedestrians are defined as any person not occupying a motor vehicle or motorcycle or any other motor driven vehicle designed primarily for operation upon the public…”
Pruitt v. Tyler, 351 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 16× “The plaintiff admitted in response to interrogatories submitted by the defendant that she had suffered no lost wages, broken bones, or scars as a result of the accident and that her medical expenses had totalled only $99; and it was on the basis of these admissions that the *175…”
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Buyce, 328 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 16× “The Supreme Court expressly articulated three reasons for its conclusion: (1) the term "insured" as defined by OCGA § 33-34-2 (5) includes the spouse of the named insured; (2) survivor's benefits constitute a portion of the optional PIP benefits at issue, and the spouse or…”
Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 480 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 12× “” In the present case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals construed the term “motor vehicle” in the uninsured motorist statute to include only those motor vehicles that meet the definition of “motor vehicle” in OCGA § 33-34-2 (1), which Code section sets forth the type of…”
Show all 125 citing cases →
— 33-34-2(1) — 4 cases
Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 470 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “The insurer contended, and the trial court found, that this farm tractor was not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist law because the insurance code provision requiring liability insurance (OCGA § 33-34-2) designates a "motor vehicle" as being a vehicle having…”
Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 480 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1997). “” In the present case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals construed the term “motor vehicle” in the uninsured motorist statute to include only those motor vehicles that meet the definition of “motor vehicle” in OCGA § 33-34-2 (1), which Code section sets forth the type of…”
Crider v. Zurich Ins., 474 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “Automobile liability policies are purchased to provide coverage consistent with the statutes governing such policies, including the definition of a motor vehicle as being designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads and highways.”
Janice H. Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 747 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1984).
— 33-34-2(11) — 1 case
Janice H. Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 747 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1984).
— 33-34-2(12) — 1 case
Ryan v. Boyd, 911 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Ga. 1996).
— 33-34-2(2) — 1 case
Russell v. Dairyland Ins., 580 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
— 33-34-2(5) — 3 cases
Ryan v. Boyd, 911 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Ga. 1996).
S. Guar. Ins. v. Berry, 560 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
Janice H. Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 747 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1984).
— 33-34-2(6) — 1 case
Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 470 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “The insurer contended, and the trial court found, that this farm tractor was not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist law because the insurance code provision requiring liability insurance (OCGA § 33-34-2) designates a "motor vehicle" as being a vehicle having…”
— 33-34-2(8) — 2 cases
Rose v. Allstate Ins. Co., 782 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1989).
Janice H. Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 747 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1984).
— 33-34-2(9) — 1 case
Janice H. Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 747 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1984).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.