CopyCited 98 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 30, 1985 | 254 Ga. 335, 49 A.L.R. 4th 311
...I believe that the public policy of the State of Georgia is to encourage drivers to be financially responsible by requiring certain minimum liability insurance coverage, OCGA §
33-34-4, and to further encourage drivers to protect themselves and others by obtaining more than the mere statutory minimum amounts, OCGA §
33-34-5....
...te to encourage financially responsible drivers to protect themselves and others. The addition of the "no-fault" law was not designed only to protect the victims, otherwise the legislature would not have stated, "Nothing in Code Sections
33-34-4 and
33-34-5 shall be construed to prohibit the issuance of policies providing coverage more extensive than the minimum coverage required by those Code sections." OCGA §
33-34-3 (b). The legislative intent of promoting greater financial responsibility is even clearer when we look at the wording of OCGA §
33-34-5 which states in part, "Each insurer shall also make available on an optional basis the following coverage: (1) An aggregate limit of benefits payable without regard to fault up to $50,000 per person." Insurers have a statutory obligation t...
...Our statute is not similar to the one in Arizona or Mississippi. Our statute encourages additional coverage. Where their statutes provide that additional coverage may be granted, our statute provides that insurers shall make optional coverage available. OCGA §
33-34-5....
...Not only has the court concerned itself with an exclusion it found against public policy, it has found that the insured and the victim will only be allowed to rely on the lowest statutory minimum, OCGA §
33-34-4, rather than the optional coverage which was required to be offered, OCGA §
33-34-5....
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 1985 | 254 Ga. 550
...J., Clarke, Weltner, Bell, JJ., and Judge William F. Grant concur. Smith, J., not participating. *555 HILL, Chief Justice, concurring. I concur in the opinion and judgment of the court. I would prefer that the application for insurance required by OCGA §
33-34-5 (b) be contained in the record, so that we would know positively that Ms. Banks rejected the optional property damage provided by OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (3), and instead chose the traditional collision coverage offered by Nationwide....
...Maximum payment is $10 for each occurrence." The declared deductible was $100. The policy provided "basic personal injury protection," the minimum required coverages of OCGA §
33-34-4. It also contained $5,000 "additional personal injury protection," the optional coverages of OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (1) and (2) but not the coverage for damage to the insured motor vehicle of OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (3)....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 19, 1992 | 261 Ga. 869, 45 Fulton County D. Rep. 17
...funeral and medical expenses first be paid out of the funeral and medical benefits available under no-fault. Moreover, State Farm contends that Acheson, supra, does not control this case, because it involved optional no-fault benefits and under OCGA §
33-34-5(a)(1) insureds have the power to specify how optional no-fault benefits shall be paid....
...of required no-fault benefits. See Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Davis, supra,
145 Ga. App. at 151,
243 S.E.2d 531. Finally, we agree with State Farm that Acheson, supra, is inapposite, as it dealt with the allocation of optional no-fault benefits, and §
33-34-5(a)(1) grants insureds the power to allocate those benefits....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 25, 1989 | 259 Ga. 257
...Darroch & Obenshain, Robert M. Darroch, Emory A. Wilkerson, C. David Vaughan, for appellant. Didio & Broome, Stefano A. Didio, Robert W. Broome, for appellee. CLARKE, Presiding Justice. This case presents our first opportunity to construe the 1982 amendment to OCGA §
33-34-5 providing the means by which an applicant for liability insurance may reject additional coverage and the requirements of what must be contained in the application for such insurance....
...*258 A detailed and accurate statement of the facts and description of the application involved in this case appear in the Court of Appeals' opinion and will not be repeated here. The statutory provision in question is an amendment to the original no-fault insurance act and appears as OCGA §
33-34-5 (b)....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 27, 1988 | 258 Ga. 236
...His car was hit by another car causing it to move; the bodies changed positions, and decedent was pronounced dead at the scene. Decedent's minor daughter, Shamone Collins, made a claim for survivor's benefits pursuant to OCGA §
33-34-4 (b) and OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (2) under the passerby's automobile insurance policy issued by International Indemnity....
...r at the death of the insured. Cannon v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
240 Ga. 479 (241 SE2d 238) (1978). To this end, the no-fault statute gives survivor's benefits to the spouse and dependent children of the deceased. OCGA §
33-34-4 (b) and OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (2)....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 11, 1986 | 255 Ga. 596
...e of the original Section 5 (d) in Blaylock, supra. In readopting the language that we construed in Blaylock, supra, the legislature adopted our construction, as well, since there were no other relevant, material changes made in the language of OCGA §
33-34-5 (d) (1)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 3, 1988 | 258 Ga. 332
...ection without regard to fault as the result of any one accident shall not exceed the sum of $5,000.00 per each individual covered as an insured person or such greater amount of coverage as has been purchased on an optional basis as provided in Code Section
33-34-5, regardless of the number of insurers providing such benefits or of the number of policies providing such coverage."
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 4, 1985 | 254 Ga. 647
...Scoggins, Ivy, Goodman & Weiss, Charles H. Ivy, David J. Dempsey, for appellee. CLARKE, Justice. This case involves the effect of a written rejection of no-fault benefits made by an insured under a policy in existence prior to the effective date of Ga. L. 1975, p. 3, former OCGA §
33-34-5 (c)....
...123 (325 SE2d 777) (1984). We reverse. Frederick Ansley purchased automobile insurance from United Services Automobile Association (USAA) in 1972 and this policy was an "existing" policy on March 1, 1975, when the Georgia no-fault law went into effect. OCGA §
33-34-5....
...Ansley responded to the first mailing of December 1974, by checking the box indicating a desire to reject all optional coverages. In early 1975 USAA sent a second mailing to its insureds with existing policies in compliance with newly enacted OCGA §
33-34-5 (c), *648 Ga....
...onse need be made to the second mailing. This case is controlled solely by the sufficiency of and response to the first mailing as opposed to our holding in Wiard where no response was made by the insured to the first mailing. Subsection (c) of OCGA §
33-34-5 as it then read applied to insured's under existing policies "who have not previously responded to an offer to accept or reject the optional coverages required to be offered by this chapter." In Wiard subsection (c) applied because the insured had not previously responded....
...We held that a mailing under subsection (c) required the insurer to send written information clearly stating the optional coverage and a means for the insured to accept or reject these coverages in writing. Wiard. When there has been a response to a mailing made prior to the 1975 adoption of OCGA §
33-34-5 (c), and there is no further written response by the insured, the response to the first mailing will control....
...upra, we held the offer in Drexler was sufficient because it met the minimum standard set forth in Wiard. The Wiard standard has also been used by the Court of Appeals in examining offers made to existing policyholders prior to the enactment of OCGA §
33-34-5 (c)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 10, 1985 | 329 S.E.2d 493
...242 (4) (160 SE 228) (1931).
The Hawkins’ policy with Federated first was issued on March 14, 1973, and thereafter was renewed without interruption of coverage at intervals of six months. In February 1975, Federated sent a notice to its policyholders of record. The question under former OCGA §
33-34-5 (c) is whether there was a “proper mailing of an adequate document.” Stafford v....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 1988 | 258 Ga. 131
...Plainly, under these circumstances, the mere choice of a deductible benefit does not provide *134 the answer desired by the insurance companies. The only applications presented to these plaintiffs, and upon which insurance coverage was issued, were forms tendered by the insurers as required by OCGA §
33-34-5, relating to "optional coverages," and included, along with coverage for property damage, increased personal injury protection....
...Based on the application by which each chose deductible coverage, each was to be compensated in the event of a collision "without regard to fault for damage to the insured motor vehicle not to exceed the actual cash value of the vehicle at the time of the loss." OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (3)....
...time of the loss, including up to $10.00 per day with a maximum of $300.00 for the loss of use of the motor vehicle, provided that benefits payable under this paragraph may be subject to deductibles at the written election of the policyholder." OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (3) (1978) (as amended November 1, 1982)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 24, 1986 | 256 Ga. 16
...cable law is found in OCGA §
33-34-3 (d) (1) (as it existed prior to the 1984 amendment, Ga. L. 1984, p. 516). [1] It provides as follows: "Insurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections
33-34-4 and
33-34-5 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided except in those motor vehicle accidents involving two or more vehicles, at least one of which is a motor vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds unloaded....
...resent, and future medical expenses and lost wages. However, he has previously been paid $50,000 for past and present medical expenses and lost wages by his no-fault liability insurer under the optional PIP coverage in his insurance policy. See OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (1) (A), (B)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 5, 1997 | 268 Ga. 60, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 1511
...ory requirements for offering optional coverage. The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed. [1] We granted the writ of certiorari to determine whether her application satisfied the requirements of OCGA §
33-34-5(b) concerning optional coverages. Because Freeman signed an application with boldface type that complied with the statute and this court's decision in Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Goddard, [2] we reverse. OCGA §
33-34-5(b), which was in effect from 1982 until its repeal in 1991, provided: Each initial application for a new policy of motor vehicle liability insurance sold in this state after November 1, 1982, shall contain a statement in boldface type sign...
...Freeman appears as an exhibit at the end of the Court of Appeals' opinion. Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Freeman,
222 Ga.App. 308, 312,
474 S.E.2d 195 (1996). I agree with the majority that the application does contain the requisite statement regarding optional PIP coverage as required by OCGA §
33-34-5(b) and that Ms....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 27, 1985 | 254 Ga. 633
...Thereafter, the matter was transferred to this court in accordance with Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. The issue is whether medical payment benefits are excess over $5,000 in benefits provided by OCGA §
33-34-4 (a) (2) or excess over additional benefits available under OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (1)....
...Hall was later injured in an automobile accident and suffered $10,249.94 in medical damages. Hall made a claim for the full amount under PIP. He asserted that he was entitled not only to the minimum $5,000 PIP coverage, but also up to $45,000 additional coverage available to him through OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (1) and pursuant to the Court of Appeals' ruling in Jones v....
...d out already by State Farm. State Farm, on the other hand, contends that the intent of the statute is that medical payment benefits need not be paid until all available benefits under the chapter are exhausted, including those paid pursuant to OCGA §
33-34-5 (a) (1)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 2, 1985 | 254 Ga. 331
...[1] In that *333 case, we held that suits "arising under Georgia's Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, OCGA §
33-34-1 et seq., involve two separate claims," with one claim being to establish the insured's right to optional benefits provided by OCGA §
33-34-5....
...The six-year statute of limitation provided by OCGA §
9-3-24 applies to this threshold claim for optional benefits. Bryant, supra at 330. Moreover, as we held in Bryant, "the statute of limitation in claims for optional benefits begins to run on the date of the accident, and . . . the claim for optional benefits under OCGA §
33-34-5 must be filed within six years thereof." Bryant, supra at 331. In the present case, the Hawkinses' suit for optional benefits under OCGA §
33-34-5 is barred, since it was filed more than six years after the date of the accident....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 1991 | 410 S.E.2d 30
...igan Mutual and its insureds in an action in which Prudential chose not to intervene?
2. Whether Prudential, if it is entitled to recover on its statutory right of subrogation against Michigan Mutual and its insureds, is limited by Georgia Code Ann. §
33-34-5 (a) (1) (1990) to a recovery upon that right of $50,000.00 in personal injury protection benefits paid to Charlotte Kimerling?
*638We answer question one in the affirmative, and question two in the negative.
Prudential insured the Kimerlings with a policy issued in New Jersey....
...Thus, Georgia case law dictates that, where a case is settled prior to trial, the insurer’s right of subrogation is not barred by its failure to intervene.
2. Michigan Mutual also argues that any subrogation right held by Prudential is limited by OCGA §
33-34-5 to a maximum dollar amount of $50,000 per injured person.
Such a reading conflicts with the plain language of our no-fault subrogation statute, OCGA §
33-34-3, and Jordan v....
...There is no need to look to other insurance law provisions, or to create an artificial limit to subrogation based upon the statutory requirement for insurers (issuing relevant policies in Georgia) to offer optional benefits and coverages under OCGA §
33-34-5....
...cy being subrogated against.
Certified questions answered.
All the Justices concur.
OCGA §
33-34-3 (d) (1) provides in pertinent part:
Insurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections
33-34-4 and
33-34-5 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided except:
(A) In those motor vehicle accidents involving two or more vehicles, at least one of which is a motor vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds unloaded; ....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 23, 1985 | 255 Ga. 71
...SMITH, Justice, dissenting. 1. This court held, in the ubiquitous Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co.,
250 Ga. 709 (300 SE2d 673) (1983) that an insurance policy lacking an affirmative written rejection by the insured of optional PIP coverage violated OCGA §
33-34-5. We then determined that the insured in case of such a violation was entitled to recover $50,000 in PIP benefits in certain situations upon payment of the proper premium. Flewellen defined a violation of OCGA §
33-34-5, and it determined the consequences of such a violation. [1] The legislature, in response to the line of cases leading up to Flewellen, amended OCGA §
33-34-5 in 1982....
...Co.,
253 Ga. 486, 487 (322 SE2d 265) (1984), held that the legislature, in amending the statute, intended "to bar claims for optional PIP benefits by insureds who held policies existing as of November 1, 1982 which were not in compliance with former OCGA §
33-34-5." Although we found in Mullins, supra, that the legislature's method accomplished its purpose, we did not determine whether the legislature, by altering the definition of a violation of OCGA §
33-34-5 or by altering the remedy for such a violation, effectuated its purpose in a constitutional manner. See Mullins, supra at 488-489, (Hill, C. J., concurring specially). In amending OCGA §
33-34-5, the legislature first changed the requirement mandated under subsection (b) that the insured sign a rejection of optional PIP coverage to a requirement that the insured sign an acknowledgment that he had received an explanation of the various options available....
...The amendment then, in subsection (c), declared all insurance policies in existence to contain such a signed acknowledgment, even though the acknowledgments had never been required and had never existed. The legislature altered the definition of a violation of OCGA §
33-34-5, rather than the consequences of such *73 a violation, then it rewrote the facts in existence to fit the new definition and to preclude the finding of any violations of OCGA §
33-34-5 that had occurred prior to its amendment....
...ge as of December 1, 1985." Under our form of government based upon the separation of powers, the legislature establishes the law of the land and the courts apply the law to the facts as they find them. Const. of Ga., Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III. OCGA §
33-34-5 (c), thus, constitutes a legislative usurpation of a judicial function, and should not bind the courts of this state. 2. I would follow Dixson v. Travelers Indem., supra, as well. I dissent. NOTES [1] I would hold, in addition, that Flewellen provided a vested right, not merely a remedy, as a consequence of a violation of OCGA §
33-34-5 coupled with a personal injury to the insured....
...[2] Actually, if the change in law made in subsection (b) were to be applied retroactively without the change in fact made in subsection (c), all policies issued before November 1, 1982, not just those without proper rejections, would be in violation of OCGA §
33-34-5....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 2, 1985 | 328 S.E.2d 362
...added to your policy as of March 1, 1975, and you will be billed for an additional premium.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Payne did not reject the coverage, nor did she respond in any way to the notice.
In January 1975, the General Assembly amended OCGA §
33-34-5 to add subsection (c), which provides: “On and after March 1, 1975, all named insureds in existing motor vehicle liability policies who have not previously responded to an offer to accept or reject the optional coverages required to be o...
...“The original no-fault Act required insureds to utilize forms for application for insurance which contained separate spaces for the insured to indicate acceptance or rejection of each of the optional coverages provided for in the Act. Ga. Laws 1974, p. 113 at p. 118. (OCGA §
33-34-5 (b) (Code Ann....
...No application would be submitted for these policies because they would already be in existence. Yet, the question of optional coverages needed to be addressed for existing as well as new policies. The 1975 amendment dealt with this question. The pertinent part of the amendment is codified at OCGA §
33-34-5 (c).” Wiard v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 20, 1985 | 336 S.E.2d 748
...ouse was deceased at the time of the policy change. We hold that an application for a policy by one spouse following the death of the other spouse constitutes an application for a new policy, notwithstanding an identical policy number. As such, OCGA §
33-34-5 (b) applied to the policy, and Georgia Farm should have presented the appellant with the opportunity to choose additional PIP coverage....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 1991 | 261 Ga. 637
...igan Mutual and its insureds in an action in which Prudential chose not to intervene? 2. Whether Prudential, if it is entitled to recover on its statutory right of subrogation against Michigan Mutual and its insureds, is limited by Georgia Code Ann. §
33-34-5(a)(1) (1990) to a recovery upon that right of $50,000.00 in personal injury protection benefits paid to Charlotte Kimerling? We answer question one in the affirmative, and question two in the negative....
...Thus, Georgia case law dictates that, where a case is settled prior to trial, the insurer's right of subrogation is not barred by its failure to intervene. 2. Michigan Mutual also argues that any subrogation right held by Prudential is limited by OCGA §
33-34-5 to a maximum dollar amount of $50,000.00 per injured person....
...There is no need to look to other insurance law provisions, or to create an artificial limit to subrogation based upon the statutory requirement for insurers (issuing relevant policies in Georgia) to offer optional benefits and coverages under OCGA §
33-34-5....
...being subrogated against. Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA §
33-34-3(d)(1) provides in pertinent part: Insurers and self-insurers providing benefits without regard to fault described in Code Sections
33-34-4 and
33-34-5 shall not be subrogated to the rights of the person for whom benefits are provided except: (A) In those motor vehicle accidents involving two or more vehicles, at least one of which is a motor vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds unloaded; ......