O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5 (2019)

Vehicle not to be licensed until proof of insurance furnished

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Statute text

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 2003, p. 261, § 7, effective May 28, 2003.

Annotations

Editor's notes. - This Code section was based on Code 1981, § 33-34-5, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 1.12; Ga. L. 2003, p. 140, § 33.

For present comparable provisions, see O.C.G.A. § 40-2-26.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 203 cases, 1982–2005 · leading case: Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 300 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. 1983).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 300 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 68× “Estes, Don C. Keenan, Lamar W. Sizemore, Jr., William S.”
Mullins v. First Gen. Ins., 322 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 72× “His claim for additional PIP benefits was rejected, and he filed suit to collect the optional benefits, claiming that he was not given the requisite opportunity under OCGA § 33-34-5 as it existed before its amendment in 1982, Ga.”
Tolison v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 317 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 68× “They present two questions: first, whether an application for motor vehicle insurance coverage is in substantial compliance with the requirements of OCGA § 33-34-5 (b), see St. Paul Fire &c.”
Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Drexler, 326 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 84× “718 ( 320 SE2d 854 ) (1984), in order to consider the following questions: 1) whether the November 1974 "Offer to Purchase Additional or Optional Coverages" which was completed and returned by the named insured satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 33-34-5 (c)? and 2) whether the…”
Stafford v. Allstate Ins., 311 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 50× “By interpreting Allstate's evidence of compliance with the mailing procedure outlined in subsection (c) as creating an irrebuttable presumption of receipt of the documents by the Staffords (and hence their rejection of the optional coverages), we slam the door of recovery on…”
Int'l Indem. Co. v. Enfinger, 317 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 48× “" OCGA § 33-34-5 (c) (Code Ann. § 56- 3404b (c)).”
Nalley v. Select Ins., 313 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 52× “First, I must disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding. Our "no-fault" act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq.”
Enfinger v. Int'l Indem. Co., 317 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 28× “On August 26, 1980, appellant Enfinger applied for automobile liability insurance with appellee International Indemnity Company (IIC). It is undisputed that the policy application form executed by Enfinger did not comply with the signature requirements of OCGA § 33-34-5 (b).”
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Nixon, 314 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 22× “113, § 4), where the application contains separate spaces for the insured to indicate his acceptance or rejection of the optional coverages, but the insured's signature appears only at the bottom of the page of the insurance application offering the optional coverages.”
Cotton States Mut. Ins. v. Neese, 329 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 16× “I believe that the public policy of the State of Georgia is to encourage drivers to be financially responsible by requiring certain minimum liability insurance coverage, OCGA § 33-34-4, and to further encourage drivers to protect themselves and others by obtaining more than the…”
Int'l Indem. Co. v. Coachman, 351 S.E.2d 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 32× “Rambo owned a vehicle which was insured by appellant-defendant International Indemnity Company.”
Carter v. Banks, 330 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 16× “Banks rejected the optional property damage provided by OCGA § 33-34-5 (a) (3), and instead chose the traditional collision coverage offered by Nationwide.”
Show all 203 citing cases →
— 33-34-5(a) — 8 cases
Nalley v. Select Ins., 313 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 1983). “First, I must disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding. Our "no-fault" act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq.”
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nina Bowen Horne, 794 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1986).
Sentry Indem. Co. v. Frances Peoples, 800 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1986).
Penny M. Tatum, F/k/a Penny M. Thompson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1986).
Phillips v. South Carolina Ins., 607 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Ga. 1985).
— 33-34-5(a)(1) — 2 cases
Gerlinde G. Ryan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 276 (11th Cir. 1991).
Prudential Com. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 410 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1991).
— 33-34-5(a)(3) — 1 case
Bohannon v. Allstate Ins., 118 F.R.D. 151 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
— 33-34-5(a)(l) — 1 case
Bohannon v. Allstate Ins., 118 F.R.D. 151 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
— 33-34-5(a)(l)(B) — 1 case
Whitlock v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 579 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
— 33-34-5(b) — 16 cases
Nalley v. Select Ins., 313 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 1983). “First, I must disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding. Our "no-fault" act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq.”
Stafford v. Allstate Ins., 311 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1984). “By interpreting Allstate's evidence of compliance with the mailing procedure outlined in subsection (c) as creating an irrebuttable presumption of receipt of the documents by the Staffords (and hence their rejection of the optional coverages), we slam the door of recovery on…”
S. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Freeman, 474 S.E.2d 195 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Cotton States Mut. Ins. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins., 652 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.O. Anderson, Jr., 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1984).
— 33-34-5(c) — 8 cases
Stafford v. Allstate Ins., 311 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1984). “By interpreting Allstate's evidence of compliance with the mailing procedure outlined in subsection (c) as creating an irrebuttable presumption of receipt of the documents by the Staffords (and hence their rejection of the optional coverages), we slam the door of recovery on…”
Nalley v. Select Ins., 313 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 1983). “First, I must disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding. Our "no-fault" act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq.”
Penny M. Tatum, F/k/a Penny M. Thompson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1986).
Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 601 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
Doster v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 310 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. 1984).
— 33-34-5(d) — 1 case
Farmer v. Cont'l Ins., 657 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.